大乘玄論 2.5.1

2.5.1

Second, explaining the three kinds of Middle Way. The Tattvasiddhi masters explain the eight negations differently: one says that all eight negations are the Middle Way of the ultimate truth, and are also the ultimate truth itself. Another says that neither arising nor ceasing is the Middle Way, which is the Middle Way of neither existence nor non-existence of the ultimate truth, whereas the remaining six negations are the Middle Way of the conventional truth. We say this is not so. They do not understand the purport of the Mahāyāna treatises; they only judge in this way according to the Hīnayāna sense. We now say that the eight negations possess three kinds of Middle Way, which are precisely the two truths. Yet the Tattvasiddhi masters explain three kinds of Middle Way: first, the Middle Way of the conventional truth; second, the Middle Way of the ultimate truth; third, the Middle Way that jointly discusses the ultimate and the conventional. As for the Middle Way of the conventional truth: since the conventional truth does not go beyond the three designations, they explain the Middle Way based on the three designations. First, the designation based on causal composition explains the Middle Way through neither identical nor different. How so? A single pillar gathers the four subtle [elements] into one; this is non-identical yet one. The four dusts [sense-data] together constitute one designation without difference, yet designation and substantial entity are distinct. Being distinct, they are not identical; being one, they are not different; being distinct, they are neither identical nor different: causal composition explains the Middle Way. Second, continuity explains the Middle Way through neither eternal nor severed. But the designation of continuity has different interpretations: one says that one in the stage of succession explains the designation of continuity; another says that the preceding subtle and the subsequent single [moment] explain the designation of continuity, like the end of the mind of consciousness and the beginning of the mind of ideation, with the exact middle as the designation. A third is what Longguang transmitted from Kaishan, saying that to explain the designation of continuity: the subsequent arising joins with the preceding, and the preceding transforms into the subsequent, which is arising and reaching, together constituting the designation. Although the explanations of the three masters differ, through mutual continuity it is not severed, and through cessation it is not eternal: neither severed nor eternal explains the Middle Way of continuity. Third, the Middle Way is explained through the designation of mutual dependence. That is to say, there is mutual dependence of opening and avoiding, like the phenomena of matter and mind, which are called universal dependence, and also called fixed dependence. Like the phenomena of long and short, ruler and minister, father and son: the short is not short in itself, but is short because it is compared to the long; the long is not long in itself, but is long because it is compared to the short; such is mutual deprivation and dependence. Up to ruler and minister, father and son, and so on, which are called particular dependence, and also called non-fixed dependence. Although universal and particular are distinct, they are all the Middle Way explained through the designation of mutual dependence. Being designated rather than real, it accords with principle and therefore is not empty; being neither real nor empty universally explains the Middle Way of the conventional truth. The Middle Way of the ultimate truth is without name and without characteristic, provisionally using names in mutual dependence. The ultimate depends on ultimate non-existence, and therefore non-existence expresses not being non-existent, and moreover not being existent; neither existent nor non-existent is called the Middle Way of the ultimate truth. As for the Middle Way uniting the ultimate and conventional: as when the conventional truth speaks of existence, existence is not true existence; the ultimate truth is named non-existence, non-existence is not fixed non-existence; neither existent nor non-existent is called the Middle Way uniting both. Emperor Wu of the Liang ordered Dharma Master Zang of Kaishan Monastery to compose a subcommentary on the meaning. The Dharma master had no leisure from his lecturing duties, so the scholars consulted together and chose Master Kai of Ancheng Monastery and Master Yuan of Anle Monastery to compose the subcommentary on the Dharma master's behalf. These two men were adept at capturing the meaning and had refined comprehension of the non-Buddhist classics; having listened twice, they completed fourteen fascicles, which formed one work and submitted it to the Dharma master for selection. The Dharma master held the subcommentary in his own hands, read it through once, approved it, and said it could be sent out. This subcommentary says: 'How do the two truths and the Middle Way discuss things? Because the arising of phenomena is not yet in accord with the dharmatā. Not yet in accord, there is existence; thus this existence is illusory existence; because it is