二諦義 1.33

1.33

問：三藏明諸法有，云何於三藏起邪見耶？解云：於外道中尚得起邪見，如六師中云：無黑業無黑業報等。於外道中尚得起邪見，況於三藏中不得起邪見耶？此即小乘不識二諦失二諦也。次大乘失二諦者，大乘學二諦失二諦，龍樹正為此人出世，造此《中論》及《十二門》、《大智論》，竝為學二諦失二諦也。然大乘失二諦，復有二種：一者學二諦成性二諦、二者學二諦成一諦。前小乘，有兩失：一性有失二諦、二邪空失二諦。今大乘亦兩失，如前佛法中都有四種失二諦。學二諦失二諦成性二諦者，聞有住有、聞空住無。如從來初章，他有有可有、有無可無。有有可有，不由無故有；有無可無，不由有故無。不由無故有，此有是自有；不由有故無，此無是自無。自有即有故有、自無即無故無，斯即失因緣二成性二、失不二二成二故二也。言學二諦失二諦成一諦者，有二種：一者學二諦成空諦、二者學二諦成有諦。學二諦成一空諦者，諸法於顛倒有名世諦、諸賢聖真知性空名第一義諦，明顛倒有為非、諸法性空為是。何以故？諸賢聖真知諸法性空，故知諸法性空定是也。此人聞空故空、聞有亦是空，學二諦唯成一空諦也。學二諦成一有諦者，有二義：一者即鼠嘍栗二諦、二者心無義。鼠嘍栗二諦者，經中明色色性空。彼云：色性空者，明色無定性，非色都無。如鼠嘍栗中肉盡，栗猶有皮㲉形容宛然。栗中無肉，故言栗空；非都無栗，故言栗空也。即空有併成有也。言心無義者，然此義從來太久，什師之前，道安、竺法護之時已有此義。言心無義者，亦引經云：色色性空者，明色不可空，但空於心。以得空觀，故言色空，色終不可空也。肇師破此義，明「得在於神靜，失在於物虛。」得在神靜者，明心空，此言為得。色不可空，此義為失也。然此之兩釋，竝是學二諦失二諦。失世諦不識第一義，不識第一義即不識世諦。何者？此是空有，失有即失空。又設得一有，此有是有見有，故二諦皆失。空邊亦爾，故皆失二諦。失二諦即失假，失假即失中，中假理教皆失也。學二諦成性二諦，亦一切失。聞二住二不識不二，不識不二即失中，失中即失假，此非相待失。失中即失假。何以故？假即中故也。學二諦失二諦，既併失；不識二諦失二諦，理然皆失。大有三節：一者學二諦成一諦，失二諦一切失；二者學二諦成性二諦，失二諦一切失。三者不識二諦，失二諦一切失。如此等人既一切失，詺作何物人耶？此乃是狂愚人耳。為是人故，四依出世破之。有兩菩薩出世：提婆菩薩出世，破不識二諦失二諦；龍樹菩薩出世，破學二諦失二諦。此二菩薩破病具足也。非但釋迦佛須此二菩薩，十方三世諸佛竝須此二菩薩。何以故？此二菩薩攝一切菩薩，兩失攝一切失。破此兩失，則申一切教。何者？此二失障二諦，破此二失則二諦通，二諦通則一切經申。若爾，故知三論不可思議。所以關中歎云：「《中》、《百》兩論文未及此，人又無通鑒，誰與正之？」及至之後，歎云：「後談道之人，始可與論實矣。」實理如此。何者？失不出此二，《中》、《百》兩論既破此二失，二諦即通。二諦通，一切教申，故三論有大利益也。通意如此。次對當路。數論者，數人則不識二諦，彼不知諸法性空，但明諸法性有、一切皆有，不識第一義。既不識諸法性空，則不知諸法因緣有。二諦皆不識，故失二諦也。《成論》者，依彼論宗則同三藏。何者？彼序云「故我欲正論三藏中實義」，則同薩衛不識二諦。若就彼義中有二諦義，彼明人法二空，但是聲聞空，終不識性空。何者？《大智論》云「佛於聲聞法中，不說自性空、自相空。」以不說自性空故不識第一義，不識第一義即不識世諦。若爾，數論皆失二諦。以如此等人竝失二諦，所以諸佛說二諦、菩薩申二諦教，令眾生識二諦，識二諦即識一切中假等，所以說二諦有大利益。前明失二諦有二種：一者不識二諦失二諦者，當世即數論二人。數人不知諸法性空，但明諸法性有，此人不識性空，無第一義諦也。論人雖明諸法空，是聲聞法空，非今第一義空，今以諸法本性空為第一義諦故。論云「諸賢聖真知性空名第一義」，成論無此空。何以知爾？《成論》正明三藏法，龍樹判云「佛於聲聞法中，不說諸法自相空、自性空。」既無自性空，故彼無第一義諦。於彼不無人法二空，故彼引《羅陀祇喻經》明人法二空。但此空折法明空，不明本性空也。此則據毘曇一節，毘曇不明空，成論則明空。若爾，望毘曇則有二諦，望摩訶衍則無二諦，但是世諦。何者？今摩訶衍正以諸法本性空為第一義諦。彼但折法明空，所以無第一義諦也。

Question: The Tripiṭaka explains that all phenomena exist; how could wrong views arise with respect to the Tripiṭaka? Explanation: Even within the tīrthikas wrong views can arise—as among the six teachers who say: "There are no dark karmas, no retributions for dark karma," and so forth. If wrong views can arise even within the tīrthikas, how much more so could wrong views arise within the Tripiṭaka? This is the Hīnayāna failing in the two truths through not recognising the two truths. Next, regarding those of the Mahāyāna who fail in the two truths: those of the Mahāyāna study the two truths yet fail in the two truths. Nāgārjuna appeared in the world precisely for such people, composing this Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the Dvādaśamukhaśāstra, and the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, all for those who study the two truths yet fail in the two truths. However, for those of the Mahāyāna who fail in the two truths, there are again two kinds: first, studying the two truths so that they turn into intrinsic-nature two truths; second, studying the two truths so that they turn into a single truth. Previously, the Hīnayāna had two failings: first, failing in the two truths through intrinsic existence; second, failing in the two truths through perverse emptiness. Now the Mahāyāna also has two failings; as before, in the Buddha's Dharma there are four kinds of failing in the two truths in all. Those who study the two truths and fail in the two truths so that they turn into intrinsic-nature two truths are those who, hearing of existence, abide in existence, and hearing of emptiness, abide in non-existence. Just as in the standard introductory chapters of other traditions, they take existence to have an existence that can exist, and non-existence to have a non-existence that can not exist. When existence has an existence that can exist, it is not existent because of non-existence; when non-existence has a non-existence that can not exist, it is not non-existent because of existence. Not being existent because of non-existence, this existence is an intrinsic existence; not being non-existent because of existence, this non-existence is an intrinsic non-existence. Intrinsic existence is an existence that exists because of existence; intrinsic non-existence is a non-existence that is non-existent because of non-existence. This is losing the dependent two and becoming an intrinsic-nature two; it is losing the non-dual two and becoming a duality-dependent two. As for studying the two truths and failing in the two truths so that they turn into a single truth, there are two kinds: first, studying the two truths so that they turn into the truth of emptiness; second, studying the two truths so that they turn into the truth of existence. Studying the two truths so that they turn into a single truth of emptiness: All phenomena being existent in inversion is called conventional truth; the true knowledge by all sages and worthies of the nature of