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能顯中邊慧日論 4

English (machine translation) 4

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Contents

4.1

Compiled by the monk Huizhao of Dayun Monastery in Zizhou

4.2

3. Revealing the Correct [Doctrine] Based on Texts

4.3

1. Clarifying differences in buddhadhātu; 2. Distinctions between presence and absence; 3. Clarifying differences among varieties of icchantikas; 4. Distinctions among śrāvakas; 5. The inequality of the two kinds of death; 6. Clarifying differences regarding the permanence and impermanence of the three bodies of the Buddha; 7. Miscellaneous determinations.

4.4

1. Clarifying Differences in Buddhadhātu

4.5

According to the various sūtras and treatises, the buddhadhātu they explain does not exceed three kinds: first, the nature as principle; second, the nature as practice; third, the esoteric nature. Regarding the nature as principle, the *Buddhagotraśāstra* says: 'To eliminate this clinging, the Buddha taught the buddhadhātu. The buddhadhātu is precisely the tathatā revealed by the two emptinesses of person and phenomena. Because of tathatā, there is neither one who can revile nor one who is reviled. Thoroughly penetrating this principle, one is freed from the fault of false delusion.' Fascicle twenty-five of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'Good sons! The buddhadhātu is not the aggregates, realms, or sense-entrances; it is not non-existent originally and now existent, nor existent and then non-existent again.' Fascicle eight states: 'He reveals the secret treasury of the Tathāgata; the pure buddhadhātu is eternal and unchanging.' Fascicle thirty-three states: 'As the Buddha said, the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is like space, explained extensively as not being of the three times and being absent like space. It is not subsumed within the three times; because the buddhadhātu is eternal, it is not subsumed within the three times,' and so forth. As for the nature as practice, it extends throughout all myriad practices, sāsrava and anāsrava. If considered in relation to the three bodies, the anāsrava is primary; the productive and revelatory sāsrava serves as condition, and is only distantly termed productive and revelatory. The anāsrava is properly termed buddhadhātu, whereas the sāsrava is conventionally and not properly buddhadhātu. This refers to the innate gotra and acquired gotra explained in the *Śīlavantaprabhāsa-sūtra* (*Shan jie jing*). The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* states: 'The ālayavijñāna is called the empty tathāgatagarbha; because it is fully perfumed with anāsrava phenomena, it is called the non-empty tathāgatagarbha.' Fascicle thirty-three of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'If someone says that the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is not existent like space, and not non-existent like a rabbit's horn—why is this? Because space is eternal and a rabbit's horn is non-existent. Therefore it may be said to be both existent and non-existent: because it exists, it refutes the rabbit's horn; because it is non-existent, it refutes space.' Fascicle twenty-six states: 'Furthermore, there is a janaka-hetu, namely the six pāramitās [producing] anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi. Furthermore, there is a jñāpaka-hetu, namely the six pāramitās [revealing] the buddhadhātu.' Fascicle twelve states: 'Such a buddhadhātu proceeds from the wholesome five aggregates, up to obtaining anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.' The *Ratnagotravibhāga* and others explain faith, prajñā, samādhi, and great compassion as the causes for the three bodies. The *Bodhisattvacaryā-viśuddhi-sūtra* (*Pusa jingxing jing*) and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* clarify the bodhisattva practices of the seven grounds and the four [grounds], and the *Gayāśīrṣasūtra* explains this everywhere. As for the esoteric nature, it is as the *Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa* says: 'The horde of defilements is the seed of the Tathāgata,' and so forth. Fascicle thirty-three of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'When the Tathāgata had not yet attained anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi, all wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral [phenomena] were termed buddhadhātu.' Fascicle twenty-two of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'All knots of ignorance and defilement are buddhadhātu. Why? Because they are the cause of the buddhadhātu. From the activity of ignorance and defilements, one obtains the wholesome five aggregates.' Furthermore, the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Viśeṣacintibrahma-paripṛcchā* speak of committing the five inexpiable offenses and attaining bodhi. Fascicle two of the *Mahāyānāvatāra-śāstra* (*Ru dasheng lun*) states: 'I do not wish to let the sprouts of the Buddha-dharma arise with the seeds of defilement. Because of your foolishness, lack of wisdom, and inverted understanding, you take defilements to be the seeds of the Buddha-dharma.' From this, we know that the unwholesome and neutral fetters of defilement are not the Buddha-seeds. If so, why are they spoken of as Buddha-seeds? Answer: According to the *Vajroparamarasa-dhāraṇī-sūtra*, it says: 'Mañjuśrī said: "World-Honoured One! How is ignorance bodhi?" The Buddha said: "Mañjuśrī! Because of the absence of ignorance, one speaks of the absence of ignorance. If there is no ignorance, there is also no arising; if there is no arising, then there is no defilement. Mañjuśrī! Bodhi is undefiled, because its nature is pure and its essence bright and clean. Mañjuśrī! Seeing this, I speak of ignorance. Hence it is taught as non-dual."' According to this, it is because of severing ignorance that the purity of principle is attained; because purity is non-dual, ignorance is said to be bodhi. