二諦義 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

Next, the third section clarifies the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Now, horizontally, this meaning has no shortage of diverse threads, and vertically, it penetrates into the utmost profound and abstruse. For now, we shall briefly cite passages from three sūtras to clarify the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. First is the passage just cited from the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra: conventional truth is identical to the ultimate truth. Second is the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā: emptiness is identical to form, form is identical to emptiness; apart from emptiness there is no form, apart from form there is no emptiness. Third is the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra: the nature of form is inherently empty, it is not that emptiness arises from the cessation of form. Now, although the phrasing of these three sūtras differs, their intent is the same.

3.3

Question: How do the intended aims of these three sūtras differ? Explanation: The intended aims of these three sūtras are the same, but the expressions are not without being broad or concise. How so? The expression of the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra is broad, while the expressions of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa are concise. Why is the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra broad? The Mahāparinirvāṇa says 'conventional truth is identical to ultimate truth', but does not say 'ultimate truth is identical to conventional truth'; hence the Mahāparinirvāṇa's words are broad. Why are the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa concise? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā states 'form is identical to emptiness, emptiness is identical to form', and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa is likewise; therefore they are concise. Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra only clarifies that conventional truth is identical to ultimate truth, without clarifying that ultimate truth is identical to conventional truth, yet across the board both are admissible. Since conventional truth is already identical to ultimate truth, how could ultimate truth not be identical to conventional truth? But the Mahāparinirvāṇa employs it unilaterally, and so conventional truth is identical to ultimate truth. In the case of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, it employs both symmetrically: emptiness is identical to form, and form is identical to emptiness.

3.4

Question: Why does the Mahāparinirvāṇa speak unilaterally, while the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā clarifies symmetrically? Explanation: In all cases, they follow the same rule.

3.5

Question: Since the sūtras are not uniform, how can you arbitrarily treat them as uniform? Answer: The reason they are not uniform is now explained. The Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] specifically explains the meaning of truth (satya): it clarifies that only the ultimate is real, and therefore only the ultimate is a truth; the conventional is false and unreal, and therefore the conventional is not a truth. For this reason, it only explains that conventional truth is identical with the ultimate, and one cannot say that the ultimate is identical with the conventional. But the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā does not aim to explain the meaning of truth; it straightforwardly clarifies that emptiness is identical with form and form is identical with emptiness, using both equally. The Vimalakīrtinirdeśa also uses only one side: one can only say that the nature of form is inherently empty and that it is not that emptiness arises from the destruction of form; one cannot say that the nature of emptiness is inherently form and that form arises from the destruction of emptiness. Broadly speaking, both would hold. Yet the reason it now only says that the nature of form is inherently empty and that it is not that emptiness arises from the destruction of form is precisely to counter the doctrines of the people of the two vehicles who have appropriation. People of the Hīnayāna analyze form to seek emptiness; in response to this, it clarifies that the nature of form is inherently empty, and that it is not that one extinguishes this form and only then is there emptiness. This initiates the two contemplations and distinguishes the two emptinesses: it clarifies the contemplation of emptiness by analyzing form among Hīnayāna people, and the contemplation of emptiness as identical with form among Mahāyāna people; it clarifies emptiness by analyzing form for Hīnayāna people, and the original emptiness of the nature of form for Mahāyāna people. It is for this reason that it only clarifies that the nature of form is inherently empty and not that emptiness arises from the destruction of form. Although there are passages from these three sūtras, the various masters mostly rely on the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā to explain that form is identical with emptiness and emptiness is identical with form. However, this meaning is difficult to comprehend. Dharma Master Daren said: "For thirty years I pondered this meaning and did not understand it; upon meeting the Dharma Master in the mountains, I attained awakening." Once this master was awakened, he began to believe in the Three Treatises and so forth. In the tradition of interpreting the meaning of mutual identity, there have been three great Dharma masters. Guangzhai offered no distinct interpretation; for this master, his [work on the] Lotus Sūtra flourished widely, while his [tradition of the] Tattvasiddhi-śāstra came completely to an end. Now we set forth the interpretations of the mutual identity of the two truths by the three masters Zhuangyan, Kaishan, and Longguang. Zhuangyan said: "Causal provisionality cannot be differentiated from emptiness, and therefore the conventional is identical with the ultimate; the fourfold transcendence cannot be differentiated from existence, and therefore the ultimate is identical with the conventional. Although the conventional is identical with the ultimate, name and characteristics can never be made into the absence of name and characteristics; although the ultimate is identical with the conventional, the absence of name and characteristics can never be made into name and characteristics. Therefore, the non-difference of the two truths constitutes mutual identity." Next, Kaishan explained: "The provisional has no self-nature; arising, it is yet not existent, and therefore the conventional is identical with the ultimate; the ultimate has no nature that could be provisional, and therefore the ultimate is identical with the conventional. The conventional being identical with the ultimate, apart from non-existence there is no existence; the ultimate being identical with the conventional, apart from existence there is no non-existence. Therefore, non-dual yet dual, the middle way is the two truths; dual yet non-dual, the two truths are the middle way."

