三論玄義 1.9

1.9

排成實第三：一立義、二破斥。有訶梨跋摩高足弟子，序其宗曰「成實論者，佛滅度後九百年內，有訶梨跋摩，此云師子鎧，之所造也。其人本是薩婆多部鳩摩羅陀弟子，慨其所釋近在名相，遂徙轍僧祇，大小兼學，鑽仰九經、澄汰五部，再卷邪霧、重舒慧日，於是道振罽賓、聲流赤縣。成是能成之文，實謂所成之理。二百二品十六卷文，四諦建章、五聚明義，說既精巧，歸眾若林。」問：跋摩既排斥八犍、陶汰五部，成實之宗正依何義？答：有人言擇善而從、有能必錄，棄眾師之短、取諸部之長。有人言雖復斥排群異，正用曇無德部。有人言偏斥毘曇、專同譬喻。真諦三藏云：「用經部義也。」檢《俱舍論》經部之義，多同成實。破斥第二。問：成實為是小乘之論、為是大乘、為含大小？答：有人言是大乘也。有人言是小乘。有人言探大乘意以釋小乘，具含大小。夫珉玉精麁，蓋是耳目所覩，尚有昏明殊鏡。況妙道真偽，言亡慮絕，豈易識哉？今以十義證，則明是小乘，非大乘矣。一舊序證、二依論徵、三無大文、四有條例、五迷本宗、六分大小、七格優降、八無相即、九傷解行、十檢世人。舊序證第一。昔羅什法師翻《成實論》竟，命僧叡講之。什師沒後，叡公錄其遺言，製論序云「成實論者，佛滅度後八百九十年，罽賓小乘學者之匠鳩摩羅陀上足弟子訶梨跋摩之所造也。其論云：色香味觸實也，地水火風假也。精巧有餘，明實不足。推而究之，小乘內之實耳。比於大乘，雖復龍燭之於螢耀，未足喻其懸矣。」或有人言此論明於滅諦，與大乘均致。羅什聞而歎曰：「秦人之無深識，何乃至此乎。吾每疑其普信大乘者，當知悟不由中，而迷可識矣。」成實是羅什所翻，僧叡為講論之始，後學不應孤負前匠。依論徵第二。《成實》文云「諸比丘異論種種，佛皆聽故，我欲正論三藏內實義。」訶梨自云正論三藏，故知成實理是小乘。若言斯論亦明大者，過在門人，非跋摩之咎。問：何以知三藏是小乘耶？答：《法華》云「亦不親近小乘三藏學者，恐大照未圓小法容染，故智形宜隔、行止勿共。」誡於大士勿親近小人，則知三藏非大乘矣。《智度論》云「迦葉、阿難結集三藏，文殊、彌勒集大乘藏。外人問云：何故不於三藏內集大乘耶？論主答云：小乘不受大，不應小內而集大。」以此推之，但是小乘耳。無大文第三。原夫作論皆引佛言，如龍樹釋大而還引大經，訶梨解小經唯將小證，二百二品並探四《阿含》，十六卷文竟無方等。以此詳之，即可知矣。有條例第四。問：若《成實》釋小不許兼明於大，亦應三論解大不應兼明於小。答：義有條例，不應相濫。佛經有二：一者小乘、二者方等。若明大乘必兼辨小，若辨小乘不兼明大。故大乘經初有小乘眾，小乘經首無菩薩僧，示大能包小、小不含大。佛經既爾，在論例然。大乘之論兼明小乘，小乘之論不兼明大。若弟子之論探大釋小，如來之經義亦應然，則巨細互兼，何名大小？迷本宗第五。問：《成實論》文盛辨生法二空，與《大品》明四諦平等。義既無異，故知應是探大釋小。答：四《阿含》教內有二空，論明二空則還釋三藏，云何乃言探大解小？又身子毘曇亦辨二空，而是小非大，訶梨之論義亦應同。問：身子毘曇亦探大釋小，與《成實》例同，彼既探大則此非專小。答：身子所造還釋佛毘曇，佛說既是小乘，彼論寧言探大？分大小第六。問：小明一空、大辨二空，可有差別？既同其二空，大小何異？答：雖同辨二空，二空不同，略明四種：一者小乘拆法明空，大乘本性空寂。二者小乘但明三界內人法二空，空義即短；大乘明三界內外人法並空，空義即長。三者小乘但明於空，未說不空；大乘明空亦辨不空。故《涅槃》云「聲聞之人但見於空，不見不空。智者見空及以不空，空者一切生死，不空者謂大涅槃。」