能顯中邊慧日論 2
English (machine translation) 2
- Language
- English
Contents
- 2.12 — 4 parts
2.1
Composed by the Bhikṣu Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou
2.2
Chapter Two: Adducing Mirrors to Eliminate Errors
2.3
Error 1: Explaining and proclaiming the five gotras; Error 2: Differences in gotra; Error 3: The nature abiding by original nature; Error 4: The five gotras being solely direct; Error 5: Tathatā being the seed; Error 6: Applying the scriptures to dharmatā; Error 7: Sāsrava giving birth to anāsrava; Error 8: The sequence of teaching the doctrines; Error 9: Prolonging life not being definitive; Error 10: Using falsehood to interpret the scriptures; Error 11: Resolving external objections.
2.4
Error 1: Explaining and proclaiming the five gotras
2.5
Another opinion states: If people are at the same time but of different capacities, real extinction and lack of gotra are taught first, and non-extinction and possession of gotra are taught later; if people are different but the time is the same, the sequence is not fixed. However, that one portion lacks gotra and that the dviyāna undergo real extinction is definitely the Hīnayāna; that all possess the buddhadhātu and the dviyāna have no extinction is the Mahāyāna teaching. This is not so; it errs regarding sequence. Why is this? If it is claimed that when people are at the same time but different, real extinction and lack of gotra are taught first, based on what kind of person is this said? If it is based on the bodhisattva, this is illogical. If it is based on the śrāvaka, what teaching comes first and what later? If the Hīnayāna teachings first taught real extinction and lack of gotra, the various Mahāyāna scriptures also teach real extinction and that one portion lacks gotra. If it concerns Mahāyāna sūtras, how can one determine which sūtras were first taught for the Hīnayāna and which were first taught for the Mahāyāna? If the Prajñāpāramitā, Saṃdhinirmocana, and so forth were first taught for the Hīnayāna: the Prajñāpāramitā extensively clarifies paramārtha-śūnyatā, the Saṃdhinirmocana extensively clarifies the six pāramitās and the three natures; the Prajñāpāramitā speaks of the emptiness of sentient beings, and the Saṃdhinirmocana speaks of emptiness, both resolving into the three natures, thus already clarifying that there is a gotra. How then can one say that lack of gotra was taught first, and possession of gotra was taught later? Furthermore, they themselves hold tathatā and the mind to be the nature of the pradhāna-hetu; could there be an earlier Mahāyāna teaching or Mahāyāna master establishing that tathatā and mind do not pervade sentient beings? If they claim it is based on the gotras of the pañcayāna, they also themselves hold that the five gotras exist later and are not fundamental dharmatā. Following this, prior to having established the five gotras, those stages would still be those of a portion lacking gotra. Since the earlier teaching is identical to this, why would it not be definitive? If they say: 'Although present in the later teaching, it is presently absent and will definitely be present in the future, and therefore it is not the same as the former': this is not so. As the Nirvāṇa Sūtra and the Upāsaka-śīla Sūtra say: 'There is no curd in milk, and no gold in rock'—is this saying that the cause is absent, or that the fruit does not exist? If the causal nature were absent, and yet could later serve as a cause, this would be illogical. It would also follow that everything could arise from everything, because what lacks a causal nature would be its cause. If they say the fruit is absent, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna accept that the fruit is absent in the cause; what difference is there between before and after? Why alone say that the earlier teaching that one portion lacks gotra is Hīnayāna and does not definitively reveal the triyāna? One can understand this by looking at their delusion. Moreover, they say: that one portion lacks gotra and that the dviyāna undergo real extinction is definitely Hīnayāna; that all have buddhadhātu and the dviyāna have no extinction is the Mahāyāna doctrine. This is not so, because it mistakenly defines the Great and Lesser Vehicles. How so? If that one portion lacks gotra is called Hīnayāna, and that all possess the nature is called Mahāyāna, then the Vibhajyavādin hold that all have the buddhadhātu, and the Sautrāntika and Ekavyāvahārika generally maintain there is no real extinction—should they all be Mahāyāna? Furthermore, because the Hīnayāna speaks of real extinction and the lack of nature among living beings, and the Mahāyāna also speaks thus, they claim that according to the compliant Hīnayāna, it also speaks of all having the nature and the dviyāna having no extinction. Moreover, in the Buddhagotraśāstra, the Mahāsāṃghika hold that all have the buddhadhātu, which is paramārtha-śūnyatā; if the Mahāyāna is identical to them, it should be an accommodated teaching. Furthermore, that the Mahāyāna only teaches six consciousnesses is an accommodated teaching, and that the Nirvāṇa Sūtra also only teaches six is also an accommodated teaching. Since this is an accommodated teaching, all possessing the nature should also be accepted as an accommodated teaching; since this is not the case, how could that be so? Therefore, one knows that one cannot say that being identical to Hīnayāna makes them all accommodated teachings. As the Nyāyamukha says: 'Non-Buddhists also accept the six sense bases, objects, and consciousnesses; if the Buddha's Dharma is identical to them, is it thereby a false teaching?' Moreover, they say: 'Although the Great and Lesser Vehicles differ, neither speaks of having matured conditioned, genuine anāsrava [dharmas] prior to the path of seeing.' This too is not so. How could one not accept that the holy beings of the dviyāna turn their minds toward