三論玄義 1

English (machine translation) 1

Language: English

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Composed under imperial order by the Śramaṇa Jizang of the Huiri Bodhimaṇḍa.

A general overview of the cardinal tenets is opened into two sections: first, a general introduction to the great purpose; second, a specific explanation of the various chapters. The first section contains two parts: first, refuting the erroneous; second, revealing the correct.

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Now, transforming beings in accord with their capacities has no fixed direction, and moulding and guiding them is not of one manner alone. Examining the sage's intent, taking the cessation of afflictions as principal; synthesizing the purport of the teaching, taking penetration into the principle as the primary aim. Yet the ninety-six heterodox arts dwelt in the burning house taking it as the pure path, and the five hundred divergent sects entangled themselves in the net of views taking it as nirvāṇa. This caused the Mṛgadāva to turn to ruins and Gṛdhrakūṭa to be overgrown with brambles; the Sugata wept bitterly over this, and the Bodhisattva felt great compassion on this account. The four reliances arose for this reason, and the Three Treatises were composed because of this. Although the treatises are three, their purport takes but two tracks: first, revealing the correct; second, refuting the erroneous. Refuting the erroneous saves those who have fallen below; revealing the correct propagates the great Dharma above. Therefore, lifting the collar and grasping the net, the principle is solely these two. But erroneous fallacies are tangled and manifold, difficult to set forth completely; what is refuted by the Three Treatises briefly distinguishes four tenets: first, smashing the tīrthikas; second, breaking the Abhidharma; third, discarding the Tattvasiddhi; fourth, reproving attachment to the Mahāyāna. Question: For what reason are the various masters refuted everywhere? Answer: The treatise master investigated their source and exhausted their principle. If one source is not investigated, prapañca is not extinguished; if a hair of principle is not exhausted, the ultimate path will not be made manifest. Because there is no source left uninvestigated, the various divergent views are brought to rest; because there is no principle left unexhausted, the profound path first opens up. For this reason, this text everywhere discards the various opinions. Question: Since there is no phenomenon uninvestigated and no statement unexhausted, all divergent views ought to be discarded; why then refute only four tenets? Answer: The first one is external, and the latter three are internal; both the internal and external are subsumed. The Abhidharma clarifies existence, while the Tattvasiddhi analyzes emptiness; both emptiness and existence are comprehended, and these two are the Hīnayāna. The vaipulya is called Mahāyāna; both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are encompassed. By briefly cleansing these four delusions, tangled entanglements are completely eliminated. Question: Regarding these four attachments, how are their superiority and inferiority graded? Answer: The tīrthikas do not comprehend the twofold emptiness and arbitrarily preserve persons and dharmas. The Abhidharma has already attained the selflessness of persons, yet clings to dharmas having intrinsic nature. Harivarman fully analyzes the twofold emptiness, yet his illumination is still not complete. The Mahāyāna indeed speaks of ultimate perfection, but clinging attachments turn into delusion. From shallow to deep, these are the gradations of the four tenets. Question: The erroneous words of tīrthikas may well be called 'refuted'; as the others are the internal teaching, how can they also be refuted? Answer: Speaking generally of refutation and revelation, there are four gates in all: first, refuting without accepting; second, accepting without refuting; third, both refuting and accepting; fourth, neither refuting nor accepting. If words do not accord with the path, they are refuted and not accepted. If an exposition necessarily accords with principle, it is accepted and not refuted. When delusion arises from studying the teachings, it is both refuted and accepted: refuting the grasping mind capable of delusion, and accepting the teaching about which it was confused. The dharmatā of all phenomena transcends words and cuts off thought; there is truly nothing that can be refuted and nothing that can be accepted. Dissolving the above three gates into the one characteristic, illuminating these catuṣkoṭi makes refutation and establishment lucid and distinct. (Up to this point has been a general explanation of presenting refutation; from here on begins the specific refutation of the four tenets.)

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Regarding what is meant by 'smashing the tīrthikas': the most wondrous, open, and penetrating is referred to as the path; because their minds wander outside the path, they are called 'tīrthikas' (outsiders to the path). Tīrthikas are of many kinds, but two are briefly set forth: first, the divergent attachments of India; second, the various masters of China. Discussing the ninety-six heterodox arts of the Western Regions in general, but specifically setting forth the cardinal tenets, four attachments prevail: first, positing erroneous cause and erroneous effect; second, clinging to absence of cause and presence of effect; third, establishing presence of cause and absence of effect; fourth, discerning absence of cause and absence of effect. Question: What is meant by 'erroneous cause and erroneous effect'? Answer: A tīrthika says that Maheśvara is capable of producing the myriad things, and when the myriad things are extinguished, they return to the original god; hence he is called 'Sovereign' (Maheśvara). If the god is angry, the four modes of birth all suffer; if Maheśvara is pleased, then all six destinies rejoice. However, the god is not the cause of things, and things are not the effect of the god; this is merely a projection of an erroneous mind, and hence is called 'erroneous cause and erroneous effect'. (Maheśvara being like this, the other seven doctrines are likewise so.) Objection: Wholesome actions bring forth pleasant retribution, and unwholesome actions invite painful effects; this is indeed the dwelling place of alternation and the sphere of karmic retribution. Because they do not comprehend this principle, they give rise to such fallacies. Moreover, the human species generates humans, and kinds of things generate things; when the human species generates humans, humans resemble humans, and when kinds of things generate things, things resemble things. This is the way of mutual generation. Yet to claim that the cause of a single god produces the retribution of a myriad species—how could this not be a fallacy? Question: What is meant by 'absence of cause and presence of effect'? Answer: There are also tīrthikas who exhaustively investigate the myriad things and find no basis or reliance; hence they claim there is no cause. Yet seeing phenomena at present, one must know there are effects. This is like Zhuang Zhou's shadow being questioned by the penumbra: the shadow exists because of the form, the form is caused by the Creator, and the Creator has no source. Since the root originally exists of itself, the branches do not depend on anything else; therefore, there is an absence of cause and a presence of effect. Question: What difference is there between 'absence of cause' and 'svabhāva' (spontaneity)? Answer: 'Absence of cause' is based on the non-existence of its cause; 'svabhāva' clarifies the existence of its effect. Viewed in terms of meaning they differ, yet they are still one single attachment. Objection: Cause and effect mutually generate each other, just as long and short give form to each other. Since there is an effect, how could there be no cause? If there is no cause, how could there alone be an effect? If there were definitely effects without causes, then wholesome actions would invite hell, and unwholesome actions would evoke heaven. Question: Someone says that svabhāva has a cause, or that svabhāva has no cause, and that the myriad transformations are diverse yet all exist by svabhāva; thus they do not incur the previous flaw. Answer: It is because of not scrutinizing carefully that such a fallacy arises. If one investigates thoroughly, the principle is certainly not so. When discussing 'self' (sva-), its meaning is 'not other'. If it necessarily depends on other, then it is not 'self'. Therefore, if it is 'self', it is not dependent; if it is dependent, it is not 'self'. If one then claims that it is dependent and yet self-existent, the meaning becomes a contradiction. Question: What is meant by 'presence of cause and absence of effect'? Answer: The school of ucchedadṛṣṭi holds that there is only the present and no future life, like plants and trees being exhausted in a single period. Objection: The spiritual way is dark and mysterious; deluded people are mostly ignorant of it. Its principle was not made clear through the Classics of Confucius, and its meaning remained obscure through the works of the Duke of Zhou; only the Buddhist doctrine fully reaches its purport. A sutra says: 'Like a sparrow in a jar whose opening is covered with thin silk; when the silk is pierced the sparrow flies away, the form perishing while the spirit departs.' Huiyuan of Mount Lu explained: 'The transmission of fire from firewood is like the transmission of the spirit from physical form. The transmission of fire to different firewood is like the transmission of the spirit to a different form. The former firewood is not the latter firewood; thus we know the subtlety of the art of exhausting the fuel. The former form is not the latter form; thus we awaken to the depth of the resonance of mental states. One cannot see that the form decays in a single lifetime and thereupon say that consciousness and spirit are both lost, just as when the fire is exhausted in a single piece of wood, one should not say that the ultimate end is completely extinguished.' Later scholars praised the words of the Yellow Emperor, saying: 'Though the form decomposes, the spirit does not transform; riding transformation it reaches boundless metamorphosis.' Although this does not overtly speak of the three times, the intent has already clarified that the future is uninterrupted. Question: What is meant by 'absence of cause and absence of effect'? Answer: It rejects future fruitional effects, and also denies present causes. Thus the six teachers said: 'There is no dark karma, and no retribution of dark karma; there is no bright karma, and no retribution of bright karma.' Among the four erroneous views, this is the most harmful; in the present it severs wholesome roots, and in the next life one is born into the evil destinies. Question: When did these tangled fallacies begin? Answer: Before Śākyamuni arose, they were widely prevalent in India. When the Muni appeared, he eliminated these erroneous opinions. After the Buddha passed into extinction, the branches and twigs grew even more abundant; Nāgārjuna later arose and pruned them once again.

