大乘玄論 3.9

3.9

Sixth: Originally existent or newly existent. Question: Is buddha-nature originally existent or newly existent? Answer: The sūtras have two texts. The first says: sentient beings' buddha-nature is like a jar in a dark room, a jewel in a champion's forehead, a poor woman's treasure, or the sweet medicine on the snowy mountains—it is originally present of itself and did not just appear now. This is why the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra* explains the doctrine of the nine kinds of dharmakāya. The second says: the fruit of buddhahood is born from marvelous causes; one demands the price of a mare, not the price of a foal. Explaining that when ghee should be taken, one already claims it is foul-smelling, that there is already impurity in food, or that there is already oil in sesame seeds—these are the errors of speaking of existence in the cause. Therefore we know that buddha-nature is newly existent. Since the sūtras have two texts, people's interpretations also divide into two kinds. One master says: sentient beings' buddha-nature is originally present of itself because of the nature of principle, the true spirit, and the ālaya-vijñāna. Nirvāṇa also has two kinds: the nirvāṇa of intrinsic purity is originally pure, while the nirvāṇa of purity through expedients is newly accomplished through practice. A second interpretation says: since the sūtras state that the fruit of buddhahood is born from marvelous causes, how could there already be impurity in food? Therefore we know that buddha-nature is newly existent. There is also someone who says: it is originally existent in the future, so it is called 'originally existent.' Question: If so, then is it just originally existent? Answer: There is also the sense of being newly existent. Question again: If it is newly existent, it should be impermanent. Answer: I also have the sense of originally existent. How is this different from two people posing as robbers, Zhang and Wang, answering each other back and forth? If it is like originally existent, it should be like the various parables in the *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*. If it is newly existent, it should be impermanent. Yet saying 'it is originally existent in the future'—what kind of speech is this? Is it definitively original or definitively future? Would not the boundless buddha-gnosis of immeasurable worlds then fail to be complete? If one says that like boundless illumination it can defeat itself, why labor further to refute it? If illumination is exhausted, it is bounded; if illumination is not exhausted, then gnosis is not complete. How can such a dilemma be removed? The senses of originally existent and newly existent are also like this: all doctrines with attainment invariably defeat themselves, yet people do not realize it. Thus all people are caught in their snare. If one clings to original existence, then it is not new existence; if one clings to new existence, then it is not original existence. Each clings to a single text and fails to harmonize the intention of the sūtras. Disputing over right and wrong, they create the destruction of the wheel of the Buddha's Dharma, which cannot be fully recounted. However, the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna masters say: buddha-nature is of two kinds: the first is the nature of principle, and the second is the nature of practice. Principle is not created by things, so it is called originally existent; practice relies on cultivation to be accomplished, so it is called newly existent. If one looks at this with a mind of attainment, parsing the text at first glance seems to grasp the purport. Yet when investigating the sūtra's intention, it is not necessarily so. Why? The Great Sage simply employed skillful expedients, adapting to what suited beings, preaching the Dharma to cure their diseases. When did he ever say that the nature of principle is originally existent and the nature of practice newly existent? For example, regarding the doctrine of the tathāgatagarbha: the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* states that non-self is the tathāgatagarbha, while the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states that the self is the tathāgatagarbha. How could these two texts be matched up? The meaning of originally existent and newly existent is just the same. If one says that the nature of principle is originally existent and not newly practiced, and that the nature of practice is newly existent and not original, then clinging further creates an illness, and the holy teaching ceases to be medicine. Shallow-minded people of the world merely look at the words and definitively take them to be so, thereby generating deluded attachments. Now, in the transmission of our own school explaining the meaning of buddha-nature, it is neither existent nor non-existent, neither original nor new, neither future nor present. Thus the sūtra says: 'It is only through the reckoning of conventional words that the three periods of time are spoken of; it is not that bodhi has past, future, and present.' Because it is neither original nor new, and because dependent co-arising exists, it can also be spoken of. For instance, the 'Chapter on the Nature' in the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* explains that 'buddha-nature is originally existent, like the poor woman's treasure.' But since sentient beings clung to the teaching and made it an illness, the subsequent text immediately explained that it is newly existent. Thus we know that buddha-nature is neither original nor new; it is only for the sake of sentient beings that it is spoken of as original and new. Question: If buddha-nature is neither original nor new, for what reason are original and new spoken of? Answer: Ultimately speaking of buddha-nature, principle is in truth neither original nor new. It is only the Tathāgata's expedient: to destroy sentient