二諦義 3.8

3.8

Question: Since the interpretations of others are incorrect, how are we to explain it now? The Master said: Merely washing clean such [views of] the two truths as of one substance or different substances so that completely nothing remains—this is itself the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Therefore, the master in the mountains (Senglang) said: "If in our times there are further interpretations, they are merely an excess burden," and so forth. The interpretations of Kaishan, Zhuangyan, and Longguang have already been stated; if Mt. She now provides yet another explanation, that would indeed become an excess burden! Where could there now be a separate explanation? One need only completely cleanse all past views of oneness, difference, and the like, and that is precisely the mutual identity of the two truths. The Master said: The two truths being of one substance or of different substances is simply the matter of two chapters in the Śataśāstra. The two truths being of one substance is the Sāṃkhya doctrine; the two truths being of different substances is the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. They might say: "You merely arrange it thus; when was our doctrine ever like this?" We now clarify that this doctrine is of the same kind as that of the tīrthikas. Your ultimate truth is permanent, omnipresent, and universal; the phenomena of the conventional truth, such as pots and clothes, are impermanent, non-omnipresent, and particular. Their view is also like this: the Great Existence (mahāsattā) is permanent, omnipresent, and universal; pots, clothes, and the like are impermanent, non-omnipresent, and particular. They are of the same kind like this. Furthermore, it is analogous to their [claim that] the permanent and impermanent, the universal and particular, are of one substance while their meanings are ever distinct, and although their meanings are ever distinct, the universal and particular, the permanent and impermanent, are of one substance. Your doctrine is also like this: the ultimate and conventional are of one substance, yet their meanings are ever distinct. The conventional has the meaning of being insubstantial, and the ultimate has the meaning of being true and solid; their meanings are ever distinct, while their substance is ever one. This doctrine is of the same kind; it is merely that the Great Existence and the ultimate truth differ in name. Although the Great Existence and the ultimate truth differ in name, their meanings regarding permanence and impermanence are no different. The treatise directly refutes the oneness of substance of the permanent and impermanent; thus, all who partake in [the view of] the oneness of substance of the permanent and impermanent fall under this refutation. Although the words refer to the tīrthikas, the intent actually cleanses all the masters broadly. For this reason, the Śataśāstra has an indirect and a direct aspect: because the words refer to the tīrthikas, that is primary; because the intent broadly refutes all the masters, that is secondary. Next, Longguang is like the Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika was originally a scholar of Sāṃkhya; later he struck down the Sāṃkhya doctrine of oneness, clarifying that the Great Existence is permanent while pots and the like are impermanent; the Great Existence is omnipresent while pots and the like are not omnipresent; the Great Existence is universal while pots and the like are particular; the Great Existence is an illuminating cause (jñāpaka-hetu) while pots and the like are productive causes (kāraka-hetu); the Great Existence is indestructible while pots and the like are destructible. If one says they are one, then when the pot is destroyed, the Great Existence would be destroyed; yet there are differences of permanence versus impermanence, up to differences of destructibility versus indestructibility—how could they be of one substance? Therefore, he clarified that Existence and the pot are of different substances. Longguang is also like this. Originally a scholar of Kaishan, he extensively attacked Kaishan's doctrine that the two truths are of one substance: "If the two truths were of one substance, then burning the conventional would mean burning the ultimate; the conventional arising and perishing would mean the ultimate arising and perishing. Since there is the difference between what can be burned and what cannot be burned, and the differences between arising-and-perishing versus non-arising-and-non-perishing, and permanence versus impermanence, the two truths cannot be of one substance." Therefore, he clarified the doctrine of difference: although the two truths are different, they are not separate from each other. The Vaiśeṣika is also like this: although the Great Existence is different from the pot, it is not separate from it. Hence he says: "Because of the conjunction of pot and existence, the pot is not separate from existence; yet the pot and existence are ever different." Longguang is also like this: although they are different, they are never separate; not being separate, they are different—this is of one kind with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Since the doctrines are the same, refuting the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika is precisely refuting Kaishan and Longguang. Moreover, when the treatise master directly refutes oneness and difference, all oneness and difference whatsoever are refuted. Once oneness and difference are refuted, it washes horizontally across the myriad phenomena and exhausts the five alternatives vertically. Because views such as these are washed clean, at the very end he is first able to reveal the Tathāgata's two truths of causes, conditions, and provisional names—these two truths are free from appropriation and unobstructed. Just as it is in the Śataśāstra, so it is in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: at the very outset of its journey it cleanses arising, perishing, oneness, and difference, and hence says: "Neither arising nor perishing, neither permanent nor annihilated, neither one nor different." Since they are neither one nor different, they are free from all oneness and difference; at the very outset it reproaches the eight errors. However, in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā there are two kinds of eight errors: such as Viṣṇu generating the fine atoms, the primary nature of the world (prakṛti), and so forth—this is one kind of eight errors; arising, perishing, and so forth are another kind of eight errors. The eight errors of fine atoms, the primary nature of the world, and so on arose before the Buddha appeared in the world; the eight errors of arising, perishing, and so on arose after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa. Because Nāgārjuna knew there were such eight errors, he therefore appeared in the world to refute them, refuting oneness and difference at the very start. Refuting oneness and difference does not merely refute one kind of oneness and difference, but comprehensively refutes all oneness and difference. Once oneness and difference are gone, up to the five alternatives, completely nothing remains. Therefore, it is said that from the Chapter on Conditions onward: existence also is not, non-existence also is not, and both existence and non-existence also are not. Cleansing them in this way, he then clarifies the Tathāgata's two truths free from appropriation and unobstructed. Therefore, at the end of the Chapter on the Three Characteristics, it says: "Like a dream, like an illusion, like a city of the gandharvas: / what is spoken of as arising, staying, and perishing, / its characteristics are also like this." Since the three characteristics are like this, the two truths are also like this: like a dream, like an illusion, like a city of the gandharvas; what is spoken of as the ultimate and conventional truths, their characteristics are also like this. This is a brief clarification of the general meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths like this; for guests of profound awakening, it is already sufficient for understanding.