3.6

Question: Kaishan explains the middle way, whereas Zhuangyan does not explain the middle way. Why is this so? Answer: Zhuangyan does not take the middle way to be the essence of the two truths, and therefore does not explain the middle way. Kaishan explains the middle way as the essence of the two truths; thus he says: "The two truths are the ultimate principle of the non-dual, single reality." For this reason, he explains the middle way.

3.7

Next is Longguang's explanation of the mutual identity of the two truths. This master was a great scholar of Kaishan. He said: "Emptiness and form are not separate from each other; this is why emptiness is form, and form is emptiness. As the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra says, 'My land is always pure'—this explains that the pure land is right where the defiled land is, and therefore it says this land is pure. It is not that pure and defiled are blended together into a single land. Why? The pure land is a pure retribution, and the defiled land is a defiled retribution; the pure land is elicited by pure karma, and the defiled land is elicited by defiled karma. Since there are pure retribution and defiled retribution, pure karma and defiled karma, they cannot be one; it is simply that their non-separation constitutes identity." Now, these three masters' explanations encompass all people. Why? Kaishan and Zhuangyan assert a single substance, while Longguang asserts different substances. Although explanations are numerous, they do not exceed oneness and difference; hence these three people encompass all people. Longguang asserts different substances, and this doctrine itself contradicts the sūtras, so there is no need to refute it further. For now, let us refute the two houses of Zhuangyan and Kaishan. Zhuangyan says: "Conditioned provisionality is not different from the ultimate, and the four forgettings are not different from the conventional; yet name and mark ultimately do not become the absence of name and mark, and the absence of name and mark does not become name and mark." These words are self-contradictory. If you say that the ultimate is the conventional and the conventional is the ultimate, then name and mark are the absence of name and mark, and the absence of name and mark is name and mark. How could the conventional be the ultimate, yet name and mark cannot be the absence of name and mark? That master says: "My name and mark also have the meaning of being identical to the absence of name and mark." One further challenges: If your name and mark are identical to the absence of name and mark, can conventional truth lack name and mark, and ultimate truth possess name and mark, or not? He says: "Ultimate truth ultimately lacks name and mark, and conventional truth ultimately possesses name and mark." If so, these are ultimately two views, and they cannot be mutually identical. He says: "My substance is always identical; only the names and senses are different." One further challenges: Your conventional substance is identical to the ultimate; is the conventional name identical to the ultimate or not? If name and sense are identical to the ultimate, then since ultimate truth is eternal, name and sense would be eternal; if name and sense are impermanent, the ultimate would also be impermanent. If name and sense are not identical to the ultimate, then name and sense fall outside the ultimate, falling outside the dharma-nature, which is therefore unacceptable. This objection is like the refutation in the Śataśāstra: there is a single substance of a pot, but its name and sense are different. The author of the treatise refutes this: "Your pot is existence. Are the pot's shape, color, the five sense-objects, and so forth also existence or not? If the pot's shape, color, the five sense-objects, and so forth are existence, then since existence is eternal, the five sense-objects and so forth would be eternal; if the five sense-objects are impermanent, existence would also be impermanent." The same applies to the universal and the particular. If one says that the five sense-objects and so forth are not the Great Existence, then the five sense-objects are emptiness, falling outside the Great Existence, so the Great Existence would not encompass all dharmas completely. Refuting his doctrine of the conventional being identical to the ultimate now is just the same. This is Bodhisattva Āryadeva's refutation; how could [ordinary] people resolve it? If someone could resolve it, then Āryadeva's refutation would be ruined, and the meaning of the sūtras would also be ruined. Since Āryadeva's refutation cannot be ruined, this objection cannot be resolved. Next, there are two hurdles in refuting Kaishan. This does not merely refute Kaishan; it refutes universally all the masters who maintain that 'the sūtras have the mutual identity of the two truths,' refuting them collectively. The first refutation says: When form is emptiness, is it that at the time form arises, emptiness arises together with form, so that one says form is emptiness? Or is it that prior to the arising of form, this emptiness already exists, so that one says form is emptiness? If the emptiness identical to form already existed when form had not yet arisen, then this emptiness would be fundamentally existent, whereas form would be newly born. The fundamental and the new being different, how could they be mutually identical? Fundamentally existent emptiness is eternal, whereas newly existent form is impermanent; eternal and impermanent being different, they cannot be identical. If one says emptiness and form arise together, then emptiness and form are both newly existent; both would be fundamentally non-existent and only now newly existent, so both would be impermanent. The second refutation says: When your form is identical to emptiness, are emptiness and form delimited, or are they undelimited? If they are undelimited, they blend into one; if emptiness and form are one, both are eternal or both are impermanent. If, when the ultimate and conventional are one, it is said that the conventional is impermanent and the ultimate is eternal, then by analogy one could counter that since the ultimate and conventional are one, the ultimate is impermanent and the conventional is eternal. If they are delimited, then emptiness and form are different; though identical, they are ultimately delimited and ultimately different. Just as aloeswood and sandalwood, though joined together to make a table, are ultimately delimited and ultimately different. If they are different, the Vaipulya sūtras are destroyed, and the tongue covering the face cannot be established. This concludes the critique of others. Next, our current explanation will be clarified. It is necessary to critique others thoroughly and cleanly before our current understanding can emerge. The Great Master formerly said: "Existence is spoken of as a provisional designation; emptiness is spoken of as a provisional designation. Speaking of existence as a provisional designation is conventional truth; speaking of emptiness as a provisional designation is ultimate truth. Since it is called provisional existence, it is non-existence as existence; since it is called provisional emptiness, it is non-emptiness as emptiness. Non-existence as existence is not an existence