三論玄義 1.10

1.10

Fourth, censuring attachment to the Mahāyāna: first setting forth the tenet, next refuting it. There was a Mahāyāna master who said: “The four techniques and the three mysteries are both non-Buddhist teachings; the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi are merely Hīnayāna. Their explanation of the principle is not thorough, and their textual presentations are deficient; since they obstruct the Mahāyāna, it is reasonable that they must be refuted. As for the Vaipulya, the vast lineage and the tracks of the many āryas, its teaching is termed full syllables, and its principle is called without remainder. If one believes in it, one obtains boundless blessings; if one slanders it, one incurs the greatest guilt. One must only submit one's breast to this sweet dew and bear this Dharma bridge upon one's head; it should not be refuted.” / Question: “If it is truly a glowing pearl, one should indeed receive it upon one's head. One only fears that it is heavily mixed with counterfeit jewels, which must be sifted out. If you claim it is without flaw, you may set forth its essentials.” / Answer: “The Mahāyāna is broad and profound, impossible to explain fully. Bringing together its pivotal points, one may briefly outline two meanings: first, classifying the teachings as not exceeding five periods; second, distinguishing ordinary beings [from sages] by taking the two truths as the tenet. / As for the five periods: formerly, when the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] was first transmitted south of the Yangtze, the śramaṇa Huiguan of Daochang Temple in the Song composed a preface to the scripture, briefly determining the Buddha's teachings into two general divisions: first, the sudden teaching, which is the class of the Avataṃsaka, fully revealing the principle solely for bodhisattvas; second, beginning from Mṛgadāva and ending at the Crane Forest, proceeding from shallow to deep, which is termed the gradual teaching. Within the gradual teaching, it is divided into five periods: / First is the distinct teaching of the three vehicles: for śrāvakas he preached the four truths; for pratyekabuddhas he expounded the twelve links of conditioned arising; for Mahāyāna practitioners he clarified the six perfections. Because the practiced causes were distinct and the attained fruits differed, it is called the distinct teaching of the three vehicles. / Second is the prajñā broadly transforming the three faculties, called the common teaching of the three vehicles. / Third is the Vimalakīrti and the Viśeṣacintā praising bodhisattvas and putting down śrāvakas, called the teaching of putting down and praising. / Fourth is the Lotus Sūtra converging those three vehicles so that they return together to the one ultimate, called the teaching of common return. / Fifth is the Nirvāṇa, called the teaching of eternal presence. / Although there have been alterations since these five periods, they all fall within this schema. / Though the teachings have five periods, they do not exceed the two truths: the three kinds of prajñapti are the conventional, and the four forgettings are the ultimate. Because they realize those four forgettings, there are the worthy ones and sages of the three vehicles.” / Refuting this attachment, second. First rebuking the five periods, next challenging the two truths. / Question: “Since there are five periods, how do you distinguish between the great and the small?” / Answer: “The first one is the small, and the latter four are the great.” / Question: “In principle, is there a Mahāyāna, or is there no Mahāyāna? If there is the Mahāyāna, then this is an existence view; if you say there is no Mahāyāna, what is it that you establish? Furthermore, if you claim there is a great that is different from the small, then there is a small that is different from the great, which is called a dualistic view. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: ‘All those who have duality lack the path and lack the fruit.’ The Nirvāṇa says: ‘Ignorance and clarity: the foolish regard them as two.’ Furthermore, if there truly were a Mahāyāna, it would be called ‘with acquisition.’ Those with acquisition belong to Māra's retinue and are not disciples of the Buddha. Furthermore, for one with acquisition, there is neither movement nor emergence, there is no meaning of a vehicle, and it cannot be called a vehicle. Furthermore, if the tenet of the Mahāyāna is the eternal severance of saṃsāra, this is called an annihilation view; if nirvāṇa is permanent, this is an eternalist view. This would merely be annihilation and permanence—what ‘greatness’ is there in it?” / Next, challenging the five periods. First a general challenge, next a specific rebuke. / The challenge says: “One should only establish the two teachings of Great and Small; one should not devise the five periods. One may briefly cite three sūtras and three treatises as proof. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-sūtra says: ‘The devaputras praised: “In Jambudvīpa we see the turning of the second wheel of the Dharma.”’ Nāgārjuna explains: ‘In Mṛgadāva he had already turned the small wheel, and now he turns the great wheel of the Dharma again.’ The Lotus Sūtra says: ‘Formerly in Vārāṇasī I turned the four truths; now on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa I preach the One Vehicle.’ The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: ‘Formerly in the Deer Forest I turned the small; now at the Twin Trees I preach the great.’ Thus we know the teachings consist of only two approaches, without five periods. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: ‘The Buddhadharma has two [baskets]: first, the Tripiṭaka; second, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.’ The Bodhisattvabhūmi says: ‘The eleven classes of scriptures are named the Śrāvakapiṭaka; the Vaipulya Mahāyāna is named the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.’ The Madhyamakaśāstra says: ‘First, for the sake of śrāvakas, he preached arising and ceasing phenomena; next, for the sake of bodhisattvas, he preached phenomena without arising and ceasing.’ Examining them by sūtras and treatises, there are only two piṭakas; there are no five periods.” / Question: “If they are all the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, how do these four—the Avataṃsaka, Prajñā[pāramitā], Lotus, and Nirvāṇa—differ?” / Answer: “One must understand the four propositions, and the various sūtras will become luminous. First, only teaching bodhisattvas and not transforming śrāvakas: this refers to the Avataṃsaka Sūtra. Second, only transforming śrāvakas and not teaching bodhisattvas: this refers to the Tripiṭaka teaching. Third, explicitly teaching bodhisattvas and secretly transforming the two vehicles: this refers to the various Mahāyāna teachings from the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā on up to before the Lotus Sūtra. Having Hīnayāna practitioners preach the Great Dharma is called explicitly teaching bodhisattvas; secretly showing this Dharma and having them take it as their own responsibility, like entrusting property to the impoverished son, is called secretly transforming śrāvakas. Fourth, explicitly teaching śrāvakas and explicitly teaching bodhisattvas: this is the Lotus teaching. ‘Bodhisattvas hearing this Dharma have had their nets of doubt entirely eliminated’ is transforming bodhisattvas; ‘The twelve hundred arhats shall all likewise become buddhas’ is transforming the two vehicles. Among the four propositions, three meanings belong within the Bodhisattvapiṭaka as its subdivisions; solely transforming the two vehicles is the Tripiṭaka teaching.” / Next, specifically challenging the five periods. / Question: “If one establishes the five periods, what fault is there?” / Answer: “The doctrine of five periods not only lacks textual authority, it also harms the principle. If you say the first is called the distinct teaching of the three vehicles, this meaning is not so. According to the Abhidharma tenet, the three vehicles equally see the four truths and only then attain the path; in the sense of the Tattvasiddhi, they only realize the single cessation and then become sages; based on the Mahāyāna tenet, they equally accord with the unarisen and only then transcend the ordinary. Thus the initial teaching is also common; why do you say it is distinct? / Next, you say the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā is the common teaching of the three vehicles; this too is not so. The Upadeśa says: ‘Prajñā does not belong to the two vehicles; it belongs only to bodhisattvas.’ If the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā were the common teaching of the three vehicles, then it should belong to them in common; why does it not belong to the two vehicles?” / Question: “If, according to the Upadeśa, it explains that prajñā belongs only to bodhisattvas, why does the sūtra exhort the three vehicles to study prajñā together?” / Answer: “There are two kinds of prajñā: first, mahāprajñā, which translates as great wisdom, and is attained only by bodhisattvas; therefore it does not belong to the two vehicles. If one takes the object of dharmatā to be named prajñā, then the three vehicles contemplate it in common; therefore it exhorts the three vehicles to study it together. Masters of the sūtras do not comprehend these two kinds of explanation, and rashly claim that prajñā is the common teaching of the three vehicles. / Next, as for saying that the Vimalakīrti is the teaching of putting down and praising, this too is not so. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā scolds the two vehicles as foolish dogs, and the Vimalakīrti disparages śrāvakas as having ruined roots. Since putting down the small is identical in both, and praising the great is not different, how can you make the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā the common teaching and the Vimalakīrti the teaching of putting down and praising? / Next, taking the Lotus as the common return should be without doubt. However, in the doctrine of five periods, although they explain the common return, they have not clarified eternal presence. Yet Vasubandhu's treatise, commenting on the first part of the Lotus Sūtra, has textual passages on Buddha-nature in seven places; and explaining the latter section, the ‘Lifespan Chapter’, it explains the doctrine of the three bodies. This is indeed ultimate and without remainder; it should not be called an incomplete teaching. / Next, as for the Nirvāṇa being the teaching of eternal presence: permanence and impermanence are both approaches of remedial application. If one discusses nirvāṇa, its essence transcends the hundred negations, and its principle surpasses the catuṣkoṭi. The old school merely grasped its approach of application and did not recognize its essence; therefore they also missed the mark. / Next, challenging the two truths. Those who are confused about the two truths are three kinds of people: First, the Abhidharma, adhering to existence with a fixed nature and confused about prajñapti-existence, thereby loses conventional truth; nor does it know that prajñapti-existence is vivid yet without anything that exists, thus also losing the single true emptiness. Second, those who study the Mahāyāna called followers of the Fangguang (Vaitulya), adhering to erroneous emptiness and not knowing prajñapti-existence, thereby lose conventional truth; since they adhere to erroneous emptiness and are confused about correct emptiness, they also forfeit the ultimate [truth]. Third, those practiced in the present day, who although fully knowing the two truths, either say they are of one essence or say they are of two essences; failing to establish the two, they again forfeit the ultimate and conventional truths.” / Question: “If conventional and ultimate are of one essence, what fault is there in this?” / Answer: “If the conventional is identical with the ultimate, being one with the ultimate, then the conventional is also ultimate; if the ultimate is identical with the conventional, being one with the conventional, then the ultimate is also conventional. If the ultimate is ultimate while the conventional is not ultimate, then the conventional is different from the ultimate; if the conventional is conventional while the ultimate is not conventional, then the ultimate is different from the conventional. Therefore, both avenues are blocked, and a single essence cannot be established.” / Question: “Since oneness has fault, difference should be without blame.” / Answer: “The scripture says: ‘Form is emptiness, emptiness is form.’ If you say they have separate essences, mutual identity is immediately broken; if there is mutual identity, then two essences cannot be established. Therefore, whether advancing or retreating there is no way through, and the thesis of difference is also refuted. Thus, the five periods not being established and the ultimate and conventional having collapsed, on what can the tenets of the Mahāyāna rely?”