因明義斷 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

1.1

Composed by the bhikṣu Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou.

In examining the treatises on hetuvidyā: they weigh the eight Piṭakas and set the plumbline for the four Vedas; they are the standard for the ninety-six paths and the rutted track for the twenty-eight masters. Their doctrinal focus resides in establishment and refutation; their way permeates self and other. Truly they are the jade pearl of the great night, the dragon-lantern of the long darkness. Therefore, whoever brings forth their profound depths is a compass that plants the correct; whoever holds fast to their vast guidelines truly pursues the vanquished in overturning the heterodox. For this reason, when the Dharma King first arose, he initially opened the hidden barrier; when the wise generals succeeded him, they reopened the profound treasury. Asaṅga erected the eight members to set the mystical zenith, just like the eight pillars bearing up Heaven; Vasubandhu presented the five members to manifest the deep mysteries, like the five peaks anchoring the Earth. Furthermore, Dignāga came forth in his generation as an eminent figure, raising the three establishments to resemble the three luminaries; Śaṅkarasvāmin emerged in response to the times, unfolding the two awakenings to rival the two lights. This may be called driving the imperial carriage to the jewel mountain, or setting forth the royal chariot from the decaying mansion. Therefore, those who employ it are called heroes of wisdom, and those who expound it are marked as champions of discourse. Thus, those who expounded it have all brought forth divine lamps that dispel darkness, and those who commented on it have each brandished swords of wisdom that sever the heterodox. Hence, as soon as speech is uttered, establishment and refutation are set forth; upon opening a chapter, the correct and the heterodox are first distinguished, dispersing abundantly within the eight extremities and shining brilliantly throughout the six directions. Although I, Zhao, am not clever, I dare to admire their lofty tracks. Therefore, I have ventured to mirror and clarify right and wrong and deliberate upon the gains and losses. How could this merely be to contradict the former sages out of stubbornness? My aim is to establish their fundamental school. I hope that when future observers chance to open this, they may fortunately know my intention.

1.3

Someone explained sādhana by saying: "If one sets up the three members to cause another to understand, it is therefore called sādhana. If one looks from the perspective that the hetu and udāharaṇa are already accepted beforehand while the pratijñā member is not yet conceded, then in order to establish what is not yet believed, one must rely on the sādhaka. Since the hetu and udāharaṇa are the sādhaka, that which proves must necessarily have a sādhya; thus, the pratijñā is taken as the sādhya, and the hetu and udāharaṇa as the sādhana." What is the meaning of this? Answer: If one looks solely toward the opponent, the pratijñā is not conceded by the other, and it must be established by the hetu and udāharaṇa. As for being within the sādhya, this may be so for an ubhayānumāna, but how could it be so for an inference for the other or for oneself? How could disbelief arise for oneself concerning the pratijñā member? Moreover, at the time previously stated to be within the sādhana, how could the pratijñā have already been conceded by the other party? If the other has already conceded it, then presenting it is just a siddhasādhana; if the other does not concede it, it is perpetually within the sādhya. Why was it previously said that the pratijñā is within the sādhana? If it is said that, previously looking toward generating knowledge and understanding in the other, the pratijñā resides within the sādhana, whereas because it is established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, it is within the sādhya, this too is not so. Both the Yogācārabhūmi and the Abhidharmasamuccaya state: "The sādhya is twofold, namely svabhāva and viśeṣa. The sādhana is eightfold, namely pratijñā, hetu, and so forth." The Nyāyamukha also states: "By means of the pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa, explaining to another a meaning not yet understood is called sādhana." It does not say that the other's knowledge is within the sādhya. Why is it now said that looking toward the other, the pratijñā is itself a sādhana? Furthermore, since the pratijñā is not conceded by the other, how can it be called a sādhana? Therefore, the Nyāyamukha states: "Only commonly conceded, definitive words are called sādhana. The pratijñā is not commonly conceded, and therefore, looking toward the other, it is not called a sādhana." When it is called a sādhana, it is the words of the pratijñā looking toward the meant object that are called a sādhana. As for being a sādhya, although the words of the pratijñā have been spoken, the meaning is not yet clear and decisive; relying on the hetu and udāharaṇa for establishment, the verbal meaning only then becomes clear, and therefore it is called a sādhya. If looking toward the opponent, the pratijñā is called the sādhya, because the other does not concede it and it is now being established. Although the fundamental establishment of a thesis is to generate understanding in the other, it is not called a sādhana with respect to the other's knowledge. However, when this treatise states, "When such multiple words as the previously explained pratijñā and so forth awaken another, they are called sādhana," this is stated in terms of combining cause and effect. Because the pratijñā is established and rendered clear and decisive through the hetu and udāharaṇa, the other's knowledge is able to arise. If they cannot establish that sādhya and cause it to be clear and decisive, the other's knowledge will not arise. Therefore, the anumāna is the cause, and the other's knowledge is the effect. The sādhana and sādhya are free from flaws and complete because they can serve as the cause. For this reason the Nyāyamukha states: "Now this is based solely on the jñāpakahetu." How could the pratijñā generating another's knowledge be called a jñāpakahetu? Furthermore, it states: "Explaining to another a meaning not yet understood is called a sādhana. As for stating that the other's knowledge is the sādhya, there has never been such a scriptural authority." As for reconciling the differences between the modern and ancient sādhana and sādhya, it is as stated in the basic commentary.

