大乘玄論 1.6

1.6

The third [section] is the establishment of names. This is distinguished through three gates: first, distinguishing the establishment of names; next, distinguishing the transcending of names; and finally, distinguishing borrowed names. As for establishing names: neither ultimate nor conventional is also the Middle Way; it is also called non-existence; it is also called the correct Dharma; it is also called non-abiding. This 'neither ultimate nor conventional' is nameless, yet a name is now conventionally established for it. This name is established on the basis of what is nameless, just as Tilapāyī does not truly eat oil, yet is forcibly said to eat oil. The two truths are likewise: because the ultimate expresses what is not ultimate and the conventional expresses what is not conventional, we conventionally speak of the ultimate and conventional. Because they are conventional words, names have no power to grasp things, and things have no real entity that corresponds to names. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says: 'From the root of non-abiding, all phenomena are established; non-abiding is having no root.' Hence it is said that both the subject and the object take non-abiding as their root. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra says: 'Prajñā is like the great earth, giving birth to the myriad things; prajñā, the correct Dharma, and non-abiding—these three are different names for the same thing.' If we distinguish the two truths within their function, they mutually establish names for each other: the conventional establishes the name for the ultimate, and 'worldly' establishes the name for 'paramārtha' (first/highest), as in saying 'because of the worldly, there is the highest.' Ultimate and conventional are also like this: 'ultimate' should correspond to 'worldly', and 'first' should correspond to 'second'. Yet now 'ultimate' corresponds to 'conventional', and 'worldly' corresponds to 'first'; these are not directly correlative in meaning, so the sages did not necessarily establish names by way of direct opposition. Hence the sūtra says: 'Phenomena have neither this nor that, because they are free from correlativity.' Next, to clarify correlativity: 'ultimate' and 'conventional' receive their names according to their intrinsic substances, whereas 'worldly' and 'first' are appellations used for praise and dispraise within application. Second is distinguishing the transcending of names. According to standard transmission, conventional truth does not transcend names. They cite a passage from the Tattvasiddhi: 'In the beginning of the kalpa, things did not yet have names; the sages established names, such as objects like vases and robes; therefore conventional truth does not transcend names.' Concerning the ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood, the three masters differ. Guangzhai said: 'Both of these do not transcend names: ultimate truth has names such as "suchness" and "reality-limit", and the fruit of buddhahood has names such as "permanence, bliss, self, and purity"; it merely transcends coarse names, but does not transcend subtle names.' Zhuangyan said: 'Both of these transcend names. The fruit of buddhahood transcends the two truths, and is therefore beyond names; ultimate truth is originally empty by nature, forgetting the catuṣkoṭi and cutting off the hundred negations, and therefore transcends names.' Kaishan said: 'Ultimate truth transcends names, but the fruit of buddhahood does not transcend names. The principle of ultimate truth transcends the catuṣkoṭi and the hundred negations, so it transcends names; the fruit of buddhahood belongs to conventional truth, which is why it does not transcend names; yet if the buddha-gnosis accords with suchness, it transcends names.' Now we explain: as a preliminary formulation, why should this not be acceptable? However, it is not an exposition of the real principle. We now ask: if things at the beginning of the kalpa were given names and designations, then since ultimate truth is nameless, how does designating things by conventional names differ from the ultimate? Furthermore, we ask: as for the name 'fire', is it identical to fire or separate from fire? If this name 'fire' were identical to fire, then calling out 'fire' would burn one's mouth; if the name 'fire' were separate from fire, why does it not refer to water? Therefore we know that it is neither identical to nor separate from the substance that has the name. If it is in the mouth and not upon the fire, then fire transcends the name. Moreover, regarding traditional names such as cnidium (shéchuáng) and knotweed (hǔzhàng), the conventional truth transcends these names. Furthermore, we ask: what sort of thing is a 'person'? Why are the human head, hands, and so forth called a 'person'? If names are forcibly established, how can they not all transcend names? Next, we challenge the three positions on the fruit of buddhahood. First, we challenge the first master. If one claims that ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood merely transcend coarse names but do not transcend subtle names, we now counter: they are profound originally because they transcend names; if they do not transcend names, they are not profound. We challenge the second master, who claims that ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood both transcend names: we now counter that if seeking the ultimate by means of names does not attain the ultimate, then this name has only the words and lacks the principle. If ultimate truth has words but lacks principle, it would be like a śrotāpanna speaking of nirvāṇa; if the fruit of buddhahood has principle but lacks words, it would be like the Vātsīputrīyas positing a pudgala. We challenge the third master, who claims that the fruit of buddhahood does not transcend names while ultimate truth transcends names: this is identical to what the previous two masters maintained, so it will not be distinguished in detail. Now we explain by distinguishing with the catuṣkoṭi: first, both transcend names; second, both do not transcend names; third, the ultimate transcends names while the conventional does not; fourth, the conventional transcends names while the ultimate does not. That both truths transcend names means: both truths are suchness, so how could they not both transcend names? That both truths do not transcend names means: attaining the mark of suchness is called the Tathāgata, and because he attains these two marks of suchness, neither of them transcends names. Moreover, it is said that the Tathāgata always preaches the Dharma relying on the two truths. