因明入正理論疏 3.13

3.13

In this single fallacious reason, the reason still uses the old one, but the example is altered from what was previously established; in the latter three reasons, both reason and example are the old ones. Because these four are reasons, the reason must remain the old one, whereas the example may be altered to a similar one at will. Were it not so, there would certainly be no case where the own-nature of the property could combine with any one of the rest to form a reason contradicting two, since it is accepted that the first alters the example, while the latter three do not alter it. Furthermore, the fourth and sixth among the nine reasons are named contradictory reasons, requiring non-existence in similar instances and presence in or both [presence and absence in] dissimilar instances. If according to what is established, in the latter three contradictions, looking directly at the proponent's reason, it exists in the similar instances; how then could it again be objected to as being contradictory? The Nyāyamukha merely says: 'If a factor can establish the opposite of what is to be established, it is a contradictory fault, namely called a fallacious reason.' It does not say that the similar example also still uses the old one. The presentation of the method in this treatise—the first one altering the example and the latter three keeping the old one—is intended to let learners know that the reason is decisive and not that the example had the previous fault. Although the latter three reasons are established when viewed from the proponent's standpoint, they turn out to be contradictory: when investigated one by one, all are likewise only absent from similar instances and present in dissimilar instances, thereby becoming contradictory, as will be understood below.