能顯中邊慧日論 3.10

3.10

Another opinion says: In the first place, resolving external objections, [the opponent] says: "If only the single vehicle (ekayāna) and all beings becoming Buddhas is the definitive meaning (nītārtha), then why does Nirvana Sūtra, fascicle thirty-four, state: 'Some say: from srotāpannas up to arhats, all attain the Buddha Path, while some say they do not. Some say: those who commit the four grave prohibitions, who perpetrate the five heinous sins, and icchantikas all have the buddhadhātu, while some say they lack it. Up to saying that none understand my intention'? This was Kāśyapa's question, and the Buddha replied to him: 'Toward wise persons I do not present two teachings, etc.; just as when it is said that because an icchantika obstructs the future, they are called lacking the nature (agotraka), yet because they are certain to attain it, they are called possessing the nature.' The Laṅkāvatārasūtra says: 'Because they cross beyond [the birth and death of] distinct portions (pariccheda), it is called cessation; because they have not yet crossed beyond transformation (pariṇāma), it is called non-cessation.' Therefore, the wise person knows that the Buddha has no two teachings."

This explanation is not correct. It is not that srotāpannas and the rest are like icchantikas, called not becoming Buddhas because of obstructing the future, and called all becoming Buddhas because it will be attainable. Moreover, although those who sever good roots are called icchantikas, all allow for repentant destruction and the continuation of birth and death, as has been clarified previously. Saying that they are certain to attain it, rather than entirely lacking it, also does not mean that those of determined nature (niyata-gotra) can cross beyond transformation. The Laṅkāvatāra, Saṃdhinirmocana, Yogācārabhūmi, etc., state that the two vehicles of determined nature cannot become Buddhas, while those of undetermined nature can become Buddhas. For Mahāmati and others, the Buddha does not present two teachings; for the two vehicles of determined nature, he may speak generally of not attaining Buddhahood; for the two vehicles of undetermined nature, he may speak generally of all attaining Buddhahood. As the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Because the former verse is definitive and the latter is non-definitive, the two vehicles hear it and take the Buddha to have two teachings." The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-śāstra says: "Since the Tathāgata's former teaching was different and his present teaching is different, how does the Tathāgata not become guilty of false speech? In order to sever this doubt, the sūtra says: 'Śāriputra, you and the others should with one mind believe and understand,' etc." Based on this, the Nirvana Sūtra harmonizes the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, where it was supposed that the Buddha had two teachings. Because the Laṅkāvatāra and Saṃdhinirmocana are devoid of this doubt, when facing wise people, the Buddha speaks clearly and explicitly without presenting two teachings. If this were not so, sometimes speaking of becoming Buddhas and sometimes speaking of not doing so, how could he be without two teachings? Furthermore, the Laṅkāvatāra states: "The two vehicles of determined nature cannot even enter the first bhūmi, much less reach the eighth bhūmi," as cited previously. Based on this, we therefore know that the two vehicles of determined nature do not undergo transformation. Unable to understand this, they falsely explain the objection.

Secondly, resolving external objections: The Nirvana Sūtra states: "In the sūtras I addressed the monks, saying 'one vehicle, one path, one practice, one condition,' up to saying, 'my disciples do not understand my intention and proclaim that the Tathāgata said from srotāpannas up to arhats all attain the Buddha Path,' etc." [The opponent] explains this as: forty years prior, retaining the three to preach the one, not forty years later, with neither two nor three, breaking the two to return to the one. Since the meanings are different, why make it an objection? How is this known? "One vehicle, one path" is not the definitively determined single vehicle, because the phrasing, meaning, and audience are all different, and this text is not found in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka or Śrīmālādevī. Regarding the difference in meaning: the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka has only the one Buddha vehicle; the Śrīmālādevī has the two vehicles entering the Great Vehicle, with all sentient beings returning to the one path, the "one path" being the Great Vehicle; whereas the single vehicle established in the Nirvana Sūtra refers to a different time, speaking of being identical to the one path, like the "one path" in the Saṃdhinirmocana. "One practice" is the same as the non-differentiated practice in the Prakaraṇāryavācā; "reaching the one existence" is the same as liberation without differentiation in the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, and also like arriving together at one city in the Bodhicittotpādana-sūtra, referring to the identity of liberation. Regarding the difference in persons: this passage addresses the monks, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka addresses bodhisattvas and śrāvakas, the Nirvana Sūtra addresses Bodhisattva Kāśyapa, and the Śrīmālādevī is spoken by Queen Śrīmālā herself.

