二諦義 2.91

2.91

Question: That the sūtra clarifies the two truths as perspective and as teaching may be so; why do the treatises clarify the two truths as perspective and as teaching? Explanation: The Śataśāstra is specifically directed toward various tīrthikas who neither recognise nor have heard the Tathāgata's two truths—namely, the treatises of Kapila and the like, which they had never heard in the past and never recognised in the past. Because they do not recognise the two truths, the author of the treatise reveals the two truths to them. As for the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā's clarification of the two truths, it applies generally to all, but is specifically directed toward internal disciples who do not recognise the Mahāyāna two truths, such as the five hundred treatise masters including Sarvavāda who do not recognise the two truths of the nature of emptiness of all phenomena. In this respect it differs by one degree from the Śataśāstra: there are the Hīnayāna two truths and the Mahāyāna two truths. Those with whom the Śataśāstra is concerned do not recognise the two truths at all; because they do not recognise them, Āryadeva reveals the Mahāyāna two truths. This, then, distinguishes it from the Abhidharmakośaśāstra. The Abhidharmakośaśāstra also refutes tīrthikas, and the Śataśāstra also refutes tīrthikas. What is the difference? Explanation: There is a great difference. When the Abhidharmakośaśāstra refutes tīrthikas, it reveals Hīnayāna teachings, and so it is a Hīnayāna treatise. When the Śataśāstra refutes tīrthikas, it reveals the teaching of the Mahāyāna two truths, and so it is a Mahāyāna treatise. In the case of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, those with whom it is concerned have already studied the Buddha's Hīnayāna two truths, but do not recognise the Mahāyāna two truths of original emptiness of nature. For this reason, Bodhisattva Nāgārjuna clarifies the Mahāyāna two truths of original emptiness of nature. Now, this present sūtra differs from both treatises. How so? Mañjuśrī and the great assembly already understood the two truths, but only suspected that there were no two truths; therefore, the Buddha clarified that there are two truths. 'Good sons! That there is a sentient being upon the aggregation of the five aggregates is called conventional truth. That identical to the aggregates or apart from the aggregates there is no sentient being is called ultimate truth.' Below this, proceeding further upon different meanings, [the sūtra] extensively clarifies the meaning of the two truths in terms of phenomena, which is not like the earlier clarification of the two truths as teaching, followed by the clarification of the two truths as perspective: 'What worldly people know is called conventional truth; what world-transcending people know is called ultimate truth.' Here, the third [pair] clarifies the two truths in terms of self and no-self. It differs from what preceded: what preceded clarified the two truths by simply and directly stating that what worldly people know is called conventional truth and what world-transcending people know is called ultimate truth, without determining whether there is a person or no person, whether there are phenomena or no phenomena. Here, it specifically clarifies the two truths in terms of there being a person or no person. 'Good sons! There may be phenomena that have both name and reality.' The fourth pair of two truths: previously it clarified the two truths in terms of persons; now it clarifies the two truths in terms of phenomena. Previously it clarified the two truths in terms of the ultimate and conventional; now it further unfolds two truths within conventional truth. As for previously clarifying the two truths in terms of the ultimate and conventional: self is conventional truth, and no-self is ultimate truth. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'Persons and the like exist from the perspective of the worldly; according to the ultimate truth, they do not exist.' Now, regarding the clarification of two truths within conventional truth itself: as for conventional truth, among conventional phenomena there are inherently those that have both name and reality, and inherently those that have a name but no reality; having both name and reality is the ultimate truth, and having a name but no reality is conventional truth. For instance, things like fire and water have both name and reality. 'Having reality' means having a real referent; there is a real existent referent corresponding to the name, and the name expresses the referent, so it is the ultimate truth. As for having a name but no reality: this is like snake-bed or tiger-cane. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: 'There is a grass named zhuli, which means thief here. How could it ever have acted as a thief?' It has only a nominal name, without any real referent corresponding to the name; because it lacks a real referent, it is conventional truth. This, then, determines the two truths in terms of insubstantiality and reality. 