大乘玄論 3
English (machine translation) 3
- Language
- English
3.1
Compiled by the non-Han Jizang
3.2
The Ten Sections on the Meaning of Buddha-Nature:
3.3
1. Section on the General Purport; 2. Section on Explaining Differing Interpretations; 3. Section on Investigating the Sūtras; 4. Section on Discerning the Direct Cause; 5. Section on Explaining Names; 6. Section on Fundamental Possession versus Newly Acquired Possession; 7. Section on Presence and Absence regarding the Internal and External; 8. Section on Seeing the Nature; 9. Section on Harmonizing the Teachings; 10. Section on Critical Distinctions.
3.4
The sweet medicine has remained on the mountain for a very long time; the round pearl has lain submerged in the water indeed for many an age. Yet following the places to which it flows, the six tastes differ; contending over grasping tiles and stones, the three vehicles become disparate. Mistakenly speaking of a knife of ram's horn, or relying again on an elephant that resembles a rope, I venture to receive the Buddha's intention and lightly set forth modest words, hoping that as a reflection appears in a mirror, the face will find its proper place again. Losing one's native land when young is called childhood exile; not knowing how to return to the root is called ignorance; sweeping away consciousness and returning to the source is designated buddha-nature.
3.5
Second, the divergent interpretations. Handed down from antiquity, there have been many masters with differing explanations of buddha-nature. At present, we specifically set forth eleven lineages as holding divergent understandings. These eleven masters all have names, but we shall not enumerate them here; we will simply present their doctrines. The first school says: Sentient beings are taken as the direct cause buddha-nature. Therefore the sūtra states: "The direct cause refers to sentient beings, and the conditioning cause refers to the six pāramitās." Since it says that the direct cause refers to sentient beings, one knows that sentient beings are taken as the direct cause buddha-nature. Furthermore, it says that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature, so one knows that sentient beings are the direct cause. The second master takes the six phenomena as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the sūtra states: "It is neither identical to the six phenomena nor separate from the six phenomena." The "six phenomena" are the five aggregates and the nominal person; hence one knows that the six phenomena are the direct cause buddha-nature. The third master takes the mind as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the sūtra states: "Whoever has a mind will certainly attain unexcelled bodhi." Because mind and consciousness differ from insentient objects like wood and stone, through study and practice one will certainly become a buddha; therefore one knows that the mind is the direct cause buddha-nature. The fourth master takes subtle, imperishable transmission as the direct cause buddha-nature. This interpretation differs from the previous one taking the mind as the direct cause. Why? Here it simply clarifies that consciousness has the nature of subtle, imperishable transmission, and speaks of this function as the direct cause. The fifth master takes avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure as the direct cause buddha-nature. Among all sentient beings, there are none who do not have the nature of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure. There truly is this nature of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure, so this function is taken as the direct cause. Yet this interpretation again differs from the previous thesis taking the mind as the direct cause; here it merely takes the function of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure as the direct cause. Therefore the sūtra says: "If there were no tathāgatagarbha, one could not loathe suffering and seek nirvāṇa with joy." Hence one knows that the function of avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure is the direct cause buddha-nature. The sixth master takes the true spirit as the direct cause buddha-nature. If there were no true spirit, how could one become a true buddha? Hence one knows that the true spirit is the direct cause buddha-nature. The seventh master takes the alayavijñāna, the mind intrinsically pure by nature, as the direct cause buddha-nature. The eighth master takes the future fruit as the direct cause buddha-nature, which is the principle of the future fruit. The ninth master takes the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature. The tenth master takes ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature. The eleventh master takes the emptiness of the ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the sūtra says: "Buddha-nature is named the emptiness of the ultimate truth." Hence one knows that the emptiness of the ultimate truth is the direct cause buddha-nature. However, Dharma Master Daolang of Hexi and Dharma Master Dharmakṣema together translated the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra; personally receiving [instruction from] the Tripiṭaka master, Daolang composed the Nirvāṇayishu, in which his explanation of the meaning of buddha-nature precisely took the Middle Way as buddha-nature. Later masters all relied on Master Lang's Yishu to be able to lecture on the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] and even explain the meaning of buddha-nature. Following their own minds, they each clung to divergent interpretations, all taking doctrines refuted by the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] as correct understandings—how is this not just like the parable in the sūtra of the differing understandings of the elephant? Although they are not apart from the elephant, not a single person grasped the elephant; for this reason, they must be refuted and cleansed. Now we shall examine each of them: if an assertion can be established, it may be held as the direct cause; if an assertion cannot be made out, would one not be taking a false cause as the direct cause? In broad strokes, there are eleven schools; if discussed in detail, there are further interpretations which are of no use at present, so we do not present them again. However, in major outline, these eleven schools do not go beyond three intentions. How so? The first school takes sentient beings as the direct cause, and the second takes the six phenomena as the direct cause. These two interpretations do not go beyond the two senses of nominal and real: they explain that sentient beings are the nominal person, and the six phenomena are the five aggregates and the nominal