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* explains this in two verses. One says: 'Because outside of the dharmatā / there are no distinct phenomena, / therefore it is spoken of in this way: / defilement is precisely bodhi.' The commentary explains: 'As it is said in the sūtras that ignorance and bodhi are identical, this means that the designation "bodhi" is applied to the dharmatā of ignorance; this meaning is the intent of the sūtras.' Another verse says: 'Relying on right mindfulness toward greed, / one attains liberation from greed; / hence it is said that greed escapes greed, / and escaping anger and delusion is also like this.' The commentary explains: 'If a person raises right mindfulness and contemplates greed, knowing it thus, they are liberated from greed; hence it is said that by means of greed one transcends greed, and transcending anger and delusion is likewise; this is spoken of as buddhadhātu.' Based on this, it can be understood. Among the above three categories, the various sūtras and treatises either explain one selectively, explain both principle and phenomena together, or comprehensively clarify them. When speaking of tathatā, they selectively speak of the nature as principle; when speaking of the bodhisattva practices and so forth, they selectively speak of the nature as practice, or according to the initial excellence. For example, fascicle twenty-two of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'Or it is said that the faithful mind is the cause of bodhi. Although these causes of bodhi are limitless, if one speaks of the faithful mind, they are already completely subsumed.' Or, in terms of the stage of fruition, they selectively highlight the superior cause, as when speaking of faith, wisdom, concentration, and compassion as the causes for the four virtues and three bodies of the Buddha, and so on. Or they highlight both principle and phenomena together, as fascicle seven of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* states: 'The Buddha said to Mahāmati: "Because the tathāgatagarbha is the cause of both wholesome and unwholesome, it also serves as the cause and condition for transmigration in the six destinies. Up to: relying on the tathāgatagarbha, there is transmigration in the five destinies."' It also says: 'Mahāmati! The ālayavijñāna is called the tathāgatagarbha; together with ignorance and the seven consciousnesses, like waves on the great ocean, it is uninterrupted, because they arise together with the body.' This explains that the essence of the sāsrava consciousness can conceal and hide, and is thus called the tathāgatagarbha. It also says: 'Mahāmati! The tathāgatagarbha-consciousness is not within the ālayavijñāna; therefore, the seven kinds of consciousness have arising and ceasing, while the tathāgatagarbha-consciousness does not arise or cease.' This speaks of the principle. Fascicle eight further states: 'The ālayavijñāna is called the empty tathāgatagarbha; because it lacks the perfuming of the mutual mental functioning of the evolving consciousnesses, it is called empty; because it is replete with the perfumed anāsrava phenomena, it is called non-empty.' This is precisely the nature as practice. The *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* states: 'There are two kinds of tathāgatagarbha: the empty wisdom, the empty tathāgatagarbha, which is separated from, released from, and distinct from all repositories of defilement'—which is the same as the empty tathāgatagarbha in the *Laṅkāvatāra*. 'World-Honoured One! The non-empty tathāgatagarbha is not separated from, not released from, and not distinct from the inconceivable Buddha-dharmas that exceed the sands of the Ganges'—which is precisely what the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* states: 'The tathāgatagarbha-consciousness does not arise or cease, and because it is replete with perfumed anāsrava phenomena, it is called the non-empty tathāgatagarbha.' Up to its statement: 'Originally unobtained, the cessation of all suffering is realized only by the Buddha. Destroying all repositories of defilement, one cultivates all paths leading to the cessation of suffering.' This cessation of all suffering is the principle; cultivating the paths leading to the cessation of suffering is practice. As the fourth fascicle of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* states: 'The buddhadhātu is of two kinds: first, like an underground treasure; second, like the fruit of a tree. Relying on the beginningless element, the naturally pure mind, one cultivates the unsurpassed path; relying on these two kinds of buddhadhātu, one attains three kinds of buddhadhātu and attains the three bodies.' Up to its quoting of the verse: 'The nature from beginningless time / serves as the basis for all phenomena. / Relying on the nature, there are all realms / and the realization of the fruition of nirvāṇa.' The commentary below explains: 'Regarding the word "nature", as the holy *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* states: "World-Honoured One! That which the Tathāgata calls the tathāgatagarbha is the dharmadhātu-garbha, up to being naturally pure. Because of the tathāgatagarbha, it serves as the basis for all phenomena; therefore the tathāgatagarbha is the support and the sustainer,"' and so forth, mostly explaining it based on principle. Below, it also explains it based on phenomena: 'Thus, knowing and seeing in accordance with reality what defilements are absent and in what place they are absent is called empty wisdom; again, knowing and seeing in accordance with reality what Buddha-dharmas are fully present and in what place they are present is called non-empty wisdom.' This explains the two kinds of tathāgatagarbha: the former explains it in terms of subsuming phenomenal marks into the nature and as the basis of delusion and awakening; the latter explains it in terms of distinguishing nature and phenomenal marks. The *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* and other texts, in explaining the verse of the earlier sūtra, explain it according to the distinction between nature and phenomenal marks and as the basis for transmigration and cessation; the meanings do not contradict each other. Furthermore, the 'Chapter on Tathāgatagarbha' in the 'Section on Revealing the Essence' of the *Buddhagotraśāstra* explains three tathāgatagarbhas: First, the repository that is subsumed. Below it says: 'Sentient beings definitely never go beyond the realm of suchness, and because they are embraced and sustained by the Tathāgata, the sentient beings who are the repository are called the tathāgatagarbha.' According to this, it is the sāsrava consciousness that serves as the cause of saṃsāra in the *Laṅkāvatāra*. Second, the repository that is concealed. Below it says: 'When the Tathāgata-nature abides prior to the path, it is concealed by defilements and sentient beings do not see it; therefore it is called a repository.' This is the empty tathāgatagarbha of the *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra*. Third, the repository that can subsume: that is, at the stage of fruition, all merits exceeding the sands of the Ganges are fully subsumed at the time of the nature to be attained; this is the non-empty repository. Furthermore, the 'Chapter on the Three Causes' also encompasses both principle and phenomena; it says: 'The essence of