大乘法苑義林章 4.22

4.22

Regarding distinguishing their specific names and characteristics: *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 6, and *Xianyang*, fascicle 9, state: “It should be understood that here those who speculate on the pūrvānta either rely on the lower, intermediate, or higher dhyānas to give rise to the recollection of past abodes (pūrvenivāsānusmṛti); because they are not skilled in dependent origination, regarding past conditioned phenomena they merely remember them without knowing them as they truly are, and positing the past as the pūrvānta, they generate eternalism. Or, relying on the divine eye (divyacakṣus), they posit the present world as the pūrvānta; not knowing as it truly is the moment-by-moment arising, ceasing, and flux of conditioned phenomena, and seeing the flux and continuity of consciousnesses, without interruption from this world to that world, they generate eternalism.” Fascicle 87 states: “Those operating in association with the recollection of past abodes refers to those who, among the three theories of eternalism speculating on the pūrvānta, [arise] due to the distinctions of lower, intermediate, and higher purity.” Now observing the treatise’s intent, because the recollection of past abodes relying on dhyāna has lower, intermediate, and higher [degrees], it is divided into the first three: first, remembering twenty kalpas of cosmic formation and disintegration; second, remembering forty kalpas of cosmic formation and disintegration; third, remembering eighty kalpas of cosmic formation and disintegration. Because the recollection of past abodes has three grades, their views have near and far [ranges]. An *iṣīkā* is a Sāṃkhya metaphor, stating that all phenomena are eternal and that the world's hiding and manifesting are not its destruction; thus they posit it as eternal. Because it speaks of what is seen by the three grades of dhyāna, the recollection of past abodes does not take sixty kalpas as an object, and thus there are only three. *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 6, etc., also states: “Or, relying on the divine eye, they posit the present world as the pūrvānta. Not knowing as it truly is the moment-by-moment arising, ceasing, and flux of conditioned phenomena, and seeing the flux and continuity of consciousnesses, without interruption from this world to that world, they generate eternalism.” The meaning here shows that the divine eye sees the flux of sentient beings’ consciousnesses dying here and being born there, yet without knowing truly the moment-by-moment arising, ceasing, and flux of conditioned phenomena, they cling to them as eternal; this is the fourth [form of] eternalism. Considering this meaning broadly, although the first three views agree with the *Āgama*, the fourth does not; there, agile intellect (javana-prajñā) posits all as eternal, not by means of the divine eye. Fascicle 87 also says: “Because it operates in association with the divine eye.” Here, the first three together correspond to the first in the *Vibhāṣā*; this fourth is its third; the remaining two [forms of] eternalism in that text are absent here. Fascicle 87 states: “These four [forms of] eternalism all rely on dhyāna, not on scattered [thought].” Yet the *Vibhāṣā* states: “The first observes kalpas; the second observes births; the third observes the present dying here and being born there; the fourth relies on vitarka and vicāra.” If someone were to say: these former three are precisely what the *Yogācārabhūmi* calls relying on the three kinds of dhyāna—lower, intermediate, and higher—even so, there would be the fault of contradicting [the mention of] the divine eye, for *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 6, states: “The fourth relies on what is seen by the divine eye, not on vitarka and vicāra.” As for the four theories of partial eternalism: First, one dies from the Brahmā heaven and comes to be born here; obtaining the supernormal power of recollecting past abodes, one observes where one previously came from and forms this clinging: “We were all emanated by the Brahmā king. The Brahmā king is eternal, because his beginning and end are not seen. We are impermanent, because we see ourselves now coming here.” The statement in the theories of eternalism that “or seeing that the Brahmā king establishes things at will” refers precisely to this view. Second, one hears that the Brahmā king holds such a view: “The primary elements are eternal; mind and the like are impermanent,” or the reverse of this. Those sharing his tolerance may abide in the Brahmā realm, or hear such a principle through successive transmission. [They think:] “Taking the Brahmā king as authoritative, I believe what he says; therefore, one part of the world is eternal.” The statement in the theories of eternalism that “or seeing the transformation of the four primary elements, or seeing the transformation of the consciousnesses”—transformation meaning impermanence—refers precisely to this view. Third, there are those who previously died from the heaven of debauched by play (krīḍāpradūṣika) and came to be born here; obtaining supernormal powers, they generate the clinging: “Those devas there who did not over-indulge in play are eternal there; we are impermanent.” Fourth, there are those who previously died from the heaven of corrupted by mind (manaḥpradūṣika) and came to be born here; obtaining supernormal powers, they generate the clinging: “Those devas there who were not overly enraged are eternal there; we are impermanent.” According to *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 5, on the phrase “can die by self-harm and not by others,” these latter two heavens belong only to the upper four heavens of the desire realm dwelling in empty space, because the lower two heavens can be harmed by others. Regarding these four views, fascicle 87 states: “Because they all rely on dhyāna to know the past, they are called [speculations on] the pūrvānta.” Although the four kinds in the *Vibhāṣā* are the same as these, the latter two heavens differ. That text has two explanations: one says they abide on the terraces of Mount Meru; the other