大乘玄論 5.12.4

5.12.4

品品皆檢校斷常、章章並觀察虛妄，只八不即是其相。 彼謂是生滅、彼謂是斷常，今就其責生滅不生不滅、求斷常不斷不常，箇即是觀察斷常者不斷常、檢校虛妄者不虛妄。 故〈觀法品〉云「若法從緣生，不即不異因，是則名實觀，不斷亦不常」也。 然一家釋，中發於觀、觀發於中。 今明非是用中境發觀智、用觀智照中境，但此正觀能體悟中實，中實即是正觀。 無中實異正觀，用中實發正觀； 無正觀異中實，用正觀照中實，故如以中為名者照其實也。 非別有此實用照此實，但顯中即是實，故言照實。 今亦爾，只體悟此中實顯我正觀，我正觀即是中實，故中實發我正觀，中實即是正觀也。 然觀是了達義，亦稱履照義。 明照即俱照邪正，觀則俱觀得失。 俱照邪正者，識邪即識正，識正能破邪。 俱觀得失者，了失即了得，了得能破失。 故《涅槃》云「正善具成就，演說四顛倒。 」若不成就正善，豈能演說顛倒？ 今亦爾，若不解正，豈能破邪？ 故如喚人字為入字，非但不識人，亦復不識入。 今若識人也，非但識人，亦復識入。 今亦爾，若不識正亦不識邪，今良由識正故破邪，識邪故能解正。 今明得失相若為？ 如論初求五陰十二入十八界等，故是有是生滅，此即為失。 今就其責，有者不有、生滅者是不生滅，此即為得。 邪正亦爾，本因失故得，既破失得亦去，無失亦無得。 邪正亦爾。 此即是緣盡於觀，此得失緣由觀得盡，故是緣盡於觀。 即是觀盡於緣。 何故爾？ 觀本觀緣，緣既盡觀亦盡，故緣盡則觀淨、觀盡則緣淨。 緣盡則觀淨，此觀則非觀； 觀盡則緣淨，此緣則非緣。 故非緣非觀、緣觀俱盡，始名好中觀也。 離釋中觀已竟，今次解論。 然論是何為義？ 論是論辨為義，只論辨法相。 若依叡師序，論是盡言為義，則云盡其言、窮其慮。 若一言不盡，則眾異扶疎。 若一慮不窮，則顛倒亂起。 今盡其言故即眾異息，今窮其慮故則顛倒淨。 是故論則盡言窮慮論功方顯，故所以言盡慮窮。 故論非但盡言亦復盡觀，觀非但盡緣亦復盡論，中非但盡觀亦復盡論。 是故今表中觀論名，只欲盡淨諸法，不如人解以論欲釋中觀義，但欲盡淨諸法可爾。 今表一中，非但中是中，辨諸法皆中。 既噵諸法中，復有何法可有？ 故表中則盡淨諸法。 中既爾，觀論亦爾。 是故中發於觀、辨流神口，所以名論。 中發於觀，即是方便實慧； 辨流神口，即是實方便慧。 方便實慧，即是如說而行； 實方便慧，即是如行而說。 如說而行，即是二智； 如行而說，即是二諦。 故如說而行，行則行我所說； 如行而說，則說己所行。 故所行如所說、所說如所行，是故行說不二、諦智平等也。 今明盡言為論，此義難。 今須問：若是影公則噵「問答折徵，所以為論」，若是叡師則道「以論為稱者，盡其言也。 」箇則兩語石乖、二言鐵反。 答：乃是各據其義，非謂相違。 影師就始為言，叡公約終為語。 何故爾？ 良由問答故得盡言。 言何因得盡？ 良由問答。 是故二語相成、兩言相順，影公就始為言、叡師約終為語也。 今噵盡言為論者，若使外人言是，即噵龍樹為非； 若使龍樹言是，即噵若外人為非。 是即諍諍莫窮、云云無已，若何猶可見？ 若使據其本末得失，終自歸龍樹為得、外人為失。 外人為失故言則盡，良由外人有言故龍樹有語，外人之言既盡，龍樹之語亦窮。 舉譬如張王二人共爭一珠，張謂是張寶、王謂是王物，是則兩人各諍，紛然未決。 今據其本末得失，終自有歸，實是張物。 而王侶誌今果是張物，王即無言。 王既無言，張亦不語。 今龍樹、外人亦然，龍樹實是，外人噵非。 今龍樹果是，外人無言。 外人無言既盡，龍樹語亦窮。 問：龍樹、外人言俱盡，那得獨稱龍樹論？

Chapter after chapter investigates annihilation and permanence; section after section contemplates and examines empty falsity. The eight negations alone are precisely their characteristics. Those [opponents] claim there is production and cessation; they claim there is annihilation and permanence. Now, by demanding of them regarding production and cessation that [things] are neither produced nor ceased, and seeking regarding annihilation and permanence that [things] are neither annihilated nor permanent, this very [method] is that in contemplating annihilation and permanence there is no annihilation or permanence, and in examining empty falsity there is no empty falsity. Therefore, the 'Chapter on the Examination of Dharmas' says: 'If dharmas arise from conditions, they are neither identical to nor different from the cause; this then is named the real contemplation: neither annihilated nor permanent.'