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Next, discarding the various masters of China: first, examining the doctrine; second, assessing the persons. Question: The four Indian arts are indeed external words, but the Three Mysteries of China ought to be an internal teaching. Answer: The Śramaṇa Sengzhao said: 'Whenever I read the books of Laozi and Zhuang Zhou, I sighed and said: "They are indeed beautiful, yet their method for lodging the spirit and vanishing worldly entanglements is still not exhaustive." Later, seeing the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, I rejoiced and reverently held it, saying to my relatives and friends: "I know that to which I shall return in the ultimate." Thereupon I abandoned the world and went forth.' When Kumārajīva previously heard that the Three Mysteries and the nine divisions reached the same ultimate, and that Boyang and the Muni were on equal footing, he sighed with deep feeling and said: 'Because Laozi and Zhuangzi entered into the mysterious, they are likely to deceive the eyes and ears. They are the wisdom of ordinary people, reckless words; they seem ultimate when spoken, yet have never arrived; when pursued they seem exhaustive, yet have reached nowhere. I will briefly state six points to clarify their superiority and inferiority: The external only distinguishes a single physical form, while the internal brightly illuminates the three times; the external has not reached beyond the five sensory feelings, while the internal explains the six superknowledges exhaustively penetrating the subtle; the external cannot identify the myriad existents as the Great Void, while the internal explains that without destroying prajñapti, dharmatā is expounded; the external cannot abide in unconditioned non-action while roaming through the myriad existents, while the internal explains that without moving from the bhūtakoṭi, all phenomena are established; the external retains the gates of gain and loss, while the internal merges the two limits within the principle that transcends catuṣkoṭi; the external has not extinguished both object and cognition, while the internal has both condition and vipaśyanā utterly tranquil. Examining them with these, comparing short feathers to the wings of the Peng bird, or an abandoned well to the Heavenly Pond, is still insufficient to illustrate their vast disparity. The people of Qin suspect them to be ultimate; what more can I say!' Question: The path of Boyang is called the Great Void. The path of the Muni is called signlessness. Since the source of principle is one, the myriad streams are identical. Kumārajīva and Sengzhao's disparagement and praise is merely flattery toward the Buddha. (This is Wang Bi's old commentary, taking unconditioned non-action as the substance of the Dao.) Answer: The path of Boyang refers to voidness and non-being; the path of the Muni transcends the catuṣkoṭi. Since shallow and deep are so far apart, how could their substance be one? It is you who flatter the Dao, not I who flatter the Buddha. Question: The path of the Muni is the paramārthasatya, and its substance cuts off the hundred negations. The path of Boyang is said to be dim and indistinct, its principle transcending the catuṣkoṭi. This all the more proves that their substance is one; how could there be shallow and deep? (This is Emperor Wu of Liang's new interpretation, using Buddhist sutras to take true emptiness as the substance of the Dao.) Answer: The nine schools synthesize and the Seven Summaries encompass; they only distinguish being and non-being, and have not clarified cutting off the four [koṭis]. If one says that Laozi's teaching also distinguishes the double negation, it is mixing sand with gold, identical to the argument of the stolen cow. (Zhou Hongzheng and Zhang Ji both refuted Laozi having the meaning of double negation.)