四者小乘名為但空，謂但住於空。菩薩名不可得空，空亦不可得也。故知雖明二空，空義有異，故分大小。格優降第七。龍樹釋《般若．累教品》云「善吉觀生法二空，欲比菩薩二空，譬如毛孔之空比十方空。」即小空為淺，大空為深。《成實》所明但是聲聞空，非大士所得耳。無相即第八。《法華．信解品》云「四大聲聞自述所得空云：我等長夜修習空法，無生無滅、無小無大，無漏無為，於佛智慧不生貪著。」《成實》所辨與此全同，故知非大也。問：何以知然？答：《法華》之文辨聲聞證空，不能即空觀有、即有觀空，故無相即。《成實》所說亦無相即。若明相即，應空有並觀。若空有並觀，與大乘何別？問：何以知小乘義無相即耶：答：《釋論》云「小乘內不明生死即畢竟空，唯大乘乃說。」故知爾也。傷解行第九。《涅槃經》云「若以聲聞辟支佛心言無布施，是即名為破戒邪見。」小乘人入於空觀不見布施，破大乘行，故云破戒；破大乘解，故云邪見。而《成實》明不見布施是實法空，以為宗極。欲為大乘，勿起小心也。檢世人第十。秦弘始七年，天竺有剎利浮海至長安，聞羅什作大乘學，以《正觀論》等諮而驗之。什公為其敷折，為頂受，絕歎不能已。已白什公曰：「當以此明震暉天竺，何由蘊此摩尼乃在邊地？我在天竺，聞諸論師深怪罽賓小乘學者鳩摩羅陀自稱朗月之照，偏智小才非此喻也。而訶梨惜其師以才自傷、以智自病，故作此論，以辨有法之實、明其依實之假，故以成實為名。」用天竺剎利之言驗之，跋摩師資皆小乘學也。爰至齊司徒文宣王，誠信三寶，每感嘉瑞。以齊永明十年十月，延請名德五百餘人，於普弘寺敷講。文宣王每以大乘經論為履道之津涯、正法之樞鍵，而後生棄本崇末，即請諸法師抄此《成實》以為九卷，命周顒作序，恐專弘小論廢大乘業。自爾已後，爰至梁武，盛弘大乘，排拆成實眾師，不可具記。問：若以十義證成實為小乘者，與毘曇優劣云何？答：求那跋摩遺文偈云「諸論各異端，修行理無二。偏執有是非，達者無違諍。」又《釋論》云「有四種門：一者阿毘曇門；二者空門；三者昆勒門，此云篋藏；四者非空非有門。」不得般若方便，學毘曇門則墮有見，學於空門則墮空見，學昆勒門則墮亦空亦有見，學非空非有門則墮愚癡論。若得般若，心無染著，隨機適化，通道利人，無相違背。而成實、毘曇各執空有，互相排斥，障道增見，皆失佛旨也。問：會空斷結方得道耳，鑒有之心何能隔凡？故知毘曇乖宗，成實得理。答、若言見空成聖、有不隔凡，三藏教門應無得道，釋迦小乘一化徒然虛設，待成實後興方有大利。豈可然乎？問：毘曇但明人空，成實具明二空，云何兩論無有優劣？答：於小乘內分三品，一者俱不得二空。如犢子部云「四大和合有於眼法，五陰和合別有人法。」此下根人也。二者薩衛之流，但得人空，不得法空，為次根人也。三者譬喻訶梨之流，具得二空，為上根人也。約空義淺深，則毘曇為小乘之劣，成實為小內之勝也。問：《釋論》云「佛滅度後分為二分，一但信人空不信法空、二俱信人法二空。」但應有二，何得分三？答：犢子入真觀故則見我空，出於俗諦別有人體。龍樹約其入觀義邊，故但分二也。問：三論斥外道、毘曇，斯事可爾。而龍樹前興、訶梨後出，時節遙隔，何由相破？答：俱令執著，即便被破，何論前後。若前論不破後迷，亦應古方不治今病，扁鵲之術末世無益矣。問：若法勝、訶梨著小論以通三藏，馬鳴、龍樹作大教以弘方等，巨細分流，何俟相破？答：佛說小乘，本為詮大，保冥之徒守指忘月，經自斥之，故論主依佛。問：有人言《成實論》探大釋小。此有何過？答：上已明之。必有此迷，今當更述。探大釋小，則小大不收，進不馳於白牛、退失駕於羊鹿，騾論之言驗之久矣。