buddhadhātu has three kinds, subsumed under the three natures, as should be understood. The three kinds are the so-called three causes and three kinds of buddhadhātu. The three causes are: first, the cause of what should be attained; second, the cause of applied practice; third, the cause of fulfillment. Tathatā is the cause of what should be attained; the bodhicitta is the cause of applied practice; the bodhicitta and the practices arising from it are the cause of fulfillment. The cause of fulfillment refers to the fulfillment of the practices of merit and wisdom; the fruition of fulfillment refers to the virtues of wisdom, eradication, and benevolence.' Furthermore, the 'Chapter on the Three Natures' in the 'Section on Revealing the Essence' states that the three natures and the three non-natures completely subsume the Tathāgata-nature. This is the broadest and most encompassing. In fascicle thirty-six of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, the defiled and pure causes and fruitions are all comprehensively termed buddhadhātu. Therefore, the sūtra states: 'These seven types of sentient beings, whether wholesome phenomena or unwholesome phenomena, whether the path of expedients, the path of liberation, or the sequential path, whether cause or fruition, are all the buddhadhātu. This is called the Tathāgata speaking according to his own intention.' This is distinguished in accordance with the prior meaning. However, in relation to the nirmāṇakāya, the cause of what should be attained can extend to both productive and revelatory. Because [the nirmāṇakāya] arises based on it, it is distantly called a janaka-hetu; but according to the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra*, it is only called a jñāpaka-hetu, just as the earth is a jñāpaka-hetu in relation to the sprout. Because of the existence of suchness, the nirmāṇakāya can exist; hence it can be considered a jñāpaka-hetu. If viewed in relation to the dharmakāya, it is not subsumed under either the janaka-hetu or jñāpaka-hetu. The *Yogācārabhūmi* states: 'The nature of another serves as the cause, not one's own nature. Because the essence of tathatā as cause and fruition is not distinct, it cannot itself reveal itself. If it could reveal itself, it would not be covered by defilements. Furthermore, because its essence is eternal, it does not arise later. Therefore, it is neither of the two causes. However, it is called the cause of the fruition that should be attained because, by virtue of the existence of suchness, one will certainly attain the pure-stage dharmakāya later; hence it is called the cause of what should be attained.' Therefore the *Buddhagotraśāstra* states: 'Although not immediately revealed, it must certainly be manifest; therefore it is called the pradhāna-hetu of what should be attained.' The *Śrīmālādevī-sūtra* states that when bound, it is called tathāgatagarbha, and when freed from bondage, it is called dharmakāya; this is said based on those who possess the nature, not those who lack the nature. Because it will be able to be revealed, when unrevealed it is called the cause, and when revealed it is called the dharmakāya. When spoken of as cause in the two treatises, it is called the cause because it is at the causal stage; if at the stage of fruition, it is called the fruition. That is, suchness at the causal stage is the dharmakāya of the fruition stage; it is called the pradhāna-hetu, not properly productive or revelatory. How is this known? The *Buddhagotraśāstra* says: 'First, saying that there are two causes: first, the buddhadhātu; second, faith and joy. In these two phenomena, the buddhadhātu is unconditioned and faith and joy are conditioned. In terms of obtaining the buddhadhātu through nature, it is a jñāpaka-hetu, because it can reveal the pradhāna-hetu and the true nature; faith and joy, in terms of applied practice, are the janaka-hetu, because they can give rise to the myriad practices.' This is said in relation to the four virtues of the dharmakāya, stating that faith and joy, in terms of applied practice, are the janaka-hetu because they can give rise to the myriad practices; in relation to the saṃbhogakāya, tathatā is not said to be productive or revelatory. Fascicle twenty-six of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'The buddhadhātu of sentient beings also has two kinds of causes. The pradhāna-hetu refers to sentient beings. This word "sentient beings" is called sentient beings because of sentient-being-nature; it does not mean that the five aggregates are called sentient beings. The pratyaya-hetu refers to the six pāramitās; the meaning is also the same as this. Up to: the mind is not the buddhadhātu; the mind is impermanent, while the buddhadhātu is eternal.' The third fascicle of the *Buddhagotraśāstra* says: 'Furthermore, the comprehensive meaning should be understood. Subsumption is of two kinds: first, by cause; second, by fruition. Subsumption by cause means that the purity of the Tathāgata-nature has four kinds of causes. Up to: the cause of purity of the dharmakāya should be known as cultivating faith and joy in the Mahāyāna. Or it may be that this refers to the saṃbhogakāya Tathāgata, because it is accomplished through meritorious phenomena. If not, could the saṃbhogakāya lack the pure virtues and the Buddha's wisdom virtue? The janaka-hetu should be known as cultivating prajñā and dhyāna-concentration. The virtue of benevolence is the same, and should be known as cultivating the great compassion of the bodhisattva; neither does it state that tathatā is the cause of the dharmakāya.' Furthermore, fascicle twenty-seven of the *Nirvāṇa-sūtra* states: 'Good sons! The cause of nirvāṇa that I explain is the so-called buddhadhātu. The nature of the buddhadhātu does not produce nirvāṇa; therefore, I say that nirvāṇa has no cause.' Again, fascicle nineteen states: 'The essence of nirvāṇa is not accomplished by these five causes. Furthermore, there are two causes: first, the productive; second, the revelatory. The thirty-seven factors of awakening, the six pāramitās, and so forth are called the jñāpaka-hetu.' Again, fascicle thirty-three states: 'Therefore, nirvāṇa has only a jñāpaka-hetu and has no janaka-hetu.' The dharmakāya and nirvāṇa differ in meaning but are identical in essence; therefore, we know that tathatā, in relation to the dharmakāya, is neither a janaka-hetu nor a jñāpaka-hetu. As for the two [causes] of applied practice and fulfillment, they are precisely the primary causes: in relation to the dharmakāya, they are the jñāpaka-hetu; in relation to the rest, they are the janaka-hetu. This briefly explains the differences in buddhadhātu.