the Mahāyāna, and instead hold that they definitely do not mature conditioned anāsrava [dharmas] before the path of seeing? Furthermore, they say: 'In the Hīnayāna it is said that the initial anāsrava mind has no sabhāga-hetu, and is called a momentary dharma. Thus we know that the Great and Lesser Vehicles both teach that in the stage of an ordinary being, one has not yet matured conditioned, genuine anāsrava dharmas.' This too is not so. Why? In the Buddhagotraśāstra, the masters of the Vibhajyavādin do not believe in the absence of gotra; in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, the masters of the Sautrāntika maintain that holy dharmas are achieved in the stage of an ordinary being; the Yogācārabhūmi states that beings in the hells achieve the three anāsrava indriyas; in the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, anāsrava impressions are not momentary dharmas; and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that they arise from sabhāga-hetu. Why do they solely believe the Sarvāstivādin masters who hold that the anāsrava mind has no sabhāga-hetu, while not believing the Sautrāntika, Vibhajyavādin, and the Yogācārabhūmi, which teach that anāsrava [dharmas] exist? However, when the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says that milk lacks the nature of curd, it is to refute their attachment to the fruit existing in the cause. Therefore that sūtra says: 'If an āmalaka seed possessed the nature of that tree, why do we not see a trunk of fifty feet standing?' The intent of the scripture from beginning to end is not found in just one place, and agrees with the Yogācārabhūmi and Prakaraṇāryavācā in refuting the doctrine that the effect exists within the cause. If this were not so, how could the sūtra say: 'If all sentient beings lacked the buddhadhātu, how could they attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi? It is because of the pradhāna-hetu that sentient beings are enabled to attain' anuttara[samyaksaṃbodhi], which is the so-called buddhadhātu? The earlier statement of lacking buddhadhātu referred to lacking the nature of the Buddha's fruit. That other statement of buddhadhātu as cause refers precisely to having the causal nature of a Buddha. If they say that prior to the path of seeing there are entirely no conditioned anāsrava bījas, is this not merely an offhand remark, unsupported by scriptures or treatises, which contradicts their own cited texts? If one drops a single drop of poqiu tree sap into milk, it immediately turns to curd. If curd were fundamentally present, why would it await conditions? The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is also like this. The meaning here is that just as milk is the cause, curd is the fruit. If curd already existed, why would milk await conditions? In the same way that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is like this: if one were already a Buddha, what need would there be to cultivate causes? Since it awaits the cultivation of causes, it is clear that a Buddha does not yet exist, not that it rejects the causal nature of the buddhadhātu. If one carefully examines the text and understands the intent, this meaning becomes evident. Furthermore, citing the Bodhisattva-upāsaka-śīla Sūtra, which says: 'The three kinds of bodhi have no fixed nature, up to: if one says there is definitely a nature, this is called an outsider': this refutes literal adherence to a fixedly existing nature, which is the fruit existing in the cause. This accords with the Nirvāṇa Sūtra saying: 'It is not existent like empty space, nor does it say it is nonexistent like the horns of a hare.' Moreover, if following the words one were not to accept that there is a nature, then even after the path of seeing there should also be no nature. In stating that the three bodhis have no fixed nature, it does not distinguish cause from fruit; how then can this be used to deny the existence of anāsrava bījas in the stage of an ordinary being? The remaining passages can be understood by analogy with this.
2.6
Error 2: Differences in gotra
2.7
There is an opinion: Tathatā of the dharmadhātu and the eighth consciousness are the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood. Because tathatā and the eighth consciousness are present in all sentient beings without exception, the teaching of a portion lacking the gotra is an expedient doctrine accommodated to capacity, not the definitive Mahāyāna teaching. Thus the Nirvāṇa, Laṅkāvatāra, and Ghanavyūha all teach both the storehouse consciousness and the tathāgatagarbha as the cause of all phenomena. The Nirvāṇa further says that the ultimate emptiness, capable of giving birth to wholesome phenomena, is the bīja. The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra and others also speak of this original nature. That only the dharmatā and not the mind is spoken of is because the principle possesses merits as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; conforming to it results in purity, while opposing it results in defilement. Hence, what is acquired through cultivation is called the secret nature, whereas the mind is not like this. Furthermore, although the principle also serves as the support for defiled phenomena and can give birth to wholesome and unwholesome phenomena, it does not possess passions numerous as the sands of the Ganges. This is also not correct. Where in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi or other Mahāyāna texts is it not accepted that tathatā and the mind pervade sentient beings, such that one would say that the absence [of gotra] in a portion [of sentient beings] is an accommodated doctrine? Moreover, if principle and mind are taken as the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood—namely, the bodhisattva gotra—why do you yourself cite the Upāsakaśīlasūtra: "The bodhisattva gotra is likewise: through the