二諦義 3.7

3.7

次龍光解二諦相即義。此師是開善大學士，彼云：空色不相離，為空即色、色即空。如《淨名經》云「我此土常淨」，此明淨土即在穢土處，故言此土淨。非是淨穢混成一土。何者？淨土是淨報、穢土是穢報，淨土淨業感、穢土穢業感。既有淨報穢報、淨業穢業，故不得一，但不相離為即也。然此三師釋，攝一切人。何者？開善與莊嚴明一體、龍光明異體，釋雖眾多，不出一異，故此三人攝一切人也。龍光明異體，此義自反經，不須更難。今且難莊嚴、開善二家。莊嚴云：緣假不異真、四忘不異俗，名相終不為無名相、無名相不為名相。此言自相反。汝既真即俗、俗即真，名相為無名相、無名相為名相，那得俗即真，名相不得為無名相耶？彼師云：我名相復有即無名相義也。又責：汝若名相即無名相，可得世諦無名相、真諦有名相不？彼云：真諦終無名相，俗諦終有名相。若爾，終是二見，不得相即也。彼云：我體常即，但名義異耳。又責：汝俗體即真，俗名即真不？若名義即真者，真諦既常，名義即常；名義無常，真亦即無常。若名義不即真、名義出真外，出法性外，故不可也。此難如《百論》難，有一瓶體，一名義異。論主難云：汝瓶是有，瓶家之形對及五塵等亦是有不？若使瓶家之形對五塵等是有者，有既常，五塵等即常；五塵既無常，有亦無常。總別亦爾也。若言五塵等非大有者，五塵即是空，出大有外，大有攝法則不盡。今難彼俗即真義亦爾。此是提婆菩薩難，豈是人之能通？若能通者，提婆難即壞，經義亦壞。提婆難既不可壞，故此難不可通也。次難開善有兩關，非但難開善，遍難眾師「經有二諦相即」，總而難之。第一難云：色即空時，為色起之時空與色同起故云色即空、為當色未起前已有此空故云色即空耶？若使色未起時已有即色之空者，此則空本有、色即始生，本始為異，云何相即？本有空即常、始有色則無常，常無常異，故不得即也。若言空與色俱起者，則空與色俱是始有，皆是本無今始有，皆無常也。第二難云：汝色即空時，為空色分際、為不分際？若不分際，則混成一；若空色一，皆常皆無常。真俗一言俗無常、真常者，即例難真俗一真無常俗常也。若分際，則空色異，雖即終分際終異。如沈檀雖合為案，沈檀終分際終異。若異，方等之經便壞，覆面之舌不成也。此即彈他竟。次明今釋。要須彈他盡淨，乃得出今時解也。大師舊云：假名說有、假名說空。假名說有為世諦、假名說空為真諦。既名假有，即非有為有；既名假空，即非空為空。非有為有，非異空之有；非空為空，非異有之空。非異空之有，有名空有；非異有之空，空名有空。有名空有，故空有即有空；空名有空，故有空即空有也。師釋相即義方言如此。今作若為解耶？亦得用前難難之。汝因緣空色即不因緣，色即空。色壞空壞不？又如長短因緣，有長即有短、無長即無短。若爾，空色因緣，有色即有空、色壞空即壞云云。然此義應須得其根本、識其大意，只為不得意故，所以成失。故《中論》云「像法中人根轉鈍，雖尋經文，但著文字。」此即失因緣有。又云「聞大乘法說畢竟空，不知何因緣故空。」此即失空意也。又《涅槃經》明諸諍論，一一諍論云：是諸弟子不解我意。為不解教意故，所以成失。是故須知其大意、識其根本。故《法華》云「知佛所說經，因緣及次第，隨義而解說。」然原由來人不解二諦相即者，凡有兩失故不解。一者不識四悉壇，故不解二諦相即。言二諦相即，是何物悉壇耶？四悉壇是通經之要術，解四悉壇則一切經可通；若不解四悉壇，一切經即不可通。大師約四悉壇明四假義。四假者，因緣假、對緣假、就緣假、隨緣假。彼尚不識四悉壇，豈解四假？以彼不識四悉壇，故不解二諦相即義也。二者謂有真俗色空道理。道理有色、道理有空，若無空色則無六道眾生、三乘賢聖。由有色空二諦，迷之則有六道、悟之則有三乘。為是故道理有空、道理有空道理有色。既道理有空色則是有所得，有所得豈能通他難？豈能難他通？故《中論．五陰品》末云「不依空問答，問不成問、答不成答。」空者只是無得異名，以不依無得，故不能難、不能通也。又只為有空色道理，故得作前諸難。汝既有色即空，為當有色之時空色俱時起言色即空、為當色未起之時已有空言色即空耶？若色起時空與色俱起為色即空者，此則皆無常，失真諦。若色未起時已有空為色即空者，即空本有、色始生，空色兩異不得相即。俱起，真墮無常；不俱起，則成異體。次難：汝色即空，為分際、為不分際？不分際則混成一體，即皆常皆無常。例難云云。若分際則異體，不得相即。不分際得，即失二諦；分際得，二諦失相即。進退不可。作若為解耶？此難若可通，提婆、龍樹則成漫語。此二人若是漫語，佛則漫語。佛親記二論主，二論主豈當漫語？既非漫語，作若為解耶？龍光難開善，開善云：待我面黃只得解耳。實理如此。若非三論意，終不得解。故叡師云「《中》、《百》二論文未及此土，又無通鑒，誰與正之？」前匠所以輟章遐慨，思請決於彌勒者，良在此也。《中》、《百》二論既至赤縣，歎云「此區之赤縣，怱得移靈鷲以作鎮；險陂之邊情，乃蒙流光之餘惠。而今後談道之賢，始可與論實矣。」故除三論之外，有所得心終不解此義也。

Next is Longguang's explanation of the mutual identity of the two truths. This master was a great scholar of Kaishan. He said: "Emptiness and form are not separate from each other; this is why emptiness is form, and form is emptiness. As the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra says, 'My land is always pure'—this explains that the pure land is right where the defiled land is, and therefore it says this land is pure. It is not that pure and defiled are blended together into a single land. Why? The pure land is a pure retribution, and the defiled land is a defiled retribution; the pure land is elicited by pure karma, and the defiled land is elicited by defiled karma. Since there are pure retribution and defiled retribution, pure karma and defiled karma, they cannot be one; it is simply that their non-separation constitutes identity." Now, these three masters' explanations encompass all people. Why? Kaishan and Zhuangyan assert a single substance, while Longguang asserts different substances. Although explanations are numerous, they do not exceed oneness and difference; hence these three people encompass all people. Longguang asserts different substances, and this doctrine itself contradicts the sūtras, so there is no need to refute it further. For now, let us refute the two houses of Zhuangyan and Kaishan. Zhuangyan says: "Conditioned provisionality is not different from the ultimate, and the four forgettings are not different from the conventional; yet name and mark ultimately do not become the absence of name and mark, and the absence of name and mark does not become name and mark." These words are self-contradictory. If you say that the ultimate is the conventional and the conventional is the ultimate, then name and mark are the absence of name and mark, and the absence of name and mark is name and mark. How could the conventional be the ultimate, yet name and mark cannot be the absence of name and mark? That master says: "My name and mark also have the meaning of being identical