says they are the Trāyastriṃśa heaven. These four arise from clinging to Great Brahmā, the primary elements, mind, debauched by play, or enraged mind. The *Āgama* text states that there is no second [view among these], the remaining three being the same as these; it adds the agile worldly intellect, and what is posited by the other three is half-eternal and [half-]impermanent. Although this is stated, its characteristics remain difficult to discern. Not only do the tenets differ and the meanings diverge, but it is also exceedingly difficult to grasp the idea. As for the two theories of causelessness: First, dying from the heaven of non-conception (asaṃjñisattva) and coming to be born here, one obtains the supernormal power of recollecting past abodes; unable to remember all the states prior to the emergence of mind there, one clings to the idea that phenomena arise originally without existing: “Just as I was originally non-existent and then born, so too must all phenomena originally be non-existent and arise.” One then clings to the view that self and the world arise without a cause. Second, due to reasoning, not remembering previous lives, one forms such a clinging: “They arise without a cause,” and so on at length. Therefore, *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 7, states: “The theories of causelessness refer to the two distinctions of relying on dhyāna and relying on reasoning: seeing that causes and conditions are empty and devoid of karmic fruition—a great wind suddenly rises and then abruptly becomes calm again; a raging river floods and all at once dries up into emptiness—they thus form this clinging.” The *Āgama* and others agree. As for the four theories of the finite and the infinite: *Yogācārabhūmi*, fascicle 7, and *Xianyang*, fascicle 9, state: “First, if when seeking the limit of the world based on the cutting off of boundaries, one recollects the kalpa of disintegration, one gives rise to the conception of the world as finite, because after the world disintegrates, bordering on the empty kalpa, there is a boundary. Second, if one recollects the kalpa of formation, one gives rise to the conception of the world as infinite, because being far removed from the kalpa of disintegration, one sees no boundary. Third, if when seeking the limit of the world based on spatial extent, one finds nothing further below Avīci, and nothing further above the fourth dhyāna, yet finds no boundary in any transverse direction, one gives rise to the conception of finite above and below, and the conception of infinite in the transverse directions. Fourth, if to counter this clinging, merely relying on different phrasings without difference in meaning, one gives rise to the conception of the world as neither finite nor infinite.” The first two views arise by taking the past as an object; the latter two arise by taking the present as an object; in relation to the future, they are called theories of the finite and infinite of the pūrvānta. It states that all four arise relying on dhyāna. Fascicle 87 also states: “Operating in association with the recollection of past abodes means that in the four theories of the finite and infinite, by their recollecting the means of manifestation of the receptacle world and the worlds of formation and disintegration, when they recollect the phases of the kalpa of formation, they then generate four kinds of deluded conceptions: First, if one exclusively recollects vertically, down to the bottom of the Avīci hell and up to the top of the fourth dhyāna, recollecting such measured boundaries, one abides in the conception of the world as finite. Second, if one exclusively recollects transversely without boundary, one abides in the conception of the world as infinite. Third, if one recollects both operating together, one abides in the conception of the world as both [finite and infinite]. Fourth, when one recollects the phases of the kalpa of disintegration, one then generates the conception of neither finite nor infinite, because no receptacle world is to be found.” Although the two passages explain two varieties of these views, because they have these modes of apprehension, they are collectively called theories of the finite and infinite. The *Āgama* states that this fourth view relies on agile intellect. The four kinds in the *Yogācārabhūmi* all arise relying on the dhyāna-based knowledge of past abodes. However, in the *Vibhāṣā*: First, seeing with the divine eye down to the hells and up to the first dhyāna, one clings to the self as entirely pervading therein, and then reflects: “Beyond this, if there were a self, I should be able to see it; therefore I know it is finite.” Second, clinging to what is transversely seen as boundless, just as before, one gives rise to the conception of the infinite. Third, relying on the divine eye and the supernormal power of psychic manifestation, seeing below and above at the near and far distances as in the first [view], one projects one’s body transversely and finds no boundary; one gives rise to the conception of finite above and below, and infinite transversely. Fourth, the reverse of this. All four take the present as an object; in relation to the future, they are called [views of] the pūrvānta. Only the fourth view differs from fascicle 87, while the other three views agree; however, what is seen above also has near and far [distances]. Yet the *Āgama* speaks in general terms that, having obtained concentration, one gives rise to the clinging to the finite or infinite, without specifying the demarcations taken as objects to give rise to the clinging. Its third view agrees with the *Vibhāṣā*. Its fourth view gives rise to this clinging relying on agile intellect, and also does not state what object it arises from; hence it cannot be relied upon. As for the four theories of amarāvikkhepa: Fascicle 87 states: “Pure devas are of two kinds: first, not well-purified; second, well-purified. Entering only mundane concentration is called not well-purified, because one has not comprehended the truths and the mind is not liberated. If one realizes the concentration of internal phenomena, it is called