大乘玄論 5.12

Chapter 4 clarifies the title of the Madhyamakaśāstra (Zhongguan lun). However, the three characters zhong, guan, and lun are not fixed; one may also say Zhongguan lun, or Guan zhong lun, or Lun zhongguan. If it is Zhongguan lun, it takes its name from the author of the treatise. If it is Guan zhong lun, it takes its title with reference to meditative understanding. If it is Lun zhongguan, it takes its designation with reference to the treatise's function. Why is this? If it takes its name from the author of the treatise, zhong (middle) extends to both principle and teaching—that is, the middle of teaching and the middle of principle. Receiving the teaching of the two truths gives rise to the two gnoses; the teaching turns into the name cognitive object, and the middle cognitive object gives rise to contemplative gnosis. Therefore, it first expresses the middle cognitive object, and next expresses contemplative gnosis. Once middle-contemplation has arisen, the name 'treatise' (lun) can arise. The middle cognitive object gives rise to contemplative gnosis, and using this contemplative gnosis one can investigate back and forth; therefore it is called a treatise. Thus it is called Zhongguan lun. In what way does it take its title with reference to meditative understanding? It explains that one uses this contemplative gnosis to contemplate the cognitive object of the middle and correct, and uses this contemplative gnosis to scrutinize right and wrong; therefore it is called Guan zhong lun. In what way does it take its designation with reference to the treatise's function? It explains what it is that the treatise expounds: the treatise expounds nothing other than middle-contemplation. If it were other treatises, they would expound one-sided understandings; but being the present treatise, it expounds middle-contemplation. Thus it is called Lun zhongguan. This explanation is not without meaning, yet it is not the principal meaning of our lineage. Now it is asked: Why is it entitled Zhongguan from the very beginning? Answer: There is a profound reason for this. It is explained that conditions for straying from the path consist in having not yet seen the buddha-nature and having not yet accorded with prajñā; the mind constantly roams in arising and ceasing, and the intellect perpetually wanders into annihilationism and eternalism. Because they practice arising and ceasing, annihilationism and eternalism, they run counter to the Middle Way; because they practice what is deviant and erroneous, they lose the correct Dharma; because of unreal invertedness, they lack the true mark. Now, to counter this, it is explained that being free from annihilation and free from eternity is therefore the Middle Way; because it is free from deviance and error, it is the correct Dharma; because it is free from unreality, it is the middle-real. Thus, in countering this one-sidedness and unreality, the treatise is entitled with the middle-real. Question: Which ones are the conditions for straying from the path? Answer: The conditions are indeed immeasurable, but broadly speaking they do not go beyond three kinds: First, the condition of receiving the teaching but missing its purport; second, the condition of being driven by deviant views; third, the condition of ordinary worldly convention—which is neither receiving the teaching and missing its purport, nor being driven by deviant views, but simply the condition of ordinary worldly convention. What the present treatise eliminates primarily refutes the first one, while simultaneously cleansing the latter two. Question: From what time did the delusion regarding the teaching and the loss of its purport arise? Answer: As at the beginning of the treatise, in the latter five hundred years after the Buddha's nirvāṇa, during the Semblance Dharma, people's faculties grew increasingly dull; receiving the teaching of the Middle Way and the two truths without comprehending it, they made it into arising and ceasing, annihilation and eternity, unity and difference, coming and going, thus becoming the eight non-negations. Now the master of the treatise, receiving the teaching of the Middle Way and the two truths, comprehended that things are unborn and unceasing, unannihilated and uneternal, not one and not different, not coming and not going; therefore these are the eight negations. Because of the eight non-negations, there is unreality; because of the eight negations, there is the middle-real. Question: Why are the eight non-negations called unreality, while because of the eight negations it is called the middle-real? Answer: Non-Buddhists say there is arising and ceasing. Now, when one interrogates them, arising cannot be found; hence what arises is unborn. Now, when one interrogates them, ceasing cannot be found; hence what ceases is unceasing. They say there are arising and ceasing, but now when one interrogates them, arising and ceasing cannot be found; hence there is claiming that what does not exist exists, which is unreality. The master of the treatise says 'unborn and unceasing'; the sūtras explain