person. Next, taking mind as the direct cause, as well as subtle, imperishable transmission, avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure, the true spirit, and the alayavijñāna—these five understandings, although differing in substance versus function, and genuine versus bogus, all alike take mental consciousness as the direct cause. Next, there are the future fruit, the principle of attaining buddhahood, ultimate truth, and the emptiness of the ultimate truth. These four schools all alike take principle as the direct cause. Now we must refute them in sequence. As for the first master who takes sentient beings as the direct cause: We now merely ask, what is a sentient being that you say it is the direct cause? The sūtra states: "If a bodhisattva has the notion of a self, the notion of a person, or the notion of a sentient being, then they are not a bodhisattva." It also says: "What the Tathāgata speaks of as a sentient being is not a sentient being." The direct cause was originally for the bodhisattva; since the sūtra already says that having the notion of a sentient being means one is not a bodhisattva, how can sentient beings be taken as the direct cause? Therefore one knows that wherever there are sentient beings, it is entirely delusional conceptualisation; how could inverted delusional conceptualisation serve as the direct cause? Furthermore, if one takes sentient beings as the direct cause, we simply ask: Did the earlier, initial teaching already make clear that there are sentient beings, or not? If the initial teaching already made clear that there are sentient beings, then the initial teaching should have already made clear the direct cause buddha-nature. That [master] explains: "The initial teaching had already made clear sentient beings, but merely had not yet spoken of them as the direct cause." If so, when the later teaching speaks of sentient beings as the direct cause, does it still point to the sentient beings of the initial teaching as the direct cause, or not? If so, the sentient beings of the initial teaching were already the direct cause within the principle. If they were already the direct cause within the principle, then within the principle, buddha-nature was already clarified. If one cannot say that the initial teaching had already discerned buddha-nature, how can sentient beings be taken as the direct cause? Furthermore, as for your citing the sūtra saying that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature, and hence knowing that sentient beings are the direct cause buddha-nature—this is not so. Since it says sentient beings possess buddha-nature, how can one say sentient beings are buddha-nature? If one says sentient beings are buddha-nature, could one say that all sentient beings possess sentient beings, and all buddha-nature possesses buddha-nature? If one cannot, one knows that sentient beings and buddha-nature are different, and one must not say that sentient beings are buddha-nature. Next, we challenge the second school. The sūtra says: "Buddha-nature is neither identical to the six phenomena nor separate from the six phenomena." We ask: what kind of statement is this that you cite it so perversely? This text clarifies that buddha-nature is neither identical to the six phenomena, nor separate from the six phenomena. When did it ever clarify that the six phenomena are buddha-nature? If you say that because it is not separate from the six phenomena, the six phenomena are buddha-nature, then it also says that because it is not identical to the six phenomena, the six phenomena are not buddha-nature—how could such a statement be coherent? It is evident that this error was caused by failing to understand how to read the sūtra. Next, among the questions, there are five schools which, although their five understandings differ in words, and pertain either to substance or to function, are all the substance and function of the mind. The earlier third school, which takes the mind as the direct cause buddha-nature, is incorrect. When the sūtra says, "Those with a mind will certainly attain bodhi," this clarifies that those who possess a mind will certainly attain bodhi; when did it ever say that the mind is the direct cause buddha-nature? At that time, fearing that there would be such an error, the sūtra immediately says below: "Mind is impermanent, while buddha-nature is eternal; therefore mind is not buddha-nature." Since the sūtra clearly says that the mind is not buddha-nature, to forcibly assert that it is—how is that not contending directly with the Buddha? Since mind cannot be established, the various functions of the mind—such as subtle, imperishable transmission, and avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure—are all destroyed along with it. The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra everywhere clarifies buddha-nature; therefore, when people of that time explained buddha-nature, they cited the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] throughout as proof. In what passage does it discern subtle, imperishable transmission, or avoiding suffering and seeking pleasure, as the direct cause buddha-nature? The Śrīmālādevīsūtra says: "If there were no tathāgatagarbha, one could not loathe suffering and seek nirvāṇa with joy." This precisely clarifies that through the power of the tathāgatagarbha buddha-nature, sentient beings are able to loathe suffering and seek pleasure. When did it ever clarify that loathing suffering and seeking pleasure is the direct cause buddha-nature? That master says: "It points to the future fruit as the tathāgatagarbha; because there is the future fruit tathāgatagarbha, sentient beings are able to loathe suffering and seek pleasure." This is not so. The chapter "On the Nature" says: "The self is the tathāgatagarbha; the tathāgatagarbha is the buddha-nature." This clarifies that buddha-nature is originally present, like the impoverished woman's hidden treasure; why bother pointing to the future fruit as the tathāgatagarbha? Furthermore, the substance of the future fruit does not yet exist; for it to be able to cause sentient beings to loathe suffering and seek pleasure—how could this not be idle talk? If based on human authority: historically, who offered such an interpretation? This was Dharma Master Guangzhe, who momentarily speculated and produced such an understanding. The sūtra lacks any confirming sentence, and it was not transmitted by a master; therefore it cannot be adopted. Furthermore, the eighth, the alayavijñāna, is also not buddha-nature. As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "It is the mother of ignorance and the root of saṃsāra." Hence we know that the six consciousnesses, the seventh