Part Three: Rejecting the Tattvasiddhi has two sections: first, establishing the thesis; second, refuting it. A prominent disciple of Harivarman set forth its school's lineage, saying: “As for the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, it was composed within nine hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa by Harivarman (which translates as ‘Lion Armor’). This man was originally a disciple of Kumāralāta of the Sarvāstivāda school. Lamenting that [Kumāralāta's] explanations remained close to names and marks, he then changed course to the Mahāsāṃghika, studying both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, delving deeply into the ninefold scriptures and sifting through the five Nikāyas. Rolling back the erroneous mists once again and unfurling the sun of wisdom anew, his teaching shook Jalandhara and his fame spread to China. ‘Accomplishing’ (tattva) refers to the text that can establish; ‘truth’ (siddhi) refers to the principle established. In two hundred and two chapters across sixteen fascicles, it establishes the chapters with the four noble truths and clarifies the principles through the five aggregates. Its exposition being refined and subtle, those who took refuge in it were like a forest.”

Question: Since Harivarman rejected the Eight Sections (*Aṣṭaskandha) and sifted through the five Nikāyas, on what doctrine does the school of the Tattvasiddhi properly rely?

Answer: Some say that he chose what was good and followed it, recording whatever had merit, casting aside the shortcomings of the various masters and adopting the strengths of the various schools. Some say that although he rejected various divergent views, he properly used the Dharmaguptaka school. Some say that he specifically rejected the Abhidharma and exclusively agreed with the Dārṣṭāntikas. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha said, “He used the doctrines of the Sautrāntika school.” When one examines the Sautrāntika doctrines in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, many agree with the Tattvasiddhi.

Second is the refutation.

Question: Is the Tattvasiddhi a Hīnayāna treatise, a Mahāyāna treatise, or does it contain both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Answer: Some say it is Mahāyāna. Some say it is Hīnayāna. Some say it explored the Mahāyāna intent to explain the Hīnayāna, possessing both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Now, the fineness or coarseness of jade and common stone is seen by eyes and ears, yet mirrors still differ in clarity and dimness. How much more so the authenticity or falsehood of the wondrous Path, where speech ceases and thought is cut off—how could it be easily recognized? Now, by proving with ten points, it will be clearly shown that it is Hīnayāna and not Mahāyāna:
1. Proof from the ancient preface;
2. Verification from the treatise itself;
3. Absence of Mahāyāna texts;
4. Having established precedents;
5. Confusion regarding its own school;
6. Differentiating Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna;
7. Evaluating superiority and inferiority;
8. Absence of mutual identity;
9. Harming understanding and practice;
10. Examining contemporary people.

First, proof from the ancient preface: Formerly, after Dharma Master Kumārajīva finished translating the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, he instructed Sengrui to lecture on it. After Master Kumārajīva passed away, Venerable Sengrui recorded his bequeathed words and composed a preface to the treatise, which states: “The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra was composed eight hundred and ninety years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa by Harivarman, the chief disciple of Kumāralāta, the master of Hīnayāna scholars in Jalandhara. His treatise states: visible matter, scent, taste, and tangibles are real; earth, water, fire, and wind are provisional. While its refinement is abundant, its clarification of reality is deficient. Inferring and investigating it, it is merely the reality within Hīnayāna. Compared to the Mahāyāna, even comparing a dragon’s torch to the glow of a firefly would not suffice to illustrate the vast distance between them.” Someone once said that this treatise clarifies the truth of cessation equally with the Mahāyāna. When Kumārajīva heard this, he sighed and said: “How has the lack of deep discernment among the people of Qin reached such a point? Whenever I suspected that those who universally believe in the Mahāyāna did not awaken from within, their delusion could now be recognized!” The Tattvasiddhi was translated by Kumārajīva, and Sengrui was the first to lecture on it; later scholars should not fail these former masters.

Second, verification from the treatise itself: The text of the Tattvasiddhi states: “Because the Buddha permitted the diverse treatises of the various monks, I wish to correctly discuss the real meaning within the Tripiṭaka.” Since Harivarman himself says he correctly discusses the Tripiṭaka, we know that the principle of the Tattvasiddhi is Hīnayāna. If one says that this treatise also clarifies the Mahāyāna, the fault lies with his disciples, not with Harivarman.