to the absence of name and mark." One further challenges: If your name and mark are identical to the absence of name and mark, can conventional truth lack name and mark, and ultimate truth possess name and mark, or not? He says: "Ultimate truth ultimately lacks name and mark, and conventional truth ultimately possesses name and mark." If so, these are ultimately two views, and they cannot be mutually identical. He says: "My substance is always identical; only the names and senses are different." One further challenges: Your conventional substance is identical to the ultimate; is the conventional name identical to the ultimate or not? If name and sense are identical to the ultimate, then since ultimate truth is eternal, name and sense would be eternal; if name and sense are impermanent, the ultimate would also be impermanent. If name and sense are not identical to the ultimate, then name and sense fall outside the ultimate, falling outside the dharma-nature, which is therefore unacceptable. This objection is like the refutation in the Śataśāstra: there is a single substance of a pot, but its name and sense are different. The author of the treatise refutes this: "Your pot is existence. Are the pot's shape, color, the five sense-objects, and so forth also existence or not? If the pot's shape, color, the five sense-objects, and so forth are existence, then since existence is eternal, the five sense-objects and so forth would be eternal; if the five sense-objects are impermanent, existence would also be impermanent." The same applies to the universal and the particular. If one says that the five sense-objects and so forth are not the Great Existence, then the five sense-objects are emptiness, falling outside the Great Existence, so the Great Existence would not encompass all dharmas completely. Refuting his doctrine of the conventional being identical to the ultimate now is just the same. This is Bodhisattva Āryadeva's refutation; how could [ordinary] people resolve it? If someone could resolve it, then Āryadeva's refutation would be ruined, and the meaning of the sūtras would also be ruined. Since Āryadeva's refutation cannot be ruined, this objection cannot be resolved. Next, there are two hurdles in refuting Kaishan. This does not merely refute Kaishan; it refutes universally all the masters who maintain that 'the sūtras have the mutual identity of the two truths,' refuting them collectively. The first refutation says: When form is emptiness, is it that at the time form arises, emptiness arises together with form, so that one says form is emptiness? Or is it that prior to the arising of form, this emptiness already exists, so that one says form is emptiness? If the emptiness identical to form already existed when form had not yet arisen, then this emptiness would be fundamentally existent, whereas form would be newly born. The fundamental and the new being different, how could they be mutually identical? Fundamentally existent emptiness is eternal, whereas newly existent form is impermanent; eternal and impermanent being different, they cannot be identical. If one says emptiness and form arise together, then emptiness and form are both newly existent; both would be fundamentally non-existent and only now newly existent, so both would be impermanent. The second refutation says: When your form is identical to emptiness, are emptiness and form delimited, or are they undelimited? If they are undelimited, they blend into one; if emptiness and form are one, both are eternal or both are impermanent. If, when the ultimate and conventional are one, it is said that the conventional is impermanent and the ultimate is eternal, then by analogy one could counter that since the ultimate and conventional are one, the ultimate is impermanent and the conventional is eternal. If they are delimited, then emptiness and form are different; though identical, they are ultimately delimited and ultimately different. Just as aloeswood and sandalwood, though joined together to make a table, are ultimately delimited and ultimately