different from emptiness; non-emptiness as emptiness is not an emptiness different from existence. An existence that is not different from emptiness is an existence called empty existence; an emptiness that is not different from existence is an emptiness called existent emptiness. Existence is called empty existence, so empty existence is existent emptiness; emptiness is called existent emptiness, so existent emptiness is empty existence." The master's explanation of mutual identity was put in this manner. How should this be understood now? One could also use the previous refutation to challenge it: Your conditioned emptiness and form are not unconditioned; form is emptiness. When form perishes, does emptiness perish or not? Also, like the mutual conditioning of long and short: where there is long, there is short; where there is no long, there is no short. If so, in the mutual conditioning of emptiness and form, where there is form, there is emptiness; and when form perishes, emptiness perishes, and so forth. However, with respect to this meaning, one must grasp its root and understand its general intent. It is only because they fail to grasp the intent that errors arise. Therefore the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "People during the Semblance Dharma have increasingly dull faculties; though they search through the sūtra texts, they only cling to the words." This is losing conditioned existence. It also says: "Hearing the Mahāyāna Dharma speak of ultimate emptiness, they do not understand on what conditioned basis it is empty." This is losing the intent of emptiness. Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, clarifying various disputes, says in each dispute: "These disciples do not understand my intent." It is because they do not understand the intent of the teaching that errors arise. Therefore one must know its general intent and grasp its root. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: "Knowing the sūtras spoken by the Buddha, their causes, conditions, and order, one explains them according to the meaning." Now, the reason why people have historically failed to understand the mutual identity of the two truths is that, in general, there are two errors causing their lack of understanding. First, they do not recognize the four siddhāntas, and therefore do not understand the mutual identity of the two truths. What kind of siddhānta is the mutual identity of the two truths? The four siddhāntas are the essential technique for penetrating the sūtras. If one understands the four siddhāntas, all sūtras can be penetrated; if one does not understand the four siddhāntas, all sūtras cannot be penetrated. The Great Master explained the meaning of the four provisionalities in terms of the four siddhāntas. The four provisionalities are: conditioned provisionality, opposite-conditioned provisionality, contextual provisionality, and adaptational provisionality. If they do not even recognize the four siddhāntas, how could they understand the four provisionalities? Because they do not recognize the four siddhāntas, they do not understand the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Second, they assert that there is an ontological principle of ultimate and conventional, form and emptiness. That in principle there is form and in principle there is emptiness; and that if there were no emptiness and form, there would be no sentient beings of the six paths or noble ones of the three vehicles. Because there are the two truths of form and emptiness, if one is confused about them, there are the six paths, and if one is awakened to them, there are the three vehicles. For this reason, [they hold that] in principle there is emptiness, in principle there is emptiness and in principle there is form. Since [they hold that] in principle there are emptiness and form, this is appropriation; and with appropriation, how could one resolve another's challenge? How could one challenge another's solution? Therefore, at the end of the 'Chapter on the Five Aggregates' in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, it says: "If questions and answers are not based on emptiness, a question does not constitute a question, and an answer does not constitute an answer." Emptiness is merely an alternative name for non-appropriation; because they are not based on non-appropriation, they can neither refute nor resolve. Furthermore, it is precisely because they hold that there is an ontological principle of emptiness and form that the previous refutations could be made. If you hold that form is emptiness, is it said that form is emptiness because emptiness and form arise at the same time when form exists? Or is it said that form is emptiness because emptiness already exists when form has not yet arisen? If emptiness arises together with form when form arises and this is taken as form being emptiness, then both are impermanent, and the ultimate truth is lost. If emptiness already exists when form has not yet arisen and this is taken as form being emptiness, then emptiness is fundamentally existent while form is newly born; emptiness and form being two different things, they cannot be mutually identical. If they arise together, the ultimate lapses into impermanence; if they do not arise together, they become different substances. Next is the refutation: When your form is identical to emptiness, are they delimited or undelimited? If they are undelimited, they blend into one substance, and both would be eternal or both impermanent. The analogous refutation proceeds as before. If they are delimited, they are different substances and cannot be mutually identical. If undelimited holds, identity is obtained but the two truths are lost; if delimited holds, the two truths are obtained but mutual identity is lost. One can neither advance nor retreat. How should this be resolved? If this refutation could be resolved [by their positions], then Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna would have spoken random words. If these two men had spoken random words, the Buddha would have spoken random words. The Buddha himself prophesied these two treatise authors; how could the two treatise authors have spoken random words? Since they are not random words, how should this be resolved? When Longguang challenged Kaishan, Kaishan said: "Only wait until my face turns yellow, and you will understand." Such is the actual reality. If not for the intent of the Three Treatises, it can never be understood. Therefore Master Rui said: "The texts of the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, had not yet reached this land, and there was no comprehensive insight; who could correct it?" The reason why the earlier masters ceased writing, sighed from afar, and thought to request a decision from Maitreya lies precisely in this. Once the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, reached China, he sighed: "In this land of China, Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa has suddenly been moved to serve as a guard; the crooked frontiers have received the lingering grace of radiating light. And from now on, the worthy who discourse on the Way can finally discuss reality with one another." Therefore, apart from the Three Treatises, a mind with appropriation will never understand this meaning.