4.6

2. The Distinction between Existence and Non-Existence

4.7

If we speak of the nature of principle, it is not twofold and not born. As [stated in] the twenty-sixth [fascicle of the] *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, even icchantikas who have severed roots of goodness are endowed with it. That sūtra states: "If the bodhicitta were the buddhadhātu, icchantikas would not be called icchantikas, and the bodhicitta could not be called impermanent." The meaning of this is that the bodhicitta is not the buddhadhātu of principle; if it were the nature of principle, icchantikas would not sever it. Since there are true statements everywhere, there is no need to cite extensively. If we speak of the nature of practice, there are again two kinds: sāsrava and anāsrava. The existence or non-existence of these two kinds of nature is variable. Regarding the sāsrava nature, the seeds exist definitively in all sentient beings, while their actual manifestations are either achieved or not achieved. Regarding the anāsrava [nature], according to actual manifestation, ordinary persons do not achieve it. According to seeds, some achieve it and some do not. As the fifty-seventh [fascicle of the] *Yogācārabhūmi* states: "For one born in naraka, the seeds and actual manifestations of eight faculties are definitely achieved. Excluding the remaining three, the actual manifestations of the eight faculties are either achieved or not achieved, while their seeds are definitely achieved. For three faculties, their actual manifestations are definitely not achieved. Their seeds are either achieved or not achieved: that is, those who have the phenomenon of attaining parinirvāṇa achieve them, while those who do not have the phenomenon of attaining parinirvāṇa do not achieve them." This is based on present existence. If we speak regarding the future, in the future they will also be actually manifested. Why say definite and indefinite? The *Anuttarāśraya-sūtra*, the *Buddhagotraśāstra*, and the *Ratnagotravibhāga* all state: Sentient beings are of three kinds. First are those attached to existence. Those attached to existence are again of two kinds: first, those who turn their backs on the path to nirvāṇa, have no nirvāṇa-nature, do not seek nirvāṇa, and desire and delight in saṃsāra. The fourteenth [fascicle of the] Liang *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* states: "If sentient beings lack the nirvāṇa-nature, this is called being deficient in causes. In this stage, the Buddhas cannot cause them to attain parinirvāṇa, and their spiritual penetrations also have no mastery." Lacking the nirvāṇa-nature means being greedily attached to saṃsāra and not having faith in and delighting in the Mahāyāna; it is not like the determination of performing karma and receiving its retribution, for it is not the case that they can be transformed at these two times. Saying that one lacks the nirvāṇa-nature and that in this stage [the Buddhas] do not obtain mastery means that they perpetually lack the nirvāṇa-nature. Furthermore, the *Buddhagotraśāstra* states: "Because the pure portion serves as the condition and the pure nature serves as the cause, this contemplation is accomplished; it is not without causes and conditions. If it were not accomplished by means of these two things, and contemplation were without causes and conditions, then just as icchantika persons lack the nirvāṇa-nature, they should attain this contemplation. Yet since icchantikas do not have this contemplation, we know that causes and conditions are definitely required for the contemplation to appear." The *Ratnagotravibhāga* is the same. Furthermore, the third [fascicle of the] *Ratnagotravibhāga* states: "The pradhāna-hetu of buddhadhātu can perform two kinds of activities for sentient beings of the indefinite group: first, seeing the world and revulsing against suffering; second, seeing nirvāṇa and hoping for the bliss of quiescent cessation." It does not state that the definitely wrong group can perform the two activities; the *Buddhagotraśāstra* is also the same. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* also states: "One cannot establish the bodhicitta in icchantika persons, just as a diamond cannot break a white ram's horn," and so on, as cited extensively before. The ninth [fascicle] states: "The Buddha further said: 'Good son! Except for icchantikas, when all other sentient beings have heard this sūtra, they are all able to make it the cause and condition for roots of goodness. Those into whose pores the light of the voice of the Dharma enters will definitely attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.'" Since it is not said that icchantika persons will attain it in the future, it is clear that they lack buddhadhātu. Furthermore, the thirty-third [fascicle of the] *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, in explaining that there are seven kinds of persons in the river of saṃsāra, states: "Good son! Among these seven kinds of persons, either one person possesses all seven, or there are seven persons who each have one." Since it says each has one, the ever-drowned one is precisely one lacking the nature. Were it not so, what distinction would there be from one person possessing all seven? The *Bodhicaryā-sūtra*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra*, and the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s *Bodhisattvabhūmi* all state: persons lacking the nature are without gotra, and so forth. The *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, the *Buddhabhūmiśāstra*, and so forth, all establish the existence and non-existence of the nature, as discriminated extensively in those texts and not cited here in full. The twenty-sixth [fascicle of the] *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* states: "Good son! Although I have stated that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu, sentient beings do not understand such words spoken according to [the Buddha's] own intent. Good son, even bodhisattvas in their final rebirth cannot understand such words, much less the dviyāna and other bodhisattvas." It also states: "If one says that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu, this is called the Tathāgata's speech according to his own intent. How could sentient beings interpret such speech according to the Tathāgata's own intent in only one unilateral way?" The thirty-second [fascicle] states: "Just as there is grass of forbearance in the Gandhamādana Mountain, which not all cattle are able to eat; buddhadhātu is also like this; this is called a differentiated answer." Since the question was about buddhadhātu, he did not give a definitive answer, but gave a differentiated answer, just as with the grass of forbearance there are those who obtain it and those who do not; thus we clearly know that the existence and non-existence of the nature of practice are different. What of the nature of principle? All sentient beings enter it. Based on this principle, Maitreya, Asaṅga, and other bodhisattvas all cited sūtra evidence to clarify that sentient beings either have the nature or do not have the nature. The *Buddhagotraśāstra* and the *Ratnagotravibhāga* both state that icchantikas lack the nirvāṇa-nature. This means lacking the nature of practice, not lacking the nature of principle. In resolving objections, they say there is a pure nature, which is precisely the nature of principle. Were it not so, the preceding and following parts of the treatise text would contradict each other, and it would also contravene many teachings.