1.4

Someone says: "However, it has been traditionally transmitted from old that all interpret it thus: before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, eight were stated to be sādhana, while the two—svabhāva and viśeṣa—were stated to be sādhya. And then they cite the previous commentary, presenting a challenge based on vyākaraṇa, and the commentary explains: 'The hetu has three aspects; the one hetu and two udāharaṇas are all called multiple words. From this it is definitively known that the pratijñā is the sādhya. Before Vasubandhu, it was shown that all disputes did not exceed two kinds, svabhāva and viśeṣa, and therefore these are the sādhya, while the pratijñā is the sādhana, because it establishes these two. After Dignāga, because these two have not yet qualified each other and formed an inseparable relation, they are not the matter in dispute.' The intention here is: The former virtuous ones determined definitively without exception that after Dignāga the pratijñā is the sādhya, and before him the pratijñā was the sādhana, not allowing mutual interchange. Therefore it is said that now relying on my own interpretation..." up to "...the ancient masters also said that the pratijñā is the sādhya, which is established by extensive scriptural authority and reasoning. Dignāga's pratijñā can also establish many points of reasoning and scriptural authority. What is the meaning of this?" Answer: This merely expands upon what was explained before; why say it is only one's own new understanding? Therefore the basic commentary states: After Dignāga there are briefly three explanations. The first says that the meant object of the words of the pratijñā is the sādhya. Therefore the fifteenth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: "There are two kinds of objects to be established: first, svabhāva; second, viśeṣa. There are eight kinds of factors that establish. The words expressing the pratijñā, as well as the words and meanings of the hetu and so forth, are all called sādhana." The words of the pratijñā, because they are established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, are although also a sādhya, that is explained subsequently. Why is the pratijñā established first? It is to display first the thesis meaning of one's own preference; therefore it is also a sādhya, but not definitively a sādhya, because it can establish the meaning. Just as with the hetu and udāharaṇa, in relation to the sādhya they are only called sādhana. The meant object of the pratijñā is definitively and exclusively the sādhya, solely called the object to be established. This fully explains that the pratijñā pertains to both that which establishes and that which is established; how can one say it was not spoken of before? The second says: The aggregate collection of svabhāva and viśeṣa in both teaching and reasoning is all the sādhya; the treatise calls both "meaning." A component part within the aggregate, whether words or meaning, svabhāva or viśeṣa, as presented to the opponent, is all called the pratijñā, which is immediately called a sādhana. Although this, relative to the pratijñā, is also a sādhya, because it can establish the aggregate, it obtains the name sādhana. Therefore, that Dignāga and others call the pratijñā a sādhya does not conflict with the reasoning of the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth, because the Yogācārabhūmi and others do not say that the pratijñā is definitively and exclusively a sādhana. This also applies to both; how is it not clearly stated? The third says: The combined referent of svabhāva and viśeṣa is called the sādhya. The combination of the pratijñā that depends on it is called a sādhana. Because the aggregate establishes the particulars, it is not the case that this aggregate pratijñā is definitively and exclusively a sādhana. When presented in combination to an opponent, because it is established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, it is also a sādhya. Because it is not definitively a sādhya, it obtains the name sādhana. Dignāga merely uses the commonly conceded hetu and udāharaṇa to establish what the other has not conceded. What the other has not conceded is solely the combined pratijñā; the pratijñā is the sādhya. Svabhāva and viśeṣa are merely the basis of the pratijñā, not the primary sādhya, but the instruments of the sādhya. Because the perspectives of meaning differ, they do not conflict. If it were not so, did Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu not understand hetuvidyā, when they spoke of that which is to be established as the sādhana (this too is clearly explained)? This gathers the essentials and raises the grand guidelines, being fully consistent without conflict; why labor redundantly? The different meanings presented reciprocally across the treatises do not conflict with one another. If one says that Dignāga's text and meaning are entirely identical to the old masters, did Vasubandhu not understand hetuvidyā, that one allows them to diverge? Furthermore, when Dignāga establishes the pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa, he says that they are all the same as the ancient masters' sādhana. Why then are members such as pratyakṣa and anumāna allowed to be eliminated and selected out? Moreover, as within the eight members of the Yogācārabhūmi, unfolding the udāharaṇa has no upanaya or nigamana members; among the eight sādhanas in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, combining the udāharaṇa adds the upanaya and nigamana. If it is said that upanaya and nigamana are just sādharmya and vaidharmya, why are the names not equivalent? The Tarkaśāstra also has the five members of upanaya and nigamana. Why is it distinctively and uniquely conceded that Dignāga refutes the five sādhanas and states the word "only," but one does not allow refuting the eight members, asserting that there are sādhanas outside the three? If it is said that the Tarkaśāstra is not the true principle, this statement is not yet truthful discourse. If they are also conceded to understand hetuvidyā, why are their expansions and restrictions unequal? Furthermore, as when the ancient masters established pramāṇas, they added sacred teaching to make three; whereas Dignāga, for the portal of self-awakening, held only two kinds among pramāṇas. Therefore, one knows that across the various treatises, expanding and contracting, close and distant, are not uniform; their adoptions and rejections take different paths, each relying on a distinct principle. The reconciliation and explanation among them is completely discerned in the basic commentary. Consequently, inquiring more broadly by means of reasoning and scriptural authority would simply be an empty exercise.