different. If they are different, the Vaipulya sūtras are destroyed, and the tongue covering the face cannot be established. This concludes the critique of others. Next, our current explanation will be clarified. It is necessary to critique others thoroughly and cleanly before our current understanding can emerge. The Great Master formerly said: "Existence is spoken of as a provisional designation; emptiness is spoken of as a provisional designation. Speaking of existence as a provisional designation is conventional truth; speaking of emptiness as a provisional designation is ultimate truth. Since it is called provisional existence, it is non-existence as existence; since it is called provisional emptiness, it is non-emptiness as emptiness. Non-existence as existence is not an existence different from emptiness; non-emptiness as emptiness is not an emptiness different from existence. An existence that is not different from emptiness is an existence called empty existence; an emptiness that is not different from existence is an emptiness called existent emptiness. Existence is called empty existence, so empty existence is existent emptiness; emptiness is called existent emptiness, so existent emptiness is empty existence." The master's explanation of mutual identity was put in this manner. How should this be understood now? One could also use the previous refutation to challenge it: Your conditioned emptiness and form are not unconditioned; form is emptiness. When form perishes, does emptiness perish or not? Also, like the mutual conditioning of long and short: where there is long, there is short; where there is no long, there is no short. If so, in the mutual conditioning of emptiness and form, where there is form, there is emptiness; and when form perishes, emptiness perishes, and so forth. However, with respect to this meaning, one must grasp its root and understand its general intent. It is only because they fail to grasp the intent that errors arise. Therefore the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "People during the Semblance Dharma have increasingly dull faculties; though they search through the sūtra texts, they only cling to the words." This is losing conditioned existence. It also says: "Hearing the Mahāyāna Dharma speak of ultimate emptiness, they do not understand on what conditioned basis it is empty." This is losing the intent of emptiness. Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, clarifying various disputes, says in each dispute: "These disciples do not understand my intent." It is because they do not understand the intent of the teaching that errors arise. Therefore one must know its general intent and grasp its root. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: "Knowing the sūtras spoken by the Buddha, their causes, conditions, and order, one explains them according to the meaning." Now, the reason why people have historically failed to understand the mutual identity of the two truths is that, in general, there are two errors causing their lack of understanding. First, they do not recognize the four siddhāntas, and therefore do not understand the mutual identity of the two truths. What kind of siddhānta is the mutual identity of the two truths? The four siddhāntas are the essential technique for penetrating the sūtras. If one understands the four siddhāntas, all sūtras can be penetrated; if one does not understand the four siddhāntas, all sūtras cannot be penetrated. The Great Master explained the meaning of the four provisionalities in terms of the four siddhāntas. The four provisionalities are: conditioned provisionality, opposite-conditioned provisionality, contextual provisionality, and adaptational provisionality. If they do not even recognize the four siddhāntas, how could they understand the four provisionalities? Because they do not recognize the four siddhāntas, they do not understand the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Second, they assert that there is an ontological principle of ultimate and conventional, form and