因明入正理論疏 2.75

2.75

However, there was Dharma Master Sun-gyeong of Silla, whose fame shook Tang and Tibet, whose learning embraced both the Great and Small Vehicles, whose practice venerated Kāśyapa—always adhering in practice to the dhūtas—and whose mind was devoted to Vakkula, constantly instilling the admonition of few desires. Having amassed his art in the Western Xia, he transmitted the light to the Eastern Barbarians; his name and path grew daily renewed, and monks and laity alike held him in veneration. Although there was no lack of 'dragons and elephants' there, he was celebrated across the seas as peerless in his time. He constructed a decisive contradiction against this inference, and in the Qianfeng era (666–668 CE), he sent a message requesting the Master to explain it: 'Ultimately, commonly recognized form is definitely separate from eye-consciousness, because of being subsumed under the first three accepted by oneself and not subsumed under eye-consciousness, just like the eye-faculty.' At that time, the explanation given was: 'In the method of hetuvidyā, in an inference for oneself (svānumāna), the thesis, reason, and example must all rely on one's own [perspective]; the same applies to inferences for another (parānumāna) and inferences for both (ubhayānumāna). When establishing [an argument] based on oneself, another, or both, the opponent's counter must also be likewise; only then is it called good hetuvidyā, free of divergence and error.' Earlier, it was said that the mere-consciousness [argument] relied on an inference for both, but now you establish [a counter-argument] relying on oneself; in that case, all inferences would be subject to such contradictions. For instance, when a Buddhist disciple, debating a proponent of the production of sound (Śabdakāryavādin), establishes that sound is impermanent because it is produced, like a pot, the Śabdakāryavādin might say: 'Sound is permanent, because it is audible, like the sound-nature (śabdatva) accepted by myself'—which would be a decisive contradiction against the previous inference. Since that is invalid, one cannot counter an inference for both with an inference relying on oneself.