emptiness is called ultimate truth. They explain that inverted existence is wrong, and that the nature of emptiness of all phenomena is right. Why? Because the sages and worthies truly know the nature of emptiness of all phenomena, one therefore knows that the nature of emptiness of all phenomena is definitively right. This person, hearing of emptiness, takes it as empty, and hearing of existence, also takes it as empty; in studying the two truths, they turn solely into a single truth of emptiness. Studying the two truths so that they turn into a single truth of existence has two meanings: first, the two truths of the rat-gnawed chestnut; second, the doctrine of the absence of mind. As for the two truths of the rat-gnawed chestnut: in the sūtras it is explained that form is the nature of emptiness of form. They say: "When it says the nature of emptiness of form, this explains that form lacks a fixed nature, not that form is entirely non-existent. It is like when the meat inside a rat-gnawed chestnut is completely gone, yet the chestnut still has its skin and shell, its appearance completely intact. Because there is no meat inside the chestnut, one says the chestnut is empty; it is not that there is no chestnut at all, which is why one says the chestnut is empty." Thus emptiness and existence both turn into existence. As for the doctrine of the absence of mind: this doctrine has been around for a very long time, already existing before Master Kumārajīva, in the time of Dao'an and Dharmarakṣa. When they speak of the absence of mind, they also cite the sūtras saying: "When it says form is the nature of emptiness of form, this explains that form cannot be emptied, but that one only empties the mind. Because one attains the contemplation of emptiness, one therefore says form is empty; form itself can ultimately never be emptied." Master Zhao refuted this doctrine, explaining: "What is attained lies in the quietude of spirit; what is lost lies in the insubstantiality of things." What is attained lying in the quietude of spirit explains that the mind is empty; this statement is correct. That form cannot be emptied: this doctrine is erroneous. However, both of these two interpretations are studying the two truths and failing in the two truths. In failing in the conventional truth, one does not recognise the ultimate; in not recognising the ultimate, one does not recognise the conventional truth. Why? This is an empty existence; losing existence is losing emptiness. Furthermore, even if one were to obtain a single existence, this existence would be an existence of the view of existence; therefore both truths are lost. The side of emptiness is also like this; hence one loses both truths in every case. Losing the two truths is losing the provisional; losing the provisional is losing the middle; the middle, the provisional, the principle, and the teaching are all lost. Studying the two truths so that they turn into intrinsic-nature two truths is also losing everything. Hearing of the two, one abides in the two and does not recognise the non-dual; not recognising the non-dual is losing the middle; losing the middle is losing the provisional. This is not a loss through mutual dependence. Losing the middle is losing the provisional. Why? Because the provisional is the middle. Since studying the two truths and failing in the two truths loses both, failing in the two truths through not recognising the two truths naturally loses both as well. In broad terms, there are three stages: first, studying the two truths so that they turn into a single truth, losing the two truths and losing everything; second, studying the two truths so that they turn into intrinsic-nature two truths, losing the two truths and losing everything; third, not recognising the two truths, losing the two truths and losing everything. Since such people lose everything, what kind of people should they be called? They are merely mad and foolish people. It was for such people that the Four Refuges appeared in the world to refute them. There are two bodhisattvas who appeared in the world: Bodhisattva Āryadeva appeared in the world to refute failing in the two truths through not recognising the two truths; Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna appeared in the world to refute failing in the two truths through studying the two truths. These two bodhisattvas completely cure these sicknesses. Not only did Śākyamuni Buddha require these two bodhisattvas, but all the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three times likewise require these two bodhisattvas. Why? These two bodhisattvas encompass all bodhisattvas, and the two failings encompass all failings. Refuting these two failings expounds all teachings. Why? These two failings obstruct the