1.5

Someone says: "If the one hetu and two udāharaṇas constitute the 'multiple words' named sādhana, then any deficiency among them is named a fault of the sādhana. For instance, lacking a vaidharmyodāharaṇa should be included as a fault. If one says it is a fault, this contradicts the Karatalaratna, for in that text lacking a vaidharmyodāharaṇa is not a fault." What is the meaning of this? Answer: This too is not so. Who said that the anumāna of that treatise is faultless? The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: "Some, relying on the Mahāyāna principle of emptiness that eliminates characteristics and depending on a pseudo-inference, negate this consciousness and all phenomena." If one says that it speaks of other inferences and not the Karatalaratna, one should produce truthful words. Furthermore, in this inference, does it not negate all phenomena? Moreover, the Nyāyamukha states: "Must one possess both udāharaṇa statements before accomplishing a sādhana, or, as with the hetu, may one state just either one?" The treatise itself answers: "If based on the correct reasoning, one should state both completely. Through their completeness, the sādhya is demonstrated..." up to "...If someone has already established one portion regarding this, then stating either portion also accomplishes a sādhana." Judging by the intent of that treatise, if either of the two udāharaṇas is understood, not presenting [the other] is not a fault; but if both are falsely understood and one awaits being spoken to before awakening, it is necessary to state both completely. Therefore it states: "If based on the correct reasoning, one should state both completely; if one does not state them, know clearly that it is not correct." Furthermore, this treatise states: "Moreover, the first sādhana has the nature of the fault of deficiency." If it is said that the udāharaṇa is general and lacking one does not constitute a deficiency, then the pratijñā should also be general and lacking one would not constitute a deficiency. Another explanation says: Who said that the Karatalaratna lacks a vaidharmyodāharaṇa? A vaidharmyodāharaṇa is fundamentally meant to prevent the hetu from overextending. Where there is no substratum, the hetu does not overextend; where the correct is absent and there is neither pratijñā nor hetu, that itself is the vaidharmyodāharaṇa. Therefore the Nyāyamukha, in explaining the two udāharaṇas, states: "The former is an exclusionary expression; the latter solely puts a stop to overextension..." up to "...Thereby, even though facing [an opponent] who does not establish real space or the like, one is able to demonstrate that where the pratijñā is absent, the meaning of the hetu being absent is established." If when there is no different substratum a vaidharmyodāharaṇa cannot be established, what would be the use of these words? If that is so, since it is complete in members, why is it called a pseudo-inference? Answer: It incurs other faults, as detailed in the separate commentary.

1.6

Someone asks: Since Dignāga diverged from the ancient teachings, why is there no text in his treatises refuting them? How is this matter to be understood? Answer: This too is not so. Dignāga clarified the ancient teachings; there was no need to refute them—he merely took a different meaning, and therefore did not refute them. Just as Vasubandhu spoke of five sādhana and yet did not fault what was formerly stated, although Dignāga had three parts that are sādhaka, why would he need to fault the ancient teachings? Even if one were to speak of his refuting ancient masters of hetuvidyā, he faulted others who were incorrect, not the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the like. Yet as for some claiming that he faulted the *Yogācārabhūmi* and so forth, that is an error of other people, not the fault of the commentator cited earlier. If one says that the three parts refer to the three [members] beginning with the pratijñā: since it is conceded that for Dignāga the pratijñā is also sādhya, how could there be only three among the sādhana? If one says, "He spoke of three parts on the basis that the pratijñā is included in the sādhana"—if the pratijñā were in the sādhya, then there should be only two parts. If so, why was the word "only" fruitlessly posited? Two would also be able [to serve as sādhana]. If one says, "When the pratijñā is in the sādhya, the udāharaṇa is then expanded into three"—from this we know that when he spoke of "three parts", he meant merely the one hetu and the two udāharaṇa. Furthermore, for the ancient masters the pratijñā was a sādhana, and Dignāga, following the ancients, did not contradict them in his words; therefore, when speaking of sādhana in the *Nyāyamukha* and other texts, he consistently spoke of "pratijñā and so forth"—the wording is the same, but the meaning is different. It is the master of translation who was able to know that Dignāga conceded that the pratijñā can be a sādhaka; this was also understood by previous virtuous masters. It was merely for the sake of the intention in composing the treatise at present, which directly clarifies that the pratijñā falls within the sādhya, that he explained the phrasing which made the pratijñā a sādhana—this has also been explained fully in the commentary. Others, not having thoroughly grasped this, adhere to the claim that all [teachings] are the same, failing to realize that the author's original intention had a distinction. Since the commentator himself entered the inner chamber and personally received instructions, how much more so when the greater and lesser works on hetuvidyā state it explicitly! Thus the verse of the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Among these, taking only what is followed according to one's own intention as that which is to be established is called the pratijñā." It does not say that taking a sādhana is called the pratijñā; therefore, in the commentary [to the verse], it says: "Therefore, these multiple statements are called sādhana in the *Vādavidhi* and other texts." This precisely shows that he conformed to the ancients. The primary commentary then states: The words "among these" have the meaning of selection and exclusion. It means "among the pratijñā and so forth"; hence it is called "among these". The word "only" has the meaning of delimitation and exclusion. It delimits and excludes the sādhana, stating that it is the sādhya. This explicitly clarifies that if the present pratijñā were also a sādhana, why would "only" be necessary? Furthermore, it says: "'Wishing it to be the sādhya' means not wishing it to have the nature of being a sādhaka." Furthermore, it says: "If so, since one takes cognition as the jñāpakahetu, these words would lose their meaning of being a sādhaka. This too is not so, because they cause the other to recall what is originally prasiddha." In this treatise as well, there is no direct explanation of the pratijñā being a sādhana. Since it states that "only these three parts are called sādhana", we know it means the one hetu and two udāharaṇa. Because when the pratijñā is posited, cognition has not yet arisen in the other party, and one must wait for the hetu and udāharaṇa before the other will understand, [and] inferential cognition arises by relying upon the trairūpya. Therefore this treatise says: "'Anumāna' means observing an object by relying on multiple characteristics," down to: "With that as hetu, correct cognition arises with regard to the inferred object." The *Nyāyamukha* says: "Cognition means the former cognition; the subsequent cognition arises from the sādhaka-hetu as stated, and it cognizes that object—it is not said to arise from that sādhaka-pratijñā. Furthermore, the pratijñā is not mutually accepted; when it is posited, cognition does not arise in the other party; only when the hetu and udāharaṇa are mutually established and adduce proof does that cognition arise." Therefore the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Only words that are mutually accepted and definitive are called sādhana." Again, the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Moreover, in anumāna one observes only this principle: if at the locus of what is to be inferred, this mark definitely pervades other sapakṣa, one recalls that it definitely exists; where that is absent, one recalls that it is completely absent. Therefore, from this, definitive understanding arises." Hence we know that what is to be inferred is precisely the sādhya. That from which this understanding arises is precisely the trairūpya. It also says: "Therefore, determining the three characteristics is solely for the purpose of clarifying the hetu. By this principle, although all members can serve as hetu to make the sādhya clear, nevertheless only one member is provisionally called the hetu." Therefore, the phrase "only three" definitely designates the hetu and udāharaṇa. If one says that Dignāga definitively judged the pratijñā to belong to the sādhaka, why is there no explicit statement in his commentary? Merely seeing the passages where he introduces and concludes by conforming to the ancients, one then definitively judges it to be a sādhana—this is like a boat traveling with the current: the locations differ, but the boat is the same. Clinging to this to definitively judge it a sādhaka may be called seeing the boat and clinging to the former waters. In the past one heard of notching the boat to search for the sword; this is precisely what it means.

