大乘玄論 3.5

3.5

Second, the divergent interpretations. Handed down from antiquity, there have been many masters with differing explanations of buddha-nature. At present, we specifically set forth eleven lineages as holding divergent understandings. These eleven masters all have names, but we shall not enumerate them here; we will simply present their doctrines. The first school says: Sentient beings are taken as the direct cause buddha-nature. Therefore the sūtra states: "The direct cause refers to sentient beings, and the conditioning cause refers to the six pāramitās." Since it says that the direct cause refers to sentient beings, one knows that sentient beings are taken as the direct cause buddha-nature. Furthermore, it says that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature, so one knows that sentient beings are the direct cause. The second master takes the six phenomena as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the sūtra states: "It is neither identical to the six phenomena nor separate from the six phenomena." The "six phenomena" are the five aggregates and the nominal person; hence one knows that the six phenomena are the direct cause buddha-nature. The third master takes the mind as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the sūtra states: "Whoever has a mind will certainly attain unexcelled bodhi." Because mind and consciousness differ from insentient objects like wood and stone, through study and practice one will certainly become a buddha; therefore one knows that the mind is the direct cause buddha-nature. The fourth master takes subtle, imperishable transmission as the direct cause buddha-nature. This interpretation differs from the previous one taking the mind as the direct cause. Why? Here it simply clarifies that consciousness has the nature of subtle, imperishable transmission, and speaks of this function as the direct cause. The fifth master takes avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure as the direct cause buddha-nature. Among all sentient beings, there are none who do not have the nature of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure. There truly is this nature of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure, so this function is taken as the direct cause. Yet this interpretation again differs from the previous thesis taking the mind as the direct cause; here it merely takes the function of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure as the direct cause. Therefore the sūtra says: "If there were no tathāgatagarbha, one could not loathe suffering and seek nirvāṇa with joy." Hence one knows that the function of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure is the direct cause buddha-nature. The sixth master takes the true spirit as the direct cause buddha-nature. If there were no true spirit, how could one become a true buddha? Hence one knows that the true spirit is the direct cause buddha-nature. The seventh master takes the alayavijñāna, the mind intrinsically pure by nature, as the direct cause buddha-nature. The eighth master takes the future fruit as the direct cause buddha-nature, which is the principle of the future fruit. The ninth master takes the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature. The tenth master takes ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature. The eleventh master takes the emptiness of the ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the sūtra says: "Buddha-nature is named the emptiness of the ultimate truth." Hence one knows that the emptiness of the ultimate truth is the direct cause buddha-nature. However, Dharma Master Daolang of Hexi and Dharma Master Dharmakṣema together translated the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra; personally receiving [instruction from] the Tripiṭaka master, Daolang composed the Nirvāṇayishu, in which his explanation of the meaning of buddha-nature precisely took the Middle Way as buddha-nature. Later masters all relied on Master Lang's Yishu to be able to lecture on the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] and even explain the meaning of buddha-nature. Following their own minds, they each clung to divergent interpretations, all taking doctrines refuted by the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] as correct understandings—how is this not just like the parable in the sūtra of the differing understandings of the elephant? Although they are not apart from the elephant, not a single person grasped the elephant; for this reason, they must be refuted and cleansed. Now we shall examine each of them: if an assertion can be established, it may be held as the direct cause; if an assertion cannot be made out, would one not be taking a false cause as the direct cause? In broad strokes, there are eleven schools; if discussed in detail, there are further interpretations which are of no use at present, so we do not present them again. However, in major outline, these eleven schools do not go beyond three intentions. How so? The first school takes sentient beings as the direct cause, and the second takes the six phenomena as the direct cause. These two interpretations do not go beyond the two senses of nominal and real: they explain that sentient beings are the nominal person, and the six phenomena are the five aggregates and the nominal person. Next, taking mind as the direct cause, as well as subtle, imperishable transmission, avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure, the true spirit, and the alayavijñāna—these five understandings, although differing in substance versus function, and genuine versus bogus, all alike take mental consciousness as the direct cause. Next, there are the future fruit, the principle of attaining buddhahood, ultimate truth, and the emptiness of the ultimate truth. These four schools all alike take principle as the direct cause. Now we must refute them in sequence. As for the first master who takes sentient beings as the direct cause: We now merely ask, what is a sentient being that you say it is the direct cause? The sūtra states: "If a bodhisattva has the notion of a self, the notion of a person, or the notion of a sentient being, then they are not a bodhisattva." It also says: "What the Tathāgata speaks of