大乘玄論 4.14

4.14

Section 11: The Permanent and the Impermanent. We briefly explain the four propositions. First, both cognitive object and gnosis are permanent. This exists only in the Mahāyāna, not in the Hīnayāna, because in the Hīnayāna the gnosis of both ordinary persons and nobles is impermanent. Yet in the Mahāyāna, both cognitive object and gnosis being permanent comprises three meanings in all: (1) permanent gnosis illuminating the cognitive object of true reality, as when the prajñā of contemplative illumination of the fruition virtues illuminates the prajñā of true reality; (2) permanent gnosis illuminating the permanent cognitive object of space, as the Great Sūtra states: "Among all that is permanent, space is foremost"—here permanent gnosis illuminates this permanent cognitive object (if true reality is taken to be identical with space, as the *Treatise* says: "Space is neither existent nor non-existent; the path of words is cut off, and the place of mental activity is extinguished"—that is true reality itself; here, relying provisionally on phenomenal convention, space is taken as permanent; these two lines indicate the two meanings of cognitive object and gnosis); (3) permanent gnosis reflexively illuminating gnosis itself—this is the meaning of reflexive illumination of gnosis. Next, the permanent illuminating the impermanent comprises two meanings in all: (1) illuminating the impermanence of sentient beings; (2) illuminating the impermanence of the responsive trace. Next, the impermanent illuminating the permanent comprises three propositions in all: (1) illuminating the permanence of space; (2) illuminating the permanence of the cognitive object of true reality; (3) illuminating the permanence of the dharmakāya and buddha-nature (this is only illuminating cognitive objects, not illuminating the permanence of gnosis, because within the causal stage there is not yet permanent gnosis). Next, the impermanent illuminating the impermanent comprises two propositions: (1) illuminating an impermanent cognitive object; (2) impermanence itself reflexively illuminating impermanent gnosis. Question: What is the difference between impermanent gnosis reflexively illuminating impermanent gnosis, and permanent gnosis knowing permanent gnosis? Answer: Permanent gnosis knowing the permanent has only one meaning. Impermanent gnosis knowing the impermanent has two meanings: first, gnosis in a subsequent moment knowing gnosis in a prior moment; second, gnosis in a single moment being directly capable of self-knowledge. For one who attains simultaneous contemplation, both meanings are present; for one who cannot yet contemplate simultaneously, there is only successive mutual knowledge. Permanent knowing of the permanent has only self-knowledge within a single moment, without prior and subsequent knowing. Question: The treatise masters of the Northern regions say that from the first bhūmi upwards there is already the eternally abiding dharmakāya, and likewise there is permanent gnosis. How is it with this matter? Answer: One must closely examine the intent of this statement: do they take the gnosis that realizes reality to be the dharmakāya, or do they take the realized suchness and buddha-nature to be the dharmakāya? If one takes the realizing gnosis to be the permanent dharmakāya, this is not correct. The *Treatise* states: "In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; in the mind of a Buddha it turns to be named sarvajñā." If it were permanent, then there would be no distinction of light and obscurity, and there should not be any change and transformation. Furthermore, the *Nirvāṇa Sūtra* states: "This designation 'permanent Dharma' applies only to the Tathāgata." The "Chapter on Longevity" generally excludes the meaning of permanence in three dharmas: first, non-Buddhists; second, the Hīnayāna; third, bodhisattvas—none of them are eternally abiding. Therefore, taking the permanence of buddha-nature as the dharmakāya is still the old tradition of Jiangnan, not a distinct doctrine of the North. Question: Masters who lecture on the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* say that seeing reality on the first bhūmi is not different from the Buddha bhūmi. How is it with this matter? Answer: If so, how could the *Treatise* state: "In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; in the mind of a Buddha it turns to be named sarvajñā"? Since there is change and transformation, one knows there is a difference between light and obscurity. Furthermore, the *Treatise* states: "When prajñā is purified, it turns to be named expedient means." Then one knows that on the sixth bhūmi prajñā is not yet pure. Moreover, it is fundamentally because of seeing reality that afflictions are severed; if seeing reality on the first bhūmi were not different from the Buddha, then all afflictions would be severed. If afflictions were not severed by seeing reality, then it would be that gnosis with attainment severs afflictions; hence this statement is not correct. All these are skillful distinctions within the non-discriminative. If it were not so, shallow students would lose their eyebrows and eyes, being devoid of skillful expedient means. Now, since we intend to explain the two gnoses, we broadly unpack expedient means. Expedient means is the gnosis of distinction within the non-distinct; hence one must skillfully distinguish Dharma gates, and only then will there be application that is unfettered and unobstructed. Later we will broadly set forth the merits and faults; one should not be alarmed into conflating this with the old traditions. Now, relying on this gate, there may be four propositions: First, the words are identical but the intention is different. The words are identical with what was analyzed above, having permanence and impermanence. Question: Why are the words identical? Answer: The words come from the sūtras and treatises; since sūtras and treatises use them in common, how could they not be identical? Yet their intention is different, as the *Madhyamakaśāstra* says: "Though the words are identical, the mind is different." Now we explain that this is skillful distinction within the non-discriminative, the two meanings of non-dual yet dual; therefore we open up the two meanings of permanent and impermanent cognitive objects and gnoses. Since we speak of non-dual yet dual, it is also dual yet non-dual; as the Great Sūtra says: "Self and non-self have no dual marks; the permanent and the impermanent are also like this." The sūtra says: "The foolish person says they are two; the wise person understands thoroughly, knowing that they are not two." There are also foolish people who merely say they are non-dual; the wise person knows thoroughly that they are non-dual and yet dual. Why is this? The foolish person does not recognize the permanent and the impermanent, and does not know cognitive object and gnosis; hence it is ignorance, and being ignorant, they are foolish. The wise person understands thoroughly the permanent and the impermanent, and is called a wise person. Therefore this is called identical words but different intention. Second, the words are different and the intention is different. Persons of attainment do not make distinctions skillfully; the Mahāyāna of non-attainment is capable of making distinctions skillfully; hence it is called different words. One is making skillful distinctions with a mind of non-attainment; the other is making unskillful distinctions with a mind of attainment; hence it is called different intention. Third, identical words and identical intention: the words are identical with the vaipulya sūtras and treatises of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the intention is likewise identical with the correct contemplation of non-dependence of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; hence it is called identical words and identical intention. Furthermore, the words are identical with the words of persons of attainment, and persons of attainment also have minor areas of attainment where our present intention is also identical with theirs; hence we say identical words and identical intention. Fourth, different words and identical intention: though the words differ from the sūtras and treatises, yet if the intention accords with the Way, they may also be used. Furthermore, though the words differ from the old traditions, yet if the intention joins with the Buddha's meaning, they may also be used. One ought to link all the gates using these four propositions, and must not rigidly lean toward accepting or rejecting. Question: Why explain these four propositions? Answer: There are two kinds of people. First, those who begin to study the Mahāyāna and think it must rigidly differ from the old tradition; then they commit the offense of slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words come from the sūtras and treatises, and ought to be used in common. However, attainment and non-attainment have distinct minds; one should not cause the words also to be different just because the intention is different. Second, students of the Hīnayāna, which is profoundly different from the Mahāyāna, forcefully assert that the meaning is identical; this is also slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words and intention of the Hīnayāna are genuinely different from the words and intention of the Mahāyāna, yet they forcefully assert they are identical. For instance, students of the *Tattvasiddhi* claim that the unconditioned cessation truth is equal to the principle of the vaipulya; hence this is also called slandering the Dharma. For the sake of these students of the Great and Small [Vehicles], one ought to open up the four propositions of identity and difference.