the true record of all phenomena as unborn and unceasing, and indeed they are naturally unborn and unceasing; hence this is the middle-real. To cite an example, as in the Abhidharma doctrine: their doctrine states that 'when analyzing all phenomena, that which is explained upon discarding the name, etc., is the conventional truth; that which is not discarded upon analysis is called the ultimate truth,' etc. Being the conventional truth, it is unreal; being the ultimate truth, it is the middle-real. Just as speaking of a 'self' in the conventional truth: when interrogating the self, one does not find it; the name is applied in vain without an entity answering to the name—this is claiming that what does not exist exists; hence they say that upon discarding the name it is explained, and so forth. Just as saying that the eleven kinds of form together constitute the aggregate of form: this is the true record; there is a name that summons the entity, and an entity that answers to the name, so there is nothing discarded, which is the ultimate truth. Now it is also like this: what is stated by non-Buddhists claims that what does not exist exists, so it is unreal. The words spoken by the master of the treatise are indeed as explained in the sūtras, so it is the middle-real. Question: The sūtras also explain the two truths and the Middle Way, and the treatise also explains the two truths and the Middle Way; in what way are they different? Answer: They are different. In the sūtras, it is the Middle Way of the two truths that is clarified; in the treatise, it is the two truths of the Middle Way that is clarified. Why is this? The sūtras explain that depending on teaching principle is expressed, and depending on duality non-duality is revealed; this is clarifying the Middle Way of the two truths. In the treatise, because beings received the two teachings of emptiness and existence, they immediately abided in the duality of emptiness and existence, thus ending up in delusion and loss. The master of the treatise now refutes those who cling to emptiness and existence by showing that they are not empty and not existent, completely scouring away designations to call it the Middle; this is first clarifying the Middle Way, first clarifying non-duality. Non-Buddhists then fault the master of the treatise: 'If so, how can the sūtras explain the two truths of existence and non-existence?' The master of the treatise then explains: The explanation of existence and non-existence in the sūtras is the existence and non-existence of expedient means; the explanation of the two truths in the sūtras is the two truths of conventional designation; therefore in the treatise it clarifies the two truths of the Middle Way. Next, reversing this sentence: in the sūtras it explains the two truths of the Middle Way, while in the treatise it explains the Middle Way of the two truths. Why is this? The Buddha meets conditions with the correct contemplation of the Middle Way and teaches the two teachings of ultimate and conventional; this is arising of function from essence, producing duality from non-duality; therefore in the sūtras he explains the two truths of the Middle Way. However, beings receiving the teaching of the two truths of ultimate and conventional all erred, and thus became one-sided. Now the master of the treatise exposes the ultimate as non-ultimate and refutes the conventional as non-conventional, breaking their one-sided attachments so that they all return to the understanding of the Middle; therefore it clarifies the Middle Way of the two truths. Now, these three names of Zhongguan lun are sometimes explained together, and sometimes explained separately. Although explained together, they are combined without being one; although explained separately, they are separated without being different. Combined without being one, they are therefore not identical; separated without being different, they are therefore not distinct. Although explained together, the three meanings are not lost; although explained separately, the single meaning is fully penetrated. Now we first explain them together, and next clarify them separately. Now, first explaining them together, what is its character? Zhongguan lun does not use the middle cognitive object to express contemplative gnosis in order to clarify that object and gnosis are different; now it is explained by using the middle to interpret contemplation. What kind of contemplation is this? This is middle-contemplation. This contemplation is the middle, hence it is called middle-contemplation. Experiencing the middle-real gives rise to correct contemplation; merely using this correct contemplation, one can purify annihilationism and eternalism; therefore it is called a treatise, and for this reason it is called Zhongguan lun. How could this treatise be different from middle-contemplation? Why is this? If one practices arising and ceasing, annihilationism and eternalism, it is not middle-contemplation; now, because one does not practice arising and ceasing, annihilationism and eternalism, it is middle-contemplation.