3.8

Question: Since the interpretations of others are incorrect, how are we to explain it now? The Master said: Merely washing clean such [views of] the two truths as of one substance or different substances so that completely nothing remains—this is itself the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Therefore, the master in the mountains (Senglang) said: "If in our times there are further interpretations, they are merely an excess burden," and so forth. The interpretations of Kaishan, Zhuangyan, and Longguang have already been stated; if Mt. She now provides yet another explanation, that would indeed become an excess burden! Where could there now be a separate explanation? One need only completely cleanse all past views of oneness, difference, and the like, and that is precisely the mutual identity of the two truths. The Master said: The two truths being of one substance or of different substances is simply the matter of two chapters in the Śataśāstra. The two truths being of one substance is the Sāṃkhya doctrine; the two truths being of different substances is the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. They might say: "You merely arrange it thus; when was our doctrine ever like this?" We now clarify that this doctrine is of the same kind as that of the tīrthikas. Your ultimate truth is permanent, omnipresent, and universal; the phenomena of the conventional truth, such as pots and clothes, are impermanent, non-omnipresent, and particular. Their view is also like this: the Great Existence (mahāsattā) is permanent, omnipresent, and universal; pots, clothes, and the like are impermanent, non-omnipresent, and particular. They are of the same kind like this. Furthermore, it is analogous to their [claim that] the permanent and impermanent, the universal and particular, are of one substance while their meanings are ever distinct, and although their meanings are ever distinct, the universal and particular, the permanent and impermanent, are of one substance. Your doctrine is also like this: the ultimate and conventional are of one substance, yet their meanings are ever distinct. The conventional has the meaning of being insubstantial, and the ultimate has the meaning of being true and solid; their meanings are ever distinct, while their substance is ever one. This doctrine is of the same kind; it is merely that the Great Existence and the ultimate truth differ in name. Although the Great Existence and the ultimate truth differ in name, their meanings regarding permanence and impermanence are no different. The treatise directly refutes the oneness of substance of the permanent and impermanent; thus, all who partake in [the view of] the oneness of substance of the permanent and impermanent fall under this refutation. Although the words refer to the tīrthikas, the intent actually cleanses all the masters broadly. For this reason, the Śataśāstra has an indirect and a direct aspect: because the words refer to the tīrthikas, that is primary; because the intent broadly refutes all the masters, that is secondary. Next, Longguang is like the Vaiśeṣika. The Vaiśeṣika was originally a scholar of Sāṃkhya; later he struck down the Sāṃkhya doctrine of oneness, clarifying that the Great Existence is permanent while pots and the like are impermanent; the Great Existence is omnipresent while pots and the like are not omnipresent; the Great Existence is universal while pots and the like are particular; the Great Existence is an illuminating cause (jñāpaka-hetu) while pots and the like are productive causes (kāraka-hetu); the Great Existence is indestructible while pots and the like are destructible. If one says they are one, then when the pot is destroyed, the Great Existence would be destroyed; yet there are differences of permanence versus impermanence, up to differences of destructibility versus indestructibility—how could they be of one substance? Therefore, he clarified that Existence and the pot are of different substances. Longguang is also like this. Originally a scholar of Kaishan, he extensively attacked Kaishan's doctrine that the two truths are of one substance: "If the two truths were of one substance, then burning the conventional would mean burning the ultimate; the conventional arising and perishing would mean the ultimate arising and perishing. Since there is the difference between what can be burned and what cannot be burned, and the differences between arising-and-perishing versus non-arising-and-non-perishing, and permanence versus impermanence, the two truths cannot be of one substance." Therefore, he clarified the doctrine of difference: although the two truths are different, they are not separate from each other. The Vaiśeṣika is also like this: although the Great Existence is different from the pot, it is not separate from it. Hence he says: "Because of the conjunction of pot and existence, the pot is not separate from existence; yet the pot and existence are ever different." Longguang is also like this: although they are different, they are never separate; not being separate, they are different—this is of one kind with the Vaiśeṣika doctrine. Since the doctrines are the same, refuting the Sāṃkhya and the Vaiśeṣika is precisely refuting Kaishan and Longguang. Moreover, when the treatise master directly refutes oneness and difference, all oneness and difference whatsoever are refuted. Once oneness and difference are refuted, it washes horizontally across the myriad phenomena and exhausts the five alternatives vertically. Because views such as these are washed clean, at the very end he is first able to reveal the Tathāgata's two truths of causes, conditions, and provisional names—these two truths are free from appropriation and unobstructed. Just as it is in the Śataśāstra, so it is in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: at the very outset of its journey it cleanses arising, perishing, oneness, and difference, and hence says: "Neither arising nor perishing, neither permanent nor annihilated, neither one nor different." Since they are neither one nor different, they are free from all oneness and difference; at the very outset it reproaches the eight errors. However, in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā there are two kinds of eight errors: such as Viṣṇu generating the fine atoms, the primary nature of the world (prakṛti), and so forth—this is one kind of eight errors; arising, perishing, and so forth are another kind of eight errors. The eight errors of fine atoms, the primary nature of the world, and so on arose before the Buddha appeared in the world; the eight errors of arising, perishing, and so on arose after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa. Because Nāgārjuna knew there were such eight errors, he therefore appeared in the world to refute them, refuting oneness and difference at the very start. Refuting oneness and difference does not merely refute one kind of oneness and difference, but comprehensively refutes all oneness and difference. Once oneness and difference are gone, up to the five alternatives, completely nothing remains. Therefore, it is said that from the Chapter on Conditions onward: existence also is not, non-existence also is not, and both existence and non-existence also are not. Cleansing them in this way, he then clarifies the Tathāgata's two truths free from appropriation and unobstructed. Therefore, at the end of the Chapter on the Three Characteristics, it says: "Like a dream, like an illusion, like a city of the gandharvas: / what is spoken of as arising, staying, and perishing, / its characteristics are also like this." Since the three characteristics are like this, the two truths are also like this: like a dream, like an illusion, like a city of the gandharvas; what is spoken of as the ultimate and conventional truths, their characteristics are also like this. This is a brief clarification of the general meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths like this; for guests of profound awakening, it is already sufficient for understanding.