4.8

3. Clarifying the Different Classes of Icchantikas

4.9

According to the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, the *Yogācārabhūmi*, and other texts, which speak of the gotras of the five yānas, the fifth, the icchantika, is also termed the "absence of gotra" (agotraka). Yet, taken together, there are three kinds of such icchantikas: first, called *icchantika*, meaning "desire," because they desire cyclic existence; second, called *acchantika*, meaning "non-desire," because they do not desire nirvāṇa. These two apply to persons who do not sever their roots of virtue, because they are veiled by disbelief and ignorance. They also apply to bodhisattvas of great compassion, because they are perfumed by great wisdom and great compassion. The third is called *atyantika*, meaning "ultimate," because they ultimately lack the gotra for nirvāṇa. This person without gotra also receives the previous two designations: the former two will eventually attain Buddhahood after a long time, whereas the latter certainly will not. However, the statements in various sūtras and treatises are not identical: some speak of only one, while others speak comprehensively of all three. For example, the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* speaks of both the first two as the agotraka-yāna. That sūtra states: "Icchantikas are of two kinds: first, those who incinerate all roots of virtue; second, those who make the vow to exhaust the realm of sentient beings. Mahāmati asked the Buddha: 'How do they become Buddhas?' The Buddha replied to Mahāmati: 'Those who incinerate roots of virtue [can become Buddhas], not those who make the vow to exhaust the realm [of sentient beings], because roots of virtue can be rejoined. Sentient beings being endless, [the latter] all possess the nature [to become Buddhas]; for those who sever roots of virtue there is no actualization, and for the cause of great compassion there is no future fruit—hence they are termed "agotraka," not that they lack bījas.'" The *Yogācārabhūmi* speaks solely of the third, the ultimate agotraka, whereas the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra*, the *Buddhagotraśāstra*, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and the *Nirvāṇasūtra* speak comprehensively of all three kinds. The *Anuttarāśrayasūtra* states: "The Buddha told Ānanda: 'There are three classes of sentient beings in the world. The first are those attached to existence. Those attached to existence are further of two kinds: first, those who turn their backs on the path to nirvāṇa and lack the gotra for nirvāṇa, who do not seek nirvāṇa and wish for and delight in cyclic existence; second, those who do not generate thirst and longing for my Dharma, slander the Mahāyāna, and ultimately fall into the net of the icchantika, unable to extricate themselves.'" The former is agotraka, while the latter possesses the gotra; yet both are called the group of wrong determination (mithyātvaniyata-rāśi). Where other passages speak of transforming the group of wrong determination to make them become Buddhas, this refers to the latter who possess the gotra. Otherwise, how could there be a distinction between the two kinds of persons? The *Ratnagotravibhāga*, speaking of the second kind of those attached to existence, says: "In the Buddha's Dharma, the cause-stage of an icchantika makes clear that they are not agotraka." The *Buddhagotraśāstra* says: "The second have already conformed to the determined stage. Those of the determined stage are neither noble nor ordinary, taking neither progression nor regression, but are persons within the Buddha's Dharma who turn their backs on the Mahāyāna Dharma. On account of such persons, the Buddha spoke these words: 'I am not their teacher,' and so forth." Thus, according to the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra* and other texts, the first person is agotraka. Of the second person, it says: "They cannot extricate themselves [on their own]. Over an immeasurable time, with the Buddhas and others acting as conditions, they can still emerge." The ninth fascicle of the *Nirvāṇasūtra* extensively uses metaphors to explain that [the icchantika] can never serve as a cause or condition for bodhi, even saying: "Even if all immeasurable sentient beings simultaneously achieved anuttarabodhi, these Tathāgatas would still not see that icchantika attain bodhi." The thirtieth fascicle says: "Good sons! The great ocean of saṃsāra is also like this. There are seven kinds of persons who, out of fear of the afflictions, generate the intention to cross over..." up to speaking extensively: "The first person severs roots of virtue and is ever-drowned in the three evil destinies. The second person, although able to attain faith by associating with good friends, subsequently encounters evil, conversely severs roots of virtue, and is drowned again. The third person, by associating with good friends, although having severed roots of virtue, is termed 'emerged'; firmly abiding in faith and wisdom, their mind does not backslide, which is termed 'abiding.' The fourth person, having severed roots of virtue, is submerged therein; by associating with good friends, up to gazing in all four directions—the four directions are the four fruits of a śramaṇa. The fifth person, having severed roots of virtue and submerged, by associating with good friends, up to saying that a pratyekabuddha, though able to deliver themselves, does not reach other sentient beings—this is termed 'emerging.' The sixth person severs roots of virtue and submerges, but by associating with good friends attains faith, which is termed 'emerging'; having reached