Question: How is it known that the Tripiṭaka refers to the Hīnayāna?

Answer: The Lotus Sūtra says: “Nor does one draw near to scholars of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka, fearing that because one's great illumination is not yet complete, the lesser teachings might defile it; thus wisdom and form should be separated, and their conduct should not be shared.” Admonishing the Mahāsattva not to draw near to lesser persons, we know that the Tripiṭaka is not the Mahāyāna. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra states: “Kāśyapa and Ānanda compiled the Tripiṭaka, while Mañjuśrī and Maitreya compiled the Mahāyāna Piṭaka. An outsider asked: ‘Why was the Mahāyāna not compiled within the Tripiṭaka?’ The treatise master answered: ‘The Hīnayāna does not accept the Mahāyāna; the Mahāyāna should not be compiled within the Hīnayāna.’” Inferring from this, it is merely Hīnayāna.

Third, absence of Mahāyāna texts: Generally, when composing treatises, one always cites the Buddha's words. Just as Nāgārjuna explained the Mahāyāna and cited Mahāyāna sūtras in return, Harivarman explained Hīnayāna sūtras and only used Hīnayāna proofs: all two hundred and two chapters draw from the four Āgamas, and throughout the sixteen fascicles there is not a single vaipulya [sūtra]. Deliberating from this, one can know it.

Fourth, having established precedents.

Question: If the Tattvasiddhi's explaining the Hīnayāna does not permit it to concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna, then likewise the Three Treatises' explaining the Mahāyāna should not concurrently clarify the Hīnayāna.

Answer: The principles have established precedents; they should not be confused. The Buddha's sūtras are twofold: first, the Hīnayāna; second, the vaipulya. If one clarifies the Mahāyāna, one must concurrently explain the Hīnayāna; if one explains the Hīnayāna, one does not concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna. Therefore, at the beginning of Mahāyāna sūtras there is a Hīnayāna assembly, whereas at the head of Hīnayāna sūtras there is no saṃgha of bodhisattvas; this shows that the great can encompass the small, but the small cannot contain the great. Since the Buddha's sūtras are like this, treatises follow the same precedent. A Mahāyāna treatise concurrently clarifies the Hīnayāna; a Hīnayāna treatise does not concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna. If a disciple's treatise explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, the Tathāgata's sūtras should likewise be so; then large and small would mutually encompass each other, and how could they be called Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Fifth, confusion regarding its own school.

Question: The text of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra abundantly explains the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena, which is identical to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā's clarification of the equality of the four noble truths. Since the meaning is not different, we know that it must have explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna.

Answer: Within the teachings of the four Āgamas there is the twofold emptiness; when the treatise clarifies the twofold emptiness, it is explaining the Tripiṭaka in return. Why say it explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna? Furthermore, Śāriputra's Abhidharma also explains the twofold emptiness, yet it is Hīnayāna and not Mahāyāna; the meaning of Harivarman's treatise must likewise be the same.

Question: Śāriputra's Abhidharma also explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, following the same precedent as the Tattvasiddhi. Since that one explored the Mahāyāna, this one is not exclusively Hīnayāna.

Answer: What Śāriputra composed was in turn an explanation of the Buddha's Abhidharma. Since what the Buddha spoke was Hīnayāna, how could that treatise be said to explore the Mahāyāna?

Sixth, differentiating Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna.

Question: If the Hīnayāna clarifies one emptiness and the Mahāyāna explains two emptinesses, there would be a difference; but since both explain the twofold emptiness, what is the difference between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Answer: Although both explain the twofold emptiness, the twofold emptiness is not the same, briefly clarified in four points:
1. The Hīnayāna analyzes phenomena to clarify emptiness, whereas the Mahāyāna's original nature is empty and tranquil.
2. The Hīnayāna only clarifies the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena within the three realms, so its meaning of emptiness is limited; the Mahāyāna clarifies that persons and phenomena both within and outside the three realms are all empty, so its meaning of emptiness is extensive.
3. The Hīnayāna only clarifies emptiness and has not yet spoken of non-emptiness; the Mahāyāna clarifies emptiness and also explains non-emptiness. Thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “Śrāvakas only see emptiness and do not see non-emptiness. The wise see emptiness as well as non-emptiness; emptiness is all saṃsāra, and non-emptiness is the great nirvāṇa.”
4. The Hīnayāna is called ‘mere emptiness,’ meaning they merely abide in emptiness. For bodhisattvas it is called ‘unobtainable emptiness,’ where emptiness is also unobtainable.
Therefore, we know that although both clarify the twofold emptiness, the meaning of emptiness differs; thus Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are differentiated.