as a sentient being is not a sentient being." The direct cause was originally for the bodhisattva; since the sūtra already says that having the notion of a sentient being means one is not a bodhisattva, how can sentient beings be taken as the direct cause? Therefore one knows that wherever there are sentient beings, it is entirely delusional conceptualisation; how could inverted delusional conceptualisation serve as the direct cause? Furthermore, if one takes sentient beings as the direct cause, we simply ask: Did the earlier, initial teaching already make clear that there are sentient beings, or not? If the initial teaching already made clear that there are sentient beings, then the initial teaching should have already made clear the direct cause buddha-nature. That [master] explains: "The initial teaching had already made clear sentient beings, but merely had not yet spoken of them as the direct cause." If so, when the later teaching speaks of sentient beings as the direct cause, does it still point to the sentient beings of the initial teaching as the direct cause, or not? If so, the sentient beings of the initial teaching were already the direct cause within the principle. If they were already the direct cause within the principle, then within the principle, buddha-nature was already clarified. If one cannot say that the initial teaching had already discerned buddha-nature, how can sentient beings be taken as the direct cause? Furthermore, as for your citing the sūtra saying that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature, and hence knowing that sentient beings are the direct cause buddha-nature—this is not so. Since it says sentient beings possess buddha-nature, how can one say sentient beings are buddha-nature? If one says sentient beings are buddha-nature, could one say that all sentient beings possess sentient beings, and all buddha-nature possesses buddha-nature? If one cannot, one knows that sentient beings and buddha-nature are different, and one must not say that sentient beings are buddha-nature. Next, we challenge the second school. The sūtra says: "Buddha-nature is neither identical to the six phenomena nor separate from the six phenomena." We ask: what kind of statement is this that you cite it so perversely? This text clarifies that buddha-nature is neither identical to the six phenomena, nor separate from the six phenomena. When did it ever clarify that the six phenomena are buddha-nature? If you say that because it is not separate from the six phenomena, the six phenomena are buddha-nature, then it also says that because it is not identical to the six phenomena, the six phenomena are not buddha-nature—how could such a statement be coherent? It is evident that this error was caused by failing to understand how to read the sūtra. Next, among the questions, there are five schools which, although their five understandings differ in words, and pertain either to substance or to function, are all the substance and function of the mind. The earlier third school, which takes the mind as the direct cause buddha-nature, is incorrect. When the sūtra says, "Those with a mind will certainly attain bodhi," this clarifies that those who possess a mind will certainly attain bodhi; when did it ever say that the mind is the direct cause buddha-nature? At that time, fearing that there would be such an error, the sūtra immediately says below: "Mind is impermanent, while buddha-nature is eternal; therefore mind is not buddha-nature." Since the sūtra clearly says that the mind is not buddha-nature, to forcibly assert that it is—how is that not contending directly with the Buddha? Since mind cannot be established, the various functions of the mind—such as subtle, imperishable transmission, and avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure—are all destroyed along with it. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra everywhere clarifies buddha-nature; therefore, when people of that time explained buddha-nature, they cited the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] throughout as proof. In what passage does it discern subtle, imperishable transmission, or avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure, as the direct cause buddha-nature? The Śrīmālādevīsūtra says: "If there were no tathāgatagarbha, one could not loathe suffering and seek nirvāṇa with joy." This precisely clarifies that through the power of the tathāgatagarbha buddha-nature, sentient beings are able to loathe suffering and seek pleasure. When did it ever clarify that loathing suffering and seeking pleasure is the direct cause buddha-nature? That master says: "It points to the future fruit as the tathāgatagarbha; because there is the future fruit tathāgatagarbha, sentient beings are able to loathe suffering and seek pleasure." This is not so. The chapter "On the Nature" says: "The self is the tathāgatagarbha; the tathāgatagarbha is the buddha-nature." This clarifies that buddha-nature is originally present, like the impoverished woman's hidden treasure; why bother pointing to the future fruit as the tathāgatagarbha? Furthermore, the substance of the future fruit does not yet exist; for it to be able to cause sentient beings to loathe suffering and seek pleasure—how could this not be idle talk? If based on human authority: historically, who offered such an interpretation? This was Dharma Master Guangzhe, who momentarily speculated and produced such an understanding. The sūtra lacks any confirming sentence, and it was not transmitted by a master; therefore it cannot be adopted. Furthermore, the eighth, the alayavijñāna, is also not buddha-nature. As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "It is the mother of ignorance and the root of saṃsāra." Hence we know that the six consciousnesses, the seventh consciousness, and even the eighth and ninth—even if there were a hundred thousand immeasurable consciousnesses—none are buddha-nature. Why? Because they are all attainments, unseen by the five eyes. Next, there are the third and fourth groups of schools, which all take principle as the direct cause buddha-nature, though not without slight differences. The former two schools, which take the future fruit and the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature, assert