The [master] of the treatise received the Middle Path and proclaimed it with his mouth; therefore, it is termed a treatise. Hence, it is the Middle Contemplation, and it is also the Treatise on the Middle Contemplation. Next is to clarify the divergent interpretations. Without making divisions, distinctions naturally exist, but multiple masters have explained the Middle. Why is that? "Middle" (zhong) is homophonous with "faithful/true" (zhong); therefore, the Middle is simply being true to the principle. Every school claims to be true to the principle, and every interpretation claims to be faithful to the text; hence, their conceptions explaining the Middle are not singular. Briefly discussed, they do not go beyond four schools: the first is the non-Buddhist explanation of the Middle; the second is the Abhidharma explanation of the Middle; the third is the Tattvasiddhi explanation of the Middle; and the fourth is the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna explanation of the Middle. The meaning of this Middle Way will naturally be set forth at length later; now, the non-Buddhist explanation of the Middle must be briefly explained. As Kapila explained the Middle, he said that a lump of clay is neither the pot nor not the pot. Why is that? Because the lump of clay is not identical to the pot, it is said to be "not the pot"; because there is no pot apart from the lump of clay, it is said to be "not not the pot"—this is also neither identical nor distinct. As Ulūka explained the Middle, sound is neither large nor small. Why is that? It is like a large bell having a large sound and a small bell having a small sound. When discussing this sound ultimately, it is truly neither large nor small. As Ṛṣabha explained the Middle, light is neither bright nor dark. Why is that? Because it is newly arisen, it is not bright; because it destroys darkness, it is not dark. Now, I will first refute the first school. Because you hold that the lump of clay is not identical to the pot, it is distinct; because you hold that there is no pot apart from the lump of clay, it is identical. One sees only identity and distinction; where is there neither distinction nor identity? The other two schools are refuted in the same manner. As for the Tattvasiddhi masters, in explaining conventional truth, they have three kinds of the Middle. For instance, because a pillar is not identical to the four dusts, it is not identical; because there is no pillar apart from the four dusts, it is not distinct. Since this conception is the same as that of the non-Buddhists, it is also refuted as before. Now I ask: How does our school (Shanmen) explain the meaning of the Middle? Someone explains: "The Way being neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle; being both existent and non-existent is the provisional." Now I ask: Do you hold that there is separately a 'neither existent nor non-existent' that constitutes the Middle? Or do you take the 'neither existent nor non-existent' that refutes existence and non-existence to constitute the Middle? If you say that there is separately a 'neither existent nor non-existent', this doctrine is inadmissible. Why is that? Originally, because existence and non-existence were refuted, 'neither existent nor non-existent' was obtained; where now can you separately obtain this 'neither existent nor non-existent' to constitute the Middle? Therefore, it is inadmissible. If you say that you merely take the 'neither existent nor non-existent' that refutes existence and non-existence, and use this 'neither existent nor non-existent' to constitute the meaning of the Middle, this is also inadmissible. Why is that? You originally refuted what is existent as not existent, and refuted what is non-existent as not non-existent. Once existence and non-existence are eliminated, 'neither existent nor non-existent' is also removed; how could you merely take this 'neither existent nor non-existent' to constitute the Middle? The provisional is also like this: Do you merely take the negated existence and non-existence to be the provisional? Or do you separately raise existence and non-existence to be the provisional? If you say that you merely take the negated existence and non-existence to be the provisional, this too is not so. Why is that? Since the negated existence and non-existence have already been refuted, how could one have this 'being both existent and non-existent' as the provisional? If you say that one separately raises existence and non-existence to be the provisional, it is not so. Originally, because of 'neither existent nor non-existent', existence and non-existence were obtained; where could one separately raise 'being both existent and non-existent' to be the provisional? Now I ask: Do you definitely take 'neither existent nor non-existent' to be the Middle and 'being both existent and non-existent' to be the provisional? Or is it not so? He says: "I definitely take it [to be so]." Now I ask: If so, is 'neither internal nor external' the Middle, and 'both internal and