This explanation is not correct. There is no text that explicitly states that "one vehicle, one path," etc., was spoken forty years prior. Furthermore, the Dharmabherī and Śrīmālādevī were also spoken forty years prior, as clarified previously. The Nirvana Sūtra itself says: "All return to the one path, and the one path is the Great Vehicle." The Śrīmālādevī-sūtra says: "The two vehicles enter the single vehicle, and the single vehicle is the Great Vehicle." What difference is there between this and the Nirvana Sūtra's statement of the single vehicle? The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka also says: "What you are practicing is the bodhisattva path," and again: "entering the Great Vehicle is the fundamental"; how is this not the "one path"? The Śrīmālādevī says: "Because the great causes of the six bases are the Great Vehicle," speaking of this as the identical one practice. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka also says: "All such things are for the sake of attaining the one Buddha vehicle, the knowledge of all modes," and again: "solely for the sake of the one great matter of causes and conditions"; how is this not the "one condition"? In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the "Upāyakauśalya Chapter" addresses Śāriputra, up to the "Conjured City Chapter" addressing the monks, and in the direct exposition refuting the two to return to the one, it says: "Furthermore, monks, if the Tathāgata knows of himself that the time of nirvāṇa has arrived," up to saying, "they attain extinction solely through the one Buddha vehicle." Thus, the text, meaning, and persons are completely identical. Why provide a false explanation?

Moreover, if it is said: Queen Śrīmālā spoke of herself in the Śrīmālādevī-sūtra; the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka addresses Śāriputra, which the Nirvana Sūtra lacks, so it does not harmonize them; the Saṃdhinirmocana addresses Paramārthasamudgata and does not address the monks, so the Nirvana Sūtra does not harmonize it; yet since the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka addresses the monks, and the Nirvana Sūtra states "in the sūtras I addressed the monks," this alone directly harmonizes the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. When the treatise explains the single vehicle according to four meanings, it says: "Second, the meaning of sameness, because the dharmakāyas of the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, and Buddha are equal, the buddhadhātu and the dharmakāya having no further distinction." Again, explaining the three equalities, it says: "Because the Tathāgata taught the Dharma of the single vehicle based on three equalities, he confers prediction because the Tathāgata's dharmakāya and the śrāvaka's dharmakāya are not different." It also says: "Furthermore, based on what meaning does the Tathāgata call the three vehicles the single vehicle? Based on the meaning of sameness, he confers prediction on the śrāvakas. As for the meaning of sameness, it is because the Tathāgata's dharmakāya and the śrāvaka's dharmakāya are equal and without distinction; yet because the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha are distinct vehicles, there is distinction, because they are not the Great Vehicle." Based on this, speaking of the vehicle as one is in terms of Suchness (tathatā); in terms of wisdom, fruit, etc., the vehicles are distinct. Furthermore, the Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "The latter is called the intention of equality in dharma-tathatā. Regarding the various śrāvakas and others, when the Tathāgata conferred prediction upon them in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-sūtra, they had already attained the Buddha's intention; they only attained the intention of equality in dharma-tathatā, but had not yet attained the Buddha's dharmakāya." Based on this, it directly explains the single vehicle of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, and the text and meaning are identical. Without examining the sūtras and treatises, they make false speculations.

