大乘玄論 5.12.3

5.12.3

有得是橫，謂畢竟無所有故，那得為中？ 一切皆在，論其在也。 一切皆在，語其不在，一切皆不在也。 問：汝既依《二夜經》明一切諸法無非中者，論初何故但用不生不滅為中，不取生滅為中？ 答：為對病故。 緣多著生滅，只見生滅、不見不生不滅，是故成偏。 今對此生滅之偏，故說不生不滅名為中也。 然釋中有三種：一者對偏、二者對邪、三者實義釋中。 只就此中字，則復有三義。 雖復三義，不妨一意； 雖復一意，三義不失。 所以然者，只由偏故所以邪，邪故所以不正，不正故所以不中，不中故所以不實，不實故所以是虛。 今不偏故所以不邪，不邪故所以正，正故所以中，中故所以實，實故所以不虛。 雖復三義，不妨一意； 雖復一意，三義不失也。 問：偏與邪若為異？ 無差別論，偏故所以邪、邪故所以偏。 有差別論，《中論》則對偏說中、《百論》對邪故說中。 何故爾？ 偏是偏錯，稟佛教生錯解，所以名偏，是故《中論》對偏說中。 邪是自樹，外道橫生獲，不稟佛教，是故名邪，所以《百論》對邪說中。 過此二階，所以名實。 何故爾？ 對偏說中，偏去中亦盡。 對邪說中，邪破中亦除。 不偏不中、不邪不正，過此二階，所以名實也，即是實義釋中了。 次時云：前辨釋有三種，一者對偏、二者對邪、三者實義。 今問：中者言實，那得有三？ 答：中尚不可一，中復那可三？ 為緣故亦可一，為緣故亦可三。 然雖有三，只是一義。 舉例如「十方諸如來，同共一法身，一心一智慧，力無畏亦然。 」雖復十方諸佛，只同共一法身也。 今明中是實義者，然經中釋義不同，略有三種：一者橫論顯發、二者竪論表理、三者依名釋義。 若為是橫論顯發，如俗以何為義？ 俗以真為義。 真以何為義？ 真以俗為義。 故經云「欲令深識世諦故說第一，欲令深識第一故說世諦。 」今問：箇自是欲令深識世諦故說第一，何謂真以俗為義？ 箇自是欲令深識第一故說世諦，何謂俗以真為義耶？ 今明何故說世諦？ 只為欲令識第一。 豈不是真以俗為義？ 俗是真家之所以，故真以俗為義。 何故說第一？ 只為欲令識世諦。 豈不是俗以真為義？ 真是俗家之所以，故俗以真為義也。 二者竪論表理。 如俗表不俗，不俗是俗家之所以，故俗以不俗為義。 如真表不真，不真是真家之所以，故真以不真為義。 故《金鼓經》云「知有非有，本性清淨。 」故《華嚴經》云「若知有非有，則能見如來。 」故因教識理，悟佛法身也。 若為是依名釋義？ 如俗是浮虛為義，真是真實為義。 故《涅槃經》云「苦者迫迮相，集者生相，滅者盡相，道者通相」也。 今明釋中亦具三種。 如中以何為義？ 中以不中為義； 中以何為義？ 中以實為義也。 次釋觀義。 然解中既顯，則觀義可明。 何故爾？ 既稱中觀，中離斷離常，觀亦離常觀亦離常離斷，是故既解中即是釋觀。 雖然，今時復須解釋。 中既有多種，觀亦復多途。 如外道攀上厭下，下則苦麁障、上則勝妙出，亦是觀義。 如《毘曇》總別念處、五停心觀，亦是觀義。 成論人亦解觀義，不能具出。 今迄陌為論，凡有二種：一者有得小乘觀、二者無得大乘觀。 若是有得小乘觀，則境無生滅、智有生滅，斷煩惱故即是滅、修智慧故即是生； 煩惱則本有今無、智慧則本無今有。 是則境智殊、生滅異。 若是無得大乘觀，不爾，境智無二。 境無生滅、智亦無生滅，煩惱本自不生、今亦不滅，智慧本自不滅、今亦不生。 是境智不二、有無平等也。 故言「我觀如來，前際不來、後際不去、中亦不住。 如此觀者名為正觀，異斯觀者名為邪觀」也。 然觀是何為義？ 觀是了達義，亦是履照義。 然尋此論要意，即是檢校為義、觀察為義，檢校斷常、觀察虛妄。 今何處文是？

If attaining this is perverse, on the grounds that [things] are ultimately nonexistent, how could it be considered the middle? All things are present, discussing their presence; all things are present, but speaking of their non-presence, all are completely non-present. Question: Since you rely on the Sūtra of the Two Nights to explain that there are no dharmas that are not the middle, why does the beginning of the treatise take only 'neither arising nor ceasing' as the middle, and not take 'arising and ceasing' as the middle? Answer: To counter illness. Sentient beings mostly attach to arising and ceasing, seeing only arising and ceasing and not seeing neither arising nor ceasing; therefore it becomes one-sided. Now, to counter this one-sidedness of arising and ceasing, he speaks of neither arising nor ceasing and calls it the middle. However, in explaining the middle there are three kinds: first, countering the one-sided; second, countering the perverse; third, explaining the middle in its real meaning. Just regarding this character 'middle' (zhong), there are further three meanings. Although there are three meanings, they do not obstruct a single purport; although there is a single purport, the three meanings are not lost. Why is this so? Simply because being one-sided leads to being perverse; being perverse leads to being un-upright; being un-upright leads to not being the middle; not being the middle leads to not being real; not being real leads to being false. Now, not being one-sided leads to not being perverse; not being perverse leads to being upright; being upright leads to being the middle; being the middle leads to being real; being real leads to not being false. Although there are three meanings, they do not obstruct a single purport; although there is a single purport, the three meanings are not lost. Question: How do the one-sided and the perverse differ? Without differentiation, because it is one-sided it is perverse, and because it is perverse it is one-sided. With differentiation, the Madhyamakaśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the one-sided, while the Śataśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the perverse. Why is that? The one-sided is one-sided error: receiving the Buddha's teaching but generating erroneous understanding—hence it is called one-sided; therefore the Madhyamakaśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the one-sided. The perverse is self-established: non-Buddhists arbitrarily produce attachments without receiving the Buddha's teaching—hence it is called perverse; therefore the Śataśāstra speaks of the middle to counter the perverse. Transcending these two stages, it is therefore called real. Why is that? When the middle is spoken to counter the one-sided, once the one-sided is gone, the middle is also exhausted. When the middle is spoken to counter the perverse, once the perverse is broken, the middle is also eliminated. Neither one-sided nor middle, neither perverse nor upright—transcending these two stages, it is therefore called real; this is explaining the middle in its real meaning. Next, it was said: 'Earlier it was distinguished that there are three kinds of explanations: first, countering the one-sided; second, countering the perverse; third, the real meaning.' Now it is asked: The middle signifies the real; how could there be three? Answer: The middle cannot even be one; how could the middle be three? For the sake of sentient beings, it can be one; for the sake of sentient beings, it can also be three. Yet although there are three, it is only a single meaning. To cite an analogy: 'All the Tathāgatas of the ten directions share a single dharmakāya, one mind and one wisdom; the powers and fearlessnesses are likewise so.' Although there are Buddhas of the ten directions, they merely share a single dharmakāya. Now, in explaining that the middle is the real meaning, the explanations of meanings in the sūtras differ, but broadly there are three kinds: first, discussing horizontally to manifest and uncover; second, discussing vertically to express the principle; third, explaining the meaning based on the name. What is discussing horizontally to manifest and uncover? For instance, what does the conventional take as its meaning? The conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning. What does the ultimate take as its meaning? The ultimate takes the conventional as its meaning. Therefore a sūtra says: 'Wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand conventional truth, he speaks of the ultimate; wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand the ultimate, he speaks of conventional truth.' Now it is asked: That itself is wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand conventional truth and therefore speaking of the ultimate—why say that the ultimate takes the conventional as its meaning? That itself is wishing to cause [beings] to deeply understand the ultimate and therefore speaking of conventional truth—why say that the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning? Now we explain: Why speak of conventional truth? Only because he wishes to cause [beings] to understand the ultimate. Is this not the ultimate taking the conventional as its meaning? The conventional is the rationale for the ultimate; therefore the ultimate takes the conventional as its meaning. Why speak of the ultimate? Only because he wishes to cause [beings] to understand conventional truth. Is this not the conventional taking the ultimate as its meaning? The ultimate is the rationale for the conventional; therefore the conventional takes the ultimate as its meaning. Second, discussing vertically to express the principle: For instance, the conventional expresses the non-conventional; the non-conventional is the rationale for the conventional; therefore the conventional takes the non-conventional as its meaning. For instance, the ultimate expresses the non-ultimate; the non-ultimate is the rationale for the ultimate; therefore the ultimate takes the non-ultimate as its meaning. Therefore the Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra says: 'Knowing existence to be