condition of wholesome karma one generates the bodhicitta, which is called the bodhisattva nature"? Could that principle and mind be called the bodhisattva gotra only after bodhicitta has been generated? If it is said that it is only called the buddhadhātu and not the bodhisattva gotra: if it is not even the bodhisattva gotra, how could it be called the buddhadhātu? If it is said that generating bodhicitta is called the bodhisattva gotra on the basis of adventitious nature, could its original nature not be called the bodhisattva gotra? Furthermore, according to fascicle twenty-six of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: "There are two kinds: first, the janaka-hetu; second, the jñāpaka-hetu. That which can give birth to phenomena is called the janaka-hetu; a lamp can reveal objects, hence it is called a jñāpaka-hetu. In relation to the arising of the fruit, the janaka-hetu is primary (pradhāna), while the jñāpaka-hetu is auxiliary (pratyaya)." Since principle is [held by you to be] the pradhāna-hetu as janaka-hetu, the subsequent text itself admits that it gives birth to things. When practitioners before the path of seeing cultivate the principle in conformity with tathatā, why does it not produce conditioned anāsrava [dharmas]? You then take sāsrava [dharmas] as anāsrava seeds. If tathatā cannot produce [them], how can it be called the pradhāna-hetu? Even if it were admitted to produce [them], what would be the use of the mind, since tathatā would already have produced [them]? Furthermore, if tathatā directly gives birth [to them] as a cause, this contradicts the Nirvāṇa and the Buddhagotraśāstra, as cited above and as shown in passages below. Even if in some places tathatā is spoken of as a seed, just as defilements are spoken of as the tathāgata seed, how could that word "seed" mean that it is the pradhāna-hetu for Buddhahood? Therefore we know it is a figurative expression based on tathatā. As the four great elements in relation to the matter derived from them, or the five seeds are called the true seeds. The seven characteristics in the Yogācārabhūmi exclude permanent dharmas from being causes; you do not realize that the meaning of vāsanā differs from that of bīja. Bringing in the meaning of vāsanā, although you understand the meaning of vāsanā in terms of the perfumer and the perfumed regarding seeds, you have not explained the seeds themselves. Furthermore, the second fascicle of the Buddhagotraśāstra asks: "Among these three natures, how many natures lack intrinsic nature yet can produce intrinsic nature? Answer: Only the imagined nature lacks intrinsic nature yet can produce intrinsic nature. Question: How many among these have intrinsic nature and can produce intrinsic nature? Answer: Only this single other-dependent nature. Question: How many among these three natures have intrinsic nature yet can produce non-existence? Answer: The true and actual nature alone can eliminate the other-dependent nature, making it non-existent." If tathatā were the pradhāna[-hetu] and the seed of all phenomena, why could it not produce, and why say it is only the other-dependent nature alone? Furthermore, if the substance of the eighth consciousness were the pradhāna-hetu of all phenomena, this would also contradict the meaning of seed in the Yogācārabhūmi, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and so on. The substance of the mind is one; if admitted to directly produce, how could it be said to lead to its own distinct fruit and to have a determinate nature? Moreover, how could a single cause universally give birth to wholesome, unwholesome, and other phenomena? If that were accepted, a single cause would lead to an unequal [creation]. Fascicle twenty-two of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "All phenomena have different causes and different fruits; neither does one cause produce all fruits, nor do all fruits arise from one cause." From this we know that cause and fruit have distinct designations. Because the ālayavijñāna possesses the three aspects, in its causal aspect it contains diverse dhātus; although not separate from the eighth consciousness, they are also not identical with the ālayavijñāna. By principle, substance and function, cause and fruit must be like this. Therefore the Abhidharmasūtra says: "All phenomena reside in the consciousness, and the consciousness likewise resides in phenomena; / they serve reciprocally as the nature of fruits, and are constantly called the nature of causes." It also says: "Because it gathers and stores all phenomena, it is the all-seed consciousness; / hence it is called ālayavijñāna; I have revealed it to the superior ones." From this we know that within the storehouse consciousness there are diverse dhātus, which are not identical with the eighth [consciousness] itself. As for the Avataṃsaka and Laṅkāvatāra speaking of the mind's defilement and purity being able to produce all things, this gathers function back into substance and subsumes the rest under consciousness, so there is no contradiction. Further, [they say]: "Although principle and mind are both janaka-hetus, principle is mostly spoken of because conforming to tathatā leads to purity, while opposing tathatā leads to defilement. The mind is not like this, hence it is not spoken of." This is also not correct. If the mind could not universally produce defilement and purity, it might be compared to tathatā and mind; since it universally produces them, why not speak of it? Moreover, awakening to consciousness results in purity, while being confused about consciousness results in defilement. How do their meanings differ, that one should speak mostly and one-sidedly of principle? Furthermore, if it is said that the mind does not give birth to merits resembling the sands of the Ganges, to what would tathatā serve as merits possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges? Further, [they