因明入正理論疏 3.6

3.6

此宗說法略有二種：一自性、二差別。此有三重：一者局通，對法等言所成立自性者，謂我自性、法自性，若有、若無，所成立故，各別性故。差別者，謂我差別、法差別。若一切遍、若非一切遍，若常、若無常，若有色、若無色，如是等無量差別，隨其所應，空等遍有，色等非遍。前局後通，故二差別。二者先後，於總聚中言先陳者名為自性，言後說者名為差別，以後所陳分別前故。《佛地論》云：「彼因明論自相、共相與此有異，彼說諸法各別，局附自性，名為自相；貫通他上，如縷貫花，名為共相。」故依於此，聲等局體名為自性，無常貫他名為差別，得名不定。若立五蘊一切無我，五蘊名為自相，我、無我等名為差別。若說我是思，思為差別，我為自性，是故不定。以理推之，此雖即前，然教少異，義亦別故，分為二門。三者言許，言中所陳前局及後通俱名自性，故法、有法皆有自性。自意所許別義，所可成立，名為差別。故法、有法皆有差別，非取一切，義如前說。今說有因，令此四種宗之所立返成相違，故名法自相相違因等。

The Dharma stated in this thesis (pratijñā) is briefly of two kinds: first, own-nature (svabhāva); second, particular property (viśeṣa). This has three levels: First, limited versus pervasive. As stated in texts such as the Abhidharma, the "own-nature to be established" refers to the own-nature of self and the own-nature of dharmas, whether existent or nonexistent, because they are what is to be established, owing to their respective individual natures. The "particular property" refers to the particular properties of self and particular properties of dharmas: whether all-pervasive or not all-pervasive, whether permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya), whether having form (rūpa) or lacking form, and so on—boundless particular properties like these. According to their respective applications, space (ākāśa) and the like are all-pervasively existent, whereas form and the like are not pervasive. The former is limited and the latter is pervasive; hence the two are differentiated. Second, prior versus subsequent. Within a composite aggregate, that which is stated first is called "own-nature", and that which is stated later is called "particular property", because what is stated later qualifies that which came before. The Buddhabhūmi[-sūtra]-śāstra states: "The individual characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) and common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) in that hetuvidyā treatise differ from those here. That [treatise] says that the respective distinct properties of phenomena, being limited to and adhering to their own-nature, are called svalakṣaṇa; while that which runs through other [phenomena], like a thread stringing flowers, is called sāmānyalakṣaṇa." Therefore, relying on this, the limited substance of sound and the like is called own-nature, and impermanence, which runs through others, is called particular property, although their designations are not fixed. If one establishes that "the five aggregates (skandha) are all non-self," the five aggregates are called svalakṣaṇa, while self, non-self, and so forth are called particular properties. If one says that "the self is cogitation (cetanā)," cogitation is the particular property, and the self is the own-nature. Therefore it is not fixed. Deducting this logically, although this is identical with the former, yet the teaching is slightly different and the meaning also distinct; hence it is divided into two approaches. Third, stated versus intended. In what is stated in words, both the preceding limited [subject] and the subsequent pervasive [predicate] are called own-nature; thus both the property (dharma) and the subject (dharmin) have own-nature. The distinct meaning intended by one's own mind, which can be established, is called particular property; thus both dharma and dharmin have particular properties, though it does not take all [meanings], the sense being as explained above. Now it is said that there are reasons (hetu) which cause these four kinds of thesis-propositions to turn out contradictory; hence they are named "the reason contradictory to the own-nature of the property (dharma-svabhāva-viparīta-sādhana)", and so forth.