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Second, assessing the persons. Question: The Buddha is called the Greatly Awakened One, and Laozi is called the Heavenly Worthy; as persons they are both supreme sages, and their dharmas are equally wondrous and ultimate. If you insist on maintaining differences, would that not block the profound gate of non-duality and harm the deep repository of attaining oneness? (This is Daoist masters establishing doctrines using texts like the Three Caverns and Lingbao scriptures.) Answer: While Siddhārtha resided in the palace, he was to succeed as a gold-wheel-turning sage emperor; when the Muni left secular life, he became the Dharma King of the three realms. Laozi was a scribe of the Zhou court, and his pure emptiness is merely a branch of the nine schools. If you wish to make the persons one and the teachings identical, how does this differ from claiming that an earthen mound is of equal height to Mount Sumeru, or that the light of a firefly or candle shines equally with the sun and moon? Question: Those who resemble others possess the five emotions; those who differ from others possess spiritual illumination. His trace was that of a scribe, but his origin was truly the Heavenly Worthy. Speaking according to reality, they are aligned in a single unity. Answer: The Book of Han also clearly classifies categories, ranking Boyang among the worthy; He Yan and Wang Bi stated that Laozi did not yet reach the level of sage. Even if Confucius was the youth Māṇava and Laozi was Kāśyapa, though their sagely traces were both of sages, sagely traces are not identical. If one perfectly responds to the ten directions and achieves Buddhahood through the eight phases, the person is called the Greatly Awakened One, and the dharma is named world-transcending; its minor benefit brings the blessings and goodness of humans and devas, and its great benefit produces the worthy and noble ones of the three vehicles: such a kind belongs to the superior traces. As for Confucius being called the Uncrowned King and speaking of existence being named Confucianism, and Laozi occupying the post of scribe and speaking of non-being being named the Dao: discerning their benefits, no one attained sagehood; clarifying their advantages, they stopped merely at the mundane. Such kinds belong to the secondary traces.

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Second, crushing the Abhidharma. This has two parts: 1. setting forth their tenet, and 2. refuting it. A follower of the Sarvāstivāda introduced their tenet, saying: "The Abhidharma is called the incomparable dharma (abhidharma). Influx-free roots of wisdom match reality and set [one] apart from the ordinary; because its efficacy is pre-eminent, it is called 'incomparable.' It surpasses the four clingings and transcends the three realms; it is praised by all the sages and venerated by the six destinies. Should anyone dare raise objections, we will bend them with reason." Question: Whoever wishes to establish a thesis must first trace the origin of the school. How many types of Abhidharma are there in all? Answer: There are very many classes and genres, but to explain them briefly there are six: First, the Abhidharma on the characteristics of dharmas spoken by the Tathāgata himself, which flourished widely in India but was not transmitted to China. Second, Śāriputra, who stood adjacent to the ultimate as second to the Sage, composed an Abhidharma in twenty fascicles to explain the Buddha's words, which was transmitted to this land. Third, over three hundred years after the Buddha's extinction, there was a great arhat possessed of the three knowledges and six supernormal knowledges, whose family name was Kātyāyana, who composed the Jñānaprasthāna (Eight Skandhas) in twenty fascicles, which was transmitted to this land. As for the "eight": 1. Miscellaneous, 2. Fetters, 3. Knowledges, 4. Actions, 5. Great [Elements], 6. Faculties, 7. Absorptions, and 8. Views. As for "skandha" (jiandu), it is translated as "aggregate"; because each of these eight meanings has its own category, they are termed "aggregates" on that basis. Fourth, within six hundred years [after the extinction], there were five hundred arhats who were disciples of Kātyāyana; in Northern India they jointly composed the Vibhāṣā to comment on the Jñānaprasthāna. Vibhāṣā means "extensive exposition" here; it was translated in West Liangzhou in a total of one hundred fascicles. Meeting with fire from war, only sixty fascicles are extant, which explain only three of the skandhas. Fifth, after seven hundred-odd years, the arhat Dharmaśreṣṭhin, disliking the Vibhāṣā as too extensive, epitomised its essential doctrines and composed two hundred and fifty verses, named the Abhidharmahṛdaya, in four fascicles, which was also transmitted to this land. Sixth, within a thousand years, Dharmatrāta, considering the Vibhāṣā too extensive and the four fascicles [of the Abhidharmahṛdaya] extremely concise, further composed three hundred and fifty verses, adding to the four fascicles to make six hundred verses altogether, named the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya. In the interim there was also the Abhidharma of the Six Treatises. The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra states: "Maudgalyāyana, Vasumitra, and other masters of treatises jointly composed them; none were transmitted to this land. Only the Prakaraṇapāda is one among the six, and it exists in this land." Furthermore, there is the *Amṛtarasa-śāstra in two fascicles, its author unknown, which was also transmitted to this land. Although the Abhidharma differs in its classes and genres, its primary tenet explains that one attains the Path by seeing existence.