However, one school explains: the middle arises from contemplation, and contemplation arises from the middle. Now it is clarified that it is not using the cognitive object of the middle to give rise to the gnosis of contemplation, nor using the gnosis of contemplation to illuminate the cognitive object of the middle. It is simply that this correct contemplation can realize the real of the middle, and the real of the middle is precisely correct contemplation. There is no real of the middle distinct from correct contemplation such that one uses the real of the middle to give rise to correct contemplation; there is no correct contemplation distinct from the real of the middle such that one uses correct contemplation to illuminate the real of the middle. Therefore, taking 'middle' as its name is to illuminate its reality. It is not that there is separately this reality used to illuminate this reality; it merely reveals that the middle is precisely reality, hence it says 'illuminates reality.' Now it is also thus: simply realizing this real of the middle reveals my correct contemplation, and my correct contemplation is precisely the real of the middle; therefore, the real of the middle gives rise to my correct contemplation, and the real of the middle is precisely correct contemplation.
Furthermore, 'contemplation' (guan) has the meaning of clear comprehension, and also the meaning of experiential illumination. Illuminating means illuminating both the heterodox and the correct; contemplating means contemplating both gain and loss. Illuminating both the heterodox and the correct means that recognizing the heterodox is recognizing the correct, and recognizing the correct can refute the heterodox. Contemplating both gain and loss means that comprehending loss is comprehending gain, and comprehending gain can refute loss. Therefore the *Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]* says: 'Having fully accomplished the correct and good, one expounds the four inversions.' If one does not accomplish the correct and good, how could one expound the inversions? Now it is also thus: if one does not understand the correct, how could one refute the heterodox? Thus, it is like calling the character 'person' (ren 人) the character 'enter' (ru 入): not only does one fail to recognize 'person', one also fails to recognize 'enter'. Now, if one recognizes 'person', not only does one recognize 'person', one also recognizes 'enter'. Now it is also thus: if one does not recognize the correct, one also does not recognize the heterodox; now, precisely because of recognizing the correct, one refutes the heterodox, and because of recognizing the heterodox, one can understand the correct.
Now to clarify: what are the characteristics of gain and loss? As when, at the beginning of the treatise, seeking the five aggregates, twelve entrances, eighteen elements, and so forth, they are regarded as existent and as produced and ceased—this is loss. Now by demanding of them, what is existent is not existent, and what is produced and ceased is not produced and not ceased—this is gain. The heterodox and the correct are also thus: originally, because of loss there is gain; once loss is refuted, gain also departs, and there is neither loss nor gain. The heterodox and the correct are also thus. This is conditions being exhausted in contemplation: these conditions of gain and loss, through contemplation, are brought to exhaustion, hence conditions are exhausted in contemplation. This is also contemplation being exhausted in conditions. Why so? Contemplation originally contemplates conditions; conditions having been exhausted, contemplation is also exhausted. Therefore, when conditions are exhausted, contemplation is purified; when contemplation is exhausted, conditions are purified. When conditions are exhausted and contemplation is purified, this contemplation is non-contemplation; when contemplation is exhausted and conditions are purified, these conditions are non-conditions. Therefore, neither conditions nor contemplation, conditions and contemplation both exhausted—only this is called the proper Middle Contemplation.