3.9

Next, we further differentiate the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Other schools clarify that the two truths are two principles and two objects; on what basis does our present teaching clarify the two truths? The explanation states: We now clarify that there are two kinds of two truths: first, the two truths from perspective; second, the two truths as teaching. The principle has never been dual or non-dual; because of the two perspectives, there are two truths, and also in accord with sentient beings it is taught that there are two truths. Since there are two truths from [the perspective of] sentient beings and there are two truths in accord with sentient beings, in principle there are truly no two truths. Since there are no two truths, what identity or non-identity could be discussed? For the purpose of teaching and transforming sentient beings there are two truths, and also for the purpose of teaching and transforming sentient beings there is identity and non-identity. Such is the general judgment. In specific explanation, there is the meaning of identity in the truth from perspective, and there is also the meaning of identity in the truth as teaching. As for identity in the truth from perspective, the treatise says: "As for conventional truth, all phenomena are empty of nature; the world in its inversion deems them to exist, which is real from the perspective of worldly people. The worthy ones and sages truly know that all phenomena are empty of nature, which is real from the perspective of the sages." Opening the two truths at the very outset clarifies that only the ultimate is real and is a truth, while the conventional is false, inverted, unreal, and not a truth; this is precisely to cause sentient beings to transform from ordinary to sage, to abandon existence and enter emptiness, attaining one level of awakening. Next, having abandoned existence and entered emptiness, knowing that existence is inverted and emptiness is true and real, one then thinks of abandoning existence and entering emptiness, of breaking down form to enter emptiness; therefore, for their sake it is taught that form's original nature is itself empty, not that it becomes empty only after being broken down and dismantled. This is the second level of clarifying that form is itself empty within the truth from perspective. At the outset, form and emptiness were opened as two to cause them to abandon form and enter emptiness; then they said that form is different from emptiness and that one breaks down form to enter emptiness; therefore, for their sake it was taught that form is itself empty, that form's nature is naturally empty, not empty by breaking down form. Hence the treatise says: "The worthy ones and sages truly know that inversion is empty of nature"—it is simply that the nature of inversion is originally empty.

3.10

Question: That form is itself empty is like this; how is emptiness itself form? The explanation states: When the sage knows that the nature of inversion is empty, then from the perspective of the ordinary person it ever distinctly exists. When the sage knows that the nature of inversion is empty, form is itself empty; when it distinctly exists from the perspective of the ordinary person, emptiness is itself form. This determines that form is itself empty and emptiness is itself form in terms of delusion and awakening, ordinary and sage: because the sage is awakened, form is itself empty; because the ordinary person is deluded, emptiness is itself form.

