因明義斷 1.23

1.23

Someone objects, saying: “If one says that an example illustrates a subject, and the subject must resemble the example, one does not know whether the entities of the illustrating [example] and the illustrated dharma are identical or distinct. If one says they are identical, since their entities would be one and already commonly known to both parties, why would it await establishment by a reason? If one says they are distinct, then having made clear that dharmas of distinct entities possess distinct common characteristics and possess the sense of the reason, one adduces them as an example; how could you make a parallel objection demanding that all aspects of the dharma’s entity be entirely the same?” How is its meaning to be taken? Answer: This meaning is incorrect. If one takes the entity of the jar as the example, is this identical with or distinct from the pratijñā of sound? If you say they are identical, it is subject to the previous objection and has many other faults besides. If you say they are distinct, how can it be called a similar dharma (sādharmya)? If you say that sound has the quality of being produced, and the jar also has the quality of being produced, and therefore they are called similar dharmas, this is not so. Why is this? You ought to say: “It shows that a jar definitely has impermanence”; why would one need to say: “It shows that what is similar to the reason definitely has existence”? The reason is the quality of being produced present upon the jar; how could the entity of the jar be called the property of being produced? If so, the entity of sound would have to be the entity of being produced. If it were like this, then taking the dharmin, sound, and calling it the reason, would turn out to make a part of the meaning of the pratijñā into the reason, incurring the fault that there is no distinction between pratijñā and reason. Many other questions and objections can be known by parity of reasoning regarding their merits and faults, so I will not elaborate them in detail. However, having taken the jar as the example and considering it to have exceptional capacity, I shall now briefly raise three objections against that [view]. The first says: Ancient masters accepted the principle that a jar can be seen to burn, which causes their own accepted sound to be seen to burn. Dignāga formulated an objection in accordance with this: Is sound seen to burn? Or is it not seen to burn? If one accepts it oneself, it is a siddhasādhana. If one does not accept it oneself, then in now objecting to the other, how is it not a contradiction of oneself? [Answer:] This is not so. Because the other party took the entity of the jar as the entity of the similar example, Dignāga formulated the objection based on the other party’s position, saying: “The sound accepted by you should be observable burning, just like a jar and so forth.” It is like the objection against the Vaiśeṣikas: “Your earth should not possess resistance and be perceived by the tactile faculty, because it is accepted to be seen by the eye, just like visible form and so forth.” Would one fail to accept oneself that earth is perceived by the tactile faculty when formulating the objection? Therefore, when objecting based on the other, there is no fault of one's own, making it clear that it is not accepted by oneself. The second says: Therefore, the Nyāyamukha, in explaining the example, states: “By speaking in this way, one is able to show that [the reason] definitely exists in the sapakṣa and is completely absent from the vipakṣa, not spoken erroneously.” Since one does not take the jar, this would be a mere repetition of the preceding reason; how could it be able to reveal the reason? As when one says: “Sound is impermanent, because of being produced; whatever is produced is impermanent, like what is produced and impermanent, etc.” How could this constitute a sādhana? [Answer:] This is not so. The previous “produced” and “impermanent” only distinguished the pratijñā and the reason. The subsequent mentioning of “whatever is produced” comprehensively encompasses both the pratijñā and the example. Impermanence is also like this; it is not merely a repetition, but is precisely the upanaya; therefore, it is certain that what is produced and impermanent is the entity of the example. If, as was stated before, one took the jar as the entity of the example, then one should point directly to the jar; why would one need to repeat: “Whatever is produced through effort is impermanent, just like a jar and so forth”? Furthermore, if one took the entity of the jar as the example to establish that sound is impermanent and so forth, why does [the treatise] say: “It is said that where the reason is, the pratijñā follows; where the pratijñā is not, the reason does not exist,” instead of saying: “It is said that where the jar is, the reason follows; where the jar is not, the reason does not exist”? These two are termed udāharaṇa; the others are all jāti of this. It also says: “One should prove its permanence through non-production, or establish being produced through