三論玄義 1.9

1.9

Part Three: Rejecting the Tattvasiddhi has two sections: first, establishing the thesis; second, refuting it. A prominent disciple of Harivarman set forth its school's lineage, saying: “As for the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, it was composed within nine hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa by Harivarman (which translates as ‘Lion Armor’). This man was originally a disciple of Kumāralāta of the Sarvāstivāda school. Lamenting that [Kumāralāta's] explanations remained close to names and marks, he then changed course to the Mahāsāṃghika, studying both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, delving deeply into the ninefold scriptures and sifting through the five Nikāyas. Rolling back the erroneous mists once again and unfurling the sun of wisdom anew, his teaching shook Jalandhara and his fame spread to China. ‘Accomplishing’ (tattva) refers to the text that can establish; ‘truth’ (siddhi) refers to the principle established. In two hundred and two chapters across sixteen fascicles, it establishes the chapters with the four noble truths and clarifies the principles through the five aggregates. Its exposition being refined and subtle, those who took refuge in it were like a forest.”

Question: Since Harivarman rejected the Eight Sections (*Aṣṭaskandha) and sifted through the five Nikāyas, on what doctrine does the school of the Tattvasiddhi properly rely?

Answer: Some say that he chose what was good and followed it, recording whatever had merit, casting aside the shortcomings of the various masters and adopting the strengths of the various schools. Some say that although he rejected various divergent views, he properly used the Dharmaguptaka school. Some say that he specifically rejected the Abhidharma and exclusively agreed with the Dārṣṭāntikas. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha said, “He used the doctrines of the Sautrāntika school.” When one examines the Sautrāntika doctrines in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, many agree with the Tattvasiddhi.

Second is the refutation.

Question: Is the Tattvasiddhi a Hīnayāna treatise, a Mahāyāna treatise, or does it contain both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Answer: Some say it is Mahāyāna. Some say it is Hīnayāna. Some say it explored the Mahāyāna intent to explain the Hīnayāna, possessing both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Now, the fineness or coarseness of jade and common stone is seen by eyes and ears, yet mirrors still differ in clarity and dimness. How much more so the authenticity or falsehood of the wondrous Path, where speech ceases and thought is cut off—how could it be easily recognized? Now, by proving with ten points, it will be clearly shown that it is Hīnayāna and not Mahāyāna:
1. Proof from the ancient preface;
2. Verification from the treatise itself;
3. Absence of Mahāyāna texts;
4. Having established precedents;
5. Confusion regarding its own school;
6. Differentiating Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna;
7. Evaluating superiority and inferiority;
8. Absence of mutual identity;
9. Harming understanding and practice;
10. Examining contemporary people.

First, proof from the ancient preface: Formerly, after Dharma Master Kumārajīva finished translating the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, he instructed Sengrui to lecture on it. After Master Kumārajīva passed away, Venerable Sengrui recorded his bequeathed words and composed a preface to the treatise, which states: “The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra was composed eight hundred and ninety years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa by Harivarman, the chief disciple of Kumāralāta, the master of Hīnayāna scholars in Jalandhara. His treatise states: visible matter, scent, taste, and tangibles are real; earth, water, fire, and wind are provisional. While its refinement is abundant, its clarification of reality is deficient. Inferring and investigating it, it is merely the reality within Hīnayāna. Compared to the Mahāyāna, even comparing a dragon’s torch to the glow of a firefly would not suffice to illustrate the vast distance between them.” Someone once said that this treatise clarifies the truth of cessation equally with the Mahāyāna. When Kumārajīva heard this, he sighed and said: “How has the lack of deep discernment among the people of Qin reached such a point? Whenever I suspected that those who universally believe in the Mahāyāna did not awaken from within, their delusion could now be recognized!” The Tattvasiddhi was translated by Kumārajīva, and Sengrui was the first to lecture on it; later scholars should not fail these former masters.

Second, verification from the treatise itself: The text of the Tattvasiddhi states: “Because the Buddha permitted the diverse treatises of the various monks, I wish to correctly discuss the real meaning within the Tripiṭaka.” Since Harivarman himself says he correctly discusses the Tripiṭaka, we know that the principle of the Tattvasiddhi is Hīnayāna. If one says that this treatise also clarifies the Mahāyāna, the fault lies with his disciples, not with Harivarman.

Question: How is it known that the Tripiṭaka refers to the Hīnayāna?