say] that it lacks passions possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges. This is also not correct. Since there are eighty-four thousand gates of passion, conversely there are eighty-four thousand gates of merit. Since merits as numerous as the sands of the Ganges are spoken of, there are also faults as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. If tathatā is not all-pervading, it would lack passions possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges; but if you accept that tathatā is all-pervading, why would it lack the nature of passions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges? Further, [they say]: "The nature of the tathāgatagarbha and the eighth consciousness are like a mani jewel, which yields [things] according to conditions. Thus the lower fascicle of the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: 'Just as a mani jewel placed in the light of the sun or moon rains down respective objects according to suitability, so too the ālayavijñāna, joining with karmic impressions, manifests resembling various colors and pervades the world; if associated with anāsrava, it rains down all phenomena of merit.'" Then your own position that the eighth storehouse consciousness is the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood collapses. Why? The sūtra says that associated with anāsrava it rains down merits, clarifying that the eighth consciousness is not the pradhāna-hetu, because association with another nature is not its own nature. Following this, we know that upon reaching the first stage, the eighth consciousness gives birth to anāsrava wisdom through association with anāsrava, rather than sāsrava directly producing anāsrava. According to this sūtra passage, anāsrava exists originally and does not depend on abhinava-vāsanā. How can you say that the eighth consciousness is the pradhāna? Moreover, these associated anāsrava dharmas are also merits rained down from the eighth; before the eighth is simultaneous with anāsrava, how could these arise? One cannot say they arise from anāsrava seeds, because you yourself do not accept that before the path of seeing of the triyāna there are anāsrava dharmas. Further, [they say]: "Possessing confusion, the ālaya is impermanent; awakening to principle, the eighth is permanent like tathatā. Thus in the Ghanavyūhasūtra: 'Why is the ālayavijñāna the support for the vāsanās of phenomena such as manas, disturbed and muddied by the discriminating mind? If separated from discrimination, it becomes anāsrava, and anāsrava is permanent just like empty space.' The Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra says: 'The dharmakāya is permanent, while the nirmāṇakāya is impermanent.' The Nirvāṇa also says: 'When reaching the fruit of Buddhahood, it does not belong to the three times.' And further: 'The Buddha is not like conditioned formations which are saṃskṛta; nor can he be said to be asaṃskṛta on the grounds of not being made by karma and afflictions.' All anāsrava dharmas are unmade; why specifically say the Buddha's wisdom is not saṃskṛta? Therefore, when the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi cites three reasons to prove that the Buddha is impermanent, it is a false claim limited to one's own見聞." This is also not correct. If you say that the saṃbhogabuddha is permanent in continuum, what you have established already collapses. If it is immutable permanence, then there are four errors: First, the error of contradicting scriptural teachings. Now, is the bodhi of the saṃbhogabuddha originally existent or newly existent? If it is originally existent and not produced from causes, then both bodhi and nirvāṇa would only possess jñāpaka-hetus and not possess the name of janaka-hetus; why then does fascicle twenty-six of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra state: "There are further janaka-hetus, namely the six pāramitās, bodhi, and so forth"? Moreover, if it is permanent, how can it arise from causes? Fascicle thirteen of the Nirvāṇa says: "If there are dharmas that arise from conditions, know that they are impermanent." It also says: "For this reason, a dharma arising from a cause is not called permanent." A later passage says: "Good son! Space is neither produced nor emerged, neither done nor made, and not a saṃskṛta dharma. The Tathāgata is likewise: neither produced nor emerged, neither done nor made, not a saṃskṛta dharma. Just like the Tathāgata's nature, the buddhadhātu is likewise: neither produced nor emerged, not made, not a saṃskṛta dharma." This refers to the dharmakāya of tathatā, not the saṃbhogakāya. Otherwise, how could the saṃbhogabuddha be called acquired through cultivation? Moreover, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says "born from all merits," and so on. Furthermore, fascicle nineteen of the Nirvāṇa says: "Such light is called wisdom; wisdom is permanently abiding, and a permanently abiding dharma has no causes or conditions." There are multiple explanations that permanent dharmas have no causes. It also says: "The substance of nirvāṇa is not originally non-existent and now existent. If the substance of nirvāṇa were originally non-existent and now existent, it would not be an anāsrava, permanently abiding dharma." Moreover, Bodhisattva Gauravadatta says: "Whatever is accomplished through causal adornment is called impermanent. Since this great bodhi is accomplished through adornment and exists only through cultivation, it is called originally non-existent and now existent; how can it be permanent?" It also says: "The substance of nirvāṇa is not accomplished by these five causes." Since the six pāramitās and so forth are jñāpaka and not janaka, or because of the original cause, it is permanent. The substance of bodhi is obtained through the five causes; since the six pāramitās and so forth are janaka-hetus, it is impermanent.