The separate explanation of 'Middle Contemplation' being concluded, next is to explain 'treatise' (śāstra). Now, what is the meaning of 'treatise'? 'Treatise' has the meaning of discussion and discernment: it simply discusses and discerns the characteristics of dharmas. If one relies on Master Rui's preface, a treatise has the meaning of exhausting words, stating: 'exhausting its words and plumbing its reflections.' If a single word is not exhausted, then numerous divergent [views] will proliferate; if a single reflection is not plumbed, then inversions will arise in confusion. Now, because its words are exhausted, the numerous divergent [views] cease; now, because its reflections are plumbed, inversions are purified. Therefore, only when a treatise exhausts words and plumbs reflections is the efficacy of the treatise revealed; thus it is said that words are exhausted and reflections are plumbed. Therefore, a treatise not only exhausts words, it also exhausts contemplation; contemplation not only exhausts conditions, it also exhausts the treatise; the middle not only exhausts contemplation, it also exhausts the treatise. Therefore, now indicating the title 'Madhyamakaśāstra' (Treatise on the Middle Contemplation) is simply desiring to exhaustively purify all dharmas. It is not like the interpretation of people who hold that the treatise merely desires to explain the meaning of the Middle Contemplation; merely desiring to exhaustively purify all dharmas is sufficient. Now, indicating one 'middle' is not only that the middle is the middle, but discerns that all dharmas are the middle. Since it is said that all dharmas are the middle, what further dharma could exist? Therefore, indicating the middle exhaustively purifies all dharmas. The middle being thus, contemplation and treatise are also thus.
Therefore, the middle arises from contemplation, and discernment flows from the divine mouth; this is why it is called a treatise. The middle arising from contemplation is skillful means real wisdom; discernment flowing from the divine mouth is real skillful means wisdom. Skillful means real wisdom is acting in accordance with what is spoken; real skillful means wisdom is speaking in accordance with what is acted. Acting in accordance with what is spoken is the two gnoses; speaking in accordance with what is acted is the two truths. Therefore, acting in accordance with what is spoken means that in action, one enacts what one has spoken; speaking in accordance with what is acted means that one speaks what one has enacted. Therefore, what is enacted is like what is spoken, and what is spoken is like what is enacted. Hence action and speech are non-dual, and truths and gnoses are equal.
Now, clarifying that exhausting words constitutes a treatise—this meaning is difficult. Now one must ask: If it is Master Ying, he says, 'Interrogation, answers, refutations, and investigations are why it is a treatise'; if it is Master Rui, he says, 'Taking "treatise" as its designation is because it exhausts its words.' These two statements clash like stones and run contrary like irons. Answer: They each rely on a different meaning; it does not mean they contradict each other. Master Ying speaks regarding the beginning, while Master Rui speaks in terms of the end. Why so? Truly because of interrogation and answers, words can be exhausted. By what cause are words able to be exhausted? Truly because of interrogation and answers. Therefore, the two statements complement each other, and both expressions are in accord: Master Ying speaks regarding the beginning, and Master Rui speaks in terms of the end.
Now, regarding the statement that exhausting words constitutes a treatise: if one lets the outsider's words be right, then one says Nāgārjuna is wrong; if one lets Nāgārjuna's words be right, then one says the outsider is wrong. In that case, disputes would be endless, and arguments would never cease; how could [the truth] yet be seen? If one relies on their origins, consequences, gains, and losses, ultimately it naturally resolves that Nāgārjuna has the gain and the outsider has the loss. Because the outsider has the loss, his words are exhausted. Truly because the outsider has words, Nāgārjuna has speech; the outsider's words having been exhausted, Nāgārjuna's speech is also finished. To give an analogy: it is like two men, Zhang and Wang, disputing over a pearl. Zhang claims it is Zhang's treasure, and Wang claims it is Wang's possession; thus the two men each dispute, in turmoil without resolution. Now, relying on their origins, consequences, gains, and losses, ultimately it naturally has its resolution: it is truly Zhang's possession. And Wang's companion recognizes that now it is indeed Zhang's possession, so Wang has nothing to say. Wang having nothing to say, Zhang also does not speak. Now Nāgārjuna and the outsider are also thus: Nāgārjuna is truly right, and the outsider speaks falsely. Now Nāgārjuna is indeed right, and the outsider has nothing to say. The outsider having nothing to say and being exhausted, Nāgārjuna's speech is also finished. Question: If Nāgārjuna's and the outsider's words are both exhausted, why is it solely called Nāgārjuna's treatise?