三論玄義 1.10

1.10

呵大執第四：初立宗、次破斥。有大乘師曰：四術、三玄並為外教，毘曇、成實蓋是小乘，明理不周、在文不足，既障大乘，理宜須破。自方等紘宗眾聖軌轍，教稱滿字，理曰無餘，信之則獲福無邊、毀謗招莫大之罪。但須伏膺甘露、頂戴法橋，不應破矣。問：必是夜光，宜應頂受。止恐多雜偽寶，須陶汰之。若謂無瑕，可陳其要。答：大乘博奧，不可具明。統其樞鍵，略標二意：一者辨教莫出五時，二者隔凡宗歸二諦。言五時者，昔《涅槃》初度江左，宋道場寺沙門慧觀仍製經序，略判佛教凡有二科：一者頓教，即華嚴之流，但為菩薩具足顯理；二者始從鹿苑、終竟鵠林，自淺至深，謂之漸教。於漸教內開為五時：一者三乘別教，為聲聞人說於四諦，為辟支佛演說十二因緣，為大乘人明於六度。行因各別，得果不同，謂三乘別教。二者般若通化三機，謂三乘通教。三者《淨名》、《思益》讚揚菩薩，抑挫聲聞，謂抑揚教。四者《法華》會彼三乘，同歸一極，謂同歸教。五者《涅槃》名常住教。自五時已後，雖復改易，屬在其間。教雖五時，不出二諦：三假為俗，四忘為真。會彼四忘，故有三乘賢聖。破執第二。前責五時，次難二諦。問：既有五時，云何分於大小？答？初一為小，後四為大。問：道理為有大乘、為無大耶？如其有大則是有見，若言無大何所立耶？又若謂有大異小，則有小異大，名為二見。《大品》云「諸有二者，無道無果。」《涅槃》云「明與無明，愚者謂二。」又若實有大乘者，名有所得。有所得者為魔眷屬，非佛弟子。又有所得者，不動不出，無有乘義，不名為乘。又大乘之宗永斷生死名為斷見，涅槃是常即是常見，乃為斷常，何大之有？次難五時。前總難，次別責。難曰：但應立大小二教，不應制於五時，略引三經三論證之。《大品經》云「諸天子歎曰：我於閻浮見第二法輪轉」，龍樹釋云「鹿苑已轉小輪，今復轉大法輪」，《法華經》云「昔於波羅捺轉於四諦，今在靈鷲山說於一乘」，《涅槃經》云「昔於鹿林轉小，今於雙樹說大」，故知教唯二門，無五時也。《智度論》云「佛法有二：一者三藏、二者大乘藏」，《地持論》云「十一部經名聲聞藏，方等大乘名菩薩藏」，《正觀論》云「前為聲聞說生滅法，次為菩薩說無生滅法」。以經論驗之，唯有二藏，無五時矣。問：若乃皆是菩薩藏者，《華嚴》、《般若》、《法華》、《涅槃》此四何異？答：須識四句，眾經煥然。一、但教菩薩、不化聲聞，謂《華嚴經》也。二、但化聲聞、不教菩薩，謂三藏教也。三、顯教菩薩、密化二乘，《大品》以上《法華》之前諸大乘教也。命小乘人說於大法，謂顯教菩薩；密示此法以為己任，如付窮子財，謂密化聲聞也。四、顯教聲聞、顯教菩薩，法華教也。菩薩聞是法，疑網皆已除，化菩薩也；千二百羅漢悉亦當作佛，化二乘也。四句之中，三義屬菩薩藏內開之，但化二乘為三藏教矣。次別難五時。問：若立五時，有何過耶？答：五時之說，非但無文亦復害理。若言第一名三乘別教，是義不然。依毘曇宗，三乘則同見四諦然後得道；就成實義，但會一滅方乃成聖；據大乘宗，同契無生然後隔凡。是則初教亦通，何以言別？次云《大品》是三乘通教，是亦不然。《釋論》云「般若不屬二乘，但屬菩薩。」若大品是三乘通教，則應通屬，何故不屬二乘？問：若依《釋論》明般若但屬菩薩，在經何故勸三乘同學般若？答：般若有二種，一者摩訶般若，此云大慧，蓋是菩薩所得，故不屬二乘。若以實相之境名為般若，則三乘同觀，故勸三乘令並學之。經師不體二種之說，便謂般若是三乘通教。次云《淨名》是抑揚教者，是亦不然。《大品》呵二乘為癡狗、《淨名》貶聲聞為敗根，挫小既齊、揚大不二，何得以《大品》為通教、《淨名》為抑揚？次《法華》為同歸，應無所疑。但在五時之說，雖辨同歸、未明常住。而天親之論釋《法華》初分，有七處佛性之文，解後段〈壽量品〉，辨三身之說。斯乃究竟無餘，不應謂為不了之教。次《涅槃》為常住教者，然常與無常皆是對治用門。若論涅槃，體絕百非、理超四句。舊宗但得用門，未識其體，故亦失旨也。次難二諦。迷失二諦，凡有三人：一者毘曇，執定性之有、迷於假有，故失世諦；亦不知假有宛然而無所有，復失一真空。二者學大乘者，名方廣道人，執於邪空、不知假有，故失世諦；既執邪空、迷於正空，亦喪真矣。三者即世所行，雖具知二諦，或言一體、或言二體，立二不成，復喪真俗也。問：真俗一體，此有何過？答：若俗與真一真，真俗亦真；若真與俗一俗，俗真亦俗；若真真俗不真，則俗與真異；若俗俗真不俗，則真與俗異。故二途並塞，一體不成。問：一既有過，異應無咎。答：經云「色即是空，空即是色」，若言各體，相即便壞；若有雙即，便二體不成。故進退無通，異義亦屈。然五時不立、真俗又傾，大乘之宗言將何寄？

Fourth, censuring attachment to the Mahāyāna: first setting forth the tenet, next refuting it. There was a Mahāyāna master who said: “The four techniques and the three mysteries are both non-Buddhist teachings; the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi are merely Hīnayāna. Their explanation of the principle is not thorough, and their textual presentations are deficient; since they obstruct the Mahāyāna, it is reasonable that they must be refuted. As for the Vaipulya, the vast lineage and the tracks of the many āryas, its teaching is termed full syllables, and its principle is called without remainder. If one believes in it, one obtains boundless blessings; if one slanders it, one incurs the greatest guilt. One must only submit one's breast to this sweet dew and bear this Dharma bridge upon one's head; it should not be refuted.” / Question: “If it is truly a glowing pearl, one should indeed receive it upon one's head. One only fears that it is heavily mixed with counterfeit jewels, which must be sifted out. If you claim it is without flaw, you may set forth its essentials.” / Answer: “The Mahāyāna is broad and profound, impossible to explain fully. Bringing together its pivotal points, one may briefly outline two meanings: first, classifying the teachings as not exceeding five periods; second, distinguishing ordinary beings [from sages] by taking the two truths as the tenet. / As for the five periods: formerly, when the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] was first transmitted south of the Yangtze, the śramaṇa Huiguan of Daochang Temple in the Song composed a preface to the scripture, briefly determining the Buddha's teachings into two general divisions: first, the sudden teaching, which is the class of the Avataṃsaka, fully revealing the principle solely for bodhisattvas; second, beginning