external' the provisional, or not? Answer: "It is also so." Now I object: The Great Sūtra says, "Neither internal nor external, yet both internal and external—therefore it is called the Middle Way." If so, then 'neither existent nor non-existent, yet both existent and non-existent' is called the Middle Way; how could you exclusively take 'neither existent nor non-existent' to be the Middle, and 'being both existent and non-existent' to be the provisional? If so, you ought to take 'neither internal nor external' to be the Middle, and 'both internal and external' to be the provisional. Furthermore, once you have refuted existence and non-existence, how could you obtain this 'neither existent nor non-existent' as the Middle? Therefore the treatise says: "Since the beginning and the end are already non-existent, how could the middle exist?" This also means that since existence and non-existence are already non-existent, how could the middle exist? Just as refuting conditions one speaks of non-conditions, but there is no further dharma of non-conditions, so too, refuting existence and non-existence one speaks of 'neither existent nor non-existent', but there is no further dharma of 'neither existent nor non-existent'; how could you take this dharma of 'neither existent nor non-existent' to be the Middle? Furthermore, you say that 'neither existent nor non-existent' is the Middle, but existence and non-existence are also the Middle; if you say that 'both existent and non-existent' is the provisional, 'neither existent nor non-existent' is also the provisional. Why is that? "Provisional" means not by itself. Originally, because of 'neither existent nor non-existent', existence and non-existence were spoken of; since existence and non-existence are provisional, why would 'neither existent nor non-existent' not be provisional? The Middle is originally free from annihilationism and eternalism; because of existence and non-existence, you spoke of 'neither existent nor non-existent'. Since 'neither existent nor non-existent' is free from annihilationism and eternalism and is therefore the Middle, 'both existent and non-existent' is also free from annihilationism and eternalism—why would it not be the Middle? If you say that 'neither existent nor non-existent' cannot be the provisional, existence and non-existence also cannot be the provisional. If you say that existence and non-existence cannot be the Middle, 'neither existent nor non-existent' also cannot be the Middle. He said: "If so, would it be good if existence, non-existence, and 'neither existent nor non-existent' were all together the Middle?" Now I clarify: Existence is the view of eternalism; non-existence is the view of annihilationism; and 'neither existent nor non-existent' is the doctrine of foolishness—how could they suddenly be the Middle? He said: "If so, would it be good if they were all together the provisional?" Now I clarify: You grasp non-existence as distinct from existence, grasp existence as distinct from non-existence, and grasp 'neither existent nor non-existent' as distinct from existence and non-existence—how could they all together be the provisional? Now I ask: Since you have refuted others as wrong, what is the characteristic of the Middle now? Answer: The master said that simply this refutation of the middle and the provisional is itself the Middle; where is there separately a Middle? But this idea is difficult, and further explanation is required. One must recognize the meaning of the dharmakāya. The dharmakāya is nowhere present, yet nowhere not present. The dharmakāya is nowhere present: it is not present in existence, not present in non-existence, not present in both existence and non-existence, and not present in neither existence nor non-existence, and so on through all dharmas. The meaning of the Middle is also like this. It is nowhere not present: the dharmakāya is also present in existence, also present in non-existence, also present in both existence and non-existence, and also present in neither existence nor non-existence, and so on through all dharmas of form and mind. The meaning of the Middle is also like this; therefore, there is nothing that is not the Middle. Hence the Two Nights Sūtra clarifies that from the night of attaining the Way to the night of nirvāṇa, [the Buddha] constantly expounded the Middle Way. Since he expounded the Middle Way, between the two nights how could he only speak of 'neither existent nor non-existent' and not speak of existence, non-existence, and so forth? Therefore we know that among all dharmas, there is nothing that is not the Middle. Privately I say: When speaking of its not being present, it is simply not present in attainment; because of attainment, it is not the Middle. When speaking of its being present, it is present in non-attainment; because of non-attainment, it is the Middle. Objection: If it is not present in attainment, why is it said to be nowhere not present? Answer: Now saying that it is nowhere not present means simply that it is present in non-attainment.