consciousness, and even the eighth and ninth—even if there were a hundred thousand immeasurable consciousnesses—none are buddha-nature. Why? Because they are all attainments, unseen by the five eyes. Next, there are the third and fourth groups of schools, which all take principle as the direct cause buddha-nature, though not without slight differences. The former two schools, which take the future fruit and the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature, assert that it is the principle of conventional truth. The next two schools, which take ultimate truth and the emptiness of the ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature, assert that it is the principle of ultimate truth. Taking the emptiness of the ultimate truth as the direct cause buddha-nature is what was used by the northern Mahāyāna masters. Now we ask: If, relying on the text of the Nirvāṇa[sūtra], one takes the emptiness of the ultimate truth as buddha-nature, the text immediately below states: "Emptiness means not seeing emptiness and non-emptiness; this is named buddha-nature." Hence one knows that it takes the Middle Way as buddha-nature, not emptiness as buddha-nature. Taking ultimate truth as buddha-nature was used by Master He and Master Xiaoliang. We ask: Taking ultimate truth as buddha-nature—from what sūtra does it come? Whose lineage does it inherit? Lacking both master-disciple transmission and confirming sentences, it cannot be adopted. Taking the future fruit as the direct cause buddha-nature is what many ancient masters historically adopted; this is the thesis of original absence [becoming present]. If it is newly originated, then it is a created phenomenon; created phenomena are impermanent, not buddha-nature. Taking the principle of attaining buddhahood as buddha-nature was used by Sengzheng Linggen; this doctrine is the most sound, yet it lacks master-to-disciple transmission. The essence of learning requires following a master and inheriting their lineage. Now we ask: In taking the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature, what sūtra clarifies it? Whose lineage did he inherit? Since his master took mind as the direct cause buddha-nature, for the disciple to take the principle of attaining buddhahood as the direct cause buddha-nature—how is this not betraying his master and inventing his own speculations? Therefore it cannot be adopted. Speaking generally of the eleven schools, they all posit a principle of attaining buddhahood. Now we comprehensively refute the principle of attaining buddhahood, a critique that applies generally to all eleven. Since the interpretations are extensive, it is appropriate to formulate a three-tiered refutation: First, we refute it in terms of existence and non-existence. We simply ask: regarding the principle of attaining buddhahood, does this principle exist, or is it non-existent? If you say it exists, existence has already become an actual entity, not what is called a principle. If you say it is non-existent, non-existence means there is no principle. It thus falls into the two extremes and cannot be called a principle. Second, we refute it in terms of the three periods of time. We simply ask: regarding the principle of attaining buddhahood, is it an already-actualized principle? Is it a not-yet-actualized principle? Or does the principle exist at the very time of principalizing? If you say it is an already-actualized principle, then the principle is already spent, and there is no further principle. If you say it is a not-yet-actualized principle, since it is not yet principle, it does not yet exist. If you say the principle exists at the very time of principalizing: if the phenomenon has already been established, it falls under the "already"; if the phenomenon does not yet exist, it falls under the "not-yet"; therefore there is no distinct third phenomenon to be called the principle. Third, we refute it in terms of identity and difference. We simply ask: regarding the principle of attaining buddhahood, is it identical to emptiness, or separate from emptiness? If you say it is identical to emptiness, it is already emptiness, and there is no further principle. If you say this principle exists separate from emptiness: emptiness cannot be separated from, so how could one be separate from emptiness and speak of having a principle? Furthermore, if there were a principle separate from emptiness, that would constitute dual views. The sūtra says: "Whoever has duality has neither path nor fruit." How could inverted dual views be taken as the direct cause? When investigated under these three lines of inquiry, it cannot be found; not only are the doctrines of the four schools destroyed, but the positions of all eleven schools are shattered together. Question: Refuting others may be granted, but at present, what is taken as the direct cause? Answer: For a preliminary response to others, we must overturn them entirely: whatever they say exists, we now say is non-existent. They take sentient beings as the direct cause; we now take non-sentient-beings as the direct cause. They take the six phenomena as the direct cause; we now take non-six-phenomena as the direct cause. And so on, up to: they take ultimate truth as the direct cause, and we now take non-ultimate-truth as the direct cause. If they take conventional truth as the direct cause, we now take non-conventional-truth as the direct cause; hence we say that the Middle Way, neither ultimate nor conventional, is the direct cause buddha-nature. To cure illness with medicine, such discourse is necessary. Although this is so in responding to others, it must also be examined horizontally and vertically; hence this meaning of "non-sentient-beings" has a shallow and a deep aspect. Examined horizontally as medicine, it is as just explained; vertically, in relation to the Way, this very "non-sentient-beings" and so on is the direct cause. If one speaks of what is right and what is not right, what is there that is not a sentient being, such that one speaks of sentient beings? But it is precisely in non-sentient-beings that one speaks of sentient beings; could these sentient beings be said to exist? Could they be said to be non-existent? Could they be said to both exist and not exist, or neither exist nor not exist? If one understands these sentient beings, why ask whether they are not the direct cause? The same applies even to the six phenomena and the ultimate truth. If one penetrates thoroughly and awakens deeply, then the meaning of the direct cause buddha-nature is already complete. The previous was one horizontal tier of analysis, and this is another vertical tier of analysis, thus forming two tiers of discussion on the meaning of the direct cause.
