大乘義章 1.111

1.111

第二門中，生法二空相對辨異，各有四門：一辨惑情、二對情彰理、三顯法實、四對實彰用。先就生空四門分別。言惑情者，計我心也。計我之心開合不定，或總為一，謂五見中我見心也。或分為二，二有兩門：一總別分二，總就眾生計有我人，名為總計；別計諸陰以為我人，名為別計。二即離分二，就陰計我，名之為即；計有常我遍一切處，名之為離。又就向前即陰計中復有即離，指色為我，名之為即；餘為我所，名之為離。如是一切。或分為四：一者即陰，如優樓佉所計我也，指陰為我，陰滅我亡。二者離陰，如僧佉人所計我也，離陰有我，陰滅我存。若說離陰計我者，何故經言「眾生計我，終不離陰。」彼起傍陰，故說不離。然不指陰以為我故，說為離也。三亦即亦離，如先尼計常我離陰，猶如虛空遍一切處，陰滅我存；作我即陰，陰滅我亡。四不即不離，如彼犢子道人所計，五陰和合更有我生，就陰辨我，故云不離，而我非陰故曰不即。然今世人建立有體假名之我，大況似此，彼亦取其佛經之言，故為此計。如經中說「眾生佛性，不即六法、不異六法。」言六法者，所謂五陰及與我也。彼依此言，故說有我。然佛法中所說我者，諸陰和合，假名集用，故名為我。彼立定實，所以是患。或隨陰別，說之為五，人計不同，或有宣說色陰為我、或受或想或行或識。或說十六，如《大品》說：一我、二眾生、三壽者、四命者、五生者、六養育、七眾數、八人、九作者、十使作者、十一起者、十二使起者、十三受者、十四使受者、十五知者、十六見者。此義如後十六我中具廣分別。又隨陰別，所立不同，分為二十。如一色中，人計不同，差別有四，有人計云：即色是我，此是一也。或有計云：色非是我，色是我所，此是二也。說何為我而云色者是其我所？彼乃指其受等四陰以之為我，未須分別我所起處。分別起處，在後六十五種我中。今此且可總相言耳。或有計云：色者是其我之窟宅，我居其中，此是三也。或有計云：我者是其色之窟宅，色住其中，此是四也。四中初一是其我見，餘三是其我所見也。如色既然，受想行識類亦齊爾。五陰各四，四五便有二十種計。此二十中，五是我見、十五是其我所見也。若具分別所起處者，便有六十五種計我。如一色中有其十三，即色是我以之為一，色是我所離分為四。有人計彼受陰為我，色陰是彼受我所有，如人有物。如是差別，乃至有人計識為我，說色以為識我所有。如是說色與彼受想行識之我以為所，故便分四種。通前為五，或有說色與彼受想行識之我以為窟宅，復分為四，通前為九。或有宣說受想行識四陰之我為色窟宅，復分為四，通前十三。此十三中，初一我見，後之十二是我所見。如色十三，乃至行識類亦同然。五陰之上各有十三，通合有其六十五種。六十五中，五是我見，即陰而計；六十我所，異陰計也。綺互相望，以為異陰，非全陰外。多人別計有六十五，非是一人。惑情如是（此一門竟）。