the shallow water, they then abide and do not leave—this refers to a bodhisattva who, in order to deliver sentient beings, abides in contemplating the emptiness of afflictions. The seventh person, having submerged due to severing roots of virtue, emerges by associating with good friends, up to advancing forward and reaching the other shore, ascending a great high mountain and experiencing much peace and happiness—this is a metaphor for the Tathāgata's eternal abiding." The general meaning of the text in fascicle thirty-two of the *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* is the same, yet there are slight differences. Fascicle thirty says: (Some editions have six characters here.) One person embodies the seven; what was previously explained was indeterminate, because they all generate the intention to cross the river of saṃsāra. Fascicle thirty-six speaks of the determinate and indeterminate; hence, among the ever-drowned, it says: "Because their mental karma is heavy, they cannot emerge. For what reason? Because their minds cannot give rise to wholesome dharmas. Though immeasurable Buddhas appear in the world, they do not hear or see them; hence they are called 'ever-drowned.'" The above is the agotraka person. It also says: "Although I have further said that icchantikas and the like are called 'ever-drowned,' there are also the ever-drowned who are not icchantikas. Who are they? Like a person who cultivates mundane precepts and virtues for the sake of existence—this is termed 'ever-drowned.' Kokālika and others are called 'those who emerge and then drown again.' Śāriputra and others are called 'those who emerge and do not drown.' The srotāpanna is like gazing in the four directions. The sakṛdāgāmin is like proceeding after gazing. The anāgāmin is like abiding again after application of effort. The aśaikṣas of the three yānas are like divine turtles, traveling both in water and on land." According to this alignment of metaphors, it is slightly different from the previous one. According to the text, if the seven persons encounter evil friends, all can sever roots of virtue and be called "ever-drowned"; if they encounter good friends and rejoin their roots of virtue, they can cross the river of saṃsāra. Among the first person, the agotraka is ultimately drowned, whereas those possessing the gotra are temporarily so; both are called "ever-drowned." Although both are said to be "ever," there is a distinction between perpetual and temporary. Just as with the three kinds of eternity, although the word "eternal" is the same, there is no absence of distinction. Otherwise, how could the previous text have the seven distinctions in Dharma and metaphor, given that all are ever-drowned? Another explanation: when the seven sentient beings are collectively called "ever-drowned," the phrasing is collective but the intent is distinct, so there is also no contradiction. Below it further says: "As for these seven kinds of persons, either one person embodies all seven, or seven persons embody one each." Based on this, we know that there are the determinate and the indeterminate. In "one person embodies all seven," the one called "ever-drowned" is precisely the second kind of person who seeks existence in the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra*, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and other texts; it is also the icchantika lacking the dharma of nirvāṇa reconciled in the *Buddhagotraśāstra* and other texts, because their severance of roots of virtue is seen. If there were not the ever-drowned and those of determinate gotra, but only one person embodying all seven, how could there be seven persons each embodying one? Among the seven persons each embodying one, the one who is ever-drowned is precisely the agotraka. In fascicle thirty-two of the *Nirvāṇasūtra*, regarding the first person, where it says: "Although not an icchantika, like a person who cultivates giving, precepts, and virtue for the sake of existence, this is called 'ever-drowned'"—this is precisely the second person among those attached to existence in the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra* and other texts. The second, the icchantika possessing the gotra, refers to the small portion of the first person and the subsequent six persons among the seven kinds who sever roots of virtue in the *Nirvāṇasūtra*, as well as the agotraka-yāna in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*. Thus, what is explained in various sūtras and treatises is not uniform: the *Nirvāṇasūtra*, the *Anuttarāśrayasūtra*, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, and so forth all comprehensively explain both. The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* speaks solely of those possessing the gotra. What the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra*, and the *Bodhisattva-śīlasūtra* explain as agotraka is solely the ultimate absence. From this one should know that where fascicle thirty-three of the *Nirvāṇasūtra* says: "An icchantika can give rise to roots of virtue, and having given rise to roots of virtue, continuously uninterrupted, they attain anuttarabodhi"—this speaks of those possessing the gotra. Where the ninth fascicle speaks of an icchantika as being like withered wood, a stone mountain, spoiled seeds, or turtle hair, up to all becoming Buddhas without seeing an icchantika attain anuttarabodhi—this speaks of the agotraka. All others should be understood accordingly. If one interprets it in this way, the sūtras and treatises do not contradict each other. To say that all possess the gotra contradicts many sacred teachings, as extensively cited before.