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'Dharmas such as vases and robes exist in the worldly siddhānta, but do not exist in the paramārtha siddhānta. Suchness, the reality-limit, and so forth exist in the paramārtha siddhānta, but do not exist in the worldly siddhānta.' These names alternately exist and do not exist; therefore we know that both kinds both transcend and do not transcend names. Third, the ultimate transcends names while the conventional does not: texts for this are numerous, as the sūtra says, 'Spoken according to conventional dharmas, not according to the ultimate.' Fourth, the conventional transcends names while the ultimate does not, as in the statement: 'Arising cannot be spoken of; non-arising also cannot be spoken of; both arising and non-arising cannot be spoken of; neither arising nor non-arising cannot be spoken of.' All four propositions are ineffable, which means that conventional truth transcends names. Now we formulate another perspective: conventional truth transcends the real but does not transcend the conventional, while ultimate truth transcends the conventional and also transcends the real. How so? Sentient beings cling to existence as existence and cling to non-existence as non-existence; these notions of existence and non-existence are the two views of annihilationism and eternalism, which are substantive realities. Now, to refute existence we say 'not existent', and to refute non-existence we say 'not non-existent'; thus we clarify that the Buddha taught conventional existence and conventional non-existence as conventional truth, and this conventional existence is not called existence, and this conventional non-existence is not called non-existence. Question: What kind of existence is this conventional existence? Answer: We clarify that this conventional existence is not called real existence, and conventional non-existence is also not called real non-existence. Thus, this conventional existence and conventional non-existence are called conventional truth; because they are not called real existence and real non-existence, they are said to transcend names. Yet this 'not existent' establishes conventional existence, and this 'not non-existent' establishes conventional non-existence; this is the meaning of not transcending the conventional. If we say that both truths transcend names, ultimate truth transcends the catuṣkoṭi and is free from the hundred negations, and conventional truth also transcends the catuṣkoṭi and is free from the hundred negations. However, this meaning has never existed before; only our school possesses it. Saying that both truths transcend the catuṣkoṭi and are free from the hundred negations means: the conventional is not definitely conventional, so the conventional is called ultimate conventional; the ultimate is not definitely ultimate, so the ultimate is called conventional ultimate. The ultimate conventional is conventional conventionality, and the conventional ultimate is conventional ultimacy. For conventional conventionality, a hundred affirmations cannot affirm it, and a hundred negations cannot negate it; conventional ultimacy is also like this. How so? Conventional conventionality is affirmation, yet affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; non-negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Conventional ultimacy is negation, yet affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; affirmative negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. Therefore, both are free from the catuṣkoṭi and cut off from the hundred negations. Although both truths are free from the catuṣkoṭi and cut off from the hundred negations, the way both truths transcend names is greatly different. How so? The conventional truth's transcendence is the transcendence of the real, whereas the ultimate truth's transcendence is the transcendence of the conventional. For conventional truth to transcend the real: an affirmation of affirmation is a real affirmation, and a negation of negation is an intrinsic negation. Because conventional truth transcends the real, an affirmation of affirmation cannot affirm it, nor can a hundred affirmations affirm it; a negation of negation cannot negate it, nor can a hundred negations negate it. For ultimate truth to transcend the conventional: it is neither an affirmation of affirmation nor a conventional affirmation, neither a negation of negation nor a conventional negation, because ultimate truth transcends intrinsic conventionality. Not only can an affirmation of affirmation not affirm it, but a non-affirmation also cannot affirm it; not only can a negation of negation not negate it, but an affirmative negation also cannot negate it. Both an affirmation of affirmation and a non-affirmation entirely fail to affirm it; both a negation of negation and an affirmative negation entirely fail to negate it. Ultimate truth doubly transcends, while conventional truth transcends the real; this is a gradual relinquishment that explains the meaning of both truths transcending names, with conventional truth transcending the real and ultimate truth transcending both conventional and real. Next, secondly, to explain the meaning of both truths transcending names from the perspective of the level path: the conventional is not definitely conventional, for it is conventional because of the ultimate; the ultimate is not definitely ultimate, for it is ultimate because of the conventional. Because it is conventional through the ultimate, the conventional is conventional conventionality; because the ultimate exists through the conventional conventionality, the ultimate is conventional ultimacy. Since it is called conventional conventionality, all four propositions are transcended: conventional conventionality is not conventional, conventional conventionality is not non-conventional, conventional conventionality is not both conventional and non-conventional, and conventional conventionality is not neither conventional nor non-conventional; conventional ultimacy is also like this. Third is discussing borrowed names. Regarding borrowing and not borrowing, this corresponds to transcending and not transcending. If both truths transcend names, then both kinds