2.8
Second is the fault of contradicting reason. The second [fascicle] of the Buddhagotraśāstra, explaining the three tathāgatagarbhas, explains the third, 'the capacity to contain as a womb/storehouse', saying: 'This refers to the stage of fruition. Because, at the time when the Tathāgata attains the nature [he is destined to] attain, it has completely encompassed all merits exceeding the number of sands of the Ganges. If it were only upon reaching the fruition that one were said to attain the nature, then this nature would be impermanent. Why is this? Because it would not be something attained from the beginning; therefore we know it is inherently existent, and for this reason it is called permanent.' This speaks of the svabhāva-dharmakāya. If it were the saṃbhogakāya, could it already have attained perfection at the time of the cause, so that it is said to have 'completely encompassed' them? By analogy one knows that, for the mind-category of the four knowledges, if the cause were already complete, it would not rely on further cultivating the cause; the great perfect mirror wisdom only arises upon reaching the fruition, which means it is newly attained, and therefore it is impermanent. Furthermore, the third [fascicle] says: 'It should be known that the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparavṛtti) has four characteristics: first, as the basis of arising; second, as the basis of cessation.' It further says: 'First, as the basis of arising, it is the continuous support for the Buddha's non-conceptual path. If one does not take this dharma as an object, the non-conceptual path cannot arise.' Since it says it is the continuous support for the non-conceptual path, it clearly is not like tathatā, which is frozen and permanently abiding. Furthermore, in resolving the objection concerning nirvāṇa, it says: 'Because it is not produced by the path, this dharma must be reached by relying on the path, but the path cannot produce it. Therefore, when it has not yet been cultivated, one cannot say it is non-existent.' Thus the meaning of non-arising is established. Because there is no posterior limit, it is attaining non-cessation; because in the intermediate phase there are no karma or defilements, there is no change. Because it lacks the three faults of arising, changing, and ceasing, it is spoken of as permanently abiding. Bodhi, however, is produced by the path: it does not exist when not yet cultivated, and is only obtained through cultivation; hence it differs from nirvāṇa and is not permanently abiding. It also says: 'Apart from nirvāṇa, there is not a single dharma that is permanently abiding. Because nirvāṇa lacks an anterior limit, etc., we know it is permanent. Bodhi has a beginning and an anterior limit; hence it is clearly not permanently abiding.' If one says that because the saṃbhogakāya is not separate from nirvāṇa it is therefore permanent, could the other-enjoyment body (parasaṃbhoga) and the transformation body (nirmāṇakāya) be separate from nirvāṇa? Furthermore, the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, [chapter] fifteen, [adduces] six reasons proving that the enjoyment body (saṃbhogakāya) does not constitute the nature-body (svabhāvakāya). The intention here is that tathatā is the nature[-body], and the saṃbhogabuddha is called the enjoyment [body]. As for the six reasons, first: 'Because the form-body (rūpakāya) and mental-formations-body (saṃskārakāya) are manifested.' The commentary explains: 'The ten sense-bases are called the form-body; sensation and the rest are called the mental-formations-body. The Buddhas take the dharma of tathatā as their body; within the dharmakāya, form and mental formations cannot be found. The responsive body (saṃbhogakāya) is not like this. What does this mean? Although all the Tathāgata's merits exceeding the sands of the Ganges—such as omniscience, great samādhi, and great compassion—rely on the dharmakāya, when they are manifested they are not separate from the nirmāṇakāya. This nirmāṇakāya serves as the phenomenon of the responsive body by which the Buddha is distinct from all sentient beings. Form and mental formations exist in the responsive body, but do not exist in the dharmakāya; therefore the responsive body does not constitute the dharmakāya.' Sixth: 'Because the transformation of the basis of the ālayavijñāna and the arising consciousnesses is manifested, which would be illogical.' The commentary explains: 'The ālayavijñāna and the arising consciousnesses are indeed the enjoyment body; the transformation of the basis of these two consciousnesses is called the dharmakāya. If the nature-body were itself the enjoyment body, what body would be obtained after transforming the basis of the two consciousnesses? Because this would be illogical, the enjoyment body does not constitute the nature-body. If the enjoyment body were itself the nature-body, it would lack the multitude of merits such as great wisdom. Because it does not lack the multitude of merits, the nature-body does not constitute the enjoyment body.' However, the third [fascicle] of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: 'The reason the great perfect mirror wisdom and the equality wisdom are called the dharmakāya is that the eighth consciousness holds the seeds of the two obscurations, and when the mirror wisdom is attained, it abandons the seeds of the two obscurations. The seventh consciousness constantly grasps [at a self], obscuring the principle of equality; free from grasping, it realizes tathatā. Because the dharmakāya is attained through these two wisdoms, these two wisdoms are called the dharmakāya. Furthermore, the principle of tathatā is the foundation on which merits rely, while the two wisdoms are the foundation from which merits are produced; hence they are called the dharmakāya. If one distinguishes the svabhāvakāya and the self-enjoyment body (svasaṃbhogakāya), all four wisdoms are the self-enjoyment body. Because the other-enjoyment and transformation bodies arise from the two [other] wisdoms, those two wisdoms are spoken of as those two bodies.' The third [fascicle] of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says that the observing wisdom and the accomplishing wisdom are the transformation body; because they arise from these two wisdoms, those two wisdoms are called those two bodies. This is not so. Both treatises were composed by Asaṅga; why would the Sūtrālaṅkāra speak of the two wisdoms as the dharmakāya, while the Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not allow the two wisdoms to be the dharmakāya? Furthermore, the eight consciousnesses are impermanent in the causal stage; why would there be a distinction between permanent and impermanent in the fruition stage? Since you accept a distinction between permanent and impermanent, you ought to accept distinctions between cognitive and non-cognitive, mind and non-mind, form and non-form, and so forth. Furthermore, both the responsive/transformation bodies and the forms/spots are manifested by the mirror wisdom; why would the transforming mind be permanently abiding, while the transformed wisdom-body is impermanent? You cannot object by saying: 'That which transforms is purely mind, while that which is transformed differs as mind and form. What prevents the transforming mind