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Second, the refutation, which has ten sections altogether: 1. It goes against the ultimate Path; 2. It supports diverse views; 3. It contradicts the great teaching; 4. It holds to a small fish-trap; 5. It is confused about its own school; 6. It lacks fundamental faith; 7. It has partial attachments; 8. It is not the basis of learning; 9. It ruins the true words; 10. It loses the complete intent. Indeed, its title of "incomparable" is superfluous, and the principle it explains is deficient; not only does it stray far from the vaipulya, but it also falls short even of understanding the Tripiṭaka. We briefly present ten sections to demonstrate its truth and falsity. As for going against the ultimate Path: the nature of the Path is that its substance cuts off the hundred negations, and its principle transcends the catuṣkoṭi. He who speaks of it loses its reality; he who knows it returns to folly. To say it exists goes against its nature; to say it does not exist injures its substance. Thus the seven elocutions cease their sound, and the five eyes perceive in darkness; Śākyamuni shut his chamber, and Vimalakīrti closed his mouth. How could the Path ever be made of existence? Second, supporting diverse views. The Path is in truth not existent, yet they proceed to say that one attains the Path by seeing existence; this is merely seeing existence, not seeing the Path. Therefore the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: "The Dharma is named free from attachment. If one is attached to the Dharma, that is attachment, not seeking the Dharma." Furthermore, whoever sees existence is said to have an "existent-view," not to see the Path. Thus the Lotus Sūtra says: "Entering the thicket of false views, such as existence, non-existence, and the like; relying upon these views, they fully embody the sixty-two." Question: If one clings to existence or non-existence, what fault is there in this? Answer: The Madhyamakaśāstra says: "Those of shallow wisdom who see dharmas / As existent, non-existent, and so forth, / Are thereby unable to see / The tranquil dharma wherein views are extinguished." Therein lies their great error. Third, contradicting the great teaching. The Viśeṣacintibrahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra says: "In future eras there will be evil monks who say that one can accomplish the noble path through dharmas that possess characteristics." The Buddha left this instruction as a remote warning for the future. Since they are called "evil persons," it is logically an erroneous teaching that contradicts the great teaching and must be refuted. Fourth, holding to a small fish-trap. For those who do not yet recognise the source, one points to the stream so that they may trace the stream to find the source; for those who do not yet see the moon, one points with a finger so that they may use the finger to see the moon. Exhausting the stream, there is only one source; forgetting the finger, there is only one moon. Such was the Tathāgata's intent in preaching the small [vehicle]. Yet the followers of the Abhidharma stubbornly cling to the small school and do not proceed toward the Great Path; holding to the fish-trap and losing the reality, treatises were therefore composed to refute them. Fifth, being confused about their own school. The compositions of the noble disciples were originally meant to penetrate the sūtras. But the texts of the Āgamas directly speak of signlessness; therefore Subhūti attained the Path by contemplating the emptiness of dharmas, and Śāriputra entered the concentration on emptiness and was praised by the Buddha. The Abhidharma people explain only the seeing of existence, and thus are confused about their own fundamental school. Sixth, lacking fundamental faith. The Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra says: "The eighteen and the two root [schools] / All emerge from the Mahāyāna. / There is neither right nor wrong; / I speak of what will arise in the future." "The eighteen" refers to the diverse sectarian tenets of the eighteen schools. "And the two root [schools]" refers to the root divisions being only two: first, the Mahāsāṃghika, and second, the Sthaviravāda. Now the Abhidharma belongs to the Sarvāstivāda among the eighteen schools, which emerged from the Mahāyāna; thus the Great is the root of the Small. Yet the followers who cling to the Small hear of the Mahāyāna and do not believe; therefore they are refuted. Question: How do we know that those who cling to the Small do not believe in the Great Dharma? Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra says: "A disciple of Kātyāyana replied to Nāgārjuna: 'When I hear the Mahāyāna, my mind does not believe it at all.'" Therefore, in foreign lands, those who cling to the Hīnayāna and those who study the Mahāyāna drink water from divided rivers. Seventh, having partial attachments. The Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra says: "Although there are five schools, none obstructs the Tathāgata's dharmadhātu and great nirvāṇa." Yet the Abhidharma people preserve and cling to their own school, rejecting what others say, thereby violating the dharmadhātu and rejecting great nirvāṇa. Since their entanglements and hindrances are deep, one must lament them. Eighth, it is not the basis of learning. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "He who wishes to know the four conditions should study prajñā." An outsider asked Nāgārjuna: "If one wishes to learn the four conditions, one should study the Abhidharma. Why should one study prajñā?" The treatise master replied: "When first studying the Abhidharma, it seems understandable; but the longer one investigates, the more it turns into false views." Question: How does studying the Abhidharma turn into false views? Answer: If one says that the four conditions generate all dharmas, what then generates the four conditions? If the four conditions are further produced from another, then that other in turn is produced from another, and so on without end. If the four conditions exist of themselves (svabhāva) and are not produced from another, then the myriad things also should not depend on the four conditions, and one falls into the absence of cause. Thus, depending [on another leads to] infinity, and terminating [production leads to] no-cause; through these two approaches one loses faith in cause and effect, and so studying the Abhidharma for long turns into false views. Ninth, ruining the true words. The Mahāsaṃnipāta-sūtra says: "The profound meaning cannot be spoken; the ultimate truth has no sounds or words. The monk Kauṇḍinya attained true knowledge and vision regarding all dharmas." The *Caryānidāna-sūtra says: "The śramaṇa Aśvajit, being one of the five men, recited a verse for Śāriputra: 'All dharmas originate / From causes and conditions, empty and without master. / Halting the mind and reaching the root source, / One is therefore called a śramaṇa.' Upon hearing this, Śāriputra immediately attained the first fruit." Investigating both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna sūtras, both explain that seeing emptiness accomplishes sagehood; yet the Abhidharma claims that contemplating existence attains the Path, and thereby obscures the true words. Tenth, losing the complete intent. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: "Desiring to cause sentient beings to recognise the ultimate truth deeply, the Tathāgata expounds the conventional. If sentient beings were able to recognise the truth without relying on the conventional truth, the Buddhas and Tathāgatas would never speak of the conventional." Although the followers of the Abhidharma know conventional existence, they do not awaken to true emptiness; being deluded about true emptiness, they are also confused about conventional existence, and therefore both the ultimate and the conventional are lost.

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Part Three: Rejecting the Tattvasiddhi has two sections: first, establishing the thesis; second, refuting it. A prominent disciple of Harivarman set forth its school's lineage, saying: “As for the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, it was composed within nine hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa by Harivarman (which translates as ‘Lion Armor’). This man was originally a disciple of Kumāralāta of the Sarvāstivāda school. Lamenting that [Kumāralāta's] explanations remained close to names and marks, he then changed course to the Mahāsāṃghika, studying both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, delving deeply into the ninefold scriptures and sifting through the five Nikāyas. Rolling back the erroneous mists once again and unfurling the sun of wisdom anew, his teaching shook Jalandhara and his fame spread to China. ‘Accomplishing’ (tattva) refers to the text that can establish; ‘truth’ (siddhi) refers to the principle established. In two hundred and two chapters across sixteen fascicles, it establishes the chapters with the four noble truths and clarifies the principles through the five aggregates. Its exposition being refined and subtle, those who took refuge in it were like a forest.”

Question: Since Harivarman rejected the Eight Sections (*Aṣṭaskandha) and sifted through the five Nikāyas, on what doctrine does the school of the Tattvasiddhi properly rely?

Answer: Some say that he chose what was good and followed it, recording whatever had merit, casting aside the shortcomings of the various masters and adopting the strengths of the various schools. Some say that although he rejected various divergent views, he properly used the Dharmaguptaka school. Some say that he specifically rejected the Abhidharma and exclusively agreed with the Dārṣṭāntikas. Tripiṭaka Master Paramārtha said, “He used the doctrines of the Sautrāntika school.” When one examines the Sautrāntika doctrines in the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra, many agree with the Tattvasiddhi.

Second is the refutation.

Question: Is the Tattvasiddhi a Hīnayāna treatise, a Mahāyāna treatise, or does it contain both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Answer: Some say it is Mahāyāna. Some say it is Hīnayāna. Some say it explored the Mahāyāna intent to explain the Hīnayāna, possessing both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. Now, the fineness or coarseness of jade and common stone is seen by eyes and ears, yet mirrors still differ in clarity and dimness. How much more so the authenticity or falsehood of the wondrous Path, where speech ceases and thought is cut off—how could it be easily recognized? Now, by proving with ten points, it will be clearly shown that it is Hīnayāna and not Mahāyāna:
1. Proof from the ancient preface;
2. Verification from the treatise itself;
3. Absence of Mahāyāna texts;
4. Having established precedents;
5. Confusion regarding its own school;
6. Differentiating Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna;
7. Evaluating superiority and inferiority;
8. Absence of mutual identity;
9. Harming understanding and practice;
10. Examining contemporary people.