Answer: The Lotus Sūtra says: “Nor does one draw near to scholars of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka, fearing that because one's great illumination is not yet complete, the lesser teachings might defile it; thus wisdom and form should be separated, and their conduct should not be shared.” Admonishing the Mahāsattva not to draw near to lesser persons, we know that the Tripiṭaka is not the Mahāyāna. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra states: “Kāśyapa and Ānanda compiled the Tripiṭaka, while Mañjuśrī and Maitreya compiled the Mahāyāna Piṭaka. An outsider asked: ‘Why was the Mahāyāna not compiled within the Tripiṭaka?’ The treatise master answered: ‘The Hīnayāna does not accept the Mahāyāna; the Mahāyāna should not be compiled within the Hīnayāna.’” Inferring from this, it is merely Hīnayāna.

Third, absence of Mahāyāna texts: Generally, when composing treatises, one always cites the Buddha's words. Just as Nāgārjuna explained the Mahāyāna and cited Mahāyāna sūtras in return, Harivarman explained Hīnayāna sūtras and only used Hīnayāna proofs: all two hundred and two chapters draw from the four Āgamas, and throughout the sixteen fascicles there is not a single vaipulya [sūtra]. Deliberating from this, one can know it.

Fourth, having established precedents.

Question: If the Tattvasiddhi's explaining the Hīnayāna does not permit it to concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna, then likewise the Three Treatises' explaining the Mahāyāna should not concurrently clarify the Hīnayāna.

Answer: The principles have established precedents; they should not be confused. The Buddha's sūtras are twofold: first, the Hīnayāna; second, the vaipulya. If one clarifies the Mahāyāna, one must concurrently explain the Hīnayāna; if one explains the Hīnayāna, one does not concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna. Therefore, at the beginning of Mahāyāna sūtras there is a Hīnayāna assembly, whereas at the head of Hīnayāna sūtras there is no saṃgha of bodhisattvas; this shows that the great can encompass the small, but the small cannot contain the great. Since the Buddha's sūtras are like this, treatises follow the same precedent. A Mahāyāna treatise concurrently clarifies the Hīnayāna; a Hīnayāna treatise does not concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna. If a disciple's treatise explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, the Tathāgata's sūtras should likewise be so; then large and small would mutually encompass each other, and how could they be called Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Fifth, confusion regarding its own school.

Question: The text of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra abundantly explains the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena, which is identical to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā's clarification of the equality of the four noble truths. Since the meaning is not different, we know that it must have explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna.

Answer: Within the teachings of the four Āgamas there is the twofold emptiness; when the treatise clarifies the twofold emptiness, it is explaining the Tripiṭaka in return. Why say it explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna? Furthermore, Śāriputra's Abhidharma also explains the twofold emptiness, yet it is Hīnayāna and not Mahāyāna; the meaning of Harivarman's treatise must likewise be the same.

Question: Śāriputra's Abhidharma also explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, following the same precedent as the Tattvasiddhi. Since that one explored the Mahāyāna, this one is not exclusively Hīnayāna.

Answer: What Śāriputra composed was in turn an explanation of the Buddha's Abhidharma. Since what the Buddha spoke was Hīnayāna, how could that treatise be said to explore the Mahāyāna?

Sixth, differentiating Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna.

Question: If the Hīnayāna clarifies one emptiness and the Mahāyāna explains two emptinesses, there would be a difference; but since both explain the twofold emptiness, what is the difference between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Answer: Although both explain the twofold emptiness, the twofold emptiness is not the same, briefly clarified in four points:
1. The Hīnayāna analyzes phenomena to clarify emptiness, whereas the Mahāyāna's original nature is empty and tranquil.
2. The Hīnayāna only clarifies the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena within the three realms, so its meaning of emptiness is limited; the Mahāyāna clarifies that persons and phenomena both within and outside the three realms are all empty, so its meaning of emptiness is extensive.
3. The Hīnayāna only clarifies emptiness and has not yet spoken of non-emptiness; the Mahāyāna clarifies emptiness and also explains non-emptiness. Thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “Śrāvakas only see emptiness and do not see non-emptiness. The wise see emptiness as well as non-emptiness; emptiness is all saṃsāra, and non-emptiness is the great nirvāṇa.”
4. The Hīnayāna is called ‘mere emptiness,’ meaning they merely abide in emptiness. For bodhisattvas it is called ‘unobtainable emptiness,’ where emptiness is also unobtainable.
Therefore, we know that although both clarify the twofold emptiness, the meaning of emptiness differs; thus Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are differentiated.