'Good sons! Such as self and sentient beings.' The fifth meaning of the two truths: this clarifies the meaning of the two truths in terms of phenomena and principle. Subsuming both the preceding 'having both name and reality' and 'having a name but no reality' as conventional truth, suffering, origination, cessation, and the path constitute ultimate truth. Why? Aggregates, elements, and sense-bases have both name and reality, whereas a turtle's hair has a name but no reality. Both of these are phenomenal entities, and are therefore conventional truth. Suffering, origination, cessation, and the path are the unconditioned principle, and are therefore ultimate truth. 'Good sons! There are five kinds of worldly phenomena.' The sixth determines the two truths in terms of knowing in accordance with reality and not knowing in accordance with reality. Not knowing the five kinds of worldly phenomena in accordance with reality is called conventional truth; knowing the five kinds of worldly phenomena in accordance with reality without inversion is ultimate truth. The five kinds of worldly phenomena are: first, worldly name; second, worldly phrase; third, worldly bondage; fourth, worldly phenomenon; fifth, grasping. It is explained as in the sūtra text, and so forth. 'Good sons! If what burns and disintegrates...' The seventh clarifies the two truths in terms of continuity and non-continuity. If one maintains that phenomena that burn and disintegrate are continuous and uninterrupted, this is called conventional truth; if one knows that phenomena that burn and disintegrate arise and cease moment to moment and are truly without continuity, this is ultimate truth. This differs from the meaning of provisional and real in the Tattvasiddhi: the nominal name is unceasing, whereas real phenomena cease. Here it is clarified that if one speaks of all phenomena as continuous and uninterrupted, that is conventional truth; if all phenomena are truly without continuity, that is ultimate truth. As Master Zhao's Treatise on the Immutability of Things says: 'The whirlwind sweeps over the mountains yet is ever still; the rivers rush and pour yet do not flow; the wafting shimmer flutters yet does not stir; the sun and moon traverse the sky yet do not revolve.' Such is this meaning. 'Good sons! There are the eight sufferings.' This is the eighth, clarifying the two truths in terms of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. The saṃsāra that has the eight sufferings is conventional truth; being free of the saṃsāra of the eight sufferings is ultimate truth. Now, broadly speaking, saṃsāra is conventional truth, and nirvāṇa is ultimate truth; but stating here that there are no eight sufferings is not entirely [the full scope of] nirvāṇa. Why? Nirvāṇa has the meaning of having something absent and having nothing at all. Being free of the saṃsāra of the eight sufferings and so forth is the meaning of nirvāṇa having something absent. Therefore the sūtra says: 'What is empty is the twenty-five realms of existence; what is not empty is the great parinirvāṇa.' Here, being free of the saṃsāra of the eight sufferings is precisely the meaning of nirvāṇa having something absent. If nirvāṇa has something absent, there is already no saṃsāra; if nirvāṇa has nothing at all, there is likewise no saṃsāra. Here, the absence of saṃsāra fully includes nirvāṇa; therefore it is said that saṃsāra is conventional truth and nirvāṇa is ultimate truth. The subsequent text says: 'Arising dependent on father and mother is called conventional truth; arising from the twelve links of dependent origination is called ultimate truth.' This, then, is the ninth, determining the two truths in terms of causes and conditions; it is also determining the two truths in terms of direct and indirect, and also determining the two truths in terms of coarse and subtle. As for causes and conditions: the union of father and mother is the condition, and the twelve links of dependent origination are the cause; the cause is direct, and the condition is indirect. Furthermore, birth from father and mother is coarse, while arising from the twelve links of dependent origination is subtle. Sentient beings only know the coarse and do not know the subtle; therefore, birth from father and mother is conventional truth, and arising from the twelve links of dependent origination is ultimate truth. These are the nine meanings of the two truths. Adding the previous determination of the meaning of the two truths by the bodhisattva in response to the śrāvakas, they constitute ten kinds of two truths. In between, it differentiates the meaning of the two truths, presenting the analogy that just as one person has many capabilities, and may be called a runner, a harvester, or a blacksmith—yet he is just one person, and many names are established according to the function. The two truths are also like this: they are just one pair of two truths, with many names according to their meanings.