emptiness. That in principle there is form and in principle there is emptiness; and that if there were no emptiness and form, there would be no sentient beings of the six paths or noble ones of the three vehicles. Because there are the two truths of form and emptiness, if one is confused about them, there are the six paths, and if one is awakened to them, there are the three vehicles. For this reason, [they hold that] in principle there is emptiness, in principle there is emptiness and in principle there is form. Since [they hold that] in principle there are emptiness and form, this is appropriation; and with appropriation, how could one resolve another's challenge? How could one challenge another's solution? Therefore, at the end of the 'Chapter on the Five Aggregates' in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, it says: "If questions and answers are not based on emptiness, a question does not constitute a question, and an answer does not constitute an answer." Emptiness is merely an alternative name for non-appropriation; because they are not based on non-appropriation, they can neither refute nor resolve. Furthermore, it is precisely because they hold that there is an ontological principle of emptiness and form that the previous refutations could be made. If you hold that form is emptiness, is it said that form is emptiness because emptiness and form arise at the same time when form exists? Or is it said that form is emptiness because emptiness already exists when form has not yet arisen? If emptiness arises together with form when form arises and this is taken as form being emptiness, then both are impermanent, and the ultimate truth is lost. If emptiness already exists when form has not yet arisen and this is taken as form being emptiness, then emptiness is fundamentally existent while form is newly born; emptiness and form being two different things, they cannot be mutually identical. If they arise together, the ultimate lapses into impermanence; if they do not arise together, they become different substances. Next is the refutation: When your form is identical to emptiness, are they delimited or undelimited? If they are undelimited, they blend into one substance, and both would be eternal or both impermanent. The analogous refutation proceeds as before. If they are delimited, they are different substances and cannot be mutually identical. If undelimited holds, identity is obtained but the two truths are lost; if delimited holds, the two truths are obtained but mutual identity is lost. One can neither advance nor retreat. How should this be resolved? If this refutation could be resolved [by their positions], then Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna would have spoken random words. If these two men had spoken random words, the Buddha would have spoken random words. The Buddha himself prophesied these two treatise authors; how could the two treatise authors have spoken random words? Since they are not random words, how should this be resolved? When Longguang challenged Kaishan, Kaishan said: "Only wait until my face turns yellow, and you will understand." Such is the actual reality. If not for the intent of the Three Treatises, it can never be understood. Therefore Master Rui said: "The texts of the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, had not yet reached this land, and there was no comprehensive insight; who could correct it?" The reason why the earlier masters ceased writing, sighed from afar, and thought to request a decision from Maitreya lies precisely in this. Once the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, reached China, he sighed: "In this land of China, Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa has suddenly been moved to serve as a guard; the crooked frontiers have received the lingering grace of radiating light. And from now on, the worthy who discourse on the Way can finally discuss reality with one another." Therefore, apart from the Three Treatises, a mind with appropriation will never understand this meaning.