二諦義 2.91

2.91

問：經明於教二諦可如此，論何意明於教二諦耶？解云：《百論》正為諸外道不識不聞如來二諦，所謂迦毘羅論等，昔所不聞、昔所不識。為其不識二諦，所以論主示其二諦也。《中論》明二諦者，通為一切，但正為內學不識大乘二諦，如薩衛等五百論師不識諸法性空二諦。此則與《百論》挍一節，有小乘二諦、大乘二諦。《百論》緣皆不識二諦，為彼不識，故提婆示大乘二諦。此即簡異數論。數論亦破外道，《百論》亦破外道。何異？解云：大異。數論破外道，示小乘法，故是小乘論。《百論》破外道示，大乘二諦法，故是大乘論也。若是《中論》，緣已學佛小乘二諦，不識大乘本性空二諦。為是故，龍樹菩薩明大乘本性空二諦也。今此經竝異兩論。何者？文殊與大眾已解二諦，但疑無二諦，故佛明有二諦也。「善男子！五陰和合有眾生，名世諦。即陰離陰，無眾生，名第一義諦。」此下更就異義，約法廣明二諦義，不同前明教二諦、次明於二諦，「世人知者名世諦、世出人知者名第一義諦。」今第三就我無我明二諦。與前異，前明二諦，通直明世人知名世諦、世出人知名第一義諦，不判有人無人、有法無法。今的就有人無人明二諦也。「善男子！或有法有名有實。」第四二諦，前就人明二諦，今就法明二諦。前就真俗明二諦，今就世諦中更開二諦。前就真俗明二諦者，我是世諦、無我第一義諦。《大論》云「人等世界故有，第一義諦則無」也。今就世諦中自明二諦者。世諦者，世諦法中自有有名有實、自有有名無實，有名有實為第一義諦、有名無實為世諦。如火水等物，有名有實。有實者，有實義，為實有義應名，有名表義，故為第一義諦。有名無實者，如蛇床虎杖。《大論》云「草名朱利，此云賊。何其曾作賊？」但有假名，無有實義應名，以無實義，故為世諦。此則就於虛實判二諦也。「善男子！如我眾生。」第五二諦義，此就事理明二諦義。束前有名有實、有名無實竝為世諦，苦集滅道為第一義諦。何者？陰界入等有名有實，龜毛等即有名無實。此之二種竝為事法，故為世諦。苦集滅道是理法，故為第一義諦。「善男子！世法有五種者」，第六就如實知、不如實知判二諦。不如實知五種世法則名世諦、如實知五種世法無有顛倒為第一義諦。五種世法者，一名世、二句世、三縛世、四法世、五執著。如經文釋云云。「善男子！若燒壞者」，第七就續不續明二諦。若謂燒壞等法相續不斷名世諦、若知燒壞等法念念生滅實無相續為第一義諦。此異《成論》假實義，假名不滅、實法則滅。今明若言諸法相續不斷為世諦、若諸法實不續為第一義諦。如肇師《物不遷論》云「旋嵐偃嶽而常靜，江河競注而不流，野馬飄鼓而不動，日月歷天而不周。」即其義也。「善男子！有八苦者」，即第八就生死涅槃明二諦。有八苦生死為世諦、無八苦生死為第一義諦。然大判生死為世諦、涅槃為第一義諦；今言無八苦不全是涅槃。何者？涅槃有有所無、無所有義。無八苦生死等，是涅槃有所無義。故經云「空者二十五有，不空者大般涅槃。」今無八苦生死，即涅槃有所無義也。涅槃有所無，既無生死；涅槃無所有，亦無生死。今無生死具含涅槃，故言生死為世諦、涅槃為第一義諦也。次文云「依因父母而生名世諦、十二因緣生名第一義諦。」此則第九就因緣判二諦，亦是親疎判二諦，亦是麁妙判二諦。因緣者，父母和合則緣、十二因緣即是因，因親緣疎也。又父母生麁、十二因緣生妙。眾生但知麁不知妙，故父母生為世諦，十二因緣生為第一義諦。此即九種二諦義。足前菩薩對聲聞判二諦義，為十種二諦也。中間簡二諦義，舉譬如一人多有所能，或名走者、或名苅者、或名鍛者，只是一人，隨義立多名。二諦亦爾，只是一二諦，隨義有多名也。

Question: That the sūtra clarifies the two truths as perspective and as teaching may be so; why do the treatises clarify the two truths as perspective and as teaching? Explanation: The Śataśāstra is specifically directed toward various tīrthikas who neither recognise nor have heard the Tathāgata's two truths—namely, the treatises of Kapila and the like, which they had never heard in the past and never recognised in the past. Because they do not recognise the two truths, the author of the treatise reveals the two truths to them. As for the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's clarification of the two truths, it applies generally to all, but is specifically directed toward internal disciples who do not recognise the Mahāyāna two truths, such as the five hundred treatise masters including Sarvavāda who do not recognise the two truths of the nature of emptiness of all phenomena. In this respect it differs by one degree from the Śataśāstra: there are the Hīnayāna two truths and the Mahāyāna two truths. Those with whom the Śataśāstra is concerned do not recognise the two truths at all; because they do not recognise them, Āryadeva reveals the Mahāyāna two truths. This, then, distinguishes it from the Abhidharmakośaśāstra. The Abhidharmakośaśāstra also refutes tīrthikas, and the Śataśāstra also refutes tīrthikas. What is the difference? Explanation: There is a great difference. When the Abhidharmakośaśāstra refutes tīrthikas, it reveals Hīnayāna teachings, and so it is a Hīnayāna treatise. When the Śataśāstra refutes tīrthikas, it reveals the teaching of the Mahāyāna two truths, and so it is a Mahāyāna treatise. In the case of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, those with whom it is concerned have already studied the Buddha's Hīnayāna two truths, but do not recognise the Mahāyāna two truths of original emptiness of nature. For this reason, Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna clarifies the Mahāyāna two truths of original emptiness of nature. Now, this present sūtra differs from both treatises. How so? Mañjuśrī and the great assembly already understood the two truths, but only suspected that there were no two truths; therefore, the Buddha clarified that there are two truths. 