If attaining this is perverse, on the grounds that [things] are ultimately nonexistent, how could it be considered the middle? All things are present, discussing their presence; all things are present, but speaking of their non-presence, all are completely non-present. Question: Since you rely on the Sūtra of the Two Nights to explain that there are no dharmas that are not the middle, why does the beginning of the treatise take only 'neither arising nor ceasing' as the middle, and not take 'arising and ceasing' as the middle? Answer: To counter illness. Sentient beings mostly attach to arising and ceasing, seeing only arising and ceasing and not seeing neither arising nor ceasing; therefore it becomes one-sided. Now, to counter this one-sidedness of arising and ceasing, he speaks of neither arising nor ceasing and calls it the middle. However, in explaining the middle there are three kinds: first, countering the one-sided; second, countering the perverse; third, explaining the middle in its real meaning. Just regarding this character 'middle' (zhong), there are further three meanings. Although there are three meanings, they do not obstruct a single purport; although there is a single purport, the three meanings are not lost. Why is this so? Simply because being one-sided leads to being perverse; being perverse leads to being un-upright; being un-upright leads to not being the middle; not being the middle leads to not being real; not being real leads to being false. Now, not being one-sided leads to not being perverse; not being perverse leads to being upright; being upright leads to being the middle; being the middle leads to being real; being real leads to not being false. Although there are three meanings, they do not obstruct a single purport; although there is a single purport, the three meanings are not lost. Question: How do the one-sided and the perverse differ? Without differentiation, because it is one-sided it is perverse, and because it is perverse it is one-sided. With differentiation, the Madhyamakaśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the one-sided, while the Śataśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the perverse. Why is that? The one-sided is one-sided error: receiving the Buddha's teaching but generating erroneous understanding—hence it is called one-sided; therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the one-sided. The perverse is self-established: non-Buddhists arbitrarily produce attachments without receiving the Buddha's teaching—hence it is called perverse; therefore the Śataśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the perverse. Transcending these two stages, it is therefore called real. Why is that? When the middle is spoken to counter the one-sided, once the one-sided is gone, the middle is also exhausted. When the middle is spoken to counter the perverse, once the perverse is broken, the middle is also eliminated. Neither one-sided nor middle, neither perverse nor upright—transcending these two stages, it is therefore called real; this is explaining the middle in its real meaning. Next, it was said: 'Earlier it was distinguished that there are three kinds of explanations: first, countering the one-sided; second, countering the perverse; third, the real meaning.' Now it is asked: The middle signifies the real; how could there be three? Answer: The middle cannot even be one; how could the middle be three? For the sake of sentient beings, it can be one; for the sake of sentient beings, it can also be three. Yet although there are three, it is only a single meaning. To cite an analogy: 'All the Tathāgatas of the ten directions share a single dharmakāya, one mind and one wisdom; the powers and fearlessnesses are likewise so.' Although there are Buddhas of the ten directions, they merely share a single dharmakāya. Now, in explaining that the middle is the real meaning, the explanations of meanings in the sūtras differ, but broadly there are three kinds: first, discussing horizontally to manifest and uncover; second, discussing vertically to express the principle; third, explaining the meaning based on the name. What is discussing horizontally to manifest and uncover? For instance, what does the conventional take as its meaning? The conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning. What does the ultimate take as its meaning? The ultimate takes the conventional as its meaning. Therefore a sūtra says: 'Wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand conventional truth, he speaks of the ultimate; wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand the ultimate, he speaks of conventional truth.' Now it is asked: That itself is wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand conventional truth and therefore speaking of the ultimate—why say that the ultimate takes the conventional as its meaning? That itself is wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand the ultimate and therefore speaking of conventional truth—why say that the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning? Now we explain: Why speak of conventional truth? Only because he wishes to cause [beings] to understand the ultimate. Is this not the ultimate taking the conventional as its meaning? The conventional is the rationale for the ultimate; therefore the ultimate takes the conventional as its meaning. Why speak of the ultimate? Only because he wishes to cause [beings] to understand conventional