Seventh, evaluating superiority and inferiority: In explaining the chapter on ‘Entrustment’ in the Prajñāpāramitā, Nāgārjuna says: “When Subhūti contemplates the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena, if one wishes to compare it to the bodhisattva's twofold emptiness, it is like the space in a pore compared to the space in the ten directions.” Thus the Hīnayāna emptiness is shallow, and the Mahāyāna emptiness is deep. What the Tattvasiddhi clarifies is merely the emptiness of śrāvakas, not that attained by Mahāsattvas.

Eighth, absence of mutual identity: The ‘Faith and Understanding’ chapter of the Lotus Sūtra states: “The four great śrāvakas described their own attainment of emptiness, saying: ‘Throughout the long night we practiced the dharmas of emptiness—without birth and without cessation, without small and without great, without outflow and unconditioned—producing no craving or attachment toward the Buddha's wisdom.’” What the Tattvasiddhi explains is completely identical to this; thus we know it is not Mahāyāna.

Question: How is this known?

Answer: The text of the Lotus Sūtra explains that when śrāvakas realize emptiness, they cannot contemplate existence through emptiness, nor contemplate emptiness through existence; thus there is no mutual identity. What the Tattvasiddhi speaks of also lacks mutual identity. If it clarified mutual identity, it would contemplate emptiness and existence simultaneously. If it contemplated emptiness and existence simultaneously, what difference would there be from the Mahāyāna?

Question: How is it known that the Hīnayāna doctrine lacks mutual identity?

Answer: The Commentary states: “Within the Hīnayāna it is not clarified that saṃsāra is identical to ultimate emptiness; only the Mahāyāna speaks of this.” Thus we know it is so.

Ninth, harming understanding and practice: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: “If with the mind of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha one says there is no giving, this is called breaking the precepts and wrong view.” When a Hīnayāna person enters into the contemplation of emptiness, they do not see giving; this breaks Mahāyāna practice, hence it is called ‘breaking the precepts’; it breaks Mahāyāna understanding, hence it is called ‘wrong view.’ Yet the Tattvasiddhi clarifies that not seeing giving is the real emptiness of dharmas, taking this as its supreme principle. If one wishes to practice the Mahāyāna, one must not give rise to a lesser mind.

Tenth, examining contemporary people: In the seventh year of the Hongshi era of the Qin (405 CE), an Indian kṣatriya crossed the sea and reached Chang'an. Hearing that Kumārajīva practiced Mahāyāna learning, he consulted and tested him using the Madhyamakaśāstra and other texts. Master Kumārajīva analyzed and explained them for him; [the kṣatriya] received them with the crown of his head and sighed in endless admiration. He then addressed Master Kumārajīva, saying: “You ought to use this brilliance to shine upon India; why conceal this maṇi-jewel here in a borderland? When I was in India, I heard the various treatise masters deeply marvel that Kumāralāta, the Hīnayāna scholar in Jalandhara, praised himself as the illumination of the bright moon; his one-sided wisdom and lesser talent were not fit for this metaphor. Because Harivarman regretted that his master harmed himself with his talent and afflicted himself with his intellect, he composed this treatise to distinguish the reality of existing dharmas and clarify the provisional nature that relies on the real, hence naming it Tattvasiddhi.” Verifying this by the words of the Indian kṣatriya, Harivarman, both master and disciple, belonged to Hīnayāna learning.

Coming down to Prince Wenxuan, Minister of Education of the Qi, he had sincere faith in the Three Jewels and frequently experienced auspicious omens. In the tenth month of the tenth year of the Yongming era of the Qi (492 CE), he invited more than five hundred eminent and virtuous masters to lecture at Puhong Temple. Prince Wenxuan consistently regarded the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises as the ferry crossing for treading the Path and the hinge of the true Dharma; but seeing later generations abandon the root to venerate the branches, he requested the Dharma masters to abridge this Tattvasiddhi into nine fascicles, and commanded Zhou Yong to compose a preface, fearing that exclusive propagation of the lesser treatise would destroy the enterprise of the Mahāyāna. From then on, down to Emperor Wu of the Liang, the Mahāyāna was vigorously promoted, and the various masters who rejected and dismantled the Tattvasiddhi cannot be fully recorded.

