二諦義 3.8

3.8

問：他解既非，今若為釋耶？師云：只洗淨如此二諦一體異體畢竟無遺，即是二諦相即義。所以山中師云：「今時若更有解，乃是足載耳云云。」有開善解、莊嚴解、龍光解已竟，今攝山復解，即成足載濃。今何處有別解？但須盡淨從來一異等見，即是二諦相即也。師云：二諦一體異體，只是《百論》中兩品。二諦一體，即是僧佉義；二諦異體，即是衛世義也。彼云：汝安處如此耳，我義何時如此耶？今明此義與外道一種。汝真諦是常是遍是總，瓶衣世諦法等是無常是不遍是別。彼亦爾，大有是常是遍是總，瓶衣等無常不遍是別。一類如此。又類彼常無常總別一體而義常異，義常異而總別常無常一體。汝義亦爾，真俗一體而義常異。俗浮虛義、真貞實義，義常異而體常一。此義一種，但大有與真諦為異耳。雖大有與真諦名異，而常無常義無異。論直破常無常一體，然有預常無常一體者，皆墮此破。言雖屬在外道，意實遍洗眾師。為是故《百論》有傍正，言屬外道故為正、意遍破眾師故為傍也。次龍光如衛世。衛世本是僧佉學士，晚椎僧佉一義，明大有常、瓶等無常，大有遍、瓶等不遍，大有總、瓶等別，大有了因、瓶等生因，大有不可壞、瓶等可壞。若言一者，瓶破大有即破，而有常無常異乃至壞不壞異，那得一體？是故明有與瓶異體。龍光亦爾，本開善學士，廣難開善二諦一體義。二諦若一體，燒俗即燒真、俗生滅真即生滅。既有可燒不可燒異，生滅無生滅、常無常異，故二諦不可一體，故彼明異義也，二諦雖異而不相離。衛世亦爾，大有雖與瓶異而不相離。故彼云：瓶有合故，瓶不離有，而瓶與有常異。龍光亦爾，雖異終不離、不離而異，與衛世義一種也。義既是同，破僧佉、衛世，即是破開善、龍光。又論主直破一異，即一切一異皆破。一異既破，則橫洗萬法、竪窮五句。以洗淨如此等見，所以最後始得示如來因緣假名二諦，此二諦無得無礙也。《百論》既然，《中論》亦爾，前發趾即洗生滅一異，故云「不生不滅、不常不斷、不一不異」。既不一不異，則不一切一異，發初彈於八謬。然中論有兩種八謬，如韋紐天生微塵世性等，此是一種八謬。生滅等，復是一種八謬。微塵世性等八謬，佛未出世時起；生滅等八謬，佛滅後起。以龍樹知有如此八謬，故所以出世破之，發初即破一異。破一異者，不但破一種一異，乃遍破一切一異。一異既無，乃至五句畢竟無遺也。故云從〈因緣品〉來，有亦無、無亦無、亦有亦無亦無。如此洗淨，然後明如來無得無礙二諦。故〈三相品〉末云「如夢亦如幻，如乾闥婆城。所說生住滅，其相亦如是。」三相既然，二諦亦爾，如夢亦如幻、如乾闥婆城。所說真俗諦，其相亦如是也。此略明二諦相即之大意如此，玄悟之賓已足解了。