3.11

Question: Why is it that in the sūtras it is mostly first clarified that form is itself empty, and only afterward that emptiness is itself form? The explanation states: Just as above, the sage realizes that form is itself empty, while merely from the perspective of the ordinary person is emptiness itself form. How do we know this is so? As in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: "All phenomena are empty of nature; the world in its inversion deems them to exist"—this is precisely that from the perspective of the ordinary person emptiness is itself form. Next, an analogy is raised to make it clear. Like flowers in the sky: because of an eye disease, one sees flowers in the sky and speaks of the flowers being empty; there are no flowers that could be identified with emptiness, but solely because of the eye disease they are empty, and emptiness is itself the flowers. When emptiness is itself the flowers, the flowers do not perturb emptiness; when [the disease] is cured, the flowers are themselves empty, and emptiness does not perturb the flowers. Form and emptiness are also like this: because of awakening, form is itself empty; because of delusion, emptiness is itself form. Because of awakening, that which exists thus has nothing that exists; because of delusion, that which has nothing exists thus. When because of delusion it exists thus, it does not perturb having nothing; when because of awakening it has nothing, it does not perturb existing thus. Because of delusion, emptiness is itself form, and form does not perturb emptiness; because of awakening, form is itself empty, and emptiness does not perturb form. Because of delusion, one takes emptiness to be form—how was there ever any form that could perturb emptiness? Because of awakening, form is itself empty—how was there ever any form that could be different from emptiness? Since form and emptiness are like this, what identity or non-identity could be discussed? The four propositions are all purified. Pushing away the previous objections far off in this way, the objections cannot stick. The reason others were subject to objections was that they posited existence and emptiness, and by identifying form with emptiness they fell into the previous objections. We now clarify that form is ultimately empty; with what could it be identified with emptiness? Because sentient beings perceive form, it is said that form is itself empty.

3.12

Question: Earlier it was said: "Deluded, one sees that there is form; awakened, form is itself empty, just as with flowers in the sky, due to disease one sees flowers, and when cured the flowers are empty." This is merely the meaning of dream-like, insubstantial flowers in the sky; how can it be used? The explanation states: Because they hold to existence, existence is refuted by means of flowers in the sky; if there were no such existence, how could there still be emptiness? Hence the treatise says: "If there were no existence, how could there be non-existence?" Therefore, if there is no existence, there is no emptiness, and the five alternatives are all purified. Hence Master Shi (Kumārajīva) said: "The ten analogies are used to awaken to emptiness, and emptiness necessarily relies on these analogies. Words are borrowed to meet the meaning; when the meaning is exhausted, there is no place to be met. Having escaped the long snare, one abides here in non-abiding." Furthermore, there is existence from the perspective of the ordinary person and emptiness from the perspective of the sage; but non-existence is existence from the perspective of the ordinary person, so existence is the flower of existence; non-emptiness is emptiness from the perspective of the sage, so emptiness is the flower of emptiness. Existence being a flower, there is no existence that exists; emptiness being a flower, there is no emptiness that is empty. In this way, the two truths in their three stages are all flowers in the sky, all having nothing that exists. Next, we explain according to the sūtra. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā states: "Form is itself empty; emptiness is not called form." Heretofore people have not understood these words. Now we clarify: this then strikes both views of oneness and difference at once. How so? "Form is itself empty" refutes the views of ordinary persons, the two vehicles, and the like. They consider form to be different from emptiness, and that only by breaking down form does one obtain emptiness; therefore, it refutes them by saying that form is itself empty. "Emptiness is not called form" refutes the view of identity. When it was explained just prior that form is itself empty, they immediately formed an understanding of identity; therefore, it refutes them by saying that emptiness is not called form. If there were form, one could say that form is itself empty; since there is no form, how could one say that form is itself empty? This is borrowing oneness to eliminate difference, and borrowing difference to eliminate oneness; borrowing existence to refute non-existence, and borrowing non-existence to refute existence. These statements of identity and non-identity are all for sentient beings, used as the remedial siddhānta among the four siddhāntas. Such intentions are all spoken in this way in accord with sentient beings. If it is prajñā, form is unobstructed: form is itself empty and emptiness is itself form; permanence is itself impermanence and impermanence is itself permanence; emptiness functions as existence, and existence functions as emptiness; permanence functions as impermanence, and impermanence functions as permanence; one thought-moment is immeasurable kalpas, and immeasurable kalpas are one thought-moment; the three times function as one time, and one time functions as the three times, and so forth. Without coming and without accumulation, yet manifesting the affairs of all kalpas—for this reason, form is itself empty and empty is itself form.