3.6
Third, investigating the sūtras. Having recognized buddha-nature, one should read widely across the various sūtras. Traditionally, past discriminators held that the Āgamas also explain buddha-nature, but with slight reservations: they say that all sentient beings possess the nature of a śrāvaka, possess the nature of a pratyekabuddha, and possess the nature of a buddha. Since this is so in the Āgamas, other sūtras also contain statements on buddha-nature, though not very clearly. What objection could there be to these various sūtras explaining buddha-nature in this way? Thus the new Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra states: "In an explicit exposition, this body is the Mahāyāna, is the tathāgatagarbha, is the nature of the Tathāgata." The Avataṃsakasūtra states: "A bodhisattva's rejoicing mind does not sever the Tathāgata-nature." It also says: "One who wishes not to sever the lineage of the buddhas should produce the mind of awakening (bodhicitta)." Furthermore, the chapter on "Emergence of the Nature" in the Avataṃsaka precisely clarifies the meaning of buddha-nature. Emerging from the nature of the Jewel-King Tathāgata, departing from worldly causes, one attains entry into the fruit of the dharmadhātu. Tying together previous cause and fruit, it engenders subsequent cause and fruit; thus the Avataṃsaka clarifies that buddha-nature has cause and fruit, though it has not yet coined the names "primary cause" (正因) and "contributory cause" (緣因), nor the terms "fruit" (果) and "fruit-of-fruit" (果果). As for fully explaining the meaning of buddha-nature, it is as articulated in the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, which therefore fully explains: there is cause, cause-of-cause, fruit, and fruit-of-fruit. At present, a certain master constantly cites the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra as proof. Indeed, this single teaching explains buddha-nature everywhere: the parable of the lapis lazuli jewel in the "Lamentation" chapter also completely clarifies the meaning of buddha-nature; so too the chapter on "The Nature of the Tathāgata" entirely clarifies the meaning of buddha-nature; and going on to the chapters on "Lion's Roar" and "Kāśyapa", the matters of buddha-nature are extensively elucidated, its meaning becoming manifest. Therefore, among the passages cited by this master, the text of the "Lion's Roar" chapter is taken as primary. Bodhisattva Lion's Roar asks: "What is buddha-nature? For what reason is it called buddha-nature?" There are five such questions on buddha-nature, which the Tathāgata answers in turn. Answering the first question, he says: "Good son! You ask what is buddha-nature, good son? Buddha-nature is called ultimate emptiness; ultimate emptiness is called wisdom." This, on an initial reading, takes ultimate emptiness as buddha-nature. Yet it also says that ultimate emptiness is called wisdom—how is this not different from the traditional meaning? Now it simply explains the cognitive object as gnosis, and explains gnosis as the cognitive object. It further states: "What is called empty means not seeing either empty or non-empty." In response to this, one should also say: "What is called wisdom means not seeing either wisdom or non-wisdom." That is: not seeing emptiness removes emptiness; not seeing non-emptiness removes non-emptiness. Removing wisdom and also removing non-wisdom, being far removed from both extremes is called the noble Middle Way. It also says: "Such two views are not called the Middle Way; neither impermanent nor eternal is called the Middle Way." How is this not taking the Middle Way as buddha-nature? Therefore, removing non-emptiness departs from the extreme of permanence, and removing emptiness departs from the extreme of annihilation; not seeing wisdom and non-wisdom is also like this. Hence, the Middle Way is taken as buddha-nature. Thus the text states: "Buddha-nature is the seed of the Middle Way of saṃbodhi." Therefore, it is now explained that ultimate emptiness is called buddha-nature. Not seeing empty or non-empty, not seeing wisdom or non-wisdom, neither impermanence nor annihilation is called the Middle Way; it is simply this that is the Middle Way buddha-nature. If this were added to the previous eleven masters, it would make a twelfth interpretation. However, if one realizes the true path, knowing that the path does not have even one [interpretation], how could there be two interpretations within it? When it is said that ultimate emptiness is buddha-nature, it is not the ultimate emptiness distinguished traditionally. Their explanation of ultimate emptiness is merely cognitive object and not gnosis; this is a one-sided path. When wisdom is spoken of now, it is also not the wisdom explained traditionally. Their explanation of wisdom is merely gnosis and not cognitive object; this is also a one-sided doctrine, not what is called the Middle Way. Yet the meaning of the Middle Way is difficult to recognize, as fully distinguished in [the discussion of] the two truths: neither middle nor extreme, not abiding in middle or extreme, the equality of middle and extreme is conventionally designated as "middle". If one understands such a Middle Way, one recognizes buddha-nature; if one understands present buddha-nature, one also recognizes that Middle Way; if one understands the Middle Way, one understands ultimate emptiness; if one understands ultimate emptiness, one understands wisdom; understanding wisdom, one understands the sphere of practice of all buddhas of the Golden Radiance; understanding the sphere of practice of all buddhas of the Golden Radiance, one understands that this sūtra says: "Radiance is called wisdom." If one understands wisdom, one understands buddha-nature; if one understands buddha-nature, one understands nirvāṇa.
