因明義斷 1.22

1.22

Someone says: 'Supposing Vasubandhu took the substance of the pot as the example, there is no contradiction with teaching or reason; what need is there for this defense? If one refutes it by being seen to be burned and the like, that is naturally a semblance of a refutation, and the principle is not my fault. How is this known? Now, simply because the pot possesses the meaning of product-hood, it definitely possesses impermanence, and one takes the pot as an example. Because product-hood is the meaning of impermanence, although it has being seen to be burned, product-hood is not the reason; how could this be an objection?' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also is not so. If one takes the substance of the pot as the example, and because the pot possesses the meaning of product-hood, therefore it possesses impermanence, then one should say 'manifests the pot's property of definite presence'; how could one say 'manifests the property of definite presence in the sapakṣa of the reason'? Because the product-hood of the pot and the product-hood of sound are sapakṣa, and because in that pot product-hood is accompanied by impermanence, it is therefore called sapakṣa. How could the four elements of the pot's substance be called the sapakṣa of product-hood?