3.13

Next, fourth, is to clarify the substance of the two truths. Now, the substance of the two truths is also difficult to understand. From antiquity down to the present, there have been fourteen schools of explanation in all. If one were to examine in detail the merits and faults of each, and evaluate their orthodoxy or heterodoxy in terms of the sūtras and treatises, it would [take as long as] the chronological sequence in the Great Sūtra. Now I shall briefly present the explanations of the three mainstream schools and attempt to discuss them. The Great Master usually put forward three schools to clarify the meaning of the substance of the two truths: the first school clarifies that the two truths have a single substance; the second school clarifies that the two truths have different substances; the third school clarifies that the two truths take the Middle Way as their substance. Regarding the school that clarifies that the two truths have a single substance, there are further three theories: the first says that ultimate truth is the substance; the second says that conventional truth is the substance; the third says that the two truths mutually designate each other as the substance. As for the first, that ultimate truth is the substance, there are two meanings: first, it clarifies emptiness as the fundamental basis of principle. It clarifies that all phenomena take emptiness as their fundamental basis, and that existence is not the fundamental basis; for this reason, it takes ultimate truth as the substance. Second, existence is conventional truth, and breaking down the conventional originally aims at awakening to the ultimate; therefore, the ultimate is the substance. As for saying that the conventional is the substance: one must rely on breaking down the conventional to attain the ultimate; if one does not break down the conventional, one does not attain the ultimate. Precisely because one first breaks down the conventional and thus attains the ultimate, the conventional is the substance. The third school, which speaks of mutual designation as the substance, says that the previous two schools are both biased, and now clarifies that it possesses both meanings. Clarifying emptiness as the fundamental basis of existence, the ultimate is the substance of the conventional; the conventional is the function of the ultimate, and by breaking down the conventional one attains the ultimate, so the conventional is the substance of the ultimate and the ultimate is the function of the conventional. The two truths are mutually the substance, and the ultimate and conventional are mutually the function. These three explanations are within the tradition of Kaishan. Kaishan fundamentally took the ultimate as the substance, and the other two explanations are branch developments. The second school clarifies that the two truths have different substances: the three designations are the substance of conventional truth, and the four negations are the substance of ultimate truth; names and characteristics are the substance of conventional truth, and the absence of names and characteristics is the substance of ultimate truth; therefore, the substances of the two truths are different. As for the third, which clarifies that the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths: this is also Dharma Master Kaishan, who employed the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths. He clarified that duality is [grounded] in non-duality; therefore his preface says: 'Dual yet non-dual, the two truths are the Middle Way; non-dual yet dual, the Middle Way is the two truths. Therefore, the Middle Way is taken as the substance of the two truths.' Thus, in general terms there are three schools, but distinguished in detail there are five explanations. However, although there are explanations of three schools, that the two truths have a single substance or that the two truths have different substances are not worth examining closely here. Now I shall briefly discuss the meaning of taking the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths. Why? Mount She and Xinghuang both took the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths, and that [school] also clarifies that the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths; therefore it must be examined and distinguished. Now, that [school] has three kinds of Middle Way: which Middle Way does it take as the substance? As for the three kinds of Middle Way: first, the Middle within conventional truth; second, the Middle within ultimate truth; third, the Middle combining and clarifying both truths. The Middle Way within conventional truth has three kinds: first, because the principle of the effect exists within the cause, it is not non-existent; precisely because the actual effect does not [yet] exist, it is not existent—this is the Middle Way of cause and effect as neither existent nor non-existent. Second, because real entities perish, it is not eternal; because of continuity, it is not severed—this is the Middle Way of continuity as neither eternal nor severed. Third, the Middle Way of mutual dependence, which will be differentiated later, etc. As for the Middle Way within ultimate truth: neither existent nor non-existent is the Middle Way within ultimate truth. As for the Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths: neither ultimate nor conventional is the Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths. This is different from the Middle Way within ultimate truth: within ultimate truth, it is neither existent nor non-existent, not 'neither ultimate nor conventional'. The Middle Way combining and clarifying both truths is precisely neither ultimate nor conventional. Next, among the three kinds of Middle that he clarifies, which Middle Way does he take as the substance of the two truths? The explanation is: he does not use the Middle Way of conventional truth as the substance of the two truths, nor does he use the Middle Way of neither ultimate nor conventional as the substance of the two truths. Why? For him, there is no separate phenomenon that is neither ultimate nor conventional. Zhuangyan clarified that the Buddha-fruit of nirvāṇa transcends the two truths; Kaishan clarified that the two truths encompass all phenomena completely. Now when one says 'neither ultimate nor conventional', they are negated relative to each other. In precise analysis, there are only the ultimate and the conventional: the conventional is not the ultimate, and the ultimate is not the conventional—this constitutes 'neither ultimate nor conventional'. 'Not conventional' is just the ultimate; 'not ultimate' is just the conventional. There is no separate 'neither ultimate nor conventional'; therefore it is not used as the substance of the two truths. When he says that the Middle Way is the substance, the Middle Way of ultimate truth is the substance. The Middle Way of ultimate truth is still ultimate truth; therefore his preface says: 'The two truths are the ultimate principle of the one ultimate that is non-dual.' It has always been said that he contradicts himself; in fact he definitely does not contradict himself, because the Middle Way is still ultimate truth, and ultimate truth is still the Middle Way.