Seventh, evaluating superiority and inferiority: In explaining the chapter on ‘Entrustment’ in the Prajñāpāramitā, Nāgārjuna says: “When Subhūti contemplates the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena, if one wishes to compare it to the bodhisattva's twofold emptiness, it is like the space in a pore compared to the space in the ten directions.” Thus the Hīnayāna emptiness is shallow, and the Mahāyāna emptiness is deep. What the Tattvasiddhi clarifies is merely the emptiness of śrāvakas, not that attained by Mahāsattvas.

Eighth, absence of mutual identity: The ‘Faith and Understanding’ chapter of the Lotus Sūtra states: “The four great śrāvakas described their own attainment of emptiness, saying: ‘Throughout the long night we practiced the dharmas of emptiness—without birth and without cessation, without small and without great, without outflow and unconditioned—producing no craving or attachment toward the Buddha's wisdom.’” What the Tattvasiddhi explains is completely identical to this; thus we know it is not Mahāyāna.

Question: How is this known?

Answer: The text of the Lotus Sūtra explains that when śrāvakas realize emptiness, they cannot contemplate existence through emptiness, nor contemplate emptiness through existence; thus there is no mutual identity. What the Tattvasiddhi speaks of also lacks mutual identity. If it clarified mutual identity, it would contemplate emptiness and existence simultaneously. If it contemplated emptiness and existence simultaneously, what difference would there be from the Mahāyāna?

Question: How is it known that the Hīnayāna doctrine lacks mutual identity?

Answer: The Commentary states: “Within the Hīnayāna it is not clarified that saṃsāra is identical to ultimate emptiness; only the Mahāyāna speaks of this.” Thus we know it is so.

Ninth, harming understanding and practice: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: “If with the mind of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha one says there is no giving, this is called breaking the precepts and wrong view.” When a Hīnayāna person enters into the contemplation of emptiness, they do not see giving; this breaks Mahāyāna practice, hence it is called ‘breaking the precepts’; it breaks Mahāyāna understanding, hence it is called ‘wrong view.’ Yet the Tattvasiddhi clarifies that not seeing giving is the real emptiness of dharmas, taking this as its supreme principle. If one wishes to practice the Mahāyāna, one must not give rise to a lesser mind.

Tenth, examining contemporary people: In the seventh year of the Hongshi era of the Qin (405 CE), an Indian kṣatriya crossed the sea and reached Chang'an. Hearing that Kumārajīva practiced Mahāyāna learning, he consulted and tested him using the Madhyamakaśāstra and other texts. Master Kumārajīva analyzed and explained them for him; [the kṣatriya] received them with the crown of his head and sighed in endless admiration. He then addressed Master Kumārajīva, saying: “You ought to use this brilliance to shine upon India; why conceal this maṇi-jewel here in a borderland? When I was in India, I heard the various treatise masters deeply marvel that Kumāralāta, the Hīnayāna scholar in Jalandhara, praised himself as the illumination of the bright moon; his one-sided wisdom and lesser talent were not fit for this metaphor. Because Harivarman regretted that his master harmed himself with his talent and afflicted himself with his intellect, he composed this treatise to distinguish the reality of existing dharmas and clarify the provisional nature that relies on the real, hence naming it Tattvasiddhi.” Verifying this by the words of the Indian kṣatriya, Harivarman, both master and disciple, belonged to Hīnayāna learning.

Coming down to Prince Wenxuan, Minister of Education of the Qi, he had sincere faith in the Three Jewels and frequently experienced auspicious omens. In the tenth month of the tenth year of the Yongming era of the Qi (492 CE), he invited more than five hundred eminent and virtuous masters to lecture at Puhong Temple. Prince Wenxuan consistently regarded the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises as the ferry crossing for treading the Path and the hinge of the true Dharma; but seeing later generations abandon the root to venerate the branches, he requested the Dharma masters to abridge this Tattvasiddhi into nine fascicles, and commanded Zhou Yong to compose a preface, fearing that exclusive propagation of the lesser treatise would destroy the enterprise of the Mahāyāna. From then on, down to Emperor Wu of the Liang, the Mahāyāna was vigorously promoted, and the various masters who rejected and dismantled the Tattvasiddhi cannot be fully recorded.