beings' illness of impermanence, he said that the buddha-nature of all sentient beings is originally present of itself, and by this cause and condition they can attain the Buddha path. But because sentient beings lack expedients, they cling to the claim that the nature of buddha-nature is manifested as permanent and blissful. Therefore, to destroy sentient beings' illness of manifested characteristics, the Tathāgata concealed the original and illuminated the new. Ultimately speaking of buddha-nature, not only is it neither original nor new, it is also not neither-original-nor-new; to destroy original and new, it is provisionally said to be neither original nor new. If one can awaken to the equality of right and wrong concerning original, new, and neither-original-nor-new, only then can it be called the direct cause buddha-nature, and based on this, sentient beings deeply secure their attainment of the Buddha path. If it is not like this, it is not buddha-nature. If we broadly discuss the meaning of originally existent and newly existent, it is like new and old. Why? The first moment is new, and the second moment is old. For example, with fresh rice, what comes out first is new, and what comes next is no longer new. One can also take the first moment as old and the second moment as new: that which preceded is called old, and that which arises newly afterward is new. In this case, both earlier and later can be called new; hence it is said, 'moment by moment arising and ceasing anew.' One can also take both beginning and end as old; hence it is said, 'the beginning is old, and the end is also old.' Since new and old apply equally to beginning and end, the meaning of originally existent and newly existent is also like this. The meaning of new and old applies equally to beginning and end: we merely call the earlier old 'new' and the long-standing new 'old.' How can one definitively know which is new and which is old? Thus we know that there is fundamentally neither new nor old. Therefore the text explaining the ten epithets states: 'The superior (shang) is called new, and the person (shi) is called old; the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither new nor old.' Since it says the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither new nor old, one can also say the essence of great nirvāṇa has neither origin nor beginning. This explains, at first glance, the meaning of having neither origin nor beginning. Yet this meaning of having neither origin nor beginning is the pure essence; how does it forfeit lodging words in original and new? Now we discuss it in terms of actualities: just as the very first thought of ignorance that newly arises is new, and the fruit of buddhahood that arises subsequently is old. How is this different from comparing the two earlier thoughts, where the first thought is new and the subsequent thought is old? One can also say that the fruit of buddhahood newly arising is called new, while the ground of ignorance having abided for long is called old. How is this different from comparing the two thoughts, where the first thought is called old and the subsequent thought is called new? Now, original and new are just old and new: original is just old, and new is just new. Comparing the first thought of ignorance with the fruit of buddhahood, since both can be new and both can be old, both can also be new and both can be original. Since ignorance and the fruit of buddhahood can be like this, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are also like this: both can be new, and both can be original. Therefore, saṃsāra is new and nirvāṇa is original; nirvāṇa is new and saṃsāra is original. Saṃsāra is newly existent and nirvāṇa is originally existent: how is this different from the first thought being new and the second thought being old? Saṃsāra is originally existent and nirvāṇa is newly existent: how is this different from the first thought being old and the second thought being new? Therefore, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are neither originally existent nor newly existent, and ultimately have neither origin nor beginning. Yet now, spoken through conventional designations, their alternating roles as original and new are no different. The sūtra says: 'Originally existent and now non-existent; originally non-existent and now existent.' If it originally existed, it is now non-existent; if it originally did not exist, it is now existent. Thus both now and originally can be called existent, and both can be called non-existent. The ultimate intention of this text is to clarify the meaning of having neither origin nor present. Therefore the subsequent text concludes: 'It is impossible that there exist dharmas in the three periods of time.' Thus we know that the three periods of time cannot be spoken of as existent; it is only spoken through conventional designations now that there is 'originally existent and now non-existent, originally non-existent and now existent.' Applying to both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, all are existence and non-existence. If one awakens to discussing existence and non-existence through conventional designations, ultimately there is neither existence nor non-existence; hence it is said, 'It is impossible that there exist dharmas in the three periods of time.' How is this different from speaking of new and old, original and new, where ultimately there is no meaning of new, old, original, or new? One should know that when speaking of new and old, one fundamentally points to new as old and points to old as new. Original and new are also like this: one points to original as new and points to new as original. Pointing to new as original, this original is a new-original; pointing to original as new, this new is an original-new. Original-new is not new, and new-original is not original; therefore it is said that ultimately there is neither origin nor beginning.