因明入正理論疏 2.76

2.76

Furthermore, the thesis relies on both and has already stated 'commonly recognized,' while the reason says 'accepted by oneself'—these do not correspond. Moreover, the reason would then have the fault of being unestablished for one party (anyatarāsiddha), because the Mahāyāna does not accept that what he accepts for himself as not subsumed under eye-consciousness applies to mutually accepted form. Furthermore, the positive example (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta) would also have the fault of having the probandum unestablished (sādhyāsiddha), because for the Mahāyāna the eye-faculty is not definitely separate from eye-consciousness: since the faculty is the cause and consciousness is the effect, they are not definitely identical nor definitely separate. How much more so given that the wisdom that accomplishes activities universally takes the eye-faculty as its object, as a remote objective support (dūra-ālambanapratyaya), which has the property of being definitely separate from the eye-consciousness that cognizes it! Furthermore, when the proponent says 'accepted by oneself,' it relies on an inference for both to exclude the other's contradiction of the specification of the subject. When the opponent says 'accepted by oneself,' it indicates that relying on an inference for oneself it is not subsumed under eye-consciousness—how could these correspond? Moreover, in that inference, the two elements—thesis and example—both rely on an inference for both, whereas only the reason relies on oneself, so they are entirely at odds with each other. Therefore, although subtle phrasing may be raised, it cannot serve as a guiding compass. If one can scrutinize the previous text with clear discernment, it should suffice to show the ultimate truth.