3.7
Fourth, selecting the primary cause. Because the primary cause is difficult to recognize, we examine it now through two approaches: first, explaining the doctrine via the wheel of a cart, examining it as without beginning or end; second, explaining the doctrine via the three times, examining it as having beginning and end. The meaning of being without beginning or end is as the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra states: "The twelve links of dependent co-arising are neither arising nor ceasing, neither one nor two, neither eternal nor annihilated, neither coming nor going, neither cause nor fruit." It also states: "Buddha-nature has cause, cause-of-cause, fruit, and fruit-of-fruit." Therefore, the meaning of being without beginning or end is explained through four propositions. What is called "cause" is the cause as cognitive object, namely the twelve links of dependent co-arising. What is called "cause-of-cause" is the contributory cause, namely the contemplative gnosis born of the twelve links of dependent co-arising. The cognitive object is already a cause; this contemplative gnosis exists caused by that cause, hence it is called "cause-of-cause". Strictly speaking, the twelve links of dependent co-arising should also exist caused by a cause, hence called "cause-of-cause". Looking back to what precedes, looking forward to what follows—both are cause-of-cause. What is called "fruit" is saṃbodhi, which is attained by means of the cause, hence called "fruit". What is called "fruit-of-fruit" is mahāparinirvāṇa, which is attained on account of bodhi; nirvāṇa is called "fruit-of-fruit". Bodhi is gnosis, and nirvāṇa is abandonment; on account of gnosis, abandonment is spoken of. This is the meaning of being without beginning or end. Why? Just as the contemplative gnosis produced exists caused by a cause, and is therefore called "cause-of-cause", so too the twelve links of dependent co-arising exist caused by a cause, and are also "cause-of-cause". Since they mutually serve as cause and cause-of-cause, it is without beginning or end. Second, examining it through the three times as having beginning and end consists of three propositions: First, being cause and not fruit, which is the cause as cognitive object; thus the sūtra states: "It is cause and not fruit, like buddha-nature." Second, being fruit and not cause, which is the nature of the fruit-of-fruit; thus the sūtra states: "It is fruit and not cause, called great nirvāṇa." Third, being both cause and fruit, as with the revealing cause and saṃbodhi; this is both cause and fruit, being a cause looking to what follows, and a fruit looking to what precedes. Since it states that the cognitive object is cause and not fruit, and nirvāṇa is fruit and not cause, it is called the meaning of having beginning and end. Question: In first explaining the four propositions and later stating the three propositions, is there a primary cause? Answer: There is not yet the primary cause. Question: If the four propositions explained first and the three propositions stated later are both not the primary cause, what is the primary cause? Answer: In the cause and fruit explained by the previous four propositions, cause has the meaning of secondary cause, and fruit has the meaning of secondary fruit. Why is this? Cause is different from fruit, and fruit is different from cause; how could this not be a secondary meaning? Therefore, previously saying that there is cause, cause-of-cause, fruit, and fruit-of-fruit—none of these is yet the primary cause; if one speaks of neither-cause-nor-fruit, that is the primary cause. In the three propositions stated later—being cause and not fruit, being fruit and not cause, being both cause and fruit—none is yet called "primary"; if one speaks of neither-cause-nor-fruit, this is primary. Thus the sūtra states: "Neither cause nor fruit is called buddha-nature." Therefore, within the four propositions, adding a fifth proposition constitutes the primary cause. Within the three propositions, adding a fourth proposition constitutes the primary cause. This is why buddha-nature is neither cause nor fruit, yet cause and fruit are taught. Cause through non-cause: opening cognitive object and gnosis, there are two causes, namely cause and cause-of-cause. Fruit through non-fruit: opening gnosis and abandonment, there are two fruits, namely fruit and fruit-of-fruit. When it comes to discussing the primary cause, how could it be cause or fruit? Hence it is neither cause nor fruit. That which is the Middle Way is called the primary cause; therefore the Middle Way is taken as the primary-cause buddha-nature. Thus the sūtra states: "Buddha-nature is the seed of the Middle Way of saṃbodhi." Therefore, buddha-nature is the seed of the Middle Way; one may also take the Middle Way cause as the primary seed. If discussing the doctrine simply, here one must see with one's own eyes the text of the "Lion's Roar" chapter. However, previously it was stated that primary-cause buddha-nature, being cause through non-cause, has two causes, namely the two causes of cognitive object and revealing [cause]. Being fruit through non-fruit, it has two fruits, namely bodhi and nirvāṇa. Now these two causes and two fruits are not the primary cause. Because of the primary cause of neither-cause-nor-fruit, these causes and fruits exist; therefore, these two causes and two fruits are all secondary. If neither-cause-nor-fruit is the primary cause, then neither contributory nor revealing [cause] is the primary cause; neither-contributory-nor-revealing is the primary cause. Neither bodhi nor nirvāṇa is the primary fruit; neither-bodhi-nor-nirvāṇa is the primary fruit. Question: If so, that would make six kinds of buddha-nature. Why? In the cause there are the contributory cause and the revealing cause, and furthermore there is the primary cause—are these not three causes? In the fruit there are bodhi and nirvāṇa, making two fruits, and furthermore there is neither-bodhi-nor-nirvāṇa called the primary fruit—would these not be six kinds of buddha-nature? Answer: Six kinds of buddha-nature are also acceptable. Here, however, it is not so. Why is this? It is called buddha-nature only in the cause; when reaching the fruit, it becomes the nature-buddha. Therefore, in the cause it is merely called "non-cause", and in the fruit it is called "non-fruit"; it is just a single neither-cause-nor-fruit. But now, in order to distinguish buddha-nature, the sūtra takes it as the primary cause, and therefore there are only five natures, not six natures.