from being permanently abiding, while that which is transformed is impermanent?' Why is this? The seeds of what is transformed are each distinct, whereas that which transforms is solely mental; since both subject and object are mind and wisdom, how could one be permanent and the other impermanent? Furthermore, Vasubandhu's Prajñā[-pāramitā-sūtra]-śāstra says: 'Discriminative conditioned entities are not perfected by their characteristics; because the three characteristics have differing substances, that which is free from them is the Tathāgata.' This states that the dharmakāya is free from the conditioned; could the characteristics of the saṃbhogakāya be free from the conditioned? If you say it is not free from them, do you not concede that it arises? Having arisen, it persists for a time—is that not abiding? Since it possesses the three characteristics, how can it be called permanent? Furthermore, it says: 'The responsive and transformation bodies have coming and going; the dharma-Buddha has no coming and going.' Since the responsive and transformation bodies have coming and going, one clearly knows they are impermanent. Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Within the dharmakāya, form and mental formations cannot be found', which clarifies that in the saṃbhogakāya and so on, form and mental formations can be found. Since form and mental formations can be found in the saṃbhogakāya, it is therefore impermanent; nor can one say that although it has form and mental formations, its substance is permanent. As for the Nirvāṇa Sūtra saying, 'Abandoning impermanent form, one obtains permanent form, and sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness are also like this': since you accept that form and mental formations are permanent like tathatā and tranquil like tathatā, why does the Liang Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: 'If one takes the dharmakāya to be the responsive Buddha, there would be no activity of benefiting sentient beings. If one takes the responsive body to be the dharmakāya Buddha, there would be no meaning of present peace and joy, because it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility.' According to the intent of this treatise, because the dharmakāya is permanent, it cannot benefit beings. Since the saṃbhogakāya is permanent, would it not, like tathatā, be incapable of benefiting beings? Furthermore, if it were permanent, how could the objection run: 'If one takes the responsive body to be the dharmakāya Buddha, there would be no meaning of present peace and joy, because it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility'? If you accept that the saṃbhogakāya is permanent, how can it be said that 'it is constantly clamorous and active, separated from tranquility'? Furthermore, in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-upadeśa's explanation of the three bodies, only within the passage on the dharmakāya does it say 'neither false, nor such, nor different', commenting: 'This means free from the four characteristics; having the four characteristics means being impermanent.' It does not say that the saṃbhogabuddha is also free from the four characteristics.
2.9
Third is the fault of falsely citing the sacred teachings, saying: 'If it is impermanent, why does the Ghanavyūhasūtra say it is permanent like space? And why does the Nirvāṇa Sūtra say that abandoning impermanent form one obtains the permanent, etc., and further state that the Tathāgata has permanence, bliss, self, and purity?'—as widely cited above. These are not genuine proofs. Why is this? The root text of the Liang treatise says: 'Furthermore, because the self-enjoyment body and the transformation body are impermanent, how can all Buddhas take a permanently abiding dharma as their body?' The commentary on the treatise states: 'If the Tathāgata does not eternally enter parinirvāṇa, then the Tathāgata takes a permanently abiding dharma as his body, and the enjoyment body and transformation body should not be impermanent. If they are impermanent, how can it further be said that he takes a permanently abiding dharma as his body?' The root treatise answers: 'Because the responsive body and the transformation body always merely rely on the dharmakāya.' The commentary explains: 'The dharmakāya is the root of the three bodies. Since [the root] is permanently abiding, and the branch relies upon the root, because vows continue uninterruptedly, the branch is also permanently abiding.' The treatise says: 'Because the responsive body is never abandoned, and because the transformation body repeatedly manifests—like constantly enjoying bliss, or like constantly providing food—the permanent abiding of the two bodies should be understood in this way.' The explanations in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra, Anuttarāśraya-sūtra, Buddhagotraśāstra, and so on are all similar. It is not like tathatā, which is frozen, lucid, and permanently abiding; nor can one say that this refers to the responsive body as other-enjoyment. The commentary explains: 'The Tathāgata's own perfected merits and his benefiting of the bodhisattvas—these two matters are not eternally separated from one another.' Furthermore, earlier it was said: 'If the nature-body were itself the enjoyment body, after transforming the basis of the two consciousnesses, what further body would be obtained?' and so forth, down to: 'If the enjoyment body were itself the nature-body, it would lack the multitude of merits such as great wisdom.' This statement that the responsive body is the enjoyment body proves it. Furthermore, the nineteenth [fascicle] of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'Moreover, good son! In terms of their nature, arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing are all permanent. Yet, because they perish moment to moment, they cannot be spoken of as permanent.' This speaks of the four characteristics as permanent. Also, the thirty-third [fascicle] says: 'Good son! A permanent dharma has no abiding place; if it had an abiding place, it would be impermanent. The twelve links of dependent origination have no fixed abiding place; if they had an abiding place, the twelve links of dependent origination could not be called permanent.' All of these are similarly designated 'permanent' with respect to their support, the nature of tathatā. This is just what the Mahāyānasaṃgraha means by: 'Because the responsive and transformation bodies always rely on the dharmakāya, they are called permanent.' They are not permanent in their own nature. Passages in the Ghanavyūha and elsewhere should be understood by analogy with this. These are the teachings of the Unsurpassed Tamer and the great treatise-masters, whose wisdom and understanding were wholly comprehensive, and whose doctrines and reasoning were clearly complete. Lacking the Dharma-eye himself, carving the boat and watching the tree stump, with mad medicine having entered his heart, he uttered these violent and reckless words, claiming to have grasped the Dharma, etc., while directly contradicting the sutra texts, forcibly asserting that arising and ceasing accord with the Middle Way, [imagining that] noble wisdom could thereby arise. Seeing permanence where there is no permanence, he falls into the gathering of the wrongly determined.
