能顯中邊慧日論 2.20

2.20

An opinion states: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Thus the characteristics of entering the knowable have already been explained. How should the characteristics of entering the knowable be known? ... That is to say, one produces extensive hearing regarding the Mahāyāna, and having heard the meanings of the Dharma, they perfume the mind and mental factors, serving as the basis of their continuity. Because those of little hearing have no way to enter this direct realization." In accordance with this treatise text, extensive hearing and vāsanā are equivalent to the pratyaya-hetu in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, just as milk is the pradhāna-hetu for curd, while warmth and the like are [pratyaya-]hetu; thus the mūlavijñāna is the pradhāna-hetu. What they say is irrational. This explanation of the initial cause is self-contradictory before and after. How so? Here it states that extensive hearing and vāsanā are the pratyaya-hetu and the mūlavijñāna is the pradhāna-hetu, but below it states: "From the anāsrava teaching, śrutavāsanā is produced, which gradually produces the anāsrava; it is not that there is an anāsrava nature within the sāsrava." It also states: Therefore we know that the ālayavijñāna can serve as the sākṣāt-hetupratyaya for the sāsrava, and the bīja of śrutavāsanā also serves as the sākṣāt-hetupratyaya for the anāsrava. Earlier it said it was a condition (pratyaya), yet now it says it is a sākṣāt-hetu; this is the first contradiction. Furthermore, it states: in agreement with the Yogācārabhūmi, correct knowledge is produced from hearing the Dharma; this speaks of a pratyaya-hetu, not the original nature. Earlier it said that śrutavāsanā is the sākṣāt-hetu, yet now it speaks of it as a pratyaya-hetu and not the original nature; this is the second contradiction. In accordance with the above sūtra text, the earth is like the mind aligned with principle, while the seeds of medicinal herbs are like śrutavāsanā, giving rise to the phenomena of the triyāna. It further goes on to say: "Just as the worldly earth can produce all things, it must depend on seeds as the sākṣāt-hetu in order to be able to grow. The original nature is also like this: it must depend on śrutavāsanā as the hetupratyaya for the noble path to be produced." At first it used the earth as an analogy for the mind aligned with principle and vāsanā as an analogy for seeds; here the earth is the pratyaya-hetu and the seed is the pradhāna-hetu. Earlier it said that vāsanā, in agreement with the Yogācāra, is called a pratyaya-hetu and is not the original nature; this is the third contradiction. Furthermore, it states: just as the earth, although capable of producing all things, must depend on seeds as the sākṣāt-hetu in order to grow, the original nature is also like this, depending on śrutavāsanā as the hetupratyaya for the noble path to arise. It again compares the original nature to the great earth not directly producing things, but having to depend on seeds. The seed is the sākṣāt-hetu, and the original nature is the pratyaya-hetu. Earlier it said that vāsanā is equivalent to the Nirvāṇa's pratyaya-hetu, and the pradhāna-hetu is buddhadhātu. Now it again says that the original nature is like the earth, turning it instead into a pratyaya-hetu; this is the fourth contradiction. Furthermore, it states: just as the earth produces grass and trees, a remote condition can also act as a sākṣāt-hetu. This statement contradicts the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, where fascicle twenty-six says: "Seeds and the like are janaka-hetu; earth, water, manure, and the like are called jñāpaka-hetu." Now to state that the earth also acts as a sākṣāt-hetu is the fifth contradiction. Furthermore, the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: "Hearing the sound from another and proper contemplation are an adhipatipratyaya with respect to right view." Now to say that śrutavāsanā is a sākṣāt-hetupratyaya is the sixth contradiction. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also states: "This worldly mind has never co-arisen with that supramundane mind; consciousness is not perfumed by it, and to serve as its bīja is irrational." Now to state that it serves as a bīja is the seventh contradiction. Furthermore, the Śrāvakabhūmi, the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, the Prakaraṇāryavācā, and others teach upapattipratilambhika-bīja, yet now it is claimed to be solely abhinava[-vāsanā]; this is the eighth contradiction. Furthermore, holding solely to abhinava-vāsanā is the doctrine of improper masters in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi; the existence of both innate and newly perfumed bījas is the correct doctrine. Deciding on the heterodox and going against the correct is the ninth contradiction. Furthermore, it states: when the Yogācārabhūmi speaks of the three anāsrava faculties in the hells, it speaks from the perspective of their future fruits, for in the present there are no bījas. This is not so; fascicle fifty-seven states: "The practice of the three faculties is definitely not accomplished, while