大乘法苑義林章 4.23

4.23

Regarding the five classes of views concerning the future limit (aparānta), there are sixteen theories of conscious survival (saññīvāda). The sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi and the ninth fascicle of the Xianyang shengjiao lun state: "The first four views are established on the basis of three views: If one posits that the vital principle (jīva) is identical to the body, one posits that the self has form. If one posits that the vital principle is distinct from the body, one posits that the self is formless. If one posits that the self is both pervasive, non-dual, and devoid of deficiency, one posits that the self is both having form and formless. If, in order to remedy this, one forms an attachment regarding this meaning through different phrasing, one posits that the self is neither having form nor formless." This means that the heaven of non-perception (asaṃjñisattva) is called "non-perception"; the Peak of Existence (bhavāgra) is called "neither-perception-nor-non-perception"; while the lower three formless realms, the form realm excluding [the heaven of] non-perception, and the remaining desire realm, etc., are all called "conscious." The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "Depending on the view that the vital principle is identical to the body, one posits that the self has form, and that after death it has form and perception, or is without perception, or is neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient. Depending on the view that the vital principle is distinct from the body, one posits that the self is formless, and that after death it has perception, or is without perception, or is neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient. Depending on the view that this total self is pervasive, non-dual, and devoid of deficiency, one states that after death the self is both having form and formless and has perception, or is neither having form nor formless and has perception; and it is likewise for non-perception and neither-perception-nor-non-perception." The meaning above is that for the initial four propositions of positing [the self as] having form, etc., after death, having perception is identical with the initial four propositions of post-mortem non-perception and post-mortem neither-perception-nor-non-perception, differing only in the rebirth state. In the present life they are all identical, because these three kinds of tetralemmas are established upon the three views: that the vital principle is identical to the body, that it is distinct from the body, and that it is non-dual and devoid of deficiency. Clinging to form as the self is called "the vital principle is identical to the body." Clinging to the formless as the self is called "the vital principle is distinct from the body." Doubly clinging to both form and the formless as the self is called "non-dual and devoid of deficiency." Regarding the proposition that the self has form, etc.: in the lower three planes of the formless realm, if one says there is form, it also encompasses them; if one says there is no form, then it does not extend to them. The four propositions concerning post-mortem perception are: (1) clinging that the self has form and has perception after death; (2) clinging that the self is formless and has perception after death; (3) clinging that the self is both having form and formless and has perception after death; (4) clinging that the self is neither having form nor formless and has perception after death. Next are the four propositions regarding finitude and so forth. The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "One who posits that the self has form says either that it is limited or that it is immeasurable. One should know that one who posits that the self is formless is also like this: it is also limited or immeasurable, because the phenomena such as bases, objective supports, and operations have smallness and greatness." Relying on the third view—that this totality is pervasive, non-dual, and devoid of deficiency—these two theories of the self are established as two theories: (1) positing that the self is limited, and (2) positing that the self is immeasurable. Due to the differences among these four theories of the self, the four propositions of the self having finitude, etc., are spoken of, assigned accordingly in sequence. Thus the sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: "If one sees small form and small formless, one posits finitude. If one sees both of them as immeasurable, one posits infinitude. If, seeing comprehensively, the part of form is small and the part of formless is immeasurable, or the part of form is immeasurable and the part of formless is small, one posits that it is both finite and infinite. If, in order to remedy this, one forms an attachment solely through different phrasing without different meaning, one posits that it is neither finite nor infinite." Examining the meaning of this passage, the sixth fascicle is very accurate. The assignment in the eighty-seventh fascicle according to sequence follows the order of meaning rather than phrasing: clinging to form and the formless as limited is called finite; clinging to form and the formless as immeasurable is called infinite; mutually clinging to more and less constitutes the "both" proposition; refuting these constitutes the fourth. This agrees with the preceding text. With these four types of rebirth into conscious realms after death, this is called the second set of four propositions on finitude, etc. As for the next four propositions, the sixth fascicle lists their names but does not distinguish their locations. The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "(1) Clinging that the self has a single perception, which is in the sphere of infinite space and the sphere of infinite consciousness; the sphere of nothingness is not mentioned because of textual abbreviation, and also because it has a single perception, which agrees with the Vibhāṣā." Because the Yogācārabhūmi correlates immeasurable perception with the preceding single perception, it abbreviates and does not discuss the sphere of nothingness; for it is not an immeasurable perception, yet it is a single perception. "(2) Clinging that the self has manifold perceptions, which refers to the lower realms. (3) Clinging that the self has limited thinking, which refers to the lower realms. (4) Clinging that the self has immeasurable perception, which refers to the spheres of space and consciousness." The eighty-seventh fascicle states: "According to the two perceptions as spoken, they should be understood in their proper sequence: speaking of the self as having limited perception and having immeasurable perception—this matches the sequence in reverse according to the doctrinal principle." However, the Vibhāṣā states: "Clinging to limited form as one's perception or as one's own, such that the self is unified with it, is called limited perception; this exists in the desire and form realms, excluding the heaven of non-perception. As for immeasurable perception, it refers to clinging to immeasurable form as one's perception or as one's own, etc.," as explained at length previously. The intent of the Yogācārabhūmi is that the aforementioned state of single perception contains immeasurable perception, and the state of manifold perceptions contains this limited perception; thus there is also no contradiction. As for the next four propositions: (1) my self has exclusively pleasure and has perception after death—the sixth fascicle gives the name without the location; the eighty-seventh fascicle states that it refers to the lower three dhyānas; (2) my self has exclusively suffering and has perception after death, which refers to Naraka; (3) my self has both pleasure and suffering and has perception after death, located among pretas, animals, humans, and gods of the desire realm; (4) my self has neither pleasure nor suffering and has perception after death, located from the fourth dhyāna upwards to the Peak of Existence. This concludes the explanation above of the sixteen theories of conscious survival.