大乘法苑義林章 4.23

4.23

後際五類見者，有想論有十六。《瑜伽》第六、《顯揚》第九云「初四見依三見立。若計命即是身者，彼計我是色。若計命異於身者，彼計我非色。若計我俱遍無二無缺者，彼計我亦是色亦非色。若為治此於是義中由異文句而起執者，彼計我非色非非色。」此意即說：無想天處名為無想，有頂名非有想非無想。下三無色，色界中除無想，餘欲界等竝名有想。八十七云「由依命者，即是身見，故計我有色。死後或有色有想、或無有想、或非有想非無想。由依命者異於身見故，計我無色，死後有想、或無有想、或非有想非無想。由依此總是我，遍滿無二，無缺見故，說我亦有色亦無色死後有想，非有色非無色死後有想，其無想及非有想非無想亦爾。」此上意說：執有色等死後，初有想四句，與死後無想及死後非有想非無想初四句同，但生處有異。現在皆同，依於命者即異於身。無二無缺三見之上，立此三種四句義故。執色為我，名命即身。執非色為我，名命異於身。雙執色非色以為其我，名無二無缺。我有色等句，無色界下三地，若說有色，亦遍於彼；若說無色，即不及彼。死後有想四句者：一執我有色死後有想、二執我無色死後有想、三執我亦有色亦無色死後有想、四執我非有色非無色死後有想。次有邊等四句者，八十七云「計我是色者，或言狹小、或言無量。計我無色，當知亦爾，亦有狹少及與無量，所依所緣作用等法有小大故。」此二我論，依第三見，此總遍滿無二無缺，立為二論：一計我狹少、二計我無量。由此四種我論差別，說我有邊等四句，如次配之。故《瑜伽》第六云「若見少色少非色，彼計有邊。若見彼二無量，彼計無邊。若復遍見而色分少、非色分無量，或色分無量、非色分少者，彼計亦有邊亦無邊。為治此故，但由文異不由義異而起執者，彼計非有邊非無邊。」觀此文意，第六太正。八十七中如次配者，義次非文，謂執色非色狹小者名有邊，執色非色無量者名無邊，互執多少者為俱句，遮此為第四。與前文同。以此四種死後生有想地，是名第二有邊等四句。次四句者，第六有名，不辨處所。八十七說「一執我一想，在空無邊處、識無邊處，不說無所有處，略文故也。亦一想故，同《婆沙》故。」以《瑜伽》說無量想配前一想故，略不論於無所有處，彼非無量想故，然是一想。二執我種種想，謂在下地。三執我有狹少思，謂即下地。四執我無量想，謂空識處。八十七云「即如所說二想，隨其次第應知。說我有狹少想、有無量想，此以義理逆次第配。」然《毘婆沙》云「執少色為我想、為我所。我與彼合，名為少想。在欲色界，除無想天。無量想者，執無量色為我想、為我所等」，如前廣說。《瑜伽》意說：即前所說一想之處有無量想，種種想處有此少想，亦不相違。次四句者，一我純有樂，死後有想，第六有名而無處所。八十七說「謂下三靜慮，二我純有苦，死後有想，謂在捺落迦。三我有樂有苦，死後有想，在鬼、傍生、人、欲界天。四我無樂無苦，死後有想，在第四靜慮以上乃至有頂。」上明有想十六論訖。