their bījas may or may not be accomplished. That is, those possessing the dharma of parinirvāṇa are matured, while those lacking the dharma of parinirvāṇa are not matured." Moreover, when a bīja exists in the present, the future fruit can be produced. If there is no cause in the present, how could the future fruit arise? Furthermore, although the Sarvāstivādins assert existence in the three times, an entity is only said to be attained when it reaches the phase of arising. The Mahāyāna asserts only the present; in the absence of a bīja, what could be said to be accomplished in the future? If one refers to the explanation of obtaining, acquiring, and accomplishing in Yogācārabūmi fascicle fifty-one, it first refutes the other: "If obtaining is the janaka-hetu of conditioned phenomena, then if one had never previously obtained this phenomenon, since there would be no obtaining as a janaka-hetu, it should never arise, and by this it should also never be obtained in the end." Now if in the present there is no bīja as a janaka-hetu, the future fruit will not arise, and it should be utterly unattainable. How can one criticize another that without obtaining it cannot arise, while oneself asserting that without a bīja, the arising of a future fruit can be called maturation? This violates the correct text of the Yogācāra; this is the tenth contradiction. Furthermore, they draw an analogy: although curd does not produce milk, and curd is not in milk, milk is the cause of curd; although the noble does not come from the ordinary, and the ordinary lacks the noble bīja, it causes the noble to arise. Now I shall formulate a counter-analogy of conclusive contradiction (viruddha-avyabhicāra): smoke does not serve as a cause, yet original smoke arises again; its arising is not without its own bīja. Because the noble does not come from the ordinary, yet the noble arises dependent on the ordinary, although it arises from the ordinary it has its own bīja. Next, to answer: external things may lack vāsanā—curd does not perfume milk, yet milk produces curd. Internal phenomena must be produced through perfuming; it is not that without anāsrava perfuming there is no anāsrava. Nor can it be said that dharmatā bījas are produced through abhinava-vāsanā. Both the principle of dharmatā (dharmatā-yukti) and the principle of causes and conditions (hetupratyaya-yukti) are accepted as established. If they are produced through vāsanā, that is the principle of causes and conditions, not the principle of dharmatā. If one says that the initial anāsrava has no cause of the same kind, why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: "Furthermore, although the supramundane mind has not yet arisen, it is said that when the supramundane mind has not yet arisen, it is already able to counteract the entanglements of afflictions"? This cause of the same kind (sabhāga-hetu) continues successively, and its momentary power is able to counteract; external phenomena are not sākṣāt-hetu, so one cannot make an analogy identical to external things. If external things were necessarily the same, internal and external should both possess the four pratyayas and so forth. Furthermore, they say: prior to the path of seeing, the sāsrava produces the sāsrava. This is a sāsrava cause producing the sāsrava; it is not that because the cause is sāsrava, the fruit is also sāsrava. When from the sāsrava the anāsrava is produced, this is an anāsrava cause producing the anāsrava. Let us formulate an inference of contradiction: Prior to the path of seeing, the cause is sāsrava; it is not accepted that from a sāsrava cause the anāsrava is produced. The worldly supreme dharma (laukikāgradharma) is worldly; a worldly cause does not produce a supramundane bīja. Furthermore, the anāsrava has a cause, arising as anāsrava; if the cause of the anāsrava is anāsrava, it is called anāsrava; if called anāsrava without a cause, the fruit would not produce the sāsrava. Whose anāsrava bīja would it be? Furthermore, they say: you only believe that non-Buddhists have existence arising from non-existence, but do not believe that nirvāṇa transforms ignorance into clarity, or that the sāsrava produces the anāsrava. This also is not so; the Laṅkāvatāra does not accept existence arising from non-existence, so how could it agree with non-Buddhists that existence is caused by non-existence? Ignorance is the cause of transformation (pariṇāma-hetu); how is this not identical to the doctrine of the Vārṣagaṇyas? Furthermore, they say: the treatise says "only the first anāsrava is the moment of the five aggregates" and so forth, down to "if you claim that the Mahāyāna has no momentariness, from which sūtra or treatise does that come?" As cited earlier, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha contains the sabhāga-hetu, and the Yogācārabhūmi has innate anāsrava bījas. Furthermore, the fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says "the anāsrava is without momentariness"; how is that not an explicit statement? This is like staring at dripping water without seeing the Jade Spring, or looking at an autumn down feather without seeing Mount Song or Mount Dai.