1.7

Someone, directly interpreting the text of the treatise explaining sādhana, says: According to the ancient explanation, prior to Vasubandhu, mentioning the pratijñā and so forth subsumed the hetu and udāharaṇa, and the *Yogācārabhūmi* collectively called them sādhana because there were multiple statements. After Dignāga, one only takes the hetu and udāharaṇa and does not take the pratijñā; one takes the hetu and udāharaṇa subsumed by "and so forth". Down to saying: Since the eastward transmission of the Buddhist teachings, all have adopted this explanation. Yet based on reason and authoritative texts, in principle it is not so. How is this meaning to be understood? Answer: This too is not so. This merely takes the original one-sided claim that Dignāga held the pratijñā to be exclusively in the sādhya and not in the sādhana; the reconciliations of the ancients cited are as before. It is merely based on the intention of Dignāga's treatise at present, which exclusively speaks of the hetu and udāharaṇa as sādhana. The extensive presentation of similarities and differences, reason and authoritative texts, is as before. This would merely be repeating it; being superfluous, it will not be stated again.

1.8

Someone asks: When positing an anumāna to refute an opponent, all three—pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa—are refutations (dūṣaṇa). Positing an anumāna is to state the correct principle; why single out the pratijñā alone for exclusion? How is this meaning to be understood? Answer: This is also not parallel. Just as in refuting an opponent there are two kinds of refutation—pointing out doṣa and positing an anumāna—could it be that in sādhana one also makes two kinds of proof: positing an anumāna and pointing out doṣa? Furthermore, when refuting an opponent by pointing out doṣa, any single member constitutes a dūṣaṇa; could it be that in positing an anumāna, any single member constitutes a sādhana? Furthermore, positing an anumāna clarifies that the pratijñā applies to both sādhana and sādhya; could it be that in positing an anumāna to refute, the pratijñā applies to both dūṣaṇa and dūṣya? Moreover, who says that dūṣaṇa also applies to the pratijñā? Because the hetu and udāharaṇa are definitive, they are able to refute the other. The pratijñā is not accepted by the other; how could it constitute a dūṣaṇa? Therefore the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Only words that are mutually accepted and definitive are called sādhana or called dūṣaṇa; words that are mutually unestablished or doubtful are not, because they still await establishment." Furthermore, among the varieties of doṣa, there is what is called a semblance of a dūṣaṇa (dūṣaṇābhāsa). When positing an anumāna, these are doṣa of the hetu and udāharaṇa. Flipping this to real dūṣaṇa, it is therefore only the hetu and udāharaṇa that establish the pratijñā. Although it is to refute the other, without a hetu the other's pratijñā is not refuted; therefore it is only the hetu and udāharaṇa. Fascicle fourteen of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* points out the errors in their pratijñā, which resembles refutation by pointing out doṣa, not positing an anumāna. Therefore there is no positing of an anumāna to refute an opponent that also designates the pratijñā as a dūṣaṇa. Based on this, it is still parallel to the sādhana: it should only be the hetu and udāharaṇa.

1.9

Someone says: An ancient person explained that ancient masters of hetuvidyā took either sound to be the pratijñā, or impermanence to be the pratijñā, or the combination to be the pratijñā. Down to saying: Although this distinction has been handed down traditionally, in principle I fear it is not so. How is this known? Since the ancient masters had different explanations, there should be texts in the treatises. Examining the *Tarkaśāstra* and so on, there is entirely no such text; how could there be different explanations? How is this meaning to be understood? Answer: This too is not so. In stating that the ancient masters were mistaken, who said it pointed directly to treatises such as the *Yogācārabhūmi*? It was stated of other individuals. Furthermore, one cannot say that treatises such as the *Yogācārabhūmi* do not make this statement, so that the present and ancient are identical, and one cannot speak of differing ancient masters of hetuvidyā. Could "ancient masters of hetuvidyā" refer only to the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the like? All who commented on hetuvidyā were called "ancient masters of hetuvidyā". Therefore the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Furthermore, regarding points of defeat (nigrahasthāna), among the various things stated by former masters of hetuvidyā, some fall under the category of dūṣaṇa, some are extremely coarse, and some are unreasonable like sophistries; therefore these are not recorded here." It also says: "Furthermore, I have already differentiated this approach fully in the treatise refuting ancient hetuvidyā." Therefore we know that where ancient masters stated errors, he refuted them; he was not speaking of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the like.

1.10

Someone says: The treatise says "with difference as its nature" (差別為性); saying "because of its different nature" (差別性故) is incorrect. How is this meaning to be understood? Answer: This too is not so. The Tripiṭaka Master's original translation said "because of its different nature" (差別性故); later, Lü Cai and Dharma Master Wengui changed it to "with difference as its nature" (差別為性). How could one take confused understanding as true words and spiritual wisdom as reckless talk? If they were of the class of translators, it might be permissible to change it if the sense were correct. The commentary explaining it even refuted them; how could altering the treatise be casually permitted? Furthermore, the word "because" (故) is a word of conclusive determination. It shows that this pratijñā must rely upon the mutual differentiation of the dharma and the dharmin, contradicting the opponent and conforming with oneself, in order to constitute a pratijñā; therefore it says: "Both the dharmin and the dharma must be prasiddha." Thus there is this word "because" in the pratijñā, fully clarifying the reason, as made clear in the root commentary.

