因明入正理論疏 3.6

3.6

The Dharma stated in this thesis (pratijñā) is briefly of two kinds: first, own-nature (svabhāva); second, particular property (viśeṣa). This has three levels: First, limited versus pervasive. As stated in texts such as the Abhidharma, the "own-nature to be established" refers to the own-nature of self and the own-nature of dharmas, whether existent or nonexistent, because they are what is to be established, owing to their respective individual natures. The "particular property" refers to the particular properties of self and particular properties of dharmas: whether all-pervasive or not all-pervasive, whether permanent (nitya) or impermanent (anitya), whether having form (rūpa) or lacking form, and so on—boundless particular properties like these. According to their respective applications, space (ākāśa) and the like are all-pervasively existent, whereas form and the like are not pervasive. The former is limited and the latter is pervasive; hence the two are differentiated. Second, prior versus subsequent. Within a composite aggregate, that which is stated first is called "own-nature", and that which is stated later is called "particular property", because what is stated later qualifies that which came before. The Buddhabhūmi[-sūtra]-śāstra states: "The individual characteristic (svalakṣaṇa) and common characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) in that hetuvidyā treatise differ from those here. That [treatise] says that the respective distinct properties of phenomena, being limited to and adhering to their own-nature, are called svalakṣaṇa; while that which runs through other [phenomena], like a thread stringing flowers, is called sāmānyalakṣaṇa." Therefore, relying on this, the limited substance of sound and the like is called own-nature, and impermanence, which runs through others, is called particular property, although their designations are not fixed. If one establishes that "the five aggregates (skandha) are all non-self," the five aggregates are called svalakṣaṇa, while self, non-self, and so forth are called particular properties. If one says that "the self is cogitation (cetanā)," cogitation is the particular property, and the self is the own-nature. Therefore it is not fixed. Deducting this logically, although this is identical with the former, yet the teaching is slightly different and the meaning also distinct; hence it is divided into two approaches. Third, stated versus intended. In what is stated in words, both the preceding limited [subject] and the subsequent pervasive [predicate] are called own-nature; thus both the property (dharma) and the subject (dharmin) have own-nature. The distinct meaning intended by one's own mind, which can be established, is called particular property; thus both dharma and dharmin have particular properties, though it does not take all [meanings], the sense being as explained above. Now it is said that there are reasons (hetu) which cause these four kinds of thesis-propositions to turn out contradictory; hence they are named "the reason contradictory to the own-nature of the property (dharma-svabhāva-viparīta-sādhana)", and so forth.