能顯中邊慧日論 2.18

2.18

An opinion states: Citing the sūtra, "all sentient beings have various dhātus from beginningless time," to prove that there are five distinct gotras by dharmatā is illogical. That [sūtra] speaks of each individual sentient being possessing various dhātus, like the saptaparṇa tree; it does not say that all sentient beings have many individual differences. The word "dharmatā" here refers to their original nature; it is not the various dhātus known through the power of gotra. [We reply:] This is illogical. If one accepts that each individual being possesses various dhātus, and that each dhātu is similar like [the leaves of] a saptaparṇa tree, would each individual being realize the fruits of all three vehicles, [possess] the twenty-seven sages and worthies, excessive greed, food portions, and having versus lacking gotra? If so, why is it said that one who has the śrāvaka-gotra attains the śrāvaka path, and so forth? For someone of excessive greed, the contemplation of impurity is taught, and there are distinctions between sharp and dull faculties: the contradiction between having and lacking, the contradiction between dull and sharp, the contradiction between gradual and sudden, and definitive contradictions—how could a single being universally possess and mature all of them? Furthermore, did Bodhisattva Maitreya, master Asaṅga, and others fail to understand the sūtra texts, so that whenever proving the five distinct gotras, they all cited those teachings? When the Upāsakaśīlasūtra speaks of "teaching living together to cause transformation," this is said in reference to aniyata-gotra, not niyata-gotra. In the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, among the indeterminate vehicles, it is said that there are those who advance to the Great, but in the small vehicle there are none; the Mahāprajñāpāramitā is the same. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: "The Yogācārabhūmi merely says that from beginningless time there are those who have and do not have gotra; it does not speak of dharmatā or of abiding in the original nature (prakṛtistha), so it is not definitive proof." [We reply:] That is not so; this phrase "beginningless" precisely means dharmatā and prakṛtistha. How is this known? The Buddhagotraśāstra says: "Being without beginning means naturally possessing great compassion," and so forth. Being without beginning means beginningless; naturally possessing means dharmatā, and so forth. Furthermore, immediately below it cites four kinds of bīja, the first of which is prakṛtistha. How can one say that it does not speak of prakṛtistha and is not definitive proof? Furthermore, [the opponent] says: "The Yogācārabhūmi says: 'There are four kinds of bījas: first, prakṛtistha; second, arisen from prior practice; third, cultivable, meaning possessing the dharma of nirvāṇa; fourth, uncultivable, meaning lacking the dharma of nirvāṇa.' The five gotras are differentiated based on the bījas of prior practice." [We reply:] This also is not so. Since it establishes first, prakṛtistha, and second, arisen from prior practice, if one says that the five gotras are differentiated based on the bījas of prior practice, there would only be three kinds; how could it speak of four? If it collectively refers to prior practice, why mention the original nature? Moreover, this contradicts the statement in the twenty-first [fascicle] of the Śrāvakabhūmi, as cited earlier. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: "When the Yogācārabhūmi says, 'For those who possess the dharma of parinirvāṇa, all bījas are complete,' this means that possessing the four kinds is called 'complete'; for those who lack the dharma of nirvāṇa, they lack the bījas of the three vehicles, possessing only prakṛtistha bījas, prior practice bījas, and uncultivable bījas, while lacking cultivable bījas, which is called 'incomplete'." [We reply:] This too is not so. In contrast to the distinction between having and lacking, the latter two kinds are established. Since the two kinds are mutually exclusive, how could one say that having four kinds is called "complete"? Moreover, if one accepts that there are prakṛtistha and prior practice bījas, then they can be cultivated; if not, in reference to what could prior practice be called uncultivable? Furthermore, [the opponent] says: "It is only due to the differences of newly practiced mature persons; it does not speak of differences in the presence or absence of prakṛtistha bījas, nor does it speak of dharmatā. If one claims there is teaching [for this], please point out the text." [We reply:] Although this was clarified several times before, now I will cite it briefly again. They themselves cited that there are four kinds of bījas, the first of which is the original nature. How can they say that it does not speak of prakṛtistha bījas? Furthermore, at the beginning of the Śrāvakabhūmi, on the essence and establishment of gotra, it simply states that they are transmitted successively from beginningless time and acquired by dharmatā. This agrees with the Upāsakaśīlasūtra's statement that the original nature means the skandhas, dhātus, and six āyatanas continuing in sequence, without beginning and without end, as the dharmatā is naturally so. "The dharmatā being naturally so" is precisely dharmatā. In the gotras of both śrāvakas and bodhisattvas, it is identically said that they are acquired by dharmatā from beginningless time. Why do you uniquely distrust the text of the Śrāvakabhūmi, calling it a lesser teaching? Furthermore, in the chapter on supramundane purity at the beginning of the Liang Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the right view of the two vehicles is first able to arise only by taking hearing the sounds of others and one's own reflection as the adhipatipratyaya; therefore, the gotras of the three vehicles are originally existent from beginningless time. The Buddhabhūmiśāstra says: "Due to dharmatā, all sentient beings have five gotras from beginningless time." Furthermore, based on the Yogācārabhūmi and the Prakaraṇāryavācā, the establishment of gotra is in all cases grounded in the original nature. Having seen the textual teachings, one should believe and accept them. If there were only abhinava-vāsanā, from what without a bīja could the present active perfuming cause arise? If they arose without a bīja, this would contradict the first fascicle of the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatārasūtra: "Mahāmati! If one further says that [dharmas] arise from the conjunction of three conditions—lack of bījas, presence of bījas, and consciousness—then turtles should grow hair, and sand should yield oil." If they arise from causes, this reverts to distinctions in their original nature.