1.11

Someone says: The former explanation is that what is not mutually accepted is the sādhya-dharma. The hetu of being produced is prasiddha to both parties; this is the sādhaka-dharma. Therefore the dharma of impermanence is precisely the sādhya. Although this explanation is so, it is not a universally applicable path. Why is that? Take, for example, positing the single anumāna that sound is impermanent: it can be as stated, taken as what is in dispute. But if one relies on an anumāna such as the existence-property (bhāva), how could "not being a substance" (adravya) be taken as the sādhya-dharma? The original intention was to dispute whether the dharmin, the universal existence-property (mahābhāva), is not a substance or is a substance, and so forth. How is this meaning to be understood? Answer: One should consider this together. If originally one disputes the dharmin and does not dispute the dharma, then when speaking of "not being a substance" and so forth, is it the dharmin or is it the dharma? If it is the dharmin, then it should be stated first. If it is the dharma and is not what is in dispute, why mention the dharma? Moreover, what would serve as the prasiddha dharmin? With a prasiddha predicate (viśeṣaṇa), the difference is the pratijñā. If one says that it is stated on the basis of disputing the dharma, then if one disputes the dharmin, what would serve as the predicate and the subject? One cannot take the dharmin as the predicate, because it is stated first. Furthermore, if the dharmin were precisely what is in dispute, all disputes concerning a dharmin would suffer the doṣa of having no sapakṣa-udāharaṇa. Furthermore, the dharma cannot establish the dharmin. Moreover, it is impossible that both the universal existence and non-substance are what is in dispute; without a prasiddha dharmin, on what would the pratijñā be posited? Furthermore, if the universal existence were precisely what is in dispute, the pratijñā that is established should be called the dharma. Therefore the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Furthermore, herein, observing what is to be established, one posits the dharma and the dharmin." Therefore we know that one still takes "not being a substance" and so forth as the dharma, which is precisely what is in dispute. The extensive reasons for this are as explained in the root commentary. Following that, since there is no alternative explanation, the old explanation indeed accords with the universal path. And as for explaining universal existence as dharma or dharmin, and reconciling it with the *Nyāyamukha*, all are as explained in the root commentary and the separate notes.

1.12

Someone asks: Why is there no mention of being prasiddha for the hetu and udāharaṇa? He explains himself: The hetu and udāharaṇa must necessarily be prasiddha so that there is no unwarranted overextension. Flipping between the genuine and semblance, neither has this statement. How is this meaning to be understood? Answer: This too is not so. Since among the hetu there are ubhayāsiddha and anyatarāsiddha, flipping those [errors] necessarily requires that it be prasiddha. It is merely that the words are abbreviated; based on reason it definitely exists. Thus the fifth fascicle of the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* says: "Because it is subsumed under any one of the prasiddha six consciousnesses," and so forth. Furthermore, the *Nyāyamukha* says: "Because it causes the other to recall what was originally prasiddha; therefore herein one takes only the meaning that is definitely accepted by both." Hence we know that the hetu and udāharaṇa also possess being prasiddha.

1.13

Someone says: The hetu must necessarily support and accord with, assisting the sādhya; this is the meaning of the pratijñā. Taking this to be a novel and subtle [insight], how is this meaning to be understood? Answer: This has already been explained and established by previous virtuous masters; how can it be called novel and extraordinary? Thus the root commentary says: "Furthermore, it has the meaning of establishing, because it is able to establish that sādhya-pratijñā. Or it has the meaning of assisting: through positing this hetu, it assists the meaning of the pratijñā and causes the meaning of the pratijñā to be established; therefore it is called the hetu." Since this was established previously, how could it be called a new explanation?

1.14

Someone says: 'Only that which is the necessary principle of natural phenomena is a correct reason.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This explanation does not exhaust the principle. For instance, the reason 'product-hood' in establishing that 'sound is impermanent', with respect to the proponent of sound-manifestation, is [a fallacy of] being unestablished for one party. How could it be made into a necessary principle? Furthermore, the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'Therefore, here, only that meaning which is definitively accepted by both parties is a good statement.' From this [it follows that] if there is something not mutually accepted, it is definitely not a property of the subject. It also says: 'Only statements that are commonly accepted and definitive are called sadhana.' Furthermore, the *Upāyahṛdaya* says: 'Only when ordinary people and noble ones have the same understanding can it serve as an example. The example is the mark of the reason.' Thus we know that one does not determinately take only the necessary principle of natural phenomena to always be a correct reason. If one only took that, one should say that discourses on the natural principle are precisely the good statements and the expressions of a sadhana; why would common acceptance be needed? From this, therefore, we know that although it is not a natural [law], as long as it is free from all fallacies and does not contradict, being able to establish the meaning of the thesis, whatever is mutually and commonly accepted can serve as a reason. For example, seeing a white heron indicates the presence or absence of water; seeing a place with a lamp or fire indicates knowledge of hot touch. It is not that at these places fire and white herons exist by natural necessity. Instances like this are more than one; hence we know that one does not determinately take only what is natural.

