因明義斷 1.35

1.35

有人云：有唯犯他共非自俱句，云如小乘師，對大乘云：極成之聲非是識變聲，所知性故。以色等為共同品，無共異品。以菩薩不善色聲，為自同品，無自異品者。其義云何？答：此亦不然。經部許夢聞聲、有部獄卒叫，俱共異品，何得云無？若云此等聲是極成攝，立非識變，有部可爾；若經部師，即違自宗。以薩婆多云獄卒等雖非有情，由惡業感，四大所造，為有情相，能為逼害，非識變故。若云但對經部，且辨因過，非無宗過者。又亦不得，若如所立無正量過，皆犯相違決定過故。又復宗因辨過之中，無將有法為法出過者。又理如前，若云如薩婆多對大乘等云，心心所法定有自種，許所知故，如餘有為法。此無自共同品，唯有他同品。以真無為為異品，因遍轉故，為他共不定。

Someone says: 'There is an alternative that violates only the other's sāmānya and not one's own ubhaya: as when a Hīnayāna master says to a Mahāyāna master: "Prasiddha sound is not sound transformed from consciousness, because of being cognizable." Taking form and the like as the common sapakṣa, there is no common vipakṣa. Taking the bodhisattva's unwholesome form and sound as one's own sapakṣa, there is no one's own vipakṣa.' What is the meaning of this? Answer: This too is not so. The Sautrāntika accepts sound heard in dreams, and the Sarvāstivādin accepts the cries of the hell wardens; both are common vipakṣa; how can one say there are none? If one says these sounds are subsumed under prasiddha and posits them as not transformed from consciousness, this may be so for the Sarvāstivādin, but for the Sautrāntika master it would contradict his own school. For the Sarvāstivādin says that although the hell wardens and the like are not sentient beings, they are induced by evil karma, created by the four great elements, take the form of sentient beings, and can inflict torment; they are not transformations of consciousness. If one says that this is only against the Sautrāntika, and only analyzes the fallacy of the hetu, not that there is no fallacy in the pratijñā—this too is inadmissible; if as formulated it lacks the fallacy of correct pramāṇa, all would incur the fallacy of viruddhāvyabhicārin. Moreover, in distinguishing fallacies of the pratijñā and hetu, no one points out a fallacy by treating the dharmin as the dharma. Furthermore, the reasoning is as before: if one says, as when a Sarvāstivādin says to the Mahāyāna and others: 'Citta and caitta dharmas definitely have their own seeds, because of being accepted as cognizable, like other conditioned dharmas,' this has no sapakṣa in common with oneself, but only the other's sapakṣa. Taking the true unconditioned as the vipakṣa, because the hetu occurs pervasively [therein], it is an anaikāntika of the other's sāmānya.