empty, it is conventional. Its insubstantial essence is precisely devoid of characteristics; devoid of characteristics, it is precisely ultimate. The ultimate truth is neither existent nor non-existent, yet non-existent, because it is not illusory existence. Although the conventional is neither existent nor non-existent, it is existent, because it is provisional existence. In relation to things, the entire essence is ultimate, and therefore non-existent; the entire essence is conventional, and therefore not non-existent; thus, neither existent nor non-existent is the single Middle Way of the ultimate and conventional. The ultimate truth is devoid of characteristics, hence neither existent nor non-existent: the Middle Way of the ultimate truth. The conventional truth is the causal designation: the cause is not identical with the fruit, hence non-existent; it is not that it does not produce the fruit, hence not non-existent: this neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way of the conventional truth.' Longguang's formulation of the three kinds of Middle Way differs slightly in phrasing from Kaishan's formulation of the three kinds of Middle Way. Master Chao posited two essences, while Master Zang posited one essence; yet their purports are the same, both involving attainment, and in the end they fearfully cannot escape eternity and severance, so they must be refuted one by one. First, refuting the Middle Way of the conventional truth: your Middle Way of causal composition holds that the conventional designation is not identical and one, while the substantial entity is not different and distinct. Let us ask: do 'not different' and 'distinct' use two names to designate two phenomena, or do they designate one phenomenon? If you say that your four dusts are distinct, and 'distinct' refers to the four dusts, then the four dusts in reality have differences; how can you say they are not different and distinct? Can the name 'not different' furthermore be applied to the designation? You say that the conventional designation is non-dual: one name designates the designation and cannot refer to the substantial; the substantial is named non-identical. One only sees two names designating two phenomena; how is this the Middle Way? If two names naming two phenomena is called the Middle Way, then the two names 'general' and 'particular' naming two phenomena should also be the Middle Way, and the two names 'matter' and 'mind' naming two phenomena should also be the Middle Way. If you say that because matter and mind are different they cannot explain the middle, then as the three aggregates constitute a designation, how could designation and substantial explain the Middle Way? If you say that because they mutually constitute each other it is called the Middle Way, then because matter and mind are causally conditioned by each other, one could also discuss the middle. Furthermore, you say that neither identical nor different is the middle: 'not identical' eliminates the four dusts, 'not different' eliminates the conventional designation; eliminating the designation and eliminating the substantial, what is taken as the middle? Eliminating both, there is no thing; one cannot call the great void the middle. Therefore, positing the middle has no place, hence it is a false and empty explanation. Refuting Kaishan's meaning: you say there is existence, and this existence is illusory existence. Since you say illusory existence, there is a phenomenon of illusory existence; how can that be the Middle Way? 'Illusory existence' is simply an alternative name for inverted error; therefore it is not the Middle Way. Furthermore, you say that because the cause is not identical with the fruit it is non-existent, and because it is not that it does not produce the fruit it is not non-existent. As for this 'neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way of the conventional truth': what kind of Middle Way is this? Can it not be like child's play? Looking at the middle among the hundred grasses has nothing to do with the middle of the Buddha's Dharma; it is precisely a non-Buddhist doctrine. The Śataśāstra says: 'A disciple of Kapila recited a Sāṃkhya sūtra, saying: "The lump of clay is not identical with the jar, hence non-existent; it is not that it does not make a jar, hence not non-existent; neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way."' If so, is this not precisely Sāṃkhya doctrine? Next, refuting the Middle Way of continuity: although there are three explanations of the designation of continuity, what people widely employ is the meaning of the subsequent arising joining with the preceding. Question: impermanence does not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment; how could the preceding transform into the subsequent and the subsequent arise to continue the preceding, making the preceding not cease? They reply: conditioned phenomena have two meanings: first, they cease from thought-moment to thought-moment, without discussing continuity; second, what ought to cease does not cease, discussing the designation of continuity. We now say this is not so. If you say what ought to cease does not cease, then what ought to exist should also not exist.