truth. Is this not the conventional taking the ultimate as its meaning? The ultimate is the rationale for the conventional; therefore the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning. Second, discussing vertically to express the principle: For instance, the conventional expresses the non-conventional; the non-conventional is the rationale for the conventional; therefore the conventional takes the non-conventional as its meaning. For instance, the ultimate expresses the non-ultimate; the non-ultimate is the rationale for the ultimate; therefore the ultimate takes the non-ultimate as its meaning. Therefore the Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra says: 'Knowing existence to be non-existence, intrinsic nature is fundamentally pure.' Therefore the Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra says: 'If one knows that existence is non-existence, then one can see the Tathāgata.' Therefore, relying on the teaching, one understands the principle and awakens to the Buddha's dharmakāya. What is explaining the meaning based on the name? For instance, the conventional has fleeting falsity as its meaning; the ultimate has true reality as its meaning. Therefore the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: 'Suffering has oppression as its mark, origin has arising as its mark, cessation has exhaustion as its mark, and the path has access as its mark.' Now, we explain that the explanation of the middle also possesses these three kinds: For instance, what does the middle take as its meaning? The middle takes the non-middle as its meaning. What does the middle take as its meaning? The middle takes the real as its meaning. Next is the explanation of the meaning of 'contemplation' (guan). Since the explanation of the middle is already clear, the meaning of contemplation can be clarified. Why is that? Since it is called 'middle contemplation', and the middle is free from annihilation and free from permanence, contemplation is also free from permanence and contemplation is also free from permanence and free from annihilation. Therefore, having explained the middle, that is itself the explanation of contemplation. Even so, at this time we must explain it further. Since the middle has many kinds, contemplation also has many paths. For example, non-Buddhists clambering above and detesting below—where the lower is suffering, coarse, and obstructive, while the upper is superior, subtle, and liberating—this is also a meaning of contemplation. Like the Abhidharma's contemplation on the general and specific applications of mindfulness and the contemplation of the five mental pacifications, these are also meanings of contemplation. The Tattvasiddhi masters also explain the meaning of contemplation, which cannot be cited fully. Now, to discuss it in broad strokes, there are two kinds altogether: first, the contemplation of the Hīnayāna with attainment; second, the contemplation of the Mahāyāna with non-attainment. In the contemplation of the Hīnayāna with attainment, the cognitive object has no arising or ceasing, whereas gnosis has arising and ceasing: severing defilements is ceasing, and cultivating wisdom is arising; defilements were originally existent but are now nonexistent, and wisdom was originally nonexistent but is now existent. Thus cognitive object and gnosis are distinct, and arising and ceasing are different. In the contemplation of the Mahāyāna with non-attainment, it is not so: cognitive object and gnosis are non-dual. The cognitive object has no arising or ceasing, and gnosis also has no arising or ceasing; defilements fundamentally never arose and now also do not cease, and wisdom fundamentally never ceases and now also does not arise. This is the non-duality of cognitive object and gnosis, the equality of existence and non-existence. Therefore it is said: 'I contemplate the Tathāgata: he does not come from the prior limit, does not go to the posterior limit, and does not abide in the middle. Contemplating in this way is called correct contemplation; contemplating differently from this is called perverse contemplation.' Yet what is the meaning of 'contemplation'? Contemplation has the meaning of complete comprehension, and also the meaning of experiential illumination. However, investigating the essential purport of this treatise, it takes examining and checking as its meaning, and observing and contemplating as its meaning: examining and checking annihilation and permanence, and observing and contemplating falsity. Where is the text for this now?

Chapter after chapter investigates annihilation and permanence; section after section contemplates and examines empty falsity. The eight negations alone are precisely their characteristics. Those [opponents] claim there is production and cessation; they claim there is annihilation and permanence. Now, by demanding of them regarding production and cessation that [things] are neither produced nor ceased, and seeking regarding annihilation and permanence that [things] are neither annihilated nor permanent, this very [method] is that in contemplating annihilation and permanence there is no annihilation or permanence, and in examining empty falsity there is no empty falsity. Therefore, the 'Chapter on the Examination of Dharmas' says: 'If dharmas arise from conditions, they are neither identical to nor different from the cause; this then is named the real contemplation: neither annihilated nor permanent.'