First, proof from the ancient preface: Formerly, after Dharma Master Kumārajīva finished translating the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, he instructed Sengrui to lecture on it. After Master Kumārajīva passed away, Venerable Sengrui recorded his bequeathed words and composed a preface to the treatise, which states: “The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra was composed eight hundred and ninety years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa by Harivarman, the chief disciple of Kumāralāta, the master of Hīnayāna scholars in Jalandhara. His treatise states: visible matter, scent, taste, and tangibles are real; earth, water, fire, and wind are provisional. While its refinement is abundant, its clarification of reality is deficient. Inferring and investigating it, it is merely the reality within Hīnayāna. Compared to the Mahāyāna, even comparing a dragon’s torch to the glow of a firefly would not suffice to illustrate the vast distance between them.” Someone once said that this treatise clarifies the truth of cessation equally with the Mahāyāna. When Kumārajīva heard this, he sighed and said: “How has the lack of deep discernment among the people of Qin reached such a point? Whenever I suspected that those who universally believe in the Mahāyāna did not awaken from within, their delusion could now be recognized!” The Tattvasiddhi was translated by Kumārajīva, and Sengrui was the first to lecture on it; later scholars should not fail these former masters.

Second, verification from the treatise itself: The text of the Tattvasiddhi states: “Because the Buddha permitted the diverse treatises of the various monks, I wish to correctly discuss the real meaning within the Tripiṭaka.” Since Harivarman himself says he correctly discusses the Tripiṭaka, we know that the principle of the Tattvasiddhi is Hīnayāna. If one says that this treatise also clarifies the Mahāyāna, the fault lies with his disciples, not with Harivarman.

Question: How is it known that the Tripiṭaka refers to the Hīnayāna?

Answer: The Lotus Sūtra says: “Nor does one draw near to scholars of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭaka, fearing that because one's great illumination is not yet complete, the lesser teachings might defile it; thus wisdom and form should be separated, and their conduct should not be shared.” Admonishing the Mahāsattva not to draw near to lesser persons, we know that the Tripiṭaka is not the Mahāyāna. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra states: “Kāśyapa and Ānanda compiled the Tripiṭaka, while Mañjuśrī and Maitreya compiled the Mahāyāna Piṭaka. An outsider asked: ‘Why was the Mahāyāna not compiled within the Tripiṭaka?’ The treatise master answered: ‘The Hīnayāna does not accept the Mahāyāna; the Mahāyāna should not be compiled within the Hīnayāna.’” Inferring from this, it is merely Hīnayāna.

Third, absence of Mahāyāna texts: Generally, when composing treatises, one always cites the Buddha's words. Just as Nāgārjuna explained the Mahāyāna and cited Mahāyāna sūtras in return, Harivarman explained Hīnayāna sūtras and only used Hīnayāna proofs: all two hundred and two chapters draw from the four Āgamas, and throughout the sixteen fascicles there is not a single vaipulya [sūtra]. Deliberating from this, one can know it.

Fourth, having established precedents.

Question: If the Tattvasiddhi's explaining the Hīnayāna does not permit it to concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna, then likewise the Three Treatises' explaining the Mahāyāna should not concurrently clarify the Hīnayāna.

Answer: The principles have established precedents; they should not be confused. The Buddha's sūtras are twofold: first, the Hīnayāna; second, the vaipulya. If one clarifies the Mahāyāna, one must concurrently explain the Hīnayāna; if one explains the Hīnayāna, one does not concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna. Therefore, at the beginning of Mahāyāna sūtras there is a Hīnayāna assembly, whereas at the head of Hīnayāna sūtras there is no saṃgha of bodhisattvas; this shows that the great can encompass the small, but the small cannot contain the great. Since the Buddha's sūtras are like this, treatises follow the same precedent. A Mahāyāna treatise concurrently clarifies the Hīnayāna; a Hīnayāna treatise does not concurrently clarify the Mahāyāna. If a disciple's treatise explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, the Tathāgata's sūtras should likewise be so; then large and small would mutually encompass each other, and how could they be called Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Fifth, confusion regarding its own school.

Question: The text of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra abundantly explains the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena, which is identical to the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā's clarification of the equality of the four noble truths. Since the meaning is not different, we know that it must have explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna.

Answer: Within the teachings of the four Āgamas there is the twofold emptiness; when the treatise clarifies the twofold emptiness, it is explaining the Tripiṭaka in return. Why say it explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna? Furthermore, Śāriputra's Abhidharma also explains the twofold emptiness, yet it is Hīnayāna and not Mahāyāna; the meaning of Harivarman's treatise must likewise be the same.

Question: Śāriputra's Abhidharma also explored the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, following the same precedent as the Tattvasiddhi. Since that one explored the Mahāyāna, this one is not exclusively Hīnayāna.

Answer: What Śāriputra composed was in turn an explanation of the Buddha's Abhidharma. Since what the Buddha spoke was Hīnayāna, how could that treatise be said to explore the Mahāyāna?

Sixth, differentiating Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna.

Question: If the Hīnayāna clarifies one emptiness and the Mahāyāna explains two emptinesses, there would be a difference; but since both explain the twofold emptiness, what is the difference between Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna?

Answer: Although both explain the twofold emptiness, the twofold emptiness is not the same, briefly clarified in four points:
1. The Hīnayāna analyzes phenomena to clarify emptiness, whereas the Mahāyāna's original nature is empty and tranquil.
2. The Hīnayāna only clarifies the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena within the three realms, so its meaning of emptiness is limited; the Mahāyāna clarifies that persons and phenomena both within and outside the three realms are all empty, so its meaning of emptiness is extensive.
3. The Hīnayāna only clarifies emptiness and has not yet spoken of non-emptiness; the Mahāyāna clarifies emptiness and also explains non-emptiness. Thus the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra says: “Śrāvakas only see emptiness and do not see non-emptiness. The wise see emptiness as well as non-emptiness; emptiness is all saṃsāra, and non-emptiness is the great nirvāṇa.”
4. The Hīnayāna is called ‘mere emptiness,’ meaning they merely abide in emptiness. For bodhisattvas it is called ‘unobtainable emptiness,’ where emptiness is also unobtainable.
Therefore, we know that although both clarify the twofold emptiness, the meaning of emptiness differs; thus Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna are differentiated.