'Good sons! That there is a sentient being upon the aggregation of the five aggregates is called conventional truth. That identical to the aggregates or apart from the aggregates there is no sentient being is called ultimate truth.' Below this, proceeding further upon different meanings, [the sūtra] extensively clarifies the meaning of the two truths in terms of phenomena, which is not like the earlier clarification of the two truths as teaching, followed by the clarification of the two truths as perspective: 'What worldly people know is called conventional truth; what world-transcending people know is called ultimate truth.' Here, the third [pair] clarifies the two truths in terms of self and no-self. It differs from what preceded: what preceded clarified the two truths by simply and directly stating that what worldly people know is called conventional truth and what world-transcending people know is called ultimate truth, without determining whether there is a person or no person, whether there are phenomena or no phenomena. Here, it specifically clarifies the two truths in terms of there being a person or no person. 'Good sons! There may be phenomena that have both name and reality.' The fourth pair of two truths: previously it clarified the two truths in terms of persons; now it clarifies the two truths in terms of phenomena. Previously it clarified the two truths in terms of the ultimate and conventional; now it further unfolds two truths within conventional truth. As for previously clarifying the two truths in terms of the ultimate and conventional: self is conventional truth, and no-self is ultimate truth. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'Persons and the like exist from the perspective of the worldly; according to the ultimate truth, they do not exist.' Now, regarding the clarification of two truths within conventional truth itself: as for conventional truth, among conventional phenomena there are inherently those that have both name and reality, and inherently those that have a name but no reality; having both name and reality is the ultimate truth, and having a name but no reality is conventional truth. For instance, things like fire and water have both name and reality. 'Having reality' means having a real referent; there is a real existent referent corresponding to the name, and the name expresses the referent, so it is the ultimate truth. As for having a name but no reality: this is like snake-bed or tiger-cane. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'There is a grass named zhuli, which means thief here. How could it ever have acted as a thief?' It has only a nominal name, without any real referent corresponding to the name; because it lacks a real referent, it is conventional truth. This, then, determines the two truths in terms of insubstantiality and reality. 'Good sons! Such as self and sentient beings.' The fifth meaning of the two truths: this clarifies the meaning of the two truths in terms of phenomena and principle. Subsuming both the preceding 'having both name and reality' and 'having a name but no reality' as conventional truth, suffering, origination, cessation, and the path constitute ultimate truth. Why? Aggregates, elements, and sense-bases have both name and reality, whereas a turtle's hair has a name but no reality. Both of these are phenomenal entities, and are therefore conventional truth. Suffering, origination, cessation, and the path are the unconditioned principle, and are therefore ultimate truth. 'Good sons! There are five kinds of worldly phenomena.' The sixth determines the two truths in terms of knowing in accordance with reality and not knowing in accordance with reality. Not knowing the five kinds of worldly phenomena in accordance with reality is called conventional truth; knowing the five kinds of worldly phenomena in accordance with reality without inversion is ultimate truth. The five kinds of worldly phenomena are: first, worldly name; second, worldly phrase; third, worldly bondage; fourth, worldly phenomenon; fifth, grasping. It is explained as in the sūtra text, and so forth. 