4.10

4. Distinctions Among Śrāvakas

4.11

The fourteenth chapter, "Three Paths and Three Vehicles," of the Pusa yingluo jing says: "The Buddha told Śāriputra: 'The bodhisattva triyāna each has three grades; the pratyeka triyāna also has three grades; and the śrāvaka triyāna also has three grades. As for the three of the bodhisattva: there is the bodhisattva mahāyāna, the bodhisattva pratyekabuddhayāna, and the bodhisattva śrāvakayāna. As for the pratyekabuddha triyāna: there is the pratyeka-bodhisattva mahāyāna, the pratyekabuddha-bodhisattva pratyekabuddhayāna, and the pratyekabuddha-bodhisattva śrāvakayāna. As for the śrāvaka triyāna: there is the śrāvaka mahāyāna, the śrāvaka pratyekabuddhayāna, and the śrāvaka unattached yāna.'" Each indicates lands, Buddha names, practices and vows, and so on; all these are based on transformation: in order to transform the three vehicles, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas each magically transform into the three vehicles. The Ru dasheng lun and the Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra state: in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, those who receive prophecy do so because Buddhas and bodhisattvas have manifested as śrāvakas. The second fascicle of the Ru dasheng lun says: "Question: 'If Rāhula was truly a bodhisattva, why is he again called a śrāvaka and an arhat?' Answer: 'A bodhisattva is also called a śrāvaka and is also called an arhat. Why? Because he causes all sentient beings to hear (śravaṇa) of anuttarabodhi, he is called a śrāvaka. Because he is worthy of receiving offerings from all humans, devas, and asuras, he is called "worthy of offerings" (arhat). For the sake of transforming sentient beings, a bodhisattva manifests as a śrāvaka and an arhat.' Question: 'Are all the other śrāvakas also bodhisattvas?' Answer: 'Among the other śrāvakas there are also those who are bodhisattvas. Just as in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the five hundred disciples such as Śāriputra are all bodhisattvas and will all become Buddhas. All śrāvakas are avaivartika bodhisattvas, as expounded at length in the Avaivartikadharmacakrasūtra.'" If based on the second fascicle of the Shenmi jietuo jing, the Saṃdhinirmocana, and the "Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī" of the Yogācārabhūmi, both speak of two kinds: first, the quiescent; second, those proceeding toward bodhi. The "quiescent" is also called the determinate gotra (niyata-gotra). Those "proceeding toward bodhi" are also called the indeterminate gotra (aniyata-gotra), and are also said to be those who regress from the mind of bodhi. The Laṅkāvatārasūtra speaks of three kinds; thus its fourth fascicle says: "Mahāmati Bodhisattva addressed the Buddha, saying: 'The World-Honoured One speaks of three kinds of arhats. Of which kinds of arhats is it said they are arhats?' The World-Honoured One answered that there are arhats who attain determinate quiescence, arhats who generate the good roots of bodhi-vows but forget their good roots, and arhats who act as apparitional transformations." The seventh fascicle also speaks of three: namely, those who previously cultivated bodhisattva practice, śrāvakas of excessive pride (abhimānika), and quiescent śrāvakas. According to this, earlier and later, it agrees with the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka treatise that there are four kinds of śrāvakas. When the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Prakaraṇāryavācā, and Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra speak of the ekayāna, they all agree with the Laṅkāvatāra in speaking of three kinds based on the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka. The first is said to be "monks of excessive pride," and so on. The second is said to be "Formerly I taught you to aspire to the Buddha path, but now you have entirely forgotten it"; these are the śrāvakas of the bodhimind. The third is said to be "Inwardly concealing bodhisattva practice, outwardly appearing as śrāvakas," and so on; these are apparitions. According to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa, four kinds are spoken of: the treatise states, "There are four kinds of śrāvakas: first, determinate śrāvakas; second, śrāvakas of excessive pride; third, śrāvakas