3.8
Fifth, explaining the names. There are two kinds of explaining the names: first, explaining the general name; next, explaining the specific names. Regarding the general name, there are differences among three traditions. The first explanation states: Both characters of 'buddha-nature' (foxing) are names of the fruit. 'Buddha' means 'awakened one', and for this reason it should not pertain to the cause. 'Nature' has the meaning of being unalterable; since the substance of the fruit is eternal, it is therefore unalterable. In the causal stage there is dark consciousness, so it is not an awakened one; since it is subject to change and alteration, it cannot be called 'nature'. However, sentient beings necessarily have the principle of bound-to-attain this buddha-nature, and therefore it is said that all have buddha-nature. The second master explains: Buddha-nature pertains to the causal stage. He refutes the first school, saying: Since the sūtra says that all sentient beings have buddha-nature, how can one say that there is no such name in the causal stage? Because sentient beings in the causal stage have the meaning of awakening, they are 'buddha'; because they have the unalterable principle of bound-to-attain, it is called 'nature'. The third school explains the characters separately: 'Buddha' is the name of the fruit, and 'nature' is the name of the cause. He also brings up the first school to raise an objection: Sentient beings are merely benighted and deluded, and do not yet have wisdom. If they possessed the quality of awakening, one might grant buddha-awakening; but since sentient beings have no awakening at all, how can one say sentient beings are buddha? Only by grinding away with the minor wisdom of saṃsāra does one ultimately achieve the great awakening of the fruit-ground. That fruit is first named 'buddha', so 'buddha' is the name of the fruit. But sentient beings will bound-to-attain it; this principle is unalterable, and therefore it is called 'nature'. 'Nature' is simply the principle, and so 'nature' pertains to the causal stage. However, none of these three explanations are adopted now; all must be washed away. One can simply use the doctrines of the three schools to refute each other. Question: What is our present doctrine? Is it in the cause? Is it in the fruit? Or is it in [both] cause and fruit? Answer: The doctrine explained at present is neither present nor absent; hence it is said that 'neither present nor absent' is what the Buddha taught. It is solely on the basis of this meaning that it is named 'buddha-nature'. Although it is neither present nor absent, when we speak of being present and being absent: buddha-nature is in the cause, and nature-buddha is in the fruit; therefore, cause of the fruit is called 'buddha-nature', and fruit of the cause is called 'nature-buddha'. This is the meaning of the non-dual being dual. Because the non-dual is dual, duality is not dual; hence it is said that duality being non-dual is the substance, and non-duality being dual is the function. Taking substance as function and function as substance, the Middle Way where substance and function are equal and non-dual is truly buddha-nature. When the various masters explain the meaning of buddha-nature, some say buddha-nature is cause and not fruit, and some say it is fruit and not cause; these are the dual meanings of cause and fruit, not buddha-nature. Therefore the sūtra says, 'All that is dual is wrong view.' Thus we know that none of the masters know buddha-nature; each clings to one side, disputing right and wrong, and losing buddha-nature. Only if one knows that cause and fruit are equal and non-dual can it properly be termed 'buddha-nature'; hence the sūtra says, 'Neither cause nor fruit is named buddha-nature.' As it is with buddha-nature, so it is with nirvāṇa. Only if one knows that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are equal and non-dual can it properly be termed 'nirvāṇa'; hence the sūtra says, 'The Buddha knows that all sentient beings are ultimately quiescent; this is the mark of nirvāṇa, not becoming extinguished anew.' Next is explaining the specific names. First, it was said that buddha-nature as the direct cause is neither cause nor fruit. Because it is non-cause yet cause, there are two causes: namely, the objective-sphere cause and the revelatory cause. Because it is non-fruit yet fruit, there are two fruits: namely, bodhi and nirvāṇa. As for the objective-sphere cause, it is the twelve links of dependent co-arising capable of generating contemplative gnosis; because it is the objective sphere of contemplative gnosis, it is named the objective-sphere cause; because it is the prior condition capable of generating contemplative gnosis, it is also named the conditioning cause. As for the revelatory cause, contemplative gnosis can reveal and bring forth the buddha-fruit, and therefore it is named the revelatory cause. Since it is the conditioning cause that reveals and brings forth the buddha-fruit, the revelatory cause is therefore sometimes called the conditioning cause. Bodhi means here the path of correct and universal knowledge; it is named from [the standpoint of] gnosis. Nirvāṇa means here quiescence; it is designated from [the standpoint of] cessation. In the previous catuskoṭi, that which is 'cause' refers to the twelve links of dependent co-arising. Strictly speaking, the twelve links of dependent co-arising are not the direct cause of bodhi; yet it is called 'cause' because it can generate contemplative gnosis, serving as a cause for the cause, and is therefore named 'cause'. If we follow this analogy, great nirvāṇa is likewise not the direct fruit of correct contemplation, but takes the fruit of bodhi as its fruit, and so it should also simply be named 'fruit'. If one says that because nirvāṇa serves as a fruit for the fruit, it should properly be named the 'fruit of the fruit', the twelve links of dependent co-arising are also like this: because they serve as a cause for the cause, they should be named the 'cause of the cause'. Yet the sūtra says that 'cause of the cause' refers to the contemplative gnosis generated by the twelve links of dependent co-arising; because this exists dependent on the cause, it is named 'cause of the cause'. If so, the twelve links of dependent co-arising also exist dependent on a cause; why are they not named 'cause of the cause'? However, although the analogy universally allows such an interpretation, the twelve links of dependent co-arising serve as the beginning of the cause of the cause, and are therefore simply named 'cause'; hence the sūtra says 'it is cause and not fruit'. Contemplative gnosis is produced from the twelve links of dependent co-arising and exists dependent on the cause; therefore it is named 'cause of the cause'. That there is a 'fruit' refers to sambodhi. It exists dependent on the cause of contemplative gnosis, and is therefore named 'fruit'. If one says that because sambodhi