Regarding the five classes of views concerning the future limit (aparānta), there are sixteen theories of conscious survival (saññīvāda). The sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi and the ninth fascicle of the Xianyang shengjiao lun state: "The first four views are established on the basis of three views: If one posits that the vital principle (jīva) is identical to the body, one posits that the self has form. If one posits that the vital principle is distinct from the body, one posits that the self is formless. If one posits that the self is both pervasive, non-dual, and devoid of deficiency, one posits that the self is both having form and formless. If, in order to remedy this, one forms an attachment regarding this meaning through different phrasing, one posits that the self is neither having form nor formless." This means that the heaven of non-perception (asaṃjñisattva) is called "non-perception"; the Peak of Existence (bhavāgra) is called "neither-perception-nor-non-perception"; while the lower three formless realms, the form realm excluding [the heaven of] non-perception, and the remaining desire realm, etc., are all called "conscious." The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "Depending on the view that the vital principle is identical to the body, one posits that the self has form, and that after death it has form and perception, or is without perception, or is neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient. Depending on the view that the vital principle is distinct from the body, one posits that the self is formless, and that after death it has perception, or is without perception, or is neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient. Depending on the view that this total self is pervasive, non-dual, and devoid of deficiency, one states that after death the self is both having form and formless and has perception, or is neither having form nor formless and has perception; and it is likewise for non-perception and neither-perception-nor-non-perception." The meaning above is that for the initial four propositions of positing [the self as] having form, etc., after death, having perception is identical with the initial four propositions of post-mortem non-perception and post-mortem neither-perception-nor-non-perception, differing only in the rebirth state. In the present life they are all identical, because these three kinds of tetralemmas are established upon the three views: that the vital principle is identical to the body, that it is distinct from the body, and that it is non-dual and devoid of deficiency. Clinging to form as the self is called "the vital principle is identical to the body." Clinging to the formless as the self is called "the vital principle is distinct from the body." Doubly clinging to both form and the formless as the self is called "non-dual and devoid of deficiency." Regarding the proposition that the self has form, etc.: in the lower three planes of the formless realm, if one says there is form, it also encompasses them; if one says there is no form, then it does not extend to them. The four propositions concerning post-mortem perception are: (1) clinging that the self has form and has perception after death; (2) clinging that the self is formless and has perception after death; (3) clinging that the self is both having form and formless and has perception after death; (4) clinging that the self is neither having form nor formless and has perception after death. Next are the four propositions regarding finitude and so forth. The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "One who posits that the self has form says either that it is limited or that it is immeasurable. One should know that one who posits that the self is formless is also like this: it is also limited or immeasurable, because the phenomena such as bases, objective supports, and operations have smallness and greatness." Relying on the third view—that this totality is pervasive, non-dual, and devoid of deficiency—these two theories of the self are established as two theories: (1) positing that the self is limited, and (2) positing that the self is immeasurable. Due to the differences among these four theories of the self, the four propositions of the self having finitude, etc., are spoken of, assigned accordingly in sequence. Thus the sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: "If one sees small form and small formless, one posits finitude. If one sees both of them as immeasurable, one posits infinitude. If, seeing comprehensively, the part of form is small and the part of formless is immeasurable, or the part of form is immeasurable and the part of formless is small, one posits that it is both finite and infinite. If, in order to remedy this, one forms an attachment solely through different phrasing without different meaning, one posits that it is neither finite nor infinite." Examining the meaning of this passage, the sixth fascicle is very accurate. The assignment in the eighty-seventh fascicle according to sequence follows the order of meaning rather than phrasing: clinging to form and the formless as limited is called finite; clinging to form and the formless as immeasurable is called infinite; mutually clinging to more and less constitutes the "both" proposition; refuting these constitutes the fourth. This agrees with the preceding text. With these four types of rebirth into conscious realms after death, this is called the second set of four propositions on finitude, etc. As for the next four propositions, the sixth fascicle lists their names but does not distinguish their locations. The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "(1) Clinging that the self has a single perception, which is in the sphere of infinite space and the sphere of infinite consciousness; the sphere of nothingness is not mentioned because of textual abbreviation, and also because it has a single perception, which agrees with the Vibhāṣā." Because the Yogācārabhūmi correlates immeasurable perception with the preceding single perception, it abbreviates and does not discuss the sphere of nothingness; for it is not an immeasurable perception, yet it is a single perception. "(2) Clinging that the self has manifold perceptions, which refers to the lower realms. (3) Clinging that the self has limited thinking, which refers to the lower realms. (4) Clinging that the self has immeasurable perception, which refers to the spheres of space and consciousness." The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "According to the two perceptions as spoken, they should be understood in their proper sequence: speaking of the self as having limited perception and having immeasurable perception—this matches the sequence in reverse according to the doctrinal principle." However, the Vibhāṣā states: "Clinging to limited form as one's perception or as one's own, such that the self is unified with it, is called limited perception; this exists in the desire and form realms, excluding the heaven of non-perception. As for immeasurable perception, it refers to clinging to immeasurable form as one's perception or as one's own, etc.," as explained at length previously. The intent of the Yogācārabhūmi is that the aforementioned state of single perception contains immeasurable perception, and the state of manifold perceptions contains this limited perception; thus there is also no contradiction. As for the next four propositions: (1) my self has exclusively pleasure and has perception after death—the sixth fascicle gives the name without the location; the eighty-seventh fascicle states that it refers to the lower three dhyānas; (2) my self has exclusively suffering and has perception after death, which refers to Naraka; (3) my self has both pleasure and suffering and has perception after death, located among pretas, animals, humans, and gods of the desire realm; (4) my self has neither pleasure nor suffering and has perception after death, located from the fourth dhyāna upwards to the Peak of Existence. This concludes the explanation above of the sixteen theories of conscious survival.