well-purified, because one has comprehended the truths and the mind is well-liberated. Non-confusion is also twofold: first, signless and without discrimination; second, having signs and with discrimination. The former is a well-purified deva; the latter is a not well-purified deva. The former pure deva operates without confusion regarding its own deathless state, and is therefore called the deathless and unconfused. As for the latter unpurified deva, if someone questions it based on the deathless and unconfused, it will resort to other matters to evade with confusion, because it is not skilled in the concentration of mind regarding the truths and signlessness. Having first given rise to thought and considered: ‘Since we are called deathless and unconfused, there are also other deathless and unconfused ones who have already attained skill in the noble truths and the signless concentration, whose achieved virtues are superior to ours. If they question me regarding these, if I answer, I might answer erroneously, deny what truly exists, or affirm what does not exist.’ Having seen such faults in answering, they reflect: ‘I should not answer any question that is posed.’” Observing the intent of this text, the deva served is called deathless and also unconfused; it should be called “deathless and unconfused” (amarāvikkhepa). The phrasing “amarāvikkhepa” (deathless evasion / confusion) means the single negative particle applies across both words, meaning “deathless and not confused.” Alternatively, they claim of themselves: “One who gives this unconfused answer will be born in the heaven of the deathless.” Now, censuring them, it is called “confusion/evasion.” Furthermore, the noble ones are truly the deathless, pure, and unconfused devas. These serve as the questioners. Now, answering the inquiries of these devas is called [the practice of] the deathless and unconfused devas. The intent of fascicle 87 is that they do not want others to perceive their ignorance thereby, and consequently mock them, so they take this to be an answer. Moreover, those who practice deceit consider: “Not all secrets of our pure devas are permitted to be explained, namely, one’s own realization and the path of purity”; therefore they contrive evasive words. Moreover, harboring fear, they do not answer: “Lest my inferiority and dullness become known to others, and due to this condition I fail to attain liberation,” taking this as a chamber to settle themselves peacefully. That is, taking fear and non-liberation as their chamber, they settle themselves therein. Moreover, there are those who are foolish and dull, exclusively cultivating the practice of śamatha, who cannot speak evasively, but merely reflect: “Whenever someone comes to question me, I shall cross-examine them; whatever they answer, I shall endorse and conform to all of it without subtraction.” Here, the four are: first, fear of ignorance; second, practicing deceit; third, harboring fear of not attaining liberation; fourth, being foolish and dull. In the *Discussion of the Sixteen Heterodoxies*, it states: “When someone comes to those non-Buddhists to ask about the good and non-good based on the path to superior rebirth (abhyudaya), or to ask about the four noble truths based on the path to definitive excellence (niḥśreyasa), those who claim to be deathless and unconfused, in whatever place, when questioned without confusion based on the deathless pure devas, evade their questions with confusing words, resort to other matters as an expedient to avoid them, or merely shift according to the words of the questioner.” Among these, the first’s awareness is not yet awakened. Its second alternative explanation states: “Because they fear lying and fear that others will know of their lack of wisdom, they do not clearly answer: ‘I do not know.’” This means: though by nature possessing consciousness, their awareness is not yet awakened. If they say “I understand,” it is a lie. If they say “I do not understand,” others will know they know nothing at all; hence they answer with confusion. Among these, the second gives rise to excessive pride (adhimāna) regarding the teachings realized. The second alternative explanation states: “Having not yet attained fearlessness regarding their own realization, dreading being questioned by others, fearing lying, and fearing false views, they do not clearly say: ‘I have realization.’ Fearing that others will ask about their realization, because they lack fearlessness they cannot answer truly; answering would become a false view, while not answering would become a lie.” Among these, the third has an awakened awareness, but is not yet decisive. The second alternative explanation states: “Because they fear false views and lying, and dread being questioned by others, they do not clearly say: ‘I am not decisive.’” This shows that although they have attained a little, their mind is not decisive; answering would be a false view, and not answering would be a lie; since they already have some knowledge, they answer with confusion. These three kinds contrive other matters to speak with confusion. Among these, the fourth is frail, foolish, and dull. The second alternative explanation states: “Merely dreading being questioned by others, understanding neither the path to superior rebirth nor the path to definitive excellence, and not skilled even in mundane letters, yet not clearly saying: ‘I am foolish and dull,’ they merely shift along with the words of the questioner.” This means that due to foolishness they comprehend nothing at all, so they respond to the former by reversing the question. This differs entirely from the *Āgama*, where the four distinctions are made according to four questions: first, asking whether the world has retribution or not; second, asking whether there is an afterlife or not; third, asking about good and non-good; fourth, being oneself foolish and dull, not knowing when questioned by others. The *Vibhāṣā* states: “First, fear of lying; second, fear of false views; third, fear of ignorance; fourth, fear of foolishness; hence answering with confusion forms four distinctions.” The above five classes are views of the pūrvānta.