is the direct fruit of contemplative gnosis it is simply named 'fruit', contemplative gnosis is also the direct cause of sambodhi, and so it should also simply be named 'cause'. If one says that because contemplative gnosis exists dependent on a cause it should properly be named 'cause of the cause', sambodhi also exists dependent on a fruit, and so it should also be named 'fruit of the fruit'. But it is not so: strictly speaking, sambodhi is the beginning of the recompense of the cause, and so it is directly named 'fruit'. Nirvāṇa exists dependent on the fruit of sambodhi, and is therefore named 'fruit of the fruit'. However, these four kinds—the two causes and the two fruits—are all incidental and cannot be named direct; only that which is neither cause nor fruit is named the direct cause. Because it is non-cause, there are two causes; because it is non-fruit, there are two fruits. Thus this cause is non-cause, and this fruit is non-fruit; therefore, neither cause nor fruit is named the direct. While neither cause nor fruit may itself be named direct, because it is in the cause it is named direct cause, and its fruit is termed direct fruit. Yet this direct meaning can ultimately never be definitively stated; thus it is sometimes called the Path, sometimes called the Middle, and sometimes called the direct cause. If one grasps it by taking the words at face value, one will ultimately never obtain it. Why? When speaking of its being direct: the fruit itself is not direct, nor is the cause direct. It is neither not neither-cause-nor-fruit, nor is it not not neither-cause-nor-fruit. Question: If so, what is it? Answer: Herein there is no 'this is it'. Therefore, one must have that by which one transcends and awakens to the principle of speech and understanding, pointing to this awakened mind as the direct cause. Entrusted to this contemplative mind, it cannot be expressed in words; hence Kāśyapa repeatedly sighed in praise of its being inconceivable.
3.9
Sixth: Originally existent or newly existent. Question: Is buddha-nature originally existent or newly existent? Answer: The sūtras have two texts. The first says: sentient beings' buddha-nature is like a jar in a dark room, a jewel in a champion's forehead, a poor woman's treasure, or the sweet medicine on the snowy mountains—it is originally present of itself and did not just appear now. This is why the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* explains the doctrine of the nine kinds of dharmakāya. The second says: the fruit of buddhahood is born from marvelous causes; one demands the price of a mare, not the price of a foal. Explaining that when ghee should be taken, one already claims it is foul-smelling, that there is already impurity in food, or that there is already oil in sesame seeds—these are the errors of speaking of existence in the cause. Therefore we know that buddha-nature is newly existent. Since the sūtras have two texts, people's interpretations also divide into two kinds. One master says: sentient beings' buddha-nature is originally present of itself because of the nature of principle, the true spirit, and the ālaya-vijñāna. Nirvāṇa also has two kinds: the nirvāṇa of intrinsic purity is originally pure, while the nirvāṇa of purity through expedients is newly accomplished through practice. A second interpretation says: since the sūtras state that the fruit of buddhahood is born from marvelous causes, how could there already be impurity in food? Therefore we know that buddha-nature is newly existent. There is also someone who says: it is originally existent in the future, so it is called 'originally existent.' Question: If so, then is it just originally existent? Answer: There is also the sense of being newly existent. Question again: If it is newly existent, it should be impermanent. Answer: I also have the sense of originally existent. How is this different from two people posing as robbers, Zhang and Wang, answering each other back and forth? If it is like originally existent, it should be like the various parables in the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*. If it is newly existent, it should be impermanent. Yet saying 'it is originally existent in the future'—what kind of speech is this? Is it definitively original or definitively future? Would not the boundless buddha-gnosis of immeasurable worlds then fail to be complete? If one says that like boundless illumination it can defeat itself, why labor further to refute it? If illumination is exhausted, it is bounded; if illumination is not exhausted, then gnosis is not complete. How can such a dilemma be removed? The senses of originally existent and newly existent are also like this: all doctrines with attainment invariably defeat themselves, yet people do not realize it. Thus all people are caught in their snare. If one clings to original existence, then it is not new existence; if one clings to new existence, then it is not original existence. Each clings to a single text and fails to harmonize the intention of the sūtras. Disputing over right and wrong, they create the destruction of the wheel of the Buddha's Dharma, which cannot be fully recounted. However, the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna masters say: buddha-nature is of two kinds: the first is the nature of principle, and the second is the nature of practice. Principle is not created by things, so it is called originally existent; practice relies on cultivation to be accomplished, so it is called newly existent. If one looks at this with a mind of attainment, parsing the text at first glance seems to grasp the purport. Yet when investigating the sūtra's intention, it is not necessarily so. Why? The Great Sage simply employed skillful expedients, adapting to what suited beings, preaching the Dharma to cure their diseases. When did he ever say that the nature of principle is originally existent and the nature of practice newly existent? For example, regarding the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha: the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* states that non-self is the tathāgatagarbha, while the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states that the self is the tathāgatagarbha. How could these two texts be matched up? The meaning of originally existent and newly existent is just the same. If one says that the nature of principle is originally existent and not newly practiced, and that the nature of practice is newly existent and not original, then clinging further creates an illness, and the holy teaching ceases to be medicine. Shallow-minded people of the world merely look at the words and definitively take them to be so, thereby generating deluded attachments. Now, in the transmission of our own school explaining the meaning of buddha-nature, it is neither existent nor non-existent, neither original nor new, neither future nor present. Thus the sūtra says: 'It is only through the reckoning of conventional