二諦義 2.78

2.78

問：一諦者，若為是一諦？為當非真非俗為一諦耶？解云：不相關。今言一諦者，團圝始終只是一諦。何者？望凡夫唯有俗諦。凡夫但知諸法是有，不知諸法性空，故凡夫唯有俗諦，無真諦也。若望聖亦唯一諦。何者？聖知諸法性空為實名諦，知諸法虛妄不實非諦。然聖人知諸法顛倒虛妄非諦，非都無虛妄之法。若無虛妄之法，則成斷見也。何者？有大乘人聞畢竟空成空見，便謂無罪福報應等。今明不無罪福報應，只罪福報應畢竟空，畢竟空而罪福報應不失也。又《中論》云「諸賢聖真知顛倒性空」，非是離顛倒別有性空，只了顛倒性為空，故性空於聖人是實為諦，又知顛倒虛妄不實故非諦。望聖唯一真諦，無俗諦也。次轉者，俗於凡是諦、真於聖是諦，二皆是於、二皆非諦、非真非俗始是真實，始名為諦。故經云「世人知者，名為世諦。出世之人，如其性相而能知之，名第一義諦。」於世出世人是諦，實非是諦，唯非真非俗是實是諦。若爾，亦唯有一諦也。然從來人無有此義，亦不得釋涅槃經文。何者？彼明二諦是二境，亦是二理。道理有此二理，何得言世諦即第一義諦，隨順眾生故說有二諦耶？佛親明無二諦，隨眾生故說二耳，不應云道理定有二諦也。彼脫云：此是二諦相即義，故云即是者。亦不然。彼雖相即恒二，二而恒即，終是二理。二理不可無，故彼不得言實無二，隨順眾生故說有二也。

Question: Regarding the one truth, in what way is it the one truth? Does non-ultimate and non-conventional constitute the one truth? Explanation: That is irrelevant. What we now call the one truth is, completely from beginning to end, just one truth. How so? From the perspective of ordinary persons, there is only conventional truth. Ordinary persons merely know phenomena as existent and do not know the nature of emptiness of phenomena; therefore, ordinary persons have only conventional truth and no ultimate truth. If viewed from the perspective of the noble ones, there is also only one truth. How so? The noble ones know the nature of emptiness of phenomena to be real, which is called truth, and know phenomena to be insubstantial, false, and unreal, which is not truth. However, that the noble ones know phenomena to be inverted, insubstantial, and false—and thus not truth—does not mean there are entirely no insubstantial and false phenomena. If there were no insubstantial and false phenomena, that would become a view of annihilation. How so? There are Mahāyāna practitioners who, hearing of ultimate emptiness, develop a view of emptiness and then claim that there is no retribution for offenses and blessings and the like. We now clarify that there is no absence of retribution for offenses and blessings; it is merely that retribution for offenses and blessings is ultimately empty, and while being ultimately empty, retribution for offenses and blessings is not lost. Furthermore, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: "The noble ones truly know inversions to be empty by nature." It is not that there is a separate nature of emptiness apart from inversions; it is simply realizing the nature of inversions to be empty. Therefore, to the noble ones, the nature of emptiness is real and constitutes truth, and knowing that inversions are insubstantial, false, and unreal, they are not truth. From the perspective of the noble ones, there is only one ultimate truth and no conventional truth. Next, turning [to another perspective]: the conventional is truth to the ordinary person, and the ultimate is truth to the noble one; both are [truth] from perspective, and both are not [real] truth. Only what is neither ultimate nor conventional is genuine reality, and only this is called truth. Thus the sūtra states: "What worldly persons know is called conventional truth. When world-transcending persons are able to know according to their nature and characteristics, it is called ultimate truth." They are truth to worldly and world-transcending persons, but are not real truth; only neither ultimate nor conventional is real and is truth. If so, there is also only one truth. However, people in the past did not have this interpretation, nor could they explain the text of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra. How so? They explained the two truths as two objects and also as two principles. If the principle naturally possessed these two principles, how could one say that conventional truth is itself ultimate truth, and that it is only in compliance with sentient beings that two truths are spoken of? The Buddha personally clarified that there are no two truths, and that two are spoken of merely in compliance with sentient beings; one should not say that the principle definitely contains two truths. If they should say, "This is the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths, hence it says 'is itself'," that is also not correct. Although they are mutually identical, they would constantly remain two; being two yet constantly identical, there would ultimately be two principles. Since the two principles could not be absent, they could not say that in reality there are no two, and that two are spoken of merely in compliance with sentient beings.