Seventh, evaluating superiority and inferiority: In explaining the chapter on ‘Entrustment’ in the Prajñāpāramitā, Nāgārjuna says: “When Subhūti contemplates the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena, if one wishes to compare it to the bodhisattva's twofold emptiness, it is like the space in a pore compared to the space in the ten directions.” Thus the Hīnayāna emptiness is shallow, and the Mahāyāna emptiness is deep. What the Tattvasiddhi clarifies is merely the emptiness of śrāvakas, not that attained by Mahāsattvas.

Eighth, absence of mutual identity: The ‘Faith and Understanding’ chapter of the Lotus Sūtra states: “The four great śrāvakas described their own attainment of emptiness, saying: ‘Throughout the long night we practiced the dharmas of emptiness—without birth and without cessation, without small and without great, without outflow and unconditioned—producing no craving or attachment toward the Buddha's wisdom.’” What the Tattvasiddhi explains is completely identical to this; thus we know it is not Mahāyāna.

Question: How is this known?

Answer: The text of the Lotus Sūtra explains that when śrāvakas realize emptiness, they cannot contemplate existence through emptiness, nor contemplate emptiness through existence; thus there is no mutual identity. What the Tattvasiddhi speaks of also lacks mutual identity. If it clarified mutual identity, it would contemplate emptiness and existence simultaneously. If it contemplated emptiness and existence simultaneously, what difference would there be from the Mahāyāna?

Question: How is it known that the Hīnayāna doctrine lacks mutual identity?

Answer: The Commentary states: “Within the Hīnayāna it is not clarified that saṃsāra is identical to ultimate emptiness; only the Mahāyāna speaks of this.” Thus we know it is so.

Ninth, harming understanding and practice: The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra states: “If with the mind of a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha one says there is no giving, this is called breaking the precepts and wrong view.” When a Hīnayāna person enters into the contemplation of emptiness, they do not see giving; this breaks Mahāyāna practice, hence it is called ‘breaking the precepts’; it breaks Mahāyāna understanding, hence it is called ‘wrong view.’ Yet the Tattvasiddhi clarifies that not seeing giving is the real emptiness of dharmas, taking this as its supreme principle. If one wishes to practice the Mahāyāna, one must not give rise to a lesser mind.

Tenth, examining contemporary people: In the seventh year of the Hongshi era of the Qin (405 CE), an Indian kṣatriya crossed the sea and reached Chang'an. Hearing that Kumārajīva practiced Mahāyāna learning, he consulted and tested him using the Madhyamakaśāstra and other texts. Master Kumārajīva analyzed and explained them for him; [the kṣatriya] received them with the crown of his head and sighed in endless admiration. He then addressed Master Kumārajīva, saying: “You ought to use this brilliance to shine upon India; why conceal this maṇi-jewel here in a borderland? When I was in India, I heard the various treatise masters deeply marvel that Kumāralāta, the Hīnayāna scholar in Jalandhara, praised himself as the illumination of the bright moon; his one-sided wisdom and lesser talent were not fit for this metaphor. Because Harivarman regretted that his master harmed himself with his talent and afflicted himself with his intellect, he composed this treatise to distinguish the reality of existing dharmas and clarify the provisional nature that relies on the real, hence naming it Tattvasiddhi.” Verifying this by the words of the Indian kṣatriya, Harivarman, both master and disciple, belonged to Hīnayāna learning.

Coming down to Prince Wenxuan, Minister of Education of the Qi, he had sincere faith in the Three Jewels and frequently experienced auspicious omens. In the tenth month of the tenth year of the Yongming era of the Qi (492 CE), he invited more than five hundred eminent and virtuous masters to lecture at Puhong Temple. Prince Wenxuan consistently regarded the Mahāyāna sūtras and treatises as the ferry crossing for treading the Path and the hinge of the true Dharma; but seeing later generations abandon the root to venerate the branches, he requested the Dharma masters to abridge this Tattvasiddhi into nine fascicles, and commanded Zhou Yong to compose a preface, fearing that exclusive propagation of the lesser treatise would destroy the enterprise of the Mahāyāna. From then on, down to Emperor Wu of the Liang, the Mahāyāna was vigorously promoted, and the various masters who rejected and dismantled the Tattvasiddhi cannot be fully recorded.

Question: If we prove by these ten points that the Tattvasiddhi is Hīnayāna, what is its relative superiority or inferiority compared to the Abhidharma?

Answer: A bequeathed verse by Guṇavarman states: “The various treatises each have different approaches, but in practice the principle is not two. One-sided attachment leads to right and wrong; the one who has reached it has no disputes.” Furthermore, the Commentary states: “There are four gates: first, the Abhidharma gate; second, the emptiness gate; third, the Piṭaka gate (Peṭaka, which translates as ‘basket’); fourth, the neither-empty-nor-existent gate.” If one does not attain the expedient means of prajñā, studying the Abhidharma gate leads to falling into the view of existence; studying the emptiness gate leads to falling into the view of emptiness; studying the Peṭaka gate leads to falling into the view of both emptiness and existence; studying the neither-empty-nor-existent gate leads to falling into the treatise of foolishness. If one attains prajñā, the mind has no defiled attachment; adapting to capacities and suiting transformations, opening the Path and benefiting people, there is no mutual contradiction. Yet the Tattvasiddhi and the Abhidharma each cling to emptiness or existence, mutually rejecting each other, obstructing the Path and increasing views, both failing to grasp the Buddha's intent.

Question: It is only by realizing emptiness and cutting off fetters that one attains the Path; how could a mind observing existence separate the ordinary from the holy? Therefore we know that the Abhidharma violates the doctrine and the Tattvasiddhi attains the principle.

Answer: If you say that seeing emptiness accomplishes sagehood and that existence cannot separate the ordinary from the holy, then within the teaching of the Tripiṭaka no one would have attained the Path, and Śākyamuni's entire conversion via the Hīnayāna would have been set forth completely in vain, having to wait for the later emergence of the Tattvasiddhi to bring great benefit. How could this be so?

Question: The Abhidharma only clarifies the emptiness of persons, whereas the Tattvasiddhi fully clarifies the twofold emptiness; how can there be no superiority or inferiority between the two treatises?