two truths; if one refutes these two failings, then the two truths are unobstructed; when the two truths are unobstructed, then all sūtras are expounded. If so, one knows that the Three Treatises are inconceivable. For this reason, it was lamented in Guanzhong: "The texts of the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, had not yet reached this point, and people had no comprehensive insight; who could correct them?" Later, it was praised: "Only later people who discuss the Way can begin to discuss the reality with them." The real principle is indeed like this. Why? The failings do not go beyond these two; since the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, have refuted these two failings, the two truths are unobstructed. When the two truths are unobstructed, all teachings are expounded; therefore the Three Treatises possess great benefit. Such is the overarching meaning. Next, addressing current trends: regarding the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi schools, the Abhidharma masters do not recognise the two truths. They do not know the nature of emptiness of all phenomena; they only explain that all phenomena intrinsically exist and that everything exists, not recognising the ultimate truth. Since they do not know the nature of emptiness of all phenomena, they do not know that all phenomena exist through causes and conditions. Not recognising either of the two truths, they therefore fail in the two truths. As for the Tattvasiddhi scholars, according to the main tenet of their treatise, it is identical to the Tripiṭaka. Why? Its preface states, "Therefore I wish to correctly discuss the real meaning in the Tripiṭaka," and so it is identical to the Sarvāstivāda in not recognising the two truths. If one takes the doctrine of the two truths within their teaching, they explain the two emptinesses of person and phenomena, but this is only the emptiness of the śrāvakas; they ultimately do not recognise the nature of emptiness. Why? The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa states: "Within the śrāvaka Dharma, the Buddha does not teach intrinsic emptiness or intrinsic-characteristic emptiness." Because they do not teach intrinsic emptiness, they do not recognise the ultimate truth; not recognising the ultimate truth, they do not recognise the conventional truth. If so, both the Abhidharma and Tattvasiddhi fail in the two truths. Because such people all fail in the two truths, the Buddhas taught the two truths and the bodhisattvas expounded the teaching of the two truths to cause sentient beings to recognise the two truths. Recognising the two truths is recognising all middles, provisionals, and so on; therefore the teaching of the two truths has great benefit. Previously it was explained that failing in the two truths has two kinds: first, failing in the two truths through not recognising the two truths, which in the present world refers to the two groups of the Abhidharma and the Tattvasiddhi. The Abhidharma masters do not know the nature of emptiness of all phenomena; they only explain that all phenomena intrinsically exist. These people do not recognise the nature of emptiness and have no ultimate truth. Although the Tattvasiddhi treatise masters explain that all phenomena are empty, this is the emptiness of the śrāvaka Dharma, not the present ultimate emptiness, because at present we take the original nature of emptiness of all phenomena to be the ultimate truth. The treatise states: "The true knowledge by all sages and worthies of the nature of emptiness is called the ultimate." The Tattvasiddhi does not have this emptiness. How is this known? The Tattvasiddhi specifically expounds the Dharma of the Tripiṭaka, and Nāgārjuna judged: "Within the śrāvaka Dharma, the Buddha does not teach the intrinsic-characteristic emptiness or intrinsic emptiness of all phenomena." Since it lacks intrinsic emptiness, it therefore lacks the ultimate truth. For them, it is not that they lack the two emptinesses of person and phenomena; hence they cite the *Rāṣṭrapāla Sūtra* to explain the two emptinesses of person and phenomena. But this emptiness explains emptiness by breaking down phenomena; it does not explain the original nature of emptiness. This is based on a distinction from the Abhidharma: the Abhidharma does not explain emptiness, whereas the Tattvasiddhi does explain emptiness. If so, viewed from the perspective of the Abhidharma, it has the two truths; but viewed from the perspective of the Mahāyāna, it has no two truths, but only the conventional truth. Why? At present, the Mahāyāna specifically takes the original nature of emptiness of all phenomena to be the ultimate truth. They only explain emptiness by breaking down phenomena; therefore they have no ultimate truth.