Question: If we prove by these ten points that the Tattvasiddhi is Hīnayāna, what is its relative superiority or inferiority compared to the Abhidharma?

Answer: A bequeathed verse by Guṇavarman states: “The various treatises each have different approaches, but in practice the principle is not two. One-sided attachment leads to right and wrong; the one who has reached it has no disputes.” Furthermore, the Commentary states: “There are four gates: first, the Abhidharma gate; second, the emptiness gate; third, the Piṭaka gate (Peṭaka, which translates as ‘basket’); fourth, the neither-empty-nor-existent gate.” If one does not attain the expedient means of prajñā, studying the Abhidharma gate leads to falling into the view of existence; studying the emptiness gate leads to falling into the view of emptiness; studying the Peṭaka gate leads to falling into the view of both emptiness and existence; studying the neither-empty-nor-existent gate leads to falling into the treatise of foolishness. If one attains prajñā, the mind has no defiled attachment; adapting to capacities and suiting transformations, opening the Path and benefiting people, there is no mutual contradiction. Yet the Tattvasiddhi and the Abhidharma each cling to emptiness or existence, mutually rejecting each other, obstructing the Path and increasing views, both failing to grasp the Buddha's intent.

Question: It is only by realizing emptiness and cutting off fetters that one attains the Path; how could a mind observing existence separate the ordinary from the holy? Therefore we know that the Abhidharma violates the doctrine and the Tattvasiddhi attains the principle.

Answer: If you say that seeing emptiness accomplishes sagehood and that existence cannot separate the ordinary from the holy, then within the teaching of the Tripiṭaka no one would have attained the Path, and Śākyamuni's entire conversion via the Hīnayāna would have been set forth completely in vain, having to wait for the later emergence of the Tattvasiddhi to bring great benefit. How could this be so?

Question: The Abhidharma only clarifies the emptiness of persons, whereas the Tattvasiddhi fully clarifies the twofold emptiness; how can there be no superiority or inferiority between the two treatises?

Answer: Within the Hīnayāna, three grades are distinguished:
1. Those who attain neither of the two emptinesses. As the Vātsīputrīya says: “The combination of the four great elements produces the dharma of the eye; the combination of the five aggregates produces a separate dharma of the person.” These are people of inferior capacity.
2. The followers of the Sarvāstivāda, who only attain the emptiness of persons and do not attain the emptiness of phenomena; these are people of middling capacity.
3. The followers of the Dārṣṭāntikas and Harivarman, who fully attain the twofold emptiness; these are people of superior capacity.
Regarding the depth and shallowness of the meaning of emptiness, the Abhidharma is inferior within the Hīnayāna, and the Tattvasiddhi is superior within the Hīnayāna.

Question: The Commentary states: “After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, [the schools] divided into two parts: one merely believes in the emptiness of persons and does not believe in the emptiness of phenomena; the other believes in both the emptiness of persons and of phenomena.” There should only be two; how can three be distinguished?

Answer: Because the Vātsīputrīyas enter the true contemplation, they see the emptiness of the self, but when emerging into saṃvṛtisatya, there is a separate entity of the person. Nāgārjuna considers the aspect of their entering contemplation, and therefore only divides them into two.

Question: The Three Treatises rejecting the tīrthikas and the Abhidharma is understandable. But Nāgārjuna arose earlier and Harivarman appeared later; since their eras are far apart, how could they refute each other?

Answer: As long as there is clinging and attachment, it is immediately refuted; what need is there to discuss earlier or later? If an earlier treatise cannot refute later delusions, then likewise an ancient prescription could not cure a modern illness, and the techniques of Bian Que would be of no benefit to later generations.

Question: If Dharmaśreṣṭhin and Harivarman composed Hīnayāna treatises to explain the Tripiṭaka, and Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna composed the great teachings to propagate the vaipulya, their streams of large and small being divided, why must they refute each other?

Answer: When the Buddha spoke the Hīnayāna, it was originally meant to explain the Mahāyāna. Those who cling to darkness hold onto the finger and forget the moon; the sūtras themselves reproach them, and therefore the treatise master relied on the Buddha.

Question: Some say that the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra explores the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna. What fault is there in this?

Answer: This has already been clarified above. Since this delusion still persists, I shall now restate it. If it explores the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, it is contained neither in the small nor in the great: advancing, it does not hasten in the white-ox cart; retreating, it loses the mount of the goat and deer. The saying that it is a ‘mule treatise’ has long been verified.