However, one school explains: the middle arises from contemplation, and contemplation arises from the middle. Now it is clarified that it is not using the cognitive object of the middle to give rise to the gnosis of contemplation, nor using the gnosis of contemplation to illuminate the cognitive object of the middle. It is simply that this correct contemplation can realize the real of the middle, and the real of the middle is precisely correct contemplation. There is no real of the middle distinct from correct contemplation such that one uses the real of the middle to give rise to correct contemplation; there is no correct contemplation distinct from the real of the middle such that one uses correct contemplation to illuminate the real of the middle. Therefore, taking 'middle' as its name is to illuminate its reality. It is not that there is separately this reality used to illuminate this reality; it merely reveals that the middle is precisely reality, hence it says 'illuminates reality.' Now it is also thus: simply realizing this real of the middle reveals my correct contemplation, and my correct contemplation is precisely the real of the middle; therefore, the real of the middle gives rise to my correct contemplation, and the real of the middle is precisely correct contemplation.
Furthermore, 'contemplation' (guan) has the meaning of clear comprehension, and also the meaning of experiential illumination. Illuminating means illuminating both the heterodox and the correct; contemplating means contemplating both gain and loss. Illuminating both the heterodox and the correct means that recognizing the heterodox is recognizing the correct, and recognizing the correct can refute the heterodox. Contemplating both gain and loss means that comprehending loss is comprehending gain, and comprehending gain can refute loss. Therefore the *Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]* says: 'Having fully accomplished the correct and good, one expounds the four inversions.' If one does not accomplish the correct and good, how could one expound the inversions? Now it is also thus: if one does not understand the correct, how could one refute the heterodox? Thus, it is like calling the character 'person' (ren 人) the character 'enter' (ru 入): not only does one fail to recognize 'person', one also fails to recognize 'enter'. Now, if one recognizes 'person', not only does one recognize 'person', one also recognizes 'enter'. Now it is also thus: if one does not recognize the correct, one also does not recognize the heterodox; now, precisely because of recognizing the correct, one refutes the heterodox, and because of recognizing the heterodox, one can understand the correct.
Now to clarify: what are the characteristics of gain and loss? As when, at the beginning of the treatise, seeking the five aggregates, twelve entrances, eighteen elements, and so forth, they are regarded as existent and as produced and ceased—this is loss. Now by demanding of them, what is existent is not existent, and what is produced and ceased is not produced and not ceased—this is gain. The heterodox and the correct are also thus: originally, because of loss there is gain; once loss is refuted, gain also departs, and there is neither loss nor gain. The heterodox and the correct are also thus. This is conditions being exhausted in contemplation: these conditions of gain and loss, through contemplation, are brought to exhaustion, hence conditions are exhausted in contemplation. This is also contemplation being exhausted in conditions. Why so? Contemplation originally contemplates conditions; conditions having been exhausted, contemplation is also exhausted. Therefore, when conditions are exhausted, contemplation is purified; when contemplation is exhausted, conditions are purified. When conditions are exhausted and contemplation is purified, this contemplation is non-contemplation; when contemplation is exhausted and conditions are purified, these conditions are non-conditions. Therefore, neither conditions nor contemplation, conditions and contemplation both exhausted—only this is called the proper Middle Contemplation.
The separate explanation of 'Middle Contemplation' being concluded, next is to explain 'treatise' (śāstra). Now, what is the meaning of 'treatise'? 'Treatise' has the meaning of discussion and discernment: it simply discusses and discerns the characteristics of dharmas. If one relies on Master Rui's preface, a treatise has the meaning of exhausting words, stating: 'exhausting its words and plumbing its reflections.' If a single word is not exhausted, then numerous divergent [views] will proliferate; if a single reflection is not plumbed, then inversions will arise in confusion. Now, because its words are exhausted, the numerous divergent [views] cease; now, because its reflections are plumbed, inversions are purified. Therefore, only when a treatise exhausts words and plumbs reflections is the efficacy of the treatise revealed; thus it is said that words are exhausted and reflections are plumbed. Therefore, a treatise not only exhausts words, it also exhausts contemplation; contemplation not only exhausts conditions, it also exhausts the treatise; the middle not only exhausts contemplation, it also exhausts the treatise. Therefore, now indicating the title 'Madhyamakaśāstra' (Treatise on the Middle Contemplation) is simply desiring to exhaustively purify all dharmas. It is not like the interpretation of people who hold that the treatise merely desires to explain the meaning of the Middle Contemplation; merely desiring to exhaustively purify all dharmas is sufficient. Now, indicating one 'middle' is not only that the middle is the middle, but discerns that all dharmas are the middle. Since it is said that all dharmas are the middle, what further dharma could exist? Therefore, indicating the middle exhaustively purifies all dharmas. The middle being thus, contemplation and treatise are also thus.