Furthermore, resolving the thirty-fifth dispute, [the opponent] says: There are three teachings: first, the teaching without two from beginning to end; second, the teaching of indeterminacy according to capacity; third, the teaching of determination taught later. This division into three is definitely unreasonable. Why is that? What difference is there between the two teachings of "without two from beginning to end" and "later determination"? Moreover, on what textual basis are the three teachings classified? Furthermore, as for "indeterminacy according to capacity," are those [listeners] devoid of wisdom, such that they claim the World-Honored Buddha spoke indeterminately? Based on the Nirvana Sūtra: "If there is a wise person, toward this person I ultimately do not present two teachings, and this person also considers that I do not present two teachings." Based on this, toward the wise, it is without two from beginning to end; toward those devoid of wisdom, he gives indeterminate teachings. Furthermore, the Nirvana Sūtra explains the half-word for śrāvakas, and explains the full-word for bodhisattvas. Based on this, they should also simply be divided into two according to whether one lacks wisdom or possesses wisdom. Dividing into three teachings is their own word, not the Buddha's teaching. Since the doctrinal classification is false, the explanation is definitely not true; being tedious, it will not be detailed fully.

Furthermore, resolving the refutation of attachment to existence and nonexistence and the refutation of the Hīnayāna in the Yogācārabhūmi and Buddhagotraśāstra: In the Yogācārabhūmi, the Vibhajyavādin is refuted; in the Buddhagotraśāstra, the Sarvāstivādin is refuted; they do not mutually refute both because the teachings they propagate are different. The Yogācāra explains the teaching of the forty years prior, narrating the Sarvāstivādin's meaning of lacking gotra in the Śrāvakabhūmi to refute the Vibhajyavādin, because the Hīnayāna schools should not establish a buddhadhātu. The Buddhagotraśāstra propagates the teaching of the treatise on buddhadhātu, refuting the Sarvāstivādin based on the fifth period where all become Buddhas, because it teaches the buddhadhātu within the Mahāyāna. Based on their respective distinct meanings, they do not refute each other. How is this known? The answer has six meanings: 1. What the Yogācāra refutes—possessing the nature—is not a Mahāyāna meaning, but that of the Vibhajyavādin. 2. The passages cited by the Yogācāra to refute are not Mahāyāna sūtras. 3. The Yogācāra's refuting argument is not a Mahāyāna meaning. 4. The Buddhagotraśāstra's refutation of the absence of gotra established by the Yogācāra is called refuting the attachment of the Hīnayāna. 5. The Buddhagotraśāstra's refutation of the absence of gotra established by the Yogācāra says that it is identical to non-Buddhists. 6. Based on the Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra and Nirvana Sūtra, what the Yogācāra establishes is not a Mahāyāna meaning.

