起信論疏筆削記 11.23

11.23

然上多義，明此論中不說第七者，要異曉公說下智相即第七故。故彼文云：言智相者，是第七識，麁中之始。始有慧數，分別我塵，故名智相。《夫人經》說六識及心法智，今之智相即心法智也。若具而言之，緣於本識計以為我，緣所現境計為我所。今就麁現，說依境界心起分別。又此境界不離現識，猶如影像不離鏡面。此第七識直爾內向計我、我所，而不別計心外有塵，故餘處說還緣彼識。問：云何得知第七末那非但緣識，亦緣六塵？答：此有二釋，一依比量、二聖言量。比量者，量云：意根是有法，必與意識同境故，是宗。因云：不共所依故。同喻如眼等根，異喻如次第滅意。三支無過，故知意根遍行六塵。聖言量者，一《金鼓經》云：眼根受色，耳分別聲，乃至意根分別一切諸法。大乘意根即是末那，故知遍緣一切也。又《對法論》十種分別中，言第一相分別者，謂身所居處，所受用義，彼復如其次第，如諸色根、器世間色等境界為相。第二相顯分別者，謂六識身及意，如前所說所取相而顯現故。此中五識唯現色等塵，意識及意通現色根及器世界色等境界，設使末那不緣色根器世界等，即能現分別，唯應取六識，而言及意，故知通緣。已上皆略彼疏，今此疏意說無第七，乃是影攝，無違常式，意不緣外，故有多義也。

Now, the many explanations above clarifying that this treatise does not speak of the seventh [consciousness] are specifically to differ from Master Wonhyo’s claim that the mark of cognition below is indeed the seventh. Thus his text says: 'As for the mark of cognition, it is the seventh consciousness, the beginning among the coarse. For the first time there is the mental factor of wisdom conceptually differentiating the self and sensory dusts, hence it is named the mark of cognition. The *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* speaks of the six consciousnesses and the wisdom of mental dharmas; this present mark of cognition is indeed the wisdom of mental dharmas. If spoken of fully, grasping the fundamental consciousness it reckons it as self, and grasping the manifested realm it reckons it as belonging to self. Now, speaking in terms of coarse manifestation, it says that depending on the objective realm, the mind gives rise to conceptual differentiation. Moreover, this objective realm is not separate from the manifesting consciousness, just as a reflected image is not separate from the mirror’s surface. This seventh consciousness directly turns inward to reckon self and what belongs to self, without separately reckoning that there are sensory dusts outside the mind; hence elsewhere it is said to turn back and take that consciousness as its object.' Question: 'How is it known that the seventh, manas, not only takes consciousness as an object, but also takes the six dusts as objects?' Answer: 'Here there are two explanations: first, relying on inference (anumāna); second, relying on scriptural testimony (āptāgama). As for inference, the syllogism states: The mental sense faculty is the subject (pakṣa); it must share the same cognitive objects with the mental consciousness—this is the thesis (pratijñā). The reason (hetu) states: Because it is an unshared basis. The positive example (dṛṣṭānta) is like the eye and other faculties; the negative example is like the immediately preceding perished mind. The three members are without fault; hence we know that the mental sense faculty operates ubiquitously over the six dusts. As for scriptural testimony: first, the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra* says: "The eye faculty receives forms, the ear conceptually differentiates sounds, up to the mental faculty conceptually differentiates all dharmas." In the Mahāyāna, the mental faculty is precisely manas; hence we know that it ubiquitously takes all as its object. Furthermore, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, among the ten kinds of conceptual differentiation, when speaking of the first, the conceptual differentiation of marks, it refers to the place where the body resides and the things it enjoys; these, in turn and in order, take the physical faculties and the forms of the receptacle world as their marks. When speaking of the second, the conceptual differentiation of the manifest mark, it refers to the six consciousness bodies and the mind (manas), because they manifest as the apprehended marks as explained before. Here the five consciousnesses only manifest dusts such as forms, while the mental consciousness and manas both manifest realms such as the physical faculties and the forms of the receptacle world. Supposing that manas did not take physical faculties and the receptacle world as its objects, then the conceptual differentiation of what can manifest should only take the six consciousnesses; yet it says "and manas", hence we know it takes them all as objects.' All the above is a summary of his commentary. The intention of the present commentary in stating there is no seventh consciousness is that it is subsumed implicitly without violating the standard model; because the manas does not take external things as objects, there are multiple explanations.