Therefore, the middle arises from contemplation, and discernment flows from the divine mouth; this is why it is called a treatise. The middle arising from contemplation is skillful means real wisdom; discernment flowing from the divine mouth is real skillful means wisdom. Skillful means real wisdom is acting in accordance with what is spoken; real skillful means wisdom is speaking in accordance with what is acted. Acting in accordance with what is spoken is the two gnoses; speaking in accordance with what is acted is the two truths. Therefore, acting in accordance with what is spoken means that in action, one enacts what one has spoken; speaking in accordance with what is acted means that one speaks what one has enacted. Therefore, what is enacted is like what is spoken, and what is spoken is like what is enacted. Hence action and speech are non-dual, and truths and gnoses are equal.
Now, clarifying that exhausting words constitutes a treatise—this meaning is difficult. Now one must ask: If it is Master Ying, he says, 'Interrogation, answers, refutations, and investigations are why it is a treatise'; if it is Master Rui, he says, 'Taking "treatise" as its designation is because it exhausts its words.' These two statements clash like stones and run contrary like irons. Answer: They each rely on a different meaning; it does not mean they contradict each other. Master Ying speaks regarding the beginning, while Master Rui speaks in terms of the end. Why so? Truly because of interrogation and answers, words can be exhausted. By what cause are words able to be exhausted? Truly because of interrogation and answers. Therefore, the two statements complement each other, and both expressions are in accord: Master Ying speaks regarding the beginning, and Master Rui speaks in terms of the end.
Now, regarding the statement that exhausting words constitutes a treatise: if one lets the outsider's words be right, then one says Nāgārjuna is wrong; if one lets Nāgārjuna's words be right, then one says the outsider is wrong. In that case, disputes would be endless, and arguments would never cease; how could [the truth] yet be seen? If one relies on their origins, consequences, gains, and losses, ultimately it naturally resolves that Nāgārjuna has the gain and the outsider has the loss. Because the outsider has the loss, his words are exhausted. Truly because the outsider has words, Nāgārjuna has speech; the outsider's words having been exhausted, Nāgārjuna's speech is also finished. To give an analogy: it is like two men, Zhang and Wang, disputing over a pearl. Zhang claims it is Zhang's treasure, and Wang claims it is Wang's possession; thus the two men each dispute, in turmoil without resolution. Now, relying on their origins, consequences, gains, and losses, ultimately it naturally has its resolution: it is truly Zhang's possession. And Wang's companion recognizes that now it is indeed Zhang's possession, so Wang has nothing to say. Wang having nothing to say, Zhang also does not speak. Now Nāgārjuna and the outsider are also thus: Nāgārjuna is truly right, and the outsider speaks falsely. Now Nāgārjuna is indeed right, and the outsider has nothing to say. The outsider having nothing to say and being exhausted, Nāgārjuna's speech is also finished. Question: If Nāgārjuna's and the outsider's words are both exhausted, why is it solely called Nāgārjuna's treatise?

Answer: Although the words of both men are equally exhausted, their exhaustion has a source. It is truly because Nāgārjuna examined right and wrong that the outsider incurred defeat, and the outsider's words were thus exhausted. The outsider's words having been exhausted, Nāgārjuna's words were also exhausted. The exhaustion of both men's words is due to Nāgārjuna; therefore it is called Nāgārjuna's treatise. To give an analogy: it is like two men wrestling. Although both fall down together, there is victory and defeat: the one underneath is the defeated, and the one on top is the victor. Nāgārjuna and the outsider are also like this: although both ceased speaking, Nāgārjuna is the victor and the outsider is the defeated; therefore it is called Nāgārjuna's treatise.