Answer: Within the Hīnayāna, three grades are distinguished:
1. Those who attain neither of the two emptinesses. As the Vātsīputrīya says: “The combination of the four great elements produces the dharma of the eye; the combination of the five aggregates produces a separate dharma of the person.” These are people of inferior capacity.
2. The followers of the Sarvāstivāda, who only attain the emptiness of persons and do not attain the emptiness of phenomena; these are people of middling capacity.
3. The followers of the Dārṣṭāntikas and Harivarman, who fully attain the twofold emptiness; these are people of superior capacity.
Regarding the depth and shallowness of the meaning of emptiness, the Abhidharma is inferior within the Hīnayāna, and the Tattvasiddhi is superior within the Hīnayāna.

Question: The Commentary states: “After the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, [the schools] divided into two parts: one merely believes in the emptiness of persons and does not believe in the emptiness of phenomena; the other believes in both the emptiness of persons and of phenomena.” There should only be two; how can three be distinguished?

Answer: Because the Vātsīputrīyas enter the true contemplation, they see the emptiness of the self, but when emerging into saṃvṛtisatya, there is a separate entity of the person. Nāgārjuna considers the aspect of their entering contemplation, and therefore only divides them into two.

Question: The Three Treatises rejecting the tīrthikas and the Abhidharma is understandable. But Nāgārjuna arose earlier and Harivarman appeared later; since their eras are far apart, how could they refute each other?

Answer: As long as there is clinging and attachment, it is immediately refuted; what need is there to discuss earlier or later? If an earlier treatise cannot refute later delusions, then likewise an ancient prescription could not cure a modern illness, and the techniques of Bian Que would be of no benefit to later generations.

Question: If Dharmaśreṣṭhin and Harivarman composed Hīnayāna treatises to explain the Tripiṭaka, and Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna composed the great teachings to propagate the vaipulya, their streams of large and small being divided, why must they refute each other?

Answer: When the Buddha spoke the Hīnayāna, it was originally meant to explain the Mahāyāna. Those who cling to darkness hold onto the finger and forget the moon; the sūtras themselves reproach them, and therefore the treatise master relied on the Buddha.

Question: Some say that the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra explores the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna. What fault is there in this?

Answer: This has already been clarified above. Since this delusion still persists, I shall now restate it. If it explores the Mahāyāna to explain the Hīnayāna, it is contained neither in the small nor in the great: advancing, it does not hasten in the white-ox cart; retreating, it loses the mount of the goat and deer. The saying that it is a ‘mule treatise’ has long been verified.