1.15

Someone, in explaining the reason, relates an old explanation: 'The three—words, meaning, and cognition—all pertain to production and making known, and all are named "reason".' It is said that tradition universally makes this distinction. However, in generally distinguishing the cause relative to the result, this meaning is not absent. Yet if one distinguishes the characteristics of the reason with respect to the present context, it is to be feared that this is not a good statement. How is this known? The reason clarified now is relative to the meaning of the sadhya, not relative to the result of cognition. It also says: 'If one explains the productive cause on the basis of directly producing the opponent's cognition, it is to be feared that this is reckless, because it is not only the reason that can produce the opponent's cognition.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also shows an unfamiliarity with what is stated in the commentary. Although the commentary initially explains generally, nevertheless, each of these reasons possesses the three marks, and if one is lacking, it is not correctly taken to establish the thesis. The commentary itself differentiates: 'Correctly taking the productive [function] of words, because they are the direct sadhana, is precisely clarifying the reason. Relative to the meaning of the sadhya, this produces cognition that makes [it] known, illuminating and understanding the thesis; hence it is the essential substance of the correct reason. The production by words and making known by cognition also generally pertain to the rest, being able to establish the result of the thesis.' Thus we know it is not merely relative to the result of cognition. Moreover, although it speaks of producing, it does not say that only the reason can produce the other's cognition. Rather, the reason is precisely the eminent predominant condition able to produce the other's cognition, just as it speaks of the making-known cause. Although words, meaning, and cognition are spoken of, the intended meaning correctly takes cognition making [it] known and not the rest, because only when the other's cognition is produced is the thesis made manifest. Therefore, we know that although the productive cause pertains to the thesis, reason, and example, whether as words or meaning, that which is the direct productive cause is the words of the reason and example. Thus the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'If so, since cognition is taken as the making-known cause,'—this directly cites the reason in words, and raises an objection:—'then words would lose their meaning of being a sadhana. The explanation says: This also is not so, because they cause him to recollect what was originally well-established.' Since it says that they cause him to recollect what was originally well-established, that is, producing his cognition; therefore, the arising of the other's cognition is superior to merely the reason and example. Therefore, it states further below: 'Only statements that are commonly accepted and definitive are called sadhana.' It also says: 'If, in the locus to be inferred, this mark definitely pervades; in other similar classes, one remembers that this definitely exists; in places where that is absent, one remembers that this is completely absent; therefore, from this, a definitive understanding arises.' It also says: 'The production of the reason spoken of by others means that cognition is the preceding cognition, and the rest arises from the sadhana-reason as spoken of.' By this, we know: relative to making the thesis known, it correctly takes cognition making [it] known; relative to producing the other's cognition, it correctly takes the proponent's words expressing the reason and example. Why is this? The original intention of formulating an inference is to produce the other's cognition. Why does one speak of the reason? Only relative to the result of the thesis; therefore, relative to the thesis, it simply relies on making known; relative to establishing the meaning of the thesis in order to produce the other's understanding, it takes the productive cause. Otherwise, how could it say 'produces definitive understanding'? It also says 'arises from the sadhana-reason', and 'in order to reveal the not-yet-understood meaning to those who inquire', and 'when bringing about understanding in another, it is called a sadhana', and so forth. Therefore, this word 'reason' definitely pertains to both producing and making known.

1.16

Someone says: 'The traditional explanation states that the "mark" prior to Dignāga is the essential mark, not referring to the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the like, as cited before.' Refutations of ancient essential marks are detailed in the *Nyāyamukha*.

1.17

There is an explanation of the four clauses on the property of being present in the subject as a whole: 'That which is a property of the subject but not pervading is precisely the unestablished locus of the property.'

1.18

Someone refutes this, saying: 'The reason "locus of qualities" lacks a locus; because the reason lacks a locus, the substance of the reason is unestablished, and therefore it is not a property of the subject.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also is not so. If there is a subject with a dharmin, one can say that because it is a locus of qualities, it is a property belonging to the subject. Where originally there is no dharmin, whose subject's property could it be for one to say that it is a property of the subject yet not pervading?

1.19

Someone says: 'If one speaks of pervading but not being a property of the subject on the basis of a semblance of a reason, that is the indeterminate reason.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also is not so. Since it pervades the thesis, how could it not be a property of the subject? If one says that what is incorrect is not called a property of the subject, why do all nine clauses of the *Nyāyamukha* call it a property of the subject? Furthermore, if in the first mark one concurrently excluded the fallacies of the other marks, one could say it is not a property of the subject. "The property of being present in the subject as a whole" only manifests the first mark; since it pervades the dharmin, how could it not be the property-nature? If one says that it is named "the property of being present in the subject as a whole" only when it is a correct reason, then merely stating "the property of being present in the subject as a whole" would already exclude all fallacies completely; why would one further need to state "definitely present in the sapakṣa" and so on? Furthermore, if, although pervading the thesis, it is not a property of the subject because it is indeterminate, then one ought to say "the property of being correctly [present in] the subject"; why would one need the word "whole"? The word "whole" cannot eliminate all fallacies. If one says that because "whole" cannot eliminate fallacies, one must further say "the property of being [present in] the subject", then one should say "correct", because "correct" can eliminate fallacies, and there would be nothing correct that is not a property of the subject. Then a single phrase would already differentiate the correct reason, without troublesome words. Since it does not state this, we know that "the property of being present in the subject as a whole" only manifests the first mark. Hence the *Nyāyamukha* says: 'Although all parts can serve as the reason to make the sadhya manifest, nevertheless only one part is provisionally spoken of as the reason.' Since it uses the word "provisionally", it is clear that it does not completely exclude [all fallacies].

