因明入正理論疏 3.51

3.51

此上同喻，舉同異為喻亦得，隨所立故。違一有四，論自說二；違二有六，論自說一；違三有四，今略敘一；違四有一，今亦示法。自餘十種，皆如理思。此四亦有他、自、共比各三，亦說有違他、自、共，四相違因，合三十六。論文所說皆共比違共，向三四因皆自比違自，他比違他等皆應准知。諸自共比，違共及自皆為過失，違他非過。他比違他及共為失，違自非過，義同前說。此但說全，應詳一分。既許一因，通違四種，故知此四非必相違。

Regarding the above concordant example, adducing the universal-particular as an example is also permissible, according to what is established. Contradicting one has four, the treatise itself stating two; contradicting two has six, the treatise itself stating one; contradicting three has four, now briefly described as one; contradicting four has one, its method also now shown. The remaining ten should all be considered according to principle. These four also have three each of parānumāna, svānumāna, and ubhayānumāna; they are also said to contradict others, oneself, or both: the four contradictory reasons total thirty-six. What is stated in the treatise text is universally ubhayānumāna contradicting ubhaya; the three and four reasons mentioned above are all svānumāna contradicting oneself; parānumāna contradicting others and so forth should all be understood accordingly. For all svānumāna and ubhayānumāna, contradicting both and oneself are faults, while contradicting the other is not a fault. For parānumāna, contradicting the other and both are faults, while contradicting oneself is not a fault, the meaning being the same as explained before. This only discusses the complete [contradiction]; one should examine the partial (ekadeśa) as well. Since it is accepted that one reason broadly contradicts four types, it is known that these four are not necessarily mutually exclusive.