因明義斷 1.4

1.4

Someone says: "However, it has been traditionally transmitted from old that all interpret it thus: before Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, eight were stated to be sādhana, while the two—svabhāva and viśeṣa—were stated to be sādhya. And then they cite the previous commentary, presenting a challenge based on vyākaraṇa, and the commentary explains: 'The hetu has three aspects; the one hetu and two udāharaṇas are all called multiple words. From this it is definitively known that the pratijñā is the sādhya. Before Vasubandhu, it was shown that all disputes did not exceed two kinds, svabhāva and viśeṣa, and therefore these are the sādhya, while the pratijñā is the sādhana, because it establishes these two. After Dignāga, because these two have not yet qualified each other and formed an inseparable relation, they are not the matter in dispute.' The intention here is: The former virtuous ones determined definitively without exception that after Dignāga the pratijñā is the sādhya, and before him the pratijñā was the sādhana, not allowing mutual interchange. Therefore it is said that now relying on my own interpretation..." up to "...the ancient masters also said that the pratijñā is the sādhya, which is established by extensive scriptural authority and reasoning. Dignāga's pratijñā can also establish many points of reasoning and scriptural authority. What is the meaning of this?" Answer: This merely expands upon what was explained before; why say it is only one's own new understanding? Therefore the basic commentary states: After Dignāga there are briefly three explanations. The first says that the meant object of the words of the pratijñā is the sādhya. Therefore the fifteenth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: "There are two kinds of objects to be established: first, svabhāva; second, viśeṣa. There are eight kinds of factors that establish. The words expressing the pratijñā, as well as the words and meanings of the hetu and so forth, are all called sādhana." The words of the pratijñā, because they are established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, are although also a sādhya, that is explained subsequently. Why is the pratijñā established first? It is to display first the thesis meaning of one's own preference; therefore it is also a sādhya, but not definitively a sādhya, because it can establish the meaning. Just as with the hetu and udāharaṇa, in relation to the sādhya they are only called sādhana. The meant object of the pratijñā is definitively and exclusively the sādhya, solely called the object to be established. This fully explains that the pratijñā pertains to both that which establishes and that which is established; how can one say it was not spoken of before? The second says: The aggregate collection of svabhāva and viśeṣa in both teaching and reasoning is all the sādhya; the treatise calls both "meaning." A component part within the aggregate, whether words or meaning, svabhāva or viśeṣa, as presented to the opponent, is all called the pratijñā, which is immediately called a sādhana. Although this, relative to the pratijñā, is also a sādhya, because it can establish the aggregate, it obtains the name sādhana. Therefore, that Dignāga and others call the pratijñā a sādhya does not conflict with the reasoning of the Yogācārabhūmi and so forth, because the Yogācārabhūmi and others do not say that the pratijñā is definitively and exclusively a sādhana. This also applies to both; how is it not clearly stated? The third says: The combined referent of svabhāva and viśeṣa is called the sādhya. The combination of the pratijñā that depends on it is called a sādhana. Because the aggregate establishes the particulars, it is not the case that this aggregate pratijñā is definitively and exclusively a sādhana. When presented in combination to an opponent, because it is established by the hetu and udāharaṇa, it is also a sādhya. Because it is not definitively a sādhya, it obtains the name sādhana. Dignāga merely uses the commonly conceded hetu and udāharaṇa to establish what the other has not conceded. What the other has not conceded is solely the combined pratijñā; the pratijñā is the sādhya. Svabhāva and viśeṣa are merely the basis of the pratijñā, not the primary sādhya, but the instruments of the sādhya. Because the perspectives of meaning differ, they do not conflict. If it were not so, did Maitreya, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu not understand hetuvidyā, when they spoke of that which is to be established as the sādhana (this too is clearly explained)? This gathers the essentials and raises the grand guidelines, being fully consistent without conflict; why labor redundantly? The different meanings presented reciprocally across the treatises do not conflict with one another. If one says that Dignāga's text and meaning are entirely identical to the old masters, did Vasubandhu not understand hetuvidyā, that one allows them to diverge? Furthermore, when Dignāga establishes the pratijñā, hetu, and udāharaṇa, he says that they are all the same as the ancient masters' sādhana. Why then are members such as pratyakṣa and anumāna allowed to be eliminated and selected out? Moreover, as within the eight members of the Yogācārabhūmi, unfolding the udāharaṇa has no upanaya or nigamana members; among the eight sādhanas in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, combining the udāharaṇa adds the upanaya and nigamana. If it is said that upanaya and nigamana are just sādharmya and vaidharmya, why are the names not equivalent? The Tarkaśāstra also has the five members of upanaya and nigamana. Why is it distinctively and uniquely conceded that Dignāga refutes the five sādhanas and states the word "only," but one does not allow refuting the eight members, asserting that there are sādhanas outside the three? If it is said that the Tarkaśāstra is not the true principle, this statement is not yet truthful discourse. If they are also conceded to understand hetuvidyā, why are their expansions and restrictions unequal? Furthermore, as when the ancient masters established pramāṇas, they added sacred teaching to make three; whereas Dignāga, for the portal of self-awakening, held only two kinds among pramāṇas. Therefore, one knows that across the various treatises, expanding and contracting, close and distant, are not uniform; their adoptions and rejections take different paths, each relying on a distinct principle. The reconciliation and explanation among them is completely discerned in the basic commentary. Consequently, inquiring more broadly by means of reasoning and scriptural authority would simply be an empty exercise.