2.10
Fourth is the fault of failing to understand the four ways of answering questions. [The opponent] says: "If, relying on the four ways of answering questions, because whatever is born must die, one proves that the Buddha's wisdom, having arisen, must necessarily cease; then one should also, on the grounds that without affliction, or once dead, the dead is not reborn, prove that once the Buddha's wisdom has ceased it never arises again, such that it cannot be answered categorically." [If one claims that] this is answered by distinguishing moments—that is, that having extinguished a portion of samsāric existence, the Buddha has no affliction, or having ceased arises anew, and whatever is born must die, but this is not said with respect to the Buddha—this is not so. It is because you do not properly understand the intention of the four ways of answering questions that this objection arises. Once you understand these four ways of answering, this fierce objection will immediately subside. What are they? "Those that are born must die" is answered categorically, without discussing whether it is momentary or across a lifespan. "Does the one who has died get born?" is answered by distinguishing, distinguishing both momentary and lifelong [cases]. If one does not distinguish, why call it an answer by distinguishing? Now, to distinguish: if according to a lifespan, one without afflictions, having died, will certainly not be reborn. If based on moments, whether there are afflictions, or no afflictions, or both, must be distinguished. Among those without afflictions, taking the Tathāgata for instance: wisdom that has currently arisen, viewed in relation to seeds that will generate further, is called "born." Once the currently arisen [wisdom] ceases and no longer perfuses seeds, that is "the dead does not get born." If viewed as seeds generating actual functioning, there is no obstacle to [one] ceasing and other seeds arising; although there are no afflictions, the dead is born again. Bringing up one exemplifies the rest. In persons of the two vehicles with fixed gotra who lack afflictions, once a lifespan has ceased it will certainly not arise again. If based on moments, their currently arisen wise minds still perfuse and form seeds; although the manifest [moment] ceases, new seeds are born again. Persons of unfixed gotra have both momentary cessation and the absence of lifespan cessation, because they do not abandon this body to take on another body again. If you grant that a person of the fruition of non-training who turns their mind, having abandoned the portion of samsāric existence, further undergoes the transformationally produced [body], how can you say that one who dies without afflictions never arises again after death? As for discussing the Buddha, the Buddha does not die; what other person could be called "dying and not being born"? With respect to those with afflictions, those who are born all die. Does the dead get born? Stated in terms of the portions of samsāric existence, there are also those who are not born: those progressing toward the three vehicles who are destined to enter the path of seeing and do not regress, having died from their previous bodies in the three evil realms and the like, will definitely not be born there again, while human and heavenly [rebirths] are indefinite. In terms of moments, what is born must all die. Does the dead get born? Then one must make a distinction: if it is karmic vipāka, although the mind arises it does not perfuse seeds, so having died it does not arise again; if discussed from previous seeds, although it dies it arises anew. Thus, since the Saṃbhogabuddha has birth, he must certainly have cessation, without need for distinction; as to whether the dead is born, momentarily or over a lifespan, one must then distinguish. If one understands in this way, it is called understanding the four ways of answering questions. The Buddha himself definitively stated that all who are born die, which is a categorical answer. How can you now make further distinctions about it?
2.11
Third, the error concerning the gotra abiding in its original nature (prakṛtistha-gotra).
2.12.1
There is an opinion: The tathāgatagarbha and the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna) are possessed equally by all sentient beings. This is called the gotra as nature (prakṛtistha-gotra), and is also called the original nature. What is subsequently perfumed is called the adventitious nature. Due to new perfuming (abhinava-vāsanā), the gotras of the five vehicles differ, and this is not fundamentally existent. Because tathatā and the mūlavijñāna are equal in nature, there is no distinction among any [beings]. This statement is unreasonable, because the proposition is false. Why is this? The tathatā-dharmadhātu and the eighth consciousness are possessed equally by all sentient beings; the authentic texts of the sūtras and treatises say so, and both the foolish and the wise agree. As for taking these to be the gotra as nature, the wise do not do so. Why? If this tathatā and the eighth consciousness were called the gotra as nature, then since all equally possess them, how could it be called sublime? It is called sublime because there are naturally present (dharmatā) anāsrava seeds, whose differences across the three vehicles are distinguished from the lack of gotra. Therefore, the first [chapter] of the *Bhadramāyākāra-vyākaraṇa* (or *Bodhisattva-śīla-sūtra*) first clarifies the "Chapter on Gotra as Wholesome Conduct" and does not speak of a chapter on gotra as principle. It also says: "Cultivating holy conduct and walking the path to the wholesome fruit of bodhi, there are ten dharmas that can gather all wholesome dharmas." The *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* are both similar to this: they first clarify the chapter on the original nature's arousal of the mind, and only below do they clarify the gotra acquired through practice (samudānīta-gotra). Clarifying the acquired gotra within the gotra as nature is merely an explanation by contrast, not the primary topic. It has already adopted the characteristics verified by the six pāramitās from the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra*, saying that bodhisattvas by nature delight in giving, and so forth. The *Yogācārabhūmi* says: "Furthermore, bodhisattvas have the characteristics of the gotra of the six pāramitās; due to these characteristics..." and so forth. Moreover, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* says: "Because a person without gotra lacks gotra, even if they arouse the mind and diligently cultivate vigor, they will definitely not achieve ultimate anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi." Nor can one say that lacking the acquired gotra [is meant here], for how could this very arousal of the mind and diligent cultivation of vigor not be the acquired nature, yet it says they will ultimately never attain it? From