In the second gate, the two kinds of emptiness—of sentient beings and of dharmas—are differentiated in contrast to each other, each having four gates: 1. Distinguishing deluded attachments; 2. Manifesting principle in contrast to attachments; 3. Revealing the reality of dharmas; 4. Manifesting function in contrast to reality. First, they are distinguished through the four gates regarding the emptiness of sentient beings. 'Deluded attachments' refers to the mind that imputes a self. The mind that imputes a self may be opened or closed in various ways. It may be taken collectively as one, namely the mind of the view of self among the five views. Or it may be divided into two, which has two gates: First, divided into collective and particular: collectively imputing a self and person upon sentient beings is called collective imputation; particularly imputing the various aggregates to be a self and person is called particular imputation. Second, divided into identical and separate: imputing a self upon the aggregates is called identical; imputing an eternal self pervading all places is called separate. Furthermore, within the aforementioned imputation identical to the aggregates, there is again identical and separate: pointing to form as the self is called identical; the remainder being what belongs to the self is called separate. All [such cases] are like this. Or it may be divided into four: First, identical with the aggregates, such as the self imputed by the Ulūka [Vaiśeṣikas], pointing to the aggregates as the self, so that when the aggregates perish the self is annihilated. Second, separate from the aggregates, such as the self imputed by the Sāṃkhyas, where there is a self separate from the aggregates, so that when the aggregates perish the self survives. If one says that they impute a self separate from the aggregates, why does the sūtra state, 'When sentient beings impute a self, it is never separate from the aggregates'? Because it arises in dependence on the aggregates, it is said to be not separate; yet because they do not point to the aggregates as the self, it is spoken of as separate. Third, both identical and separate, such as Śreṇika imputing that an eternal self is separate from the aggregates, pervading all places like space, so that when the aggregates perish the self survives, while the active self is identical with the aggregates, so that when the aggregates perish the self is annihilated. Fourth, neither identical nor separate, such as that imputed by the Vātsīputrīya renunciants, [holding that] when the five aggregates combine, an additional self arises; discerning the self upon the aggregates, they say it is not separate, yet because the self is not the aggregates, they say it is not identical. Now, when people of the present day establish an conventionally designated self that has substance, it broadly resembles this; they also take words from Buddhist sūtras to make this imputation, as the sūtra states: 'The Buddha-nature of sentient beings is neither identical with the six dharmas nor different from the six dharmas.' 'Six dharmas' refers to the five aggregates together with the self. Relying on these words, they say there is a self. However, the self spoken of in the Buddha's teaching is a conventional confluence and function of the aggregates, and is therefore called a self. Because they establish it as fixed and real, it is an affliction. Or, according to the distinction of the aggregates, it is spoken of as five: people's imputations vary, with some declaring the form aggregate to be the self, or feeling, or perception, or mental formations, or consciousness. Or sixteen are spoken of, as the Pañcaviṃśati states: 1. self; 2. sentient being; 3. soul; 4. living being; 5. creature; 6. nourisher; 7. aggregate-number; 8. person; 9. agent; 10. instigator of action; 11. originator; 12. instigator of origination; 13. experiencer; 14. instigator of experience; 15. knower; 16. seer. This meaning will be distinguished in full detail below under the sixteen selves. Again, according to the distinction of the aggregates, what is established differs and is divided into twenty. For example, within form alone, people's imputations differ into four varieties: some impute, 'form is identical with the self,' which is the first. Or some impute, 'form is not the self; form belongs to the self,' which is the second. What is spoken of as the self such that form is said to belong to it? They point to the four aggregates of feeling and so on as the self; there is no need yet to distinguish the point from which 'what belongs to the self' arises. Distinguishing where it arises belongs below in the sixty-five kinds of self; here we may merely speak in general terms. Or some impute, 'form is the abode of the self, and the self dwells within it,' which is the third. Or some impute, 'the self is the abode of form, and form abides within it,' which is the fourth. Among these four, the first is the view of self, and the remaining three are views of what belongs to the self. As it is with form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are categorized in the same way. With four for each of the five aggregates, four times five makes twenty kinds of imputation. Among these twenty, five are views of self and fifteen are views of what belongs to the self. If one fully distinguishes the loci from which they arise, there are sixty-five kinds of imputation of a self. For example, within form alone there are thirteen: taking form as identical with the self makes one; form belonging to the self is divided into four. Someone imputes the aggregate of feeling to be the self, and the aggregate of form belongs to that feeling-self, just as a person possesses an object. With such distinctions, it extends to someone imputing consciousness to be the self, saying that form belongs to that consciousness-self. In this way, saying that form belongs to the self of feeling, perception, mental formations, or consciousness divides into four kinds; together with the former, this makes five. Or someone says that form is the abode for the self of feeling, perception, mental formations, or consciousness, which again divides into four; together with the former, this makes nine. Or someone declares that the self consisting of the four aggregates of feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness is the abode for form, which again divides into four; together with the former, this makes thirteen. Among these thirteen, the first is the view of self, and the latter twelve are views of what belongs to the self. Just as there are thirteen for form, it is likewise so up to mental formations and consciousness. There are thirteen upon each of the five aggregates, combining to make sixty-five kinds. Among the sixty-five, five are views of self, imputed as identical with the aggregates; sixty are what belongs to the self, imputed as different from the aggregates. They are viewed mutually as different aggregates, not as entirely outside the aggregates. The sixty-five are the separate imputations of many different people, not of a single person. Such are deluded attachments (this completes the first gate).