1.20

Someone says: 'Definite presence in the sapakṣa and complete absence from the vipakṣa each have four clauses; however, the word "only" is inserted merely to differ from ancient scholars, because although it excludes fallacies, it does not do so completely.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also is not so. Even with the insertion of "only" now, it is still equally incomplete, being unable to exclude the uncommon indeterminate [reason]. Furthermore, if the word "only" excludes presence in the vipakṣa, the word "only" being merely in the sapakṣa should also preclude pervading the thesis, because of the expression 'only present in the sapakṣa'. Hence we know that each serves to manifest its own characteristic. As long as there is definite presence in the sapakṣa, that is the second mark. If a fallacy arises, it is a fallacy of the other marks. Complete absence from the vipakṣa should be known likewise as only clarifying the third mark. Even if there is complete absence from the vipakṣa, if a fallacy arises, it naturally belongs to the other marks. If one says: since it does not completely exclude fallacies, why are four clauses needed? The present formulation is also the same; why place the blame on one side alone? Therefore, we know that each separately excludes and clarifies its own characteristic, and only later, taking these characteristics to distinguish them relative to each other, is the correct reason made manifest. It would be tiresome to detail this completely. The numerous other explanations of complete absence from the vipakṣa should all be reconsidered; none exhausts the principle. Therefore, this exclusion alone penetrates the marvelous gate of the correct principle and attains the author's profound intent; hence the four clauses are formulated, not set forth in vain.

1.21

Someone says: 'Where the dharma of the reason is commonly present but the dharma of the thesis is not commonly present, although it is called sādharmya, it is not an example. Therefore, the lower text says: "Because this reason takes pleasure and space as sādharmya, it is also indeterminate."' He then determines: 'It is to be feared that this does not exhaust the principle.' He resolves it himself, saying: 'Relative to the thesis, it is called sapakṣa; relative to the reason, it is called sādharmya.' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This does not differ from the former; why trouble to explain it again? Furthermore, he says himself: 'Wherever the sādhana-dharma of the reason exists, the sadhya-dharma of the thesis must follow; therefore, in the example one only states the dharma of the reason, and the dharma of the thesis naturally follows.' These words are imprecise, because they fail to make distinctions. If one says that where there is the reason, the thesis definitely follows, why in an example is there the fallacy of an indeterminate sadhya where only the sādhana is accepted? Furthermore, who said that in a similar example one only states the dharma of the reason, and the dharma of the thesis naturally follows? According to the *Nyāyamukha*, when presenting an example one must state both the reason and the thesis completely, and not state the reason alone. According to principle, in a correct reason, wherever the reason exists, the thesis must definitely follow; however, when presenting an example one must state both, otherwise there is no upanaya. The dissimilar example is analogous to this. He also says: 'Relative to the reason it is called a pakṣa and called a dharma, possessing both names; relative to the thesis it is also called a pakṣa and called a dharma.' This was also set forth previously; why bother to repeat it? Earlier masters said: 'Only the meanings produced on the dharmin through similarity or dissimilarity are called dharma. Furthermore, because what is produced here is not the sadhya as a whole, it cannot be called pakṣa, but is called dharma. The thesis is the sadhya as a whole, and so it is given the name pakṣa, because the sādhana and sadhya differ.' Furthermore, the reason and thesis are two; similarity and dissimilarity are called dharma, and specific similarity and dissimilarity are called pakṣa; because these are similarity and dissimilarity, they are called dharma. Just below, the similarity and dissimilarity of the reason, and above, the similarity and dissimilarity of the thesis, are both specific similarities and dissimilarities, and therefore are all called pakṣa.

1.22

Someone says: 'Supposing Vasubandhu took the substance of the pot as the example, there is no contradiction with teaching or reason; what need is there for this defense? If one refutes it by being seen to be burned and the like, that is naturally a semblance of a refutation, and the principle is not my fault. How is this known? Now, simply because the pot possesses the meaning of product-hood, it definitely possesses impermanence, and one takes the pot as an example. Because product-hood is the meaning of impermanence, although it has being seen to be burned, product-hood is not the reason; how could this be an objection?' What is the truth of this matter? Answer: This also is not so. If one takes the substance of the pot as the example, and because the pot possesses the meaning of product-hood, therefore it possesses impermanence, then one should say 'manifests the pot's property of definite presence'; how could one say 'manifests the property of definite presence in the sapakṣa of the reason'? Because the product-hood of the pot and the product-hood of sound are sapakṣa, and because in that pot product-hood is accompanied by impermanence, it is therefore called sapakṣa. How could the four elements of the pot's substance be called the sapakṣa of product-hood?