This explanation is not correct. Why is that? If you say that the Buddhagotraśāstra refutes the Sarvāstivāda, the treatise text makes this clearly known; but when you say the Yogācāra teaching refutes the Vibhajyavādin, on what basis can this be obtained? Furthermore, in determining the earlier and later, the error in meaning has already been clarified. Moreover, you hold that the Yogācāra propagates the previous teaching, because the Hīnayāna should not establish a buddhadhātu; as for what the Yogācāra refutes, both treatises propagate it, since the Buddha was in the world. Before sectarian division, why would there be a need for separate refutations? Could it be that the Sarvāstivādin propagated the earlier teaching and the Yogācāra conformed to it, while the master of the Vibhajyavāda propagated the later teaching and the Buddhagotraśāstra acknowledged both as Hīnayāna? Because each clings to one side, both are disparagements. This is just like the Nirvana Sūtra's statement that all-existing and all-nonexisting are both disparagements. What the Yogācāra clarifies: first, it differs from the Sarvāstivādin's 'all is non-existing'; second, it differs from the Vibhajyavādin's 'all is existing'. How is this known? Based on the Śrāvakabhūmi explaining the six aspects of non-existence and the aspects of existence, etc., existence is present from the beginning, not coming into being only upon reaching the stage of patience (kṣānti); non-existence is ultimate non-existence. It differs from the Sarvāstivāda, where existence is temporary existence, allowing for transformation, and is not definitely eternally existing at all times. It differs from the Vibhajyavāda, where the Vibhajyavādins say all possess gotra, both ordinary and noble natures being identical to ultimate emptiness (paramārtha-śūnyatā). The Yogācāra narrates possessing gotra and objects that it does not exist at all times. How is this known? Its objection states: there is no phenomenon of parinirvāṇa. Again, its objection states: if there is thus no phenomenon of parinirvāṇa, why is there no parinirvāṇa-dharmadhātu? Again, its objection states: just as one sees a piece of land where at one time there is no nature of gold, etc., or at one time there is the nature of gold, etc.; up to repeating the objection: What is your intent? Just as with that piece of land, previously lacking this gotra and later possessing this gotra, or previously possessing this gotra and later lacking this gotra; so too, previously possessing the determined gotra of a śrāvaka and later lacking this determined gotra, etc. Based on setting up these objections, how could it be identical to the Vibhajyavādin's conjecture that all possess emptiness as gotra? Since they conjecture emptiness as gotra, it exists at all times, and should not be sometimes existing and sometimes non-existing. For the Buddhagotraśāstra to make this objection contradicts its own tenets; how could it constitute a refutation? Positing that the Yogācāra refutes all-existence and the Buddhagotraśāstra refutes all-nonexistence, when reversing this objection, how does it not constitute a fallacy? Why is that? What the Yogācāra refutes is precisely the meaning established by the Buddhagotraśāstra. If all exist, the Yogācāra would not cause it to be refuted. Since it is what the Yogācāra refutes, it should not be established in the Buddhagotraśāstra. If what the Yogācāra refutes is taken as the Buddhagotraśāstra's refuting correct meaning, then the Yogācāra's refutation would be called a semblance and not real, and taking what the Yogācāra refutes as that which proves would also become what is proven. Inverting and combining both treatises, both fall into the gate of fallacy; please reflect on this carefully.

The second point says: The passages cited by the Yogācāra to refute are not Mahāyāna sūtras. The Buddhagotraśāstra says: "The Buddha, for the sake of Hīnayāna persons, spoke of sentient beings who do not abide in gotra and never enter parinirvāṇa." It also says: "The Āgama states that this is known by the power of knowing gotra among the Buddha's ten powers." This is also not correct. The Anuttarāśraya-sūtra also speaks of the nature of possessing or lacking parinirvāṇa; the Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra's "Chapter on the Nature of Practice" also speaks of lacking gotra; are these Hīnayāna sūtras? The name "Āgama" is a general designation common to both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna; how can one definitively state that it is a Hīnayāna sūtra? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and others all speak of the Mahāyāna-āgama, "āgama" being the Āgama. The Saddharmapuṇḍarīka-śāstra also states that the Āgamas are extremely profound; could it be speaking of the Hīnayāna teaching?

The third point says: The Yogācāra's refuting argument is not a Mahāyāna meaning, and only the Buddhagotraśāstra, Yogācāra, and Prakaraṇāryavācā proving the absence of gotra are Sarvāstivādin meanings. The Buddhagotraśāstra says: "The Sarvāstivādins and others say: all sentient beings lack naturally acquired buddhadhātu, but only possess cultivational buddhadhātu." This is also not correct. In the Śrāvakabhūmi, when explaining gotra, it narrates its own correct doctrine and does not conform to the Sarvāstivāda school. The Sarvāstivāda school lacks the naturally acquired [gotra], whereas in that gotra [the Śrāvakabhūmi] establishes the naturally acquired; it also establishes that non-existence is ultimate non-existence, and existence is beginningless existence, unlike the Buddhagotraśāstra's narration of the Sarvāstivāda school as originally non-existent and only existing at a later time. Furthermore, the Buddhagotraśāstra's narration of the tenets of the Sarvāstivāda school also slightly misses the Sarvāstivāda: not admitting the mind entering the path of vision (darśanamārga), from the patience regarding suffering (duḥkha-kṣānti) onward, how could it be called buddhadhātu? Moreover, attaining noble nature (ārya-gotra) is not at the patience regarding suffering, because all three vehicles attain noble nature at the stage of the worldly supreme qualities (laukikāgradharma); also, it does not admit the ten dedications (pariṇāmanā). The Abhidharmakośa narrates the orthodox doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda; even if there are other explanations, they narrate what is not orthodox. Furthermore, if the Yogācāra's Śrāvakabhūmi conforms to the Sarvāstivāda school by explaining non-existence via the six aspects, where else does it prove all-existence? How could it desire to clarify gotra on its own, not relying on its own school, but merely following Hīnayāna accounts? Furthermore, the "Viniścaya" reiterates the five objections and six answers without any divergent doctrine, and the Prakaraṇāryavācā is also identical; must they all be Sarvāstivāda? Furthermore, you yourself establish the tenet saying: Because the Yogācāra and others explain the teaching of forty years prior, they clarify that one portion lacks gotra, etc. Now you say that lacking gotra in one portion is conforming to the Hīnayāna; repeatedly contradicting yourself, is this not exhausting your mind?