impermanence.” This shows the correct statement: one should establish impermanence through being produced, and through permanence be separated from being produced; it does not say to prove impermanence through a jar. Therefore, the genuine entity of the example is what is produced and impermanent, and the substrate [of the example] is mentioned in order to reveal it. If it were not so, then by mentioning the jar one would already know that it definitely possesses being produced. When presenting the example, one would only say “like a jar”; why would one need to repeat both the pratijñā and reason, saying: “Whatever is produced is impermanent, just like a jar and so forth”? Why would one need such troublesome repetition? Furthermore, if the jar were the entity of the example, then setting up a separate dharma outside the reason as the example would not correspond at all to the meaning of that reason. Up to [where it says]: “Because of the nature of being produced, the similar dharmas of that class do not express the meaning of the sādhaka and sādhya.” This intention is because the sādhaka reason and the sādhya meaning of the pratijñā are not taken as the example. Moreover, if the reason is the nature of being produced, and the entity of the example is precisely the jar, then because the jar has being produced, it is impermanent; it is not that what is produced and impermanent serves as the sapakṣa. Then only the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) would be called the reason, and the entity of the jar would not be the reason. Although the reason and the pratijñā are present upon the entity of the jar, it would ultimately be a great fault. Therefore the Nyāyamukha states: “If only the property of the subject were the nature of the reason, then that which is anaikāntika should also become a reason.” How could having both kinds of examples—those possessing the sādhya and sādhaka, and the vipakṣa dharma—incur this fault? According to this passage of the treatise, therefore, one does not take the entity of the jar and so forth as the genuine example. The third says: Dignāga’s intention was that because outsiders established reasons devoid of meaning, their conceptual characteristics were distinct with respect to sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Because the meanings were distinct, they could not be properly stated in harmonious combination. In order to reject their meaning, he stated that the example reveals the reason, and that there is no separate entity of the example. [Answer:] This is also not so. Following what is accepted in this intention: if for a reason with meaning one established an example outside the reason, one would then take the jar and so forth. If so, how could the example be a part of the reason? The reason is being produced, whereas a jar is four sense-data. That would then contradict the Nyāyamukha. That treatise says: “If so, the words of the example should not be a distinct member.” It answers: “Although in reality it is so, yet these words of the reason are only for revealing the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva), not for revealing the existence or non-existence in the sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Therefore, one establishes the similar and dissimilar to reveal the latter two pakṣas.” The words of the reason reveal the first characteristic, namely, the being produced of sound. The similar reveals the second, and therefore it is the being produced of the jar. If, by the similar revealing the second, one were to take the entity of the jar, then when the reason reveals the first characteristic, one should take sound. Since in expressing the first characteristic, one takes being produced upon sound; when expressing the second characteristic, one takes being produced in the jar. Therefore, the lower text says: “Hence, it is determined that the three characteristics are only for revealing the reason.” By this principle, although all members can serve as reasons to reveal the sādhya, nevertheless only one member is provisionally stated as the reason; therefore, the second member is clearly also being produced. One cannot object by saying: “Then the third member, stated as the dissimilar example, should also be being produced.” The third is an exclusionary expression (apoha/vyatireka), so it does not serve as a parallel. Furthermore, the third characteristic is pervasive non-existence in the vipakṣa. Presenting non-existence in the vipakṣa is precisely the reason itself. Therefore, mentioning the jar and so forth is merely the substrate of the example (udāharaṇāśraya). If one forms this understanding, it can be called a profound understanding. When others mistakenly call something profound, it is not genuinely profound. Other improper views may be known by analogy with this. Therefore, among the three explanations of the entity of the example, the third accords with the ancient and exhibits no contradiction in text or meaning. The first two both contradict it; one should reflect and examine them carefully, so there is no need to expound them further.