this we know that there must be naturally present anāsrava seeds for it to be called the acquired gotra. If there were no original gotra, how could the acquired gotra arise? The *Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā* says: "Although there are many conditions, without a seed it will not arise, hence it is not made by another." The *Śīla-sūtra* also says: "If one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, one cannot attain bodhi." Nor can one say it refers to one lacking the acquired nature, for the sūtra says: "Therefore it should be known that the bodhisattva-gotra does not exist because of arousing the mind." Since this acquired gotra is caused by arousing the mind, how could it say that the bodhisattva-gotra does not exist because of arousing the mind? Again, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* says: "If one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, even if one possesses all expedient practices, one will ultimately not achieve unsurpassed bodhi." The *Śīla-sūtra* says: "Even if one is fully endowed with these four matters, if one lacks the bodhisattva-gotra, that one could attain anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi is impossible." Furthermore, the fourth fascicle of the *Buddhagotraśāstra* says, "Five [dharmas] without a beginning and associated with wholesome nature serve as phenomena," and the commentary explains: "'Without a beginning' means that because prajñā, great compassion, dhyāna, and the dharmakāya obtained through nature are all fundamentally existent, it is said to be without a beginning. Essence and function have never been separated, so they are said to be associated. Saying 'obtained through nature' means precisely not through perfuming." Since it says they are fundamentally existent and without a beginning, it is clear that they are not newly arisen; one cannot say that this statement refers to the principle of tathatā. The treatise says: "Because prajñā, great compassion, dhyāna, and the dharmakāya are all fundamentally existent." If it were speaking collectively only of tathatā, what would it be "along with"? Moreover, earlier it said that afflictions, karma, and vipāka are all without a beginning, thus granting three distinctions; now it says that four dharmas are all without a beginning, so how could it refer merely to principle? Furthermore, if original anāsrava seeds were not called the gotra as nature, why would the *Śīla-sūtra* name it the "Chapter on Gotra as Wholesome Conduct"? In addition, the *Buddhagotraśāstra* only allows that the nature of tathatā is non-existent [of defilement] so as to cause afflictions to be extinguished, but does not allow that it exists as an active nature. In the seventy-fourth fascicle of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna) is also [distinguished], and the substance of the eighth mind is likewise not the gotra as nature. The gotra as nature is its anāsrava fundamentally existent seeds. Since the substance of the eighth mind is sāsrava, how could it be the pradhāna-hetu for anāsrava? Therefore, Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana*, fascicle three, says: "One has never seen poison turn into amṛta. The ālayavijñāna is like poison; how could it produce the transcendent, amṛta-like, pure mind?" Also, the Liang translation of the treatise says: "Why did the Buddha, the World-Honoured One, state that from hearing sounds from another and from one's own proper contemplation, by these two causes right view is born?" The commentary explains: "These two causes are the adhipati-pratyaya for right view. The cause spoken of now is the general name of hetupratyaya, speaking of a condition as a cause." Since it says that śrutavāsanā is an adhipati-pratyaya, it is clear that right view fundamentally has its own cause. Below it says that because vāsanā serves as a seed, the transcendent mind can arise. The treatise had already reconciled this above, so it does not explain it further below, intending that all should infer this accordingly, not merely referring to what is directly present. Hearing the name opens up perfuming, and the original seed of right view is also called perfuming, because it increases. Therefore, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra* and other treatises also call it a cause and call it increase. Since this vāsanā is not subsumed under the ālayavijñāna, and is its antidote, it is clear that one cannot take the substance of the eighth [consciousness] as the bodhisattva gotra as nature and call it an equal cause. If you grant that it is anāsrava, then being the antidote to suffering and origin, it cannot be the cause for defiled phenomena. Therefore, the Liang translation says: "Since it is established as the antidote to defilement and the cause of the transcendent mind, it should not later be called the cause of impurities." If you say, "I take the qualities upon consciousness," then due to the natural presence or absence of gotra distinctions, the fundamentally existent gotra of practice is authentically taught everywhere. Not knowing that these fundamentally existent seeds are called the gotra as nature, and falsely taking tathatā and the eighth consciousness to be the gotra as nature—should one not feel ashamed? Should one not feel benighted? Because the original intention of Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* commentary is identical, I do not cite it fully. All treatises state that the vāsanā of anāsrava seeds is the cause; they do not say that the substance of tathatā or of the eighth consciousness is the direct janaka-hetu. Furthermore, tathatā does not rely on any phenomena, hence the *Ratnagotravibhāga* says, "Space does not rely on earth," and so forth. It also says, "The mind naturally pure in nature does not abide in those phenomena." Authentic teachings everywhere say this, so I will not trouble to cite them all. Why must you bring up the intention of the six āyatanas and insist on taking that tathatā? Furthermore, [the opponent] says: "The *Anuttarāśrayasūtra* says: 'The tathāgata-dhātu is inconceivable. All sentient beings possess the sublime characteristics and categories of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, manifested internally and externally, flowing continuously from beginningless time, naturally obtained (dharmatā-pratilabdha).' Based on this sūtra text, it is precisely the tathatā-dhātu that is called the gotra as nature." This too is not so, for you have cited the sūtra erroneously to save your position. Based on this sūtra text, it is precisely the beginningless, natural gotra of practice that is called the sublime characteristics and categories of skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, flowing continuously internally and externally, naturally obtained. "Naturally obtained" means precisely dharmatā.
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- 能顯中邊慧日論 — Classical Chinese