from Mṛgadāva and ending at the Crane Forest, proceeding from shallow to deep, which is termed the gradual teaching. Within the gradual teaching, it is divided into five periods: / First is the distinct teaching of the three vehicles: for śrāvakas he preached the four truths; for pratyekabuddhas he expounded the twelve links of conditioned arising; for Mahāyāna practitioners he clarified the six perfections. Because the practiced causes were distinct and the attained fruits differed, it is called the distinct teaching of the three vehicles. / Second is the prajñā broadly transforming the three faculties, called the common teaching of the three vehicles. / Third is the Vimalakīrti and the Viśeṣacintā praising bodhisattvas and putting down śrāvakas, called the teaching of putting down and praising. / Fourth is the Lotus Sūtra converging those three vehicles so that they return together to the one ultimate, called the teaching of common return. / Fifth is the Nirvāṇa, called the teaching of eternal presence. / Although there have been alterations since these five periods, they all fall within this schema. / Though the teachings have five periods, they do not exceed the two truths: the three kinds of prajñapti are the conventional, and the four forgettings are the ultimate. Because they realize those four forgettings, there are the worthy ones and sages of the three vehicles.” / Refuting this attachment, second. First rebuking the five periods, next challenging the two truths. / Question: “Since there are five periods, how do you distinguish between the great and the small?” / Answer: “The first one is the small, and the latter four are the great.” / Question: “In principle, is there a Mahāyāna, or is there no Mahāyāna? If there is the Mahāyāna, then this is an existence view; if you say there is no Mahāyāna, what is it that you establish? Furthermore, if you claim there is a great that is different from the small, then there is a small that is different from the great, which is called a dualistic view. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: ‘All those who have duality lack the path and lack the fruit.’ The Nirvāṇa says: ‘Ignorance and clarity: the foolish regard them as two.’ Furthermore, if there truly were a Mahāyāna, it would be called ‘with acquisition.’ Those with acquisition belong to Māra's retinue and are not disciples of the Buddha. Furthermore, for one with acquisition, there is neither movement nor emergence, there is no meaning of a vehicle, and it cannot be called a vehicle. Furthermore, if the tenet of the Mahāyāna is the eternal severance of saṃsāra, this is called an annihilation view; if nirvāṇa is permanent, this is an eternalist view. This would merely be annihilation and permanence—what ‘greatness’ is there in it?” / Next, challenging the five periods. First a general challenge, next a specific rebuke. / The challenge says: “One should only establish the two teachings of Great and Small; one should not devise the five periods. One may briefly cite three sūtras and three treatises as proof. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-sūtra says: ‘The devaputras praised: “In Jambudvīpa we see the turning of the second wheel of the Dharma.”’ Nāgārjuna explains: ‘In Mṛgadāva he had already turned the small wheel, and now he turns the great wheel of the Dharma again.’ The Lotus Sūtra says: ‘Formerly in Vārāṇasī I turned the four truths; now on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa I preach the One Vehicle.’ The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: ‘Formerly in the Deer Forest I turned the small; now at the Twin Trees I preach the great.’ Thus we know the teachings consist of only two approaches, without five periods. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: ‘The Buddhadharma has two [baskets]: first, the Tripiṭaka; second, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.’ The Bodhisattvabhūmi says: ‘The eleven classes of scriptures are named the Śrāvakapiṭaka; the Vaipulya Mahāyāna is named the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.’ The Madhyamakaśāstra says: ‘First, for the sake of śrāvakas, he preached arising and ceasing phenomena; next, for the sake of bodhisattvas, he preached phenomena without arising and ceasing.’ Examining them by sūtras and treatises, there are only two piṭakas; there are no five periods.” / Question: “If they are all the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, how do these four—the Avataṃsaka, Prajñā[pāramitā], Lotus, and Nirvāṇa—differ?” / Answer: “One must understand the four propositions, and the various sūtras will become luminous. First, only teaching bodhisattvas and not transforming śrāvakas: this refers to the Avataṃsaka Sūtra. Second, only transforming śrāvakas and not teaching bodhisattvas: this refers to the Tripiṭaka teaching. Third, explicitly teaching bodhisattvas and secretly transforming the two vehicles: this refers to the various Mahāyāna teachings from the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā on up to before the Lotus Sūtra. Having Hīnayāna practitioners preach the Great Dharma is called explicitly teaching bodhisattvas; secretly showing this Dharma and having them take it as their own responsibility, like entrusting property to the impoverished son, is called secretly transforming śrāvakas. Fourth, explicitly teaching śrāvakas and explicitly teaching bodhisattvas: this is the Lotus teaching. ‘Bodhisattvas hearing this Dharma have had their nets of doubt entirely eliminated’ is transforming bodhisattvas; ‘The twelve hundred arhats shall all likewise become buddhas’ is transforming the two vehicles. Among the four propositions, three meanings belong within the Bodhisattvapiṭaka as its subdivisions; solely transforming the two vehicles is the Tripiṭaka teaching.” / Next, specifically challenging the five periods. / Question: “If one establishes the five periods, what fault is there?” / Answer: “The doctrine of five periods not only lacks textual authority, it also harms the principle. If you say the first is called the distinct teaching of the three vehicles, this meaning is not so. According to the Abhidharma tenet, the three vehicles equally see the four truths and only then attain the path; in the sense of the Tattvasiddhi, they only realize the single cessation and then become sages; based on the Mahāyāna tenet, they equally accord with the unarisen and only then transcend the ordinary. Thus the initial teaching is also common; why do you say it is distinct? / Next, you say the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā is the common teaching of the three vehicles; this too is not so. The Upadeśa says: ‘Prajñā does not belong to the two vehicles; it belongs only to bodhisattvas.’ If the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā were the common teaching of the three vehicles, then it should belong to them in common; why does it not belong to the two vehicles?” / Question: “If, according to the Upadeśa, it explains that prajñā belongs only to bodhisattvas, why does the sūtra exhort the three vehicles to study prajñā together?” / Answer: “There are two kinds of prajñā: first, mahāprajñā, which translates as great wisdom, and is attained only by bodhisattvas; therefore it does not belong to the two vehicles. If one takes the object of dharmatā to be named prajñā, then the three vehicles contemplate it in common; therefore it exhorts the three vehicles to study it together. Masters of the sūtras do not comprehend these two kinds of explanation, and rashly claim that prajñā is the common teaching of the three vehicles. / Next, as for saying that the Vimalakīrti is the teaching of putting down and praising, this too is not so. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā scolds the two vehicles as foolish dogs, and the Vimalakīrti disparages śrāvakas as having ruined roots. Since putting down the small is identical in both, and praising the great is not different, how can you make the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā the common teaching and the Vimalakīrti the teaching of putting down and praising? / Next, taking the Lotus as the common return should be without doubt. However, in the doctrine of five periods, although they explain the common return, they have not clarified eternal presence. Yet Vasubandhu's treatise, commenting on the first part of the Lotus Sūtra, has textual passages on Buddha-nature in seven places; and explaining the latter section, the ‘Lifespan Chapter’, it explains the doctrine of the three bodies. This is indeed ultimate and without remainder; it should not be called an incomplete teaching. / Next, as for the Nirvāṇa being the teaching of eternal presence: permanence and impermanence are both approaches of remedial application. If one discusses nirvāṇa, its essence transcends the hundred negations, and its principle surpasses the catuṣkoṭi. The old school merely grasped its approach of application and did not recognize its essence; therefore they also missed the mark. / Next, challenging the two truths. Those who are confused about the two truths are three kinds of people: First, the Abhidharma, adhering to existence with a fixed nature and confused about prajñapti-existence, thereby loses conventional truth; nor does it know that prajñapti-existence is vivid yet without anything that exists, thus also losing the single true emptiness. Second, those who study the Mahāyāna called followers of the Fangguang (Vaitulya), adhering to erroneous emptiness and not knowing prajñapti-existence, thereby lose conventional truth; since they adhere to erroneous emptiness and are confused about correct emptiness, they also forfeit the ultimate [truth]. Third, those practiced in the present day, who although fully knowing the two truths, either say they are of one essence or say they are of two essences; failing to establish the two, they again forfeit the ultimate and conventional truths.” / Question: “If conventional and ultimate are of one essence, what fault is there in this?” / Answer: “If the conventional is identical with the ultimate, being one with the ultimate, then the conventional is also ultimate; if the ultimate is identical with the conventional, being one with the conventional, then the ultimate is also conventional. If the ultimate is ultimate while the conventional is not ultimate, then the conventional is different from the ultimate; if the conventional is conventional while the ultimate is not conventional, then the ultimate is different from the conventional. Therefore, both avenues are blocked, and a single essence cannot be established.” / Question: “Since oneness has fault, difference should be without blame.” / Answer: “The scripture says: ‘Form is emptiness, emptiness is form.’ If you say they have separate essences, mutual identity is immediately broken; if there is mutual identity, then two essences cannot be established. Therefore, whether advancing or retreating there is no way through, and the thesis of difference is also refuted. Thus, the five periods not being established and the ultimate and conventional having collapsed, on what can the tenets of the Mahāyāna rely?”