The sixth point says: Based on the Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra and Nirvana Sūtra, the sentient beings lacking gotra established in the Yogācāra are not a Mahāyāna meaning. Why is that? Because the Āgama's power of gotra knows the various realms (dhātus) and proves that one portion lacks gotra, this means the realm of gotra cannot be transformed. The Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra, fascicle five, says: "One who receives and studies the bodhisattva precepts first knows the realms of sentient beings, and then dwells together with them to transform the realm of gotra, preaching the Dharma as appropriate." Nirvana Sūtra, fascicle thirty-one, says: "Transforming the inferior into the middling, transforming the middling into the superior, etc., speaks of the indeterminacy of faculties." Based on this, we therefore know that determined realms of gotra are a Hīnayāna meaning.

This is also not correct. Could it be that in the Mahāyāna there are no determined realms of gotra? For instance, the Laṅkāvatāra and Prajñāpāramitā clarify that the nature of vehicles has the determined and the undetermined. The Anantanirdeśa-sūtra says: "Having contemplated thus, one enters the desires and faculties of sentient beings. Because natures and desires are immeasurable, the exposition of Dharma is immeasurable." The Mahāyānāvatāra-śāstra also says: "As the Buddha stated, with inferior faculties, inferior nature, and inferior generation of the aspiration for the Path, their vows are also inferior; with middling nature generating the aspiration for the Path, their vows are also middling; with superior faculties, superior nature, and superior generation of the aspiration for the Path, their vows are also superior. Therefore, among the middling faculties of the Buddhas, according to their faculties and natures, with a compassionate mind he discriminates and instructs them." The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, fascicle one, also says: "If there were no difference in gotra, there would be no difference in the fruits of the vehicles of faith," etc. The sūtras and treatises of both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna speak of the twenty-seven noble persons whose faculties and natures differ, having transformation and non-transformation. Thus we know that the Bodhisattva-śīla and Nirvana Sūtras' "transforming the inferior into the middling," etc., are stated in terms of the undetermined, whereas the determined realm of gotra is stated in terms of the determined nature (niyata-gotra). Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi fully copies the text of the Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra; how could it rely solely on the Hīnayāna to teach non-existence? Moreover, the Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra clarifies that the Buddha's gotra-power also knows the various realms, and both the Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra and Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra explain the ten causes, clarifying the fixed differentiation of faculties and natures within the cause of fixed differentiation (niyatapratyaya-hetu). Based on what can one definitively judge this to be a Hīnayāna sūtra? Thus we know that the meanings of the Yogācāra, Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra, and Nirvana Sūtra are like water and milk; yet they do not know this and make false discriminations of their own, saying that those who study the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi do not harmonize the periods and teachings. In this meaning, one should indeed examine further. The various objections seen below mostly follow personal inclination to interpret the texts in an inverted manner. Since they lack authoritative basis, being numerous, they will not be cited fully.