non-existence, intrinsic nature is fundamentally pure.' Therefore the Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra says: 'If one knows that existence is non-existence, then one can see the Tathāgata.' Therefore, relying on the teaching, one understands the principle and awakens to the Buddha's dharmakāya. What is explaining the meaning based on the name? For instance, the conventional has fleeting falsity as its meaning; the ultimate has true reality as its meaning. Therefore the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: 'Suffering has oppression as its mark, origin has arising as its mark, cessation has exhaustion as its mark, and the path has access as its mark.' Now, we explain that the explanation of the middle also possesses these three kinds: For instance, what does the middle take as its meaning? The middle takes the non-middle as its meaning. What does the middle take as its meaning? The middle takes the real as its meaning. Next is the explanation of the meaning of 'contemplation' (guan). Since the explanation of the middle is already clear, the meaning of contemplation can be clarified. Why is that? Since it is called 'middle contemplation', and the middle is free from annihilation and free from permanence, contemplation is also free from permanence and contemplation is also free from permanence and free from annihilation. Therefore, having explained the middle, that is itself the explanation of contemplation. Even so, at this time we must explain it further. Since the middle has many kinds, contemplation also has many paths. For example, non-Buddhists clambering above and detesting below—where the lower is suffering, coarse, and obstructive, while the upper is superior, subtle, and liberating—this is also a meaning of contemplation. Like the Abhidharma's contemplation on the general and specific applications of mindfulness and the contemplation of the five mental pacifications, these are also meanings of contemplation. The Tattvasiddhi masters also explain the meaning of contemplation, which cannot be cited fully. Now, to discuss it in broad strokes, there are two kinds altogether: first, the contemplation of the Hīnayāna with attainment; second, the contemplation of the Mahāyāna with non-attainment. In the contemplation of the Hīnayāna with attainment, the cognitive object has no arising or ceasing, whereas gnosis has arising and ceasing: severing defilements is ceasing, and cultivating wisdom is arising; defilements were originally existent but are now nonexistent, and wisdom was originally nonexistent but is now existent. Thus cognitive object and gnosis are distinct, and arising and ceasing are different. In the contemplation of the Mahāyāna with non-attainment, it is not so: cognitive object and gnosis are non-dual. The cognitive object has no arising or ceasing, and gnosis also has no arising or ceasing; defilements fundamentally never arose and now also do not cease, and wisdom fundamentally never ceases and now also does not arise. This is the non-duality of cognitive object and gnosis, the equality of existence and non-existence. Therefore it is said: 'I contemplate the Tathāgata: he does not come from the prior limit, does not go to the posterior limit, and does not abide in the middle. Contemplating in this way is called correct contemplation; contemplating differently from this is called perverse contemplation.' Yet what is the meaning of 'contemplation'? Contemplation has the meaning of complete comprehension, and also the meaning of experiential illumination. However, investigating the essential purport of this treatise, it takes examining and checking as its meaning, and observing and contemplating as its meaning: examining and checking annihilation and permanence, and observing and contemplating falsity. Where is the text for this now?