Question: If we prove by these ten points that the Tattvasiddhi is Hīnayāna, what is its relative superiority or inferiority compared to the Abhidharma?

Answer: A bequeathed verse by Guṇavarman states: “The various treatises each have different approaches, but in practice the principle is not two. One-sided attachment leads to right and wrong; the one who has reached it has no disputes.” Furthermore, the Commentary states: “There are four gates: first, the Abhidharma gate; second, the emptiness gate; third, the Piṭaka gate (Peṭaka, which translates as ‘basket’); fourth, the neither-empty-nor-existent gate.” If one does not attain the expedient means of prajñā, studying the Abhidharma gate leads to falling into the view of existence; studying the emptiness gate leads to falling into the view of emptiness; studying the Peṭaka gate leads to falling into the view of both emptiness and existence; studying the neither-empty-nor-existent gate leads to falling into the treatise of foolishness. If one attains prajñā, the mind has no defiled attachment; adapting to capacities and suiting transformations, opening the Path and benefiting people, there is no mutual contradiction. Yet the Tattvasiddhi and the Abhidharma each cling to emptiness or existence, mutually rejecting each other, obstructing the Path and increasing views, both failing to grasp the Buddha's intent.

Question: It is only by realizing emptiness and cutting off fetters that one attains the Path; how could a mind observing existence separate the ordinary from the holy? Therefore we know that the Abhidharma violates the doctrine and the Tattvasiddhi attains the principle.

Answer: If you say that seeing emptiness accomplishes sagehood and that existence cannot separate the ordinary from the holy, then within the teaching of the Tripiṭaka no one would have attained the Path, and Śākyamuni's entire conversion via the Hīnayāna would have been set forth completely in vain, having to wait for the later emergence of the Tattvasiddhi to bring great benefit. How could this be so?

Question: The Abhidharma only clarifies the emptiness of persons, whereas the Tattvasiddhi fully clarifies the twofold emptiness; how can there be no superiority or inferiority between the two treatises?

Answer: Within the Hīnayāna, three grades are distinguished:
1. Those who attain neither of the two emptinesses. As the Vātsīputrīya says: “The combination of the four great elements produces the dharma of the eye; the combination of the five aggregates produces a separate dharma of the person.” These are people of inferior capacity.
2. The followers of the Sarvāstivāda, who only attain the emptiness of persons and do not attain the emptiness of phenomena; these are people of middling capacity.
3. The followers of the Dārṣṭāntikas and Harivarman, who fully attain the twofold emptiness; these are people of superior capacity.
Regarding the depth and shallowness of the meaning of emptiness, the Abhidharma is inferior within the Hīnayāna, and the Tattvasiddhi is superior within the Hīnayāna.

Question: The Commentary states: “After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, [the schools] divided into two parts: one merely believes in the emptiness of persons and does not believe in the emptiness of phenomena; the other believes in both the emptiness of persons and of phenomena.” There should only be two; how can three be distinguished?

Answer: Because the Vātsīputrīyas enter the true contemplation, they see the emptiness of the self, but when emerging into saṃvṛtisatya, there is a separate entity of the person. Nāgārjuna considers the aspect of their entering contemplation, and therefore only divides them into two.

Question: The Three Treatises rejecting the tīrthikas and the Abhidharma is understandable. But Nāgārjuna arose earlier and Harivarman appeared later; since their eras are far apart, how could they refute each other?

Answer: As long as there is clinging and attachment, it is immediately refuted; what need is there to discuss earlier or later? If an earlier treatise cannot refute later delusions, then likewise an ancient prescription could not cure a modern illness, and the techniques of Bian Que would be of no benefit to later generations.

Question: If Dharmaśreṣṭhin and Harivarman composed Hīnayāna treatises to explain the Tripiṭaka, and Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna composed the great teachings to propagate the vaipulya, their streams of large and small being divided, why must they refute each other?

Answer: When the Buddha spoke the Hīnayāna, it was originally meant to explain the Mahāyāna. Those who cling to darkness hold onto the finger and forget the moon; the sūtras themselves reproach them, and therefore the treatise master relied on the Buddha.

Question: Some say that the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra explores the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna. What fault is there in this?

Answer: This has already been clarified above. Since this delusion still persists, I shall now restate it. If it explores the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, it is contained neither in the small nor in the great: advancing, it does not hasten in the white-ox cart; retreating, it loses the mount of the goat and deer. The saying that it is a ‘mule treatise’ has long been verified.