3.14

Question: For what reason did Kaishan take the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths? The explanation is: this has a source. Why? The teacher of the Dharma Master of the Mountains was originally a native of Liaodong; he studied the Three Treatises in the northern region, remotely following the teachings of Master [Kumāra]jīva, and then came to Southern Wu, residing at Caotang Temple on Mount Zhong. He encountered the recluse Zhou Yong, who thereupon went to study under him. Later in life, Zhou Yong composed the Treatise on the Three Lineages, clarifying that the two truths take the Middle Way as their substance. Later, Dharma Master Zhilin requested Zhou Yong to bring out the Treatise on the Three Lineages. Zhou Yong said: 'If this disciple brings out this treatise, I fear it will cause doubt among the multitude.' Zhilin said: 'In my youth I once heard this doctrine, but the profound sound has been interrupted for over forty years. If the patron brings out this treatise, it will surpass the giving of countries, cities, wives, children, heads, and eyes.' Thereupon he first brought out this treatise. Next, Emperor Wu of Liang deeply revered and had faith in the Buddha-Dharma, having originally studied the Chengshi lun. Hearing that the Dharma Master was in the mountains, he sent ten people, including the monastic superintendent Zhiji, to the mountains to study. Although they grasped the verbal expressions, they did not thoroughly penetrate the intended meaning. Therefore, Emperor Wu's doctrines in his later years differed from those of the other Dharma Masters, being called the 'Imperial Decree doctrines'. Although Kaishan did not enter the mountains at that time, he also heard this doctrine, and therefore took the Middle Way as the substance of the two truths. Since he did not personally receive the oral teachings, the doctrine he formulated was skewed, still taking ultimate truth as the substance. Now we clarify that it is precisely 'neither ultimate nor conventional' that is the substance of the two truths. The ultimate and the conventional are the function; they are also called principle and teaching, and are also called the Middle and provisional. The Middle and provisional are repeated as the Middle and provisional; principle and teaching are repeated as principle and teaching; substance and function are also repeated as substance and function. Therefore, non-duality is the substance, and duality is the function. The headings of the sections are briefly outlined like this. If one understands the preceding general import of the two truths, then the meaning of the substance of the two truths should already be evident.

3.15

Question: Now you clarify that the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths: what is the reason for this? What sūtras does it explain? What treatises does it interpret? What disease does it counter? The explanation is: as for the reason why the Middle Way is clarified as the substance of the two truths, it is that the two truths express the principle of non-duality. Just like a finger pointing at the moon, the intention does not lie in the finger, but intends to make one apprehend the moon. The teaching of the two truths is also like this: the two truths express non-duality; the intention does not lie in duality, but is to make one attain non-duality; therefore non-duality is taken as the substance of the two truths. Furthermore, now we clarify that the two truths are an approach through teaching, meant to lead through to non-duality. Hence the Master of the Mountains said: 'Opening the gates of ultimate and conventional, he preached the teaching of the two truths.' Thus the two truths are an approach through teaching. The approach through teaching is meant to lead through to the principle of non-duality; therefore non-duality of the Middle Way is taken as the substance. This clarifies that truth as teaching takes non-duality as its substance in this manner. Next, to distinguish how truth from perspective takes non-duality as its substance: the Way has no duality, but is dual from the perspective of the two conditions. Once one knows that it is dual [only] from [these] perspectives, this reveals non-duality; therefore non-duality is the substance. Thus, both truth from perspective and truth as teaching have a purpose; hence non-duality of the Middle Way is taken as the substance. Moreover, the reason why the Middle Way is the substance of the two truths is precisely to counter the deeply buried root of the two views from of old. Why? As distinguished above, divided specifically there are five schools, but discussed generally there are only three explanations: the first says the ultimate is the substance; the second says the conventional is the substance; the third says the ultimate and conventional each have their own substance. Although there are three explanations, ultimately they do not transcend the two truths. If ultimate truth is the substance, then in terms of principle there is this non-existence as the substance; if conventional truth is the substance, then in terms of principle there is this existence as the substance. If the two truths have different substances, then existence is the conventional substance and emptiness is the ultimate substance; in terms of principle there is duality, which means sentient beings of the two views. Now, in order to counter this, we clarify that the non-dual Middle Way is the substance. Countering this disease is precisely explaining the sūtras and treatises. Thus the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'Those of shallow wisdom see phenomena / as having characteristics of existence or non-existence; / they are unable to see / the pacifying, secure Dharma where views are extinguished.' Now, when each of you sees existence and sees non-existence, this is precisely shallow wisdom; you cannot see the secure Dharma. The secure Dharma is precisely the non-dual Way. The secure Dharma is neither existence nor non-existence; because you see existence and non-existence, you do not see it. Furthermore, the Buddhas have only one Way. Hence the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'Mañjuśrī's Dharma is always thus: / the Dharma King has only a single Dharma; / all persons of fearlessness / transcend birth and death by a single Way.' Since there is only one Way, there are not two ways; since there is only one principle, there are not two principles. Furthermore, if the two truths had two principles, this would constitute appropriation. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā says: 'Views with appropriation are called dual views. What are dual views? Namely, regarding eye and form as two, and so forth for everything.' It also says: 'All those that are dual are without the Way and without the fruit.' Since sentient beings fundamentally have the disease of the two views, if the Buddhas were further to teach that in terms of principle there is duality, this would fail to remove the old disease and would instead increase new delusion. For this reason, the Buddhas accord with sentient beings and say that there are two truths, but in terms of principle there is no duality. Hence the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'There are no two truths; through skillful means, according with sentient beings, he spoke of two truths.' Furthermore, when three truths are spoken of, how are they to be understood? The Renwang jing clarifies the doctrine of three truths; [others] then misinterpret sūtras such as this, and these are all points where they encounter obstacles. Now we clarify that there is no obstruction: at times they are taken as three truths—the truth of existence, the truth of non-existence, and the ultimate truth of the Middle Way; at times 'neither ultimate nor conventional' is principle, and the ultimate and conventional are teaching. When principle and teaching are discussed together, there are therefore three truths.

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二諦義 — Classical Chinese