that it is the principle of conventional truth. The next two schools, which take ultimate truth and the emptiness of the ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature, assert that it is the principle of ultimate truth. Taking the emptiness of the ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature is what was used by the northern Mahāyāna masters. Now we ask: If, relying on the text of the Nirvāṇa[sūtra], one takes the emptiness of the ultimate truth as buddha-nature, the text immediately below states: "Emptiness means not seeing emptiness and non-emptiness; this is named buddha-nature." Hence one knows that it takes the Middle Way as buddha-nature, not emptiness as buddha-nature. Taking ultimate truth as buddha-nature was used by Master He and Master Xiaoliang. We ask: Taking ultimate truth as buddha-nature—from what sūtra does it come? Whose lineage does it inherit? Lacking both master-disciple transmission and confirming sentences, it cannot be adopted. Taking the future fruit as the direct cause buddha-nature is what many ancient masters historically adopted; this is the thesis of original absence [becoming present]. If it is newly originated, then it is a created phenomenon; created phenomena are impermanent, not buddha-nature. Taking the principle of attaining buddhahood as buddha-nature was used by Sengzheng Linggen; this doctrine is the most sound, yet it lacks master-to-disciple transmission. The essence of learning requires following a master and inheriting their lineage. Now we ask: In taking the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature, what sūtra clarifies it? Whose lineage did he inherit? Since his master took mind as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the disciple to take the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature—how is this not betraying his master and inventing his own speculations? Therefore it cannot be adopted. Speaking generally of the eleven schools, they all posit a principle of attaining buddhahood. Now we comprehensively refute the principle of attaining buddhahood, a critique that applies generally to all eleven. Since the interpretations are extensive, it is appropriate to formulate a three-tiered refutation: First, we refute it in terms of existence and non-existence. We simply ask: regarding the principle of attaining buddhahood, does this principle exist, or is it non-existent? If you say it exists, existence has already become an actual entity, not what is called a principle. If you say it is non-existent, non-existence means there is no principle. It thus falls into the two extremes and cannot be called a principle. Second, we refute it in terms of the three periods of time. We simply ask: regarding the principle of attaining buddhahood, is it an already-actualized principle? Is it a not-yet-actualized principle? Or does the principle exist at the very time of principalizing? If you say it is an already-actualized principle, then the principle is already spent, and there is no further principle. If you say it is a not-yet-actualized principle, since it is not yet principle, it does not yet exist. If you say the principle exists at the very time of principalizing: if the phenomenon has already been established, it falls under the "already"; if the phenomenon does not yet exist, it falls under the "not-yet"; therefore there is no distinct third phenomenon to be called the principle. Third, we refute it in terms of identity and difference. We simply ask: regarding the principle of attaining buddhahood, is it identical to emptiness, or separate from emptiness? If you say it is identical to emptiness, it is already emptiness, and there is no further principle. If you say this principle exists separate from emptiness: emptiness cannot be separated from, so how could one be separate from emptiness and speak of having a principle? Furthermore, if there were a principle separate from emptiness, that would constitute dual views. The sūtra says: "Whoever has duality has neither path nor fruit." How could inverted dual views be taken as the direct cause? When investigated under these three lines of inquiry, it cannot be found; not only are the doctrines of the four schools destroyed, but the positions of all eleven schools are shattered together. Question: Refuting others may be granted, but at present, what is taken as the direct cause? Answer: For a preliminary response to others, we must overturn them entirely: whatever they say exists, we now say is non-existent. They take sentient beings as the direct cause; we now take non-sentient-beings as the direct cause. They take the six phenomena as the direct cause; we now take non-six-phenomena as the direct cause. And so on, up to: they take ultimate truth as the direct cause, and we now take non-ultimate-truth as the direct cause. If they take conventional truth as the direct cause, we now take non-conventional-truth as the direct cause; hence we say that the Middle Way, neither ultimate nor conventional, is the direct cause buddha-nature. To cure illness with medicine, such discourse is necessary. Although this is so in responding to others, it must also be examined horizontally and vertically; hence this meaning of "non-sentient-beings" has a shallow and a deep aspect. Examined horizontally as medicine, it is as just explained; vertically, in relation to the Way, this very "non-sentient-beings" and so on is the direct cause. If one speaks of what is right and what is not right, what is there that is not a sentient being, such that one speaks of sentient beings? But it is precisely in non-sentient-beings that one speaks of sentient beings; could these sentient beings be said to exist? Could they be said to be non-existent? Could they be said to both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist? If one understands these sentient beings, why ask whether they are not the direct cause? The same applies even to the six phenomena and the ultimate truth. If one penetrates thoroughly and awakens deeply, then the meaning of the direct cause buddha-nature is already complete. The previous was one horizontal tier of analysis, and this is another vertical tier of analysis, thus forming two tiers of discussion on the meaning of the direct cause.