borrow names; if neither transcends names, then neither borrows from the other. Now we also turn to critique what the previous three masters said. Those three masters all uniformly explained: conventional truth has things and has names, and by using names to summon things they are attained, hence it does not borrow names. Concerning ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood, there were three masters' interpretations. Now we first challenge conventional truth's not transcending names. If conventional truth having things means it immediately has names, then at the beginning of the kalpa there should already have been names, without needing the sages to establish names for them. If things originally had no names, how is this different from ultimate truth originally having no names, with names later established for the ultimate? We ask: if this is borrowing names conventionally, why would establishing names for things later not be borrowing names? If you seek the ultimate through names, you are far removed from the ultimate; we also say that seeking things through names is far removed from the things. Furthermore, we ask: now in conventional truth, if one seeks things through names and things correspond to names, let us ask: does the name 'vase' reside on the vase, or does it reside in the mouth? It is entirely as previously challenged. If it resides on the vase, in what place is the name? If it resides in the mouth, then the vase lacks a name—how is this not transcending names? How does this differ from the ultimate? If it is said that the ultimate originally lacks names and borrows them from conventional truth: if there were a name for the ultimate in conventional truth, one could say it borrows it; but now in conventional truth there is no dharma called suchness, which transcends and is detached—how can one speak of borrowing? Moreover, the sūtra says, 'The ultimate truth has names and has realities.' When did it say it lacks names? The sūtra also says, 'All dharmas merely have conventional names.' Because there are only names without realities, it is said to transcend names; because there are only names, it is called borrowing. If there are names, they are merely provisional positing. Why? Emptiness borrows names from existence, but existence does not borrow names from emptiness. Therefore, if one says ultimate truth is nameless and borrows names from conventional truth, this principle is untenable. Now we ask: if seeking the ultimate by names is far removed from the ultimate, does this name 'ultimate' express the ultimate principle or not? If this name expresses the principle, and one attains the principle relying on the name, why say that the ultimate principle transcends names? The name would then be useless. Since this name does not attain the principle, this name is ultimately idle talk; it could be said to have principle but lack words. The standard approaches to ultimate truth and the fruit of buddhahood have three masters: Guangzhai held that neither of the two transcends subtle names, so neither needs to borrow. Zhuangyan said both transcend names, which is why both must borrow. Kaishan explained that the fruit of buddhahood belongs to conventional truth and has names, so it does not need to borrow, while ultimate truth is nameless, so it must borrow. These three interpretations should be challenged based on the above; they will not be repeated here, as they can be understood from the foregoing. Now we clarify that borrowing is another name for conventionality (prajñapti); yet this is not found in sūtras or treatises, nor is this formulation recorded in the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna scriptures, so we fear the word 'borrow' should not be used. If we now speak of borrowing, it is merely accommodating others' intentions. Now we clarify that borrowing is another name for conventionality. Now, since the two truths have the catuṣkoṭi to distinguish the meaning of transcending and not transcending names, borrowing and not borrowing can be understood by analogy with this. If both transcend names, then neither truth borrows. If neither truth transcends names, then both borrow. If one transcends and one does not, then one borrows and one does not. If we say both truths transcend names and then discuss the meaning of borrowing, we explain that the ultimate cannot be designated by a name, and as for the names of the two truths, there is no dharma that can be spoken of. Because both truths transcend names, we do not speak of borrowing. Now, through non-ultimate we conventionally speak of ultimate, and through non-conventional we can speak of conventional; because the conventional depends on the ultimate, we say the conventional borrows names from the ultimate; because the ultimate depends on the conventional, we say the ultimate borrows names from the conventional. Therefore, both truths do not transcend names, and we conventionally speak of borrowed names, yet this borrowing of names is also non-borrowing. Now, because the ultimate is not ultimate of itself, it is spoken of through the conventional. Because the ultimate is not of itself, it requires the other, and therefore we speak of borrowing. If it is non-borrowing: we explain that if the ultimate were spoken of by virtue of the ultimate, that could be borrowing. But since the conventional is by virtue of the ultimate, how could that be borrowing? Therefore it is said that this conventional is also non-borrowing. Discussing borrowed names horizontally is like this. If discussed vertically: the ultimate borrows names from the non-ultimate, and the conventional borrows names from the non-conventional. Another question is raised: 'If it borrows names from the non-ultimate, the ultimate should merely be named "non-ultimate"; how could it be named "ultimate"? The conventional is also like this.' Answer: We now clarify that between the ultimate and non-ultimate, one cannot borrow if they are identical, nor can one borrow if they are different; it is by dependent co-arising and conventional designations that we speak of borrowing. Borrowing is an alternative name for dependency: if one does not depend on the non-ultimate, one cannot speak of the ultimate. Because of the non-ultimate there is the ultimate; because of the ultimate there is the non-ultimate. The ultimate and the non-ultimate are conventional designations of dependent co-arising, hence we speak of borrowing.