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Fourth, censuring attachment to the Mahāyāna: first setting forth the tenet, next refuting it. There was a Mahāyāna master who said: “The four techniques and the three mysteries are both non-Buddhist teachings; the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi are merely Hīnayāna. Their explanation of the principle is not thorough, and their textual presentations are deficient; since they obstruct the Mahāyāna, it is reasonable that they must be refuted. As for the Vaipulya, the vast lineage and the tracks of the many āryas, its teaching is termed full syllables, and its principle is called without remainder. If one believes in it, one obtains boundless blessings; if one slanders it, one incurs the greatest guilt. One must only submit one's breast to this sweet dew and bear this Dharma bridge upon one's head; it should not be refuted.” / Question: “If it is truly a glowing pearl, one should indeed receive it upon one's head. One only fears that it is heavily mixed with counterfeit jewels, which must be sifted out. If you claim it is without flaw, you may set forth its essentials.” / Answer: “The Mahāyāna is broad and profound, impossible to explain fully. Bringing together its pivotal points, one may briefly outline two meanings: first, classifying the teachings as not exceeding five periods; second, distinguishing ordinary beings [from sages] by taking the two truths as the tenet. / As for the five periods: formerly, when the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] was first transmitted south of the Yangtze, the śramaṇa Huiguan of Daochang Temple in the Song composed a preface to the scripture, briefly determining the Buddha's teachings into two general divisions: first, the sudden teaching, which is the class of the Avataṃsaka, fully revealing the principle solely for bodhisattvas; second, beginning from Mṛgadāva and ending at the Crane Forest, proceeding from shallow to deep, which is termed the gradual teaching. Within the gradual teaching, it is divided into five periods: / First is the distinct teaching of the three vehicles: for śrāvakas he preached the four truths; for pratyekabuddhas he expounded the twelve links of conditioned arising; for Mahāyāna practitioners he clarified the six perfections. Because the practiced causes were distinct and the attained fruits differed, it is called the distinct teaching of the three vehicles. / Second is the prajñā broadly transforming the three faculties, called the common teaching of the three vehicles. / Third is the Vimalakīrti and the Viśeṣacintā praising bodhisattvas and putting down śrāvakas, called the teaching of putting down and praising. / Fourth is the Lotus Sūtra converging those three vehicles so that they return together to the one ultimate, called the teaching of common return. / Fifth is the Nirvāṇa, called the teaching of eternal presence. / Although there have been alterations since these five periods, they all fall within this schema. / Though the teachings have five periods, they do not exceed the two truths: the three kinds of prajñapti are the conventional, and the four forgettings are the ultimate. Because they realize those four forgettings, there are the worthy ones and sages of the three vehicles.” / Refuting this attachment, second. First rebuking the five periods, next challenging the two truths. / Question: “Since there are five periods, how do you distinguish between the great and the small?” / Answer: “The first one is the small, and the latter four are the great.” / Question: “In principle, is there a Mahāyāna, or is there no Mahāyāna? If there is the Mahāyāna, then this is an existence view; if you say there is no Mahāyāna, what is it that you establish? Furthermore, if you claim there is a great that is different from the small, then there is a small that is different from the great, which is called a dualistic view. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā says: ‘All those who have duality lack the path and lack the fruit.’ The Nirvāṇa says: ‘Ignorance and clarity: the foolish regard them as two.’ Furthermore, if there truly were a Mahāyāna, it would be called ‘with acquisition.’ Those with acquisition belong to Māra's retinue and are not disciples of the Buddha. Furthermore, for one with acquisition, there is neither movement nor emergence, there is no meaning of a vehicle, and it cannot be called a vehicle. Furthermore, if the tenet of the Mahāyāna is the eternal severance of saṃsāra, this is called an annihilation view; if nirvāṇa is permanent, this is an eternalist view. This would merely be annihilation and permanence—what ‘greatness’ is there in it?” / Next, challenging the five periods. First a general challenge, next a specific rebuke. / The challenge says: “One should only establish the two teachings of Great and Small; one should not devise the five periods. One may briefly cite three sūtras and three treatises as proof. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-sūtra says: ‘The devaputras praised: “In Jambudvīpa we see the turning of the second wheel of the Dharma.”’ Nāgārjuna explains: ‘In Mṛgadāva he had already turned the small wheel, and now he turns the great wheel of the Dharma again.’ The Lotus Sūtra says: ‘Formerly in Vārāṇasī I turned the four truths; now on Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa I preach the One Vehicle.’ The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: ‘Formerly in the Deer Forest I turned the small; now at the Twin Trees I preach the great.’ Thus we know the teachings consist of only two approaches, without five periods. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: ‘The Buddhadharma has two [baskets]: first, the Tripiṭaka; second, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.’ The Bodhisattvabhūmi says: ‘The eleven classes of scriptures are named the Śrāvakapiṭaka; the Vaipulya Mahāyāna is named the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.’ The Madhyamakaśāstra says: ‘First, for the sake of śrāvakas, he preached arising and ceasing phenomena; next, for the sake of bodhisattvas, he preached phenomena without arising and ceasing.’ Examining them by sūtras and treatises, there are only two piṭakas; there are no five periods.” / Question: “If they are all the Bodhisattvapiṭaka, how do these four—the Avataṃsaka, Prajñā[pāramitā], Lotus, and Nirvāṇa—differ?” / Answer: “One must understand the four propositions, and the various sūtras will become luminous. First, only teaching bodhisattvas and not transforming śrāvakas: this refers to the Avataṃsaka Sūtra. Second, only transforming śrāvakas and not teaching bodhisattvas: this refers to the Tripiṭaka teaching. Third, explicitly teaching bodhisattvas and secretly transforming the two vehicles: this refers to the various Mahāyāna teachings from the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā on up to before the Lotus Sūtra. Having Hīnayāna practitioners preach the Great Dharma is called explicitly teaching bodhisattvas; secretly showing this Dharma and having them take it as their own responsibility, like entrusting property to the impoverished son, is called secretly transforming śrāvakas. Fourth, explicitly teaching śrāvakas and explicitly teaching bodhisattvas: this is the Lotus teaching. ‘Bodhisattvas hearing this Dharma have had their nets of doubt entirely eliminated’ is transforming bodhisattvas; ‘The twelve hundred arhats shall all likewise become buddhas’ is transforming the two vehicles. Among the four propositions, three meanings belong within the Bodhisattvapiṭaka as its subdivisions; solely transforming the two vehicles is the Tripiṭaka teaching.” / Next, specifically challenging the five periods. / Question: “If one establishes the five periods, what fault is there?” / Answer: “The doctrine of five periods not only lacks textual authority, it also harms the principle. If you say the first is called the distinct teaching of the three vehicles, this meaning is not so. According to the Abhidharma tenet, the three vehicles equally see the four truths and only then attain the path; in the sense of the Tattvasiddhi, they only realize the single cessation and then become sages; based on the Mahāyāna tenet, they equally accord with the unarisen and only then transcend the ordinary. Thus the initial teaching is also common; why do you say it is distinct? / Next, you say the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā is the common teaching of the three vehicles; this too is not so. The Upadeśa says: ‘Prajñā does not belong to the two vehicles; it belongs only to bodhisattvas.’ If the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā were the common teaching of the three vehicles, then it should belong to them in common; why does it not belong to the two vehicles?” / Question: “If, according to the Upadeśa, it explains that prajñā belongs only to bodhisattvas, why does the sūtra exhort the three vehicles to study prajñā together?” / Answer: “There are two kinds of prajñā: first, mahāprajñā, which translates as great wisdom, and is attained only by bodhisattvas; therefore it does not belong to the two vehicles. If one takes the object of dharmatā to be named prajñā, then the three vehicles contemplate it in common; therefore it exhorts the three vehicles to study it together. Masters of the sūtras do not comprehend these two kinds of explanation, and rashly claim that prajñā is the common teaching of the three vehicles. / Next, as for saying that the Vimalakīrti is the teaching of putting down and praising, this too is not so. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā scolds the two vehicles as foolish dogs, and the Vimalakīrti disparages śrāvakas as having ruined roots. Since putting down the small is identical in both, and praising the great is not different, how can you make the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā the common teaching and the Vimalakīrti the teaching of putting down and praising? / Next, taking the Lotus as the common return should be without doubt. However, in the doctrine of five periods, although they explain the common return, they have not clarified eternal presence. Yet Vasubandhu's treatise, commenting on the first part of the Lotus Sūtra, has textual passages on Buddha-nature in seven places; and explaining the latter section, the ‘Lifespan Chapter’, it explains the doctrine of the three bodies. This is indeed ultimate and without remainder; it should not be called an incomplete teaching. / Next, as for the Nirvāṇa being the teaching of eternal presence: permanence and impermanence are both approaches of remedial application. If one discusses nirvāṇa, its essence transcends the hundred negations, and its principle surpasses the catuṣkoṭi. The old school merely grasped its approach of application and did not recognize its essence; therefore they also missed the mark. / Next, challenging the two truths. Those who are confused about the two truths are three kinds of people: First, the Abhidharma, adhering to existence with a fixed nature and confused about prajñapti-existence, thereby loses conventional truth; nor does it know that prajñapti-existence is vivid yet without anything that exists, thus also losing the single true emptiness. Second, those who study the Mahāyāna called followers of the Fangguang (Vaitulya), adhering to erroneous emptiness and not knowing prajñapti-existence, thereby lose conventional truth; since they adhere to erroneous emptiness and are confused about correct emptiness, they also forfeit the ultimate [truth]. Third, those practiced in the present day, who although fully knowing the two truths, either say they are of one essence or say they are of two essences; failing to establish the two, they again forfeit the ultimate and conventional truths.” / Question: “If conventional and ultimate are of one essence, what fault is there in this?” / Answer: “If the conventional is identical with the ultimate, being one with the ultimate, then the conventional is also ultimate; if the ultimate is identical with the conventional, being one with the conventional, then the ultimate is also conventional. If the ultimate is ultimate while the conventional is not ultimate, then the conventional is different from the ultimate; if the conventional is conventional while the ultimate is not conventional, then the ultimate is different from the conventional. Therefore, both avenues are blocked, and a single essence cannot be established.” / Question: “Since oneness has fault, difference should be without blame.” / Answer: “The scripture says: ‘Form is emptiness, emptiness is form.’ If you say they have separate essences, mutual identity is immediately broken; if there is mutual identity, then two essences cannot be established. Therefore, whether advancing or retreating there is no way through, and the thesis of difference is also refuted. Thus, the five periods not being established and the ultimate and conventional having collapsed, on what can the tenets of the Mahāyāna rely?”

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