Question: Since the interpretations of others are incorrect, how are we to explain it now? The Master said: Merely washing clean such [views of] the two truths as of one substance or different substances so that completely nothing remains—this is itself the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Therefore, the master in the mountains (Senglang) said: "If in our times there are further interpretations, they are merely an excess burden," and so forth. The interpretations of Kaishan, Zhuangyan, and Longguang have already been stated; if Mt. She now provides yet another explanation, that would indeed become an excess burden! Where could there now be a separate explanation? One need only completely cleanse all past views of oneness, difference, and the like, and that is precisely the mutual identity of the two truths. The Master said: The two truths being of one substance or of different substances is simply the matter of two chapters in the Śataśāstra. The two truths being of one substance is the Sāṃkhya doctrine; the two truths being of different substances is the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. They might say: "You merely arrange it thus; when was our doctrine ever like this?" We now clarify that this doctrine is of the same kind as that of the tīrthikas. Your ultimate truth is permanent, omnipresent, and universal; the phenomena of the conventional truth, such as pots and clothes, are impermanent, non-omnipresent, and particular. Their view is also like this: the Great Existence (mahāsattā) is permanent, omnipresent, and universal; pots, clothes, and the like are impermanent, non-omnipresent, and particular. They are of the same kind like this. Furthermore, it is analogous to their [claim that] the permanent and impermanent, the universal and particular, are of one substance while their meanings are ever distinct, and although their meanings are ever distinct, the universal and particular, the permanent and impermanent, are of one substance. Your doctrine is also like this: the ultimate and conventional are of one substance, yet their meanings are ever distinct. The conventional has the meaning of being insubstantial, and the ultimate has the meaning of being true and solid; their meanings are ever distinct, while their substance is ever one. This doctrine is of the same kind; it is merely that the Great Existence and the ultimate truth differ in name. Although the Great Existence and the ultimate truth differ in name, their meanings regarding permanence and impermanence are no different. The treatise directly refutes the oneness of substance of the permanent and impermanent; thus, all who partake in [the view of] the oneness of substance of the permanent and impermanent fall under this refutation. Although the words refer to the tīrthikas, the intent actually cleanses all the masters broadly. For this reason, the Śataśāstra has an indirect and a direct aspect: because the words refer to the tīrthikas, that is primary; because the intent broadly refutes all the masters, that is secondary. Next, Longguang is like the Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika was originally a scholar of Sāṃkhya; later he struck down the Sāṃkhya doctrine of oneness, clarifying that the Great Existence is permanent while pots and the like are impermanent; the Great Existence is omnipresent while pots and the like are not omnipresent; the Great Existence is universal while pots and the like are particular; the Great Existence is an illuminating cause (jñāpaka-hetu) while pots and the like are productive causes (kāraka-hetu); the Great Existence is indestructible while pots and the like are destructible. If one says they are one, then when the pot is destroyed, the Great Existence would be destroyed; yet there are differences of permanence versus impermanence, up to differences of destructibility versus indestructibility—how could they be of one substance? Therefore, he clarified that Existence and the pot are of different substances. Longguang is also like this. Originally a scholar of Kaishan, he extensively attacked Kaishan's doctrine that the two truths are of one substance: "If the two truths were of one substance, then burning the conventional would mean burning the ultimate; the conventional arising and perishing would mean the ultimate arising and perishing. Since there is the difference between what can be burned and what cannot be burned, and the differences between arising-and-perishing versus non-arising-and-non-perishing, and permanence versus impermanence, the two truths cannot be of one substance." Therefore, he clarified the doctrine of difference: although the two truths are different, they are not separate from each other. The Vaiśeṣika is also like this: although the Great Existence is different from the pot, it is not separate from it. Hence he says: "Because of the conjunction of pot and existence, the pot is not separate from existence; yet the pot and existence are ever different." Longguang is also like this: although they are different, they are never separate; not being separate, they are different—this is of one kind with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Since the doctrines are the same, refuting the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika is precisely refuting Kaishan and Longguang. Moreover, when the treatise master directly refutes oneness and difference, all oneness and difference whatsoever are refuted. Once oneness and difference are refuted, it washes horizontally across the myriad phenomena and exhausts the five alternatives vertically. Because views such as these are washed clean, at the very end he is first able to reveal the Tathāgata's two truths of causes, conditions, and provisional names—these two truths are free from appropriation and unobstructed. Just as it is in the Śataśāstra, so it is in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: at the very outset of its journey it cleanses arising, perishing, oneness, and difference, and hence says: "Neither arising nor perishing, neither permanent nor annihilated, neither one nor different." Since they are neither one nor different, they are free from all oneness and difference; at the very outset it reproaches the eight errors. However, in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā there are two kinds of eight errors: such as Viṣṇu generating the fine atoms, the primary nature of the world (prakṛti), and so forth—this is one kind of eight errors; arising, perishing, and so forth are another kind of eight errors. The eight errors of fine atoms, the primary nature of the world, and so on arose before the Buddha appeared in the world; the eight errors of arising, perishing, and so on arose after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa. Because Nāgārjuna knew there were such eight errors, he therefore appeared in the world to refute them, refuting oneness and difference at the very start. Refuting oneness and difference does not merely refute one kind of oneness and difference, but comprehensively refutes all oneness and difference. Once oneness and difference are gone, up to the five alternatives, completely nothing remains. Therefore, it is said that from the Chapter on Conditions onward: existence also is not, non-existence also is not, and both existence and non-existence also are not. Cleansing them in this way, he then clarifies the Tathāgata's two truths free from appropriation and unobstructed. Therefore, at the end of the Chapter on the Three Characteristics, it says: "Like a dream, like an illusion, like a city of the gandharvas: / what is spoken of as arising, staying, and perishing, / its characteristics are also like this." Since the three characteristics are like this, the two truths are also like this: like a dream, like an illusion, like a city of the gandharvas; what is spoken of as the ultimate and conventional truths, their characteristics are also like this. This is a brief clarification of the general meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths like this; for guests of profound awakening, it is already sufficient for understanding.