words that the three periods of time are spoken of; it is not that bodhi has past, future, and present.' Because it is neither original nor new, and because dependent co-arising exists, it can also be spoken of. For instance, the 'Chapter on the Nature' in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* explains that 'buddha-nature is originally existent, like the poor woman's treasure.' But since sentient beings clung to the teaching and made it an illness, the subsequent text immediately explained that it is newly existent. Thus we know that buddha-nature is neither original nor new; it is only for the sake of sentient beings that it is spoken of as original and new. Question: If buddha-nature is neither original nor new, for what reason are original and new spoken of? Answer: Ultimately speaking of buddha-nature, principle is in truth neither original nor new. It is only the Tathāgata's expedient: to destroy sentient beings' illness of impermanence, he said that the buddha-nature of all sentient beings is originally present of itself, and by this cause and condition they can attain the Buddha path. But because sentient beings lack expedients, they cling to the claim that the nature of buddha-nature is manifested as permanent and blissful. Therefore, to destroy sentient beings' illness of manifested characteristics, the Tathāgata concealed the original and illuminated the new. Ultimately speaking of buddha-nature, not only is it neither original nor new, it is also not neither-original-nor-new; to destroy original and new, it is provisionally said to be neither original nor new. If one can awaken to the equality of right and wrong concerning original, new, and neither-original-nor-new, only then can it be called the direct cause buddha-nature, and based on this, sentient beings deeply secure their attainment of the Buddha path. If it is not like this, it is not buddha-nature. If we broadly discuss the meaning of originally existent and newly existent, it is like new and old. Why? The first moment is new, and the second moment is old. For example, with fresh rice, what comes out first is new, and what comes next is no longer new. One can also take the first moment as old and the second moment as new: that which preceded is called old, and that which arises newly afterward is new. In this case, both earlier and later can be called new; hence it is said, 'moment by moment arising and ceasing anew.' One can also take both beginning and end as old; hence it is said, 'the beginning is old, and the end is also old.' Since new and old apply equally to beginning and end, the meaning of originally existent and newly existent is also like this. The meaning of new and old applies equally to beginning and end: we merely call the earlier old 'new' and the long-standing new 'old.' How can one definitively know which is new and which is old? Thus we know that there is fundamentally neither new nor old. Therefore the text explaining the ten epithets states: 'The superior (shang) is called new, and the person (shi) is called old; the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither new nor old.' Since it says the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither new nor old, one can also say the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither origin nor beginning. This explains, at first glance, the meaning of having neither origin nor beginning. Yet this meaning of having neither origin nor beginning is the pure essence; how does it forfeit lodging words in original and new? Now we discuss it in terms of actualities: just as the very first thought of ignorance that newly arises is new, and the fruit of buddhahood that arises subsequently is old. How is this different from comparing the two earlier thoughts, where the first thought is new and the subsequent thought is old? One can also say that the fruit of buddhahood newly arising is called new, while the ground of ignorance having abided for long is called old. How is this different from comparing the two thoughts, where the first thought is called old and the subsequent thought is called new? Now, original and new are just old and new: original is just old, and new is just new. Comparing the first thought of ignorance with the fruit of buddhahood, since both can be new and both can be old, both can also be new and both can be original. Since ignorance and the fruit of buddhahood can be like this, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are also like this: both can be new, and both can be original. Therefore, saṃsāra is new and nirvāṇa is original; nirvāṇa is new and saṃsāra is original. Saṃsāra is newly existent and nirvāṇa is originally existent: how is this different from the first thought being new and the second thought being old? Saṃsāra is originally existent and nirvāṇa is newly existent: how is this different from the first thought being old and the second thought being new? Therefore, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are neither originally existent nor newly existent, and ultimately have neither origin nor beginning. Yet now, spoken through conventional designations, their alternating roles as original and new are no different. The sūtra says: 'Originally existent and now non-existent; originally non-existent and now existent.' If it originally existed, it is now non-existent; if it originally did not exist, it is now existent. Thus both now and originally can be called existent, and both can be called non-existent. The ultimate intention of this text is to clarify the meaning of having neither origin nor present. Therefore the subsequent text concludes: 'It is impossible that there exist dharmas in the three periods of time.' Thus we know that the three periods of time cannot be spoken of as existent; it is only spoken through conventional designations now that there is 'originally existent and now non-existent, originally non-existent and now existent.' Applying to both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, all are existence and non-existence. If one awakens to discussing existence and non-existence through conventional designations, ultimately there is neither existence nor non-existence; hence it is said, 'It is impossible that there exist dharmas in the three periods of time.' How is this different from speaking of new and old, original and new, where ultimately there is no meaning of new, old, original, or new? One should know that when speaking of new and old, one fundamentally points to new as old and points to old as new. Original and new are also like this: one points to original as new and points to new as original. Pointing to new as original, this original is a new-original; pointing to original as new, this new is an original-new. Original-new is not new, and new-original is not original; therefore it is said that ultimately there is neither origin nor beginning.
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- 大乘玄論 — Classical Chinese