大乘玄論 1.7

1.7

Fourth, existence and non-existence. Now we first explain provisional existence, and then provisional non-existence. What is ordinarily explained is that altogether there are three kinds of conventional designations: first, designation through causal composition (hetu-samākhyā), where four subtle elements compose a pillar or the five aggregates compose a person, hence called causally composed; second, designation through succession (saṃtatya-samākhyā), where the preceding thought-moment ceases of itself and continues on to form the subsequent thought-moment, the two thought-moments being linked, hence called designation through succession; third, designation through mutual dependence (apekṣā-samākhyā), where, like lord and minister, father and son, or great and small, the designations are not fixed and all follow and depend on one another, hence called designation through mutual dependence. As for what is grasped when entering the path, the three vehicles differ: the śrāvaka uses causal composition, the pratyekabuddha uses succession, and the bodhisattva uses mutual dependence. But the *Tattvasiddhi* takes the Tripiṭaka as its doctrine and mostly explains causal composition to enter the path. The reason for this is twofold: first, causal composition is the substance of conventional truth, while succession and mutual dependence are its functions; if the substance is already empty, the functions are naturally dispelled. Second, causal composition has multiple tiers, and the practice of contemplation proceeds from shallow to deep: initially one grasps the five sense faculties to empty the sentient being, and next grasps the four great elements and four subtle elements to break down phenomena; therefore it mostly grasps causal composition. As for the two designations of succession and mutual dependence, they do not have these tiers, and hence it does not use them. Now we clarify that taking the three designations in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* as orthodox is our doctrine: first, [designation of] phenomena (dharma-prajñapti); second, [designation of] grasping/appropriation (upādāna-prajñapti); third, [designation of] names (nāma-prajñapti). Explanations of the three designations differ. What we now use is this: the four subtle elements composing sense faculties and great elements are all the designation of phenomena; the sentient being as a provisional person is the designation of grasping; and all names are the designation of names. The designation of names is fundamentally pervasive: within the designation of names, taking the sense of that which can compose is the designation of phenomena, while taking the sense of that which is composed is the designation of grasping. It is not like other schools where the designation of phenomena is the substance and the other two are functions. Therefore the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā* says: “Prajñā and the five aggregates are the designation of phenomena; the bodhisattva is the designation of grasping; and all names and designations are the designation of names.” The internal phenomena are like this. External phenomena can be understood accordingly: the four subtle elements and four great elements are the designation of phenomena, the world is the designation of grasping, and all names and designations are the designation of names. Now, in clarifying that mutual dependence is primary, we intend to clarify that the great being’s contemplative practice has three meanings: first, the designation of mutual dependence is pervasive, such that there is nothing that is not dependent; whereas the two designations of causality and succession are not necessarily entirely provisional. Second, in the designation of mutual dependence, there are no real phenomena; once the ailment is dispelled, purity is attained; whereas in the two designations of causality and succession, there remain real phenomena, so dispelling the ailment leaves a residue. Third, the designation of mutual dependence is unimpeded: just as long depends on short, short also depends on long; whereas the two designations of causality and succession are impeded in their sense of composition, for the subtle elements only compose the great elements, but the great elements do not compose the subtle elements; and they only succeed what precedes, not what succeeds; hence we use the designation of mutual dependence. In the case of the śrāvaka, causal composition is the substance, while succession and mutual dependence are the functions; when the substance is empty, the functions depart of themselves. Now we contemplate that the substance of mutual dependence is originally unborn and currently unceasing. As the functions of causality and succession depart, there have always been general and specific mutual dependence: general is mutual dependence of differentiation, and specific is mutual dependence of co-aggregation, just as person, vase, cloth, and pillar are general mutual dependence, while long, short, square, and round are specific mutual dependence. Question: If when mutual dependence is empty, causality and succession depart of themselves, when contemplating mutual dependence, what object’s mutual dependence does one contemplate? Is it not that causal composition comes first, and succession and mutual dependence come afterward? Answer: Not so. In Hīnayāna contemplative practice, there are first substantial phenomena, which are broken down to enter emptiness; therefore they only see emptiness, but do not see non-emptiness. Now, when the Mahāyāna contemplates mutual dependence, it posits no substantial phenomena: all phenomena are originally unborn and currently unceasing. The initial thought-moment is the unimpeded path; the subsequent thought-moment is the path of liberation. Therefore the sūtra says: “Not only does one see emptiness, one also sees the non-emptiness of buddha-nature.” Question: Is being neither existent nor non-existent and yet existent and non-existent a coarse provisionality or a subtle provisionality? Answer: This is a coarse provisionality. Why so? Because it is explained by taking both the two phenomena of existence and non-existence together, it is a coarse provisionality. If one explains subtle provisionality, it is neither existent nor not-existent, and yet existent and not-existent, because it clarifies the meaning with respect to a single phenomenon. Thus, two phenomena constitute the coarse, and a single phenomenon constitutes the subtle. Why do we now distinguish this coarse and subtle? Coarse and subtle are distinguished in order to clarify the two kinds of hundred negations and two kinds of antidotes in the sūtras. If one speaks of suffering, pleasure, non-self, and so on, this is a coarse antidote; if one speaks of real and unreal, sentient being and non-sentient being, secure and insecure, and so on, this is a subtle antidote. If one says that the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa is neither existent nor non-existent, this is a coarse hundred negations; if one says neither cause nor not-cause, neither result nor not-result, this explains negation through subtle meaning. This clarifies the coarse and subtle of provisional existence. Question: Earlier it was said “neither existent nor non-existent”; what thing is neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: The earlier “neither existent nor non-existent” negates intrinsic existence and non-existence, in order to establish the suchness of conventional truth. Question: Later it explains “neither existent nor not-existent”; what thing is existent or not-existent? Answer: It is provisionally existent and not-existent in this way, hence it is said “neither existent nor not-existent.” Saying “neither existent” means not-existent existence; saying “neither not-existent” means not non-existent non-existence. This both deconstructs the provisional and establishes the suchness of ultimate truth. Question: What thing is existent and not-existent? Answer: All phenomena originally arise from the unborn; all take the letter *A* as their foundation. That is, all phenomena return to the single gate of the unborn of the letter *A*. Therefore the sūtra says: “The forty-two letters all return to the letter *A*.”