1.23

Someone objects, saying: “If one says that an example illustrates a subject, and the subject must resemble the example, one does not know whether the entities of the illustrating [example] and the illustrated dharma are identical or distinct. If one says they are identical, since their entities would be one and already commonly known to both parties, why would it await establishment by a reason? If one says they are distinct, then having made clear that dharmas of distinct entities possess distinct common characteristics and possess the sense of the reason, one adduces them as an example; how could you make a parallel objection demanding that all aspects of the dharma’s entity be entirely the same?” How is its meaning to be taken? Answer: This meaning is incorrect. If one takes the entity of the jar as the example, is this identical with or distinct from the pratijñā of sound? If you say they are identical, it is subject to the previous objection and has many other faults besides. If you say they are distinct, how can it be called a similar dharma (sādharmya)? If you say that sound has the quality of being produced, and the jar also has the quality of being produced, and therefore they are called similar dharmas, this is not so. Why is this? You ought to say: “It shows that a jar definitely has impermanence”; why would one need to say: “It shows that what is similar to the reason definitely has existence”? The reason is the quality of being produced present upon the jar; how could the entity of the jar be called the property of being produced? If so, the entity of sound would have to be the entity of being produced. If it were like this, then taking the dharmin, sound, and calling it the reason, would turn out to make a part of the meaning of the pratijñā into the reason, incurring the fault that there is no distinction between pratijñā and reason. Many other questions and objections can be known by parity of reasoning regarding their merits and faults, so I will not elaborate them in detail. However, having taken the jar as the example and considering it to have exceptional capacity, I shall now briefly raise three objections against that [view]. The first says: Ancient masters accepted the principle that a jar can be seen to burn, which causes their own accepted sound to be seen to burn. Dignāga formulated an objection in accordance with this: Is sound seen to burn? Or is it not seen to burn? If one accepts it oneself, it is a siddhasādhana. If one does not accept it oneself, then in now objecting to the other, how is it not a contradiction of oneself? [Answer:] This is not so. Because the other party took the entity of the jar as the entity of the similar example, Dignāga formulated the objection based on the other party’s position, saying: “The sound accepted by you should be observable burning, just like a jar and so forth.” It is like the objection against the Vaiśeṣikas: “Your earth should not possess resistance and be perceived by the tactile faculty, because it is accepted to be seen by the eye, just like visible form and so forth.” Would one fail to accept oneself that earth is perceived by the tactile faculty when formulating the objection? Therefore, when objecting based on the other, there is no fault of one's own, making it clear that it is not accepted by oneself. The second says: Therefore, the Nyāyamukha, in explaining the example, states: “By speaking in this way, one is able to show that [the reason] definitely exists in the sapakṣa and is completely absent from the vipakṣa, not spoken erroneously.” Since one does not take the jar, this would be a mere repetition of the preceding reason; how could it be able to reveal the reason? As when one says: “Sound is impermanent, because of being produced; whatever is produced is impermanent, like what is produced and impermanent, etc.” How could this constitute a sādhana? [Answer:] This is not so. The previous “produced” and “impermanent” only distinguished the pratijñā and the reason. The subsequent mentioning of “whatever is produced” comprehensively encompasses both the pratijñā and the example. Impermanence is also like this; it is not merely a repetition, but is precisely the upanaya; therefore, it is certain that what is produced and impermanent is the entity of the example. If, as was stated before, one took the jar as the entity of the example, then one should point directly to the jar; why would one need to repeat: “Whatever is produced through effort is impermanent, just like a jar and so forth”? Furthermore, if one took the entity of the jar as the example to establish that sound is impermanent and so forth, why does [the treatise] say: “It is said that where the reason is, the pratijñā follows; where the pratijñā is not, the reason does not exist,” instead of saying: “It is said that where the jar is, the reason follows; where the jar is not, the reason does not exist”? These two are termed udāharaṇa; the others are all jāti of this. It also says: “One should prove its permanence through non-production, or establish being produced through impermanence.” This shows the correct statement: one should establish impermanence through being produced, and through permanence be separated from being produced; it does not say to prove impermanence through a jar. Therefore, the genuine entity of the example is what is produced and impermanent, and the substrate [of the example] is mentioned in order to reveal it. If it were not so, then by mentioning the jar one would already know that it definitely possesses being produced. When presenting the example, one would only say “like a jar”; why would one need to repeat both the pratijñā and reason, saying: “Whatever is produced is impermanent, just like a jar and so forth”? Why would one need such troublesome repetition? Furthermore, if the jar were the entity of the example, then setting up a separate dharma outside the reason as the example would not correspond at all to the meaning of that reason. Up to [where it says]: “Because of the nature of being produced, the similar dharmas of that class do not express the meaning of the sādhaka and sādhya.” This intention is because the sādhaka reason and the sādhya meaning of the pratijñā are not taken as the example. Moreover, if the reason is the nature of being produced, and the entity of the example is precisely the jar, then because the jar has being produced, it is impermanent; it is not that what is produced and impermanent serves as the sapakṣa. Then only the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva) would be called the reason, and the entity of the jar would not be the reason. Although the reason and the pratijñā are present upon the entity of the jar, it would ultimately be a great fault. Therefore the Nyāyamukha states: “If only the property of the subject were the nature of the reason, then that which is anaikāntika should also become a reason.” How could having both kinds of examples—those possessing the sādhya and sādhaka, and the vipakṣa dharma—incur this fault? According to this passage of the treatise, therefore, one does not take the entity of the jar and so forth as the genuine example. The third says: Dignāga’s intention was that because outsiders established reasons devoid of meaning, their conceptual characteristics were distinct with respect to sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Because the meanings were distinct, they could not be properly stated in harmonious combination. In order to reject their meaning, he stated that the example reveals the reason, and that there is no separate entity of the example. [Answer:] This is also not so. Following what is accepted in this intention: if for a reason with meaning one established an example outside the reason, one would then take the jar and so forth. If so, how could the example be a part of the reason? The reason is being produced, whereas a jar is four sense-data. That would then contradict the Nyāyamukha. That treatise says: “If so, the words of the example should not be a distinct member.” It answers: “Although in reality it is so, yet these words of the reason are only for revealing the property of the subject (pakṣadharmatva), not for revealing the existence or non-existence in the sapakṣa and vipakṣa. Therefore, one establishes the similar and dissimilar to reveal the latter two pakṣas.” The words of the reason reveal the first characteristic, namely, the being produced of sound. The similar reveals the second, and therefore it is the being produced of the jar. If, by the similar revealing the second, one were to take the entity of the jar, then when the reason reveals the first characteristic, one should take sound. Since in expressing the first characteristic, one takes being produced upon sound; when expressing the second characteristic, one takes being produced in the jar. Therefore, the lower text says: “Hence, it is determined that the three characteristics are only for revealing the reason.” By this principle, although all members can serve as reasons to reveal the sādhya, nevertheless only one member is provisionally stated as the reason; therefore, the second member is clearly also being produced. One cannot object by saying: “Then the third member, stated as the dissimilar example, should also be being produced.” The third is an exclusionary expression (apoha/vyatireka), so it does not serve as a parallel. Furthermore, the third characteristic is pervasive non-existence in the vipakṣa. Presenting non-existence in the vipakṣa is precisely the reason itself. Therefore, mentioning the jar and so forth is merely the substrate of the example (udāharaṇāśraya). If one forms this understanding, it can be called a profound understanding. When others mistakenly call something profound, it is not genuinely profound. Other improper views may be known by analogy with this. Therefore, among the three explanations of the entity of the example, the third accords with the ancient and exhibits no contradiction in text or meaning. The first two both contradict it; one should reflect and examine them carefully, so there is no need to expound them further.

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因明義斷 — Classical Chinese