'Good sons! If what burns and disintegrates...' The seventh clarifies the two truths in terms of continuity and non-continuity. If one maintains that phenomena that burn and disintegrate are continuous and uninterrupted, this is called conventional truth; if one knows that phenomena that burn and disintegrate arise and cease moment to moment and are truly without continuity, this is ultimate truth. This differs from the meaning of provisional and real in the Tattvasiddhi: the nominal name is unceasing, whereas real phenomena cease. Here it is clarified that if one speaks of all phenomena as continuous and uninterrupted, that is conventional truth; if all phenomena are truly without continuity, that is ultimate truth. As Master Zhao's Treatise on the Immutability of Things says: 'The whirlwind sweeps over the mountains yet is ever still; the rivers rush and pour yet do not flow; the wafting shimmer flutters yet does not stir; the sun and moon traverse the sky yet do not revolve.' Such is this meaning. 'Good sons! There are the eight sufferings.' This is the eighth, clarifying the two truths in terms of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The saṃsāra that has the eight sufferings is conventional truth; being free of the saṃsāra of the eight sufferings is ultimate truth. Now, broadly speaking, saṃsāra is conventional truth, and nirvāṇa is ultimate truth; but stating here that there are no eight sufferings is not entirely [the full scope of] nirvāṇa. Why? Nirvāṇa has the meaning of having something absent and having nothing at all. Being free of the saṃsāra of the eight sufferings and so forth is the meaning of nirvāṇa having something absent. Therefore the sūtra says: 'What is empty is the twenty-five realms of existence; what is not empty is the great parinirvāṇa.' Here, being free of the saṃsāra of the eight sufferings is precisely the meaning of nirvāṇa having something absent. If nirvāṇa has something absent, there is already no saṃsāra; if nirvāṇa has nothing at all, there is likewise no saṃsāra. Here, the absence of saṃsāra fully includes nirvāṇa; therefore it is said that saṃsāra is conventional truth and nirvāṇa is ultimate truth. The subsequent text says: 'Arising dependent on father and mother is called conventional truth; arising from the twelve links of dependent origination is called ultimate truth.' This, then, is the ninth, determining the two truths in terms of causes and conditions; it is also determining the two truths in terms of direct and indirect, and also determining the two truths in terms of coarse and subtle. As for causes and conditions: the union of father and mother is the condition, and the twelve links of dependent origination are the cause; the cause is direct, and the condition is indirect. Furthermore, birth from father and mother is coarse, while arising from the twelve links of dependent origination is subtle. Sentient beings only know the coarse and do not know the subtle; therefore, birth from father and mother is conventional truth, and arising from the twelve links of dependent origination is ultimate truth. These are the nine meanings of the two truths. Adding the previous determination of the meaning of the two truths by the bodhisattva in response to the śrāvakas, they constitute ten kinds of two truths. In between, it differentiates the meaning of the two truths, presenting the analogy that just as one person has many capabilities, and may be called a runner, a harvester, or a blacksmith—yet he is just one person, and many names are established according to the function. The two truths are also like this: they are just one pair of two truths, with many names according to their meanings.