who regressed from the mind of bodhi; fourth, apparitional śrāvakas." As for pratyekabuddhas, according to the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa, only one kind is spoken of. The second fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra speaks of two kinds: determinate gotra and indeterminate gotra; the Mahāprajñāpāramitā is the same. According to the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā and others, two kinds are spoken of: first, those who emerge in a group (vargacārin); second, the rhinoceros-horn-like (khaḍgaviṣāṇakalpa). According to the fourteenth fascicle of the Pusa yingluo, which says "the pratyeka vehicle has three," as cited above, there are three kinds. According to the third fascicle of the Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra, which says: "Mañjuśrī said: 'I recall in a past world, in the Prabhāsa Kalpa, during which for 360 billion lifetimes I entered nirvāṇa by the pratyekabuddha vehicle.'" And further says: "'These sentient beings had nowhere to plant causes and conditions for good roots; at that time, for the sake of teaching and transforming them, I myself claimed my body was a pratyekabuddha. In this way bodhisattvas enter nirvāṇa by the pratyekabuddha vehicle without being permanently annihilated,' up to expounding extensively on manifesting the four fruits," and so on. The second fascicle of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka speaks of the indeterminate gotra because they proceed toward the Great [Vehicle]. The third fascicle speaks of the determinate gotra, which the commentary explains is to make known the distinction among various vehicles. The seventh fascicle again speaks of bodhisattva transformations; however, no text has been seen stating that there are pratyekabuddhas of excessive pride. Question: Since there are multiple kinds of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas, are all capable of attaining unexcelled bodhi, or are not all [capable]? Answer: Not all. How is this known? According to the Liang translation of the basic text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it says: "If so, since śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas do not jointly attain such dharmakāya of the Buddhas endowed with myriad virtues, with what intention was it said that they both proceed toward the one vehicle and are identical with the Buddha vehicle?" The commentary explains: "If the Buddhas lack the former five differences, it is because their five activities of the dharmakāya are identical. Persons of the two vehicles have the five activities as different, do not attain the dharmakāya, and do not have the five activities as identical. For what purpose did the Tathāgata say that persons of the two vehicles equally proceed toward the one vehicle and all can attain Buddhahood?" According to the intent of this question, it does not say that all are able to turn and proceed [to bodhi], but only that it is to guide and receive those of indeterminate faculty-gotra to make them swiftly proceed toward the Great [Vehicle]. Therefore, the commentary states: in order to reveal the intention behind speaking of the ekayāna, verses are spoken. The earlier verse speaks of the ekayāna with definitive meaning (nītārtha); the later verse speaks of the ekayāna with intentional meaning (saṃdhyārtha). The meaning is that the earlier verse is for guiding and receiving the indeterminate gotra so they may attain Buddhahood, hence the ekayāna is of definitive meaning; the later verse is because the determinate gotra of the dviyāna do not attain Buddhahood, so it is spoken only in reliance on tathatā, non-self, liberation, and so on. Saying "one" is precisely the same. The Saṃdhinirmocana says: "Therefore, among them I spoke of the ekayāna; it is not that there is no distinction in the gotras of sentient beings." It also says that those who proceed to quiescence (śamāyana) ultimately do not sit on the site of enlightenment (bodhimaṇḍa); only the indeterminate gotra can attain Buddhahood; the text of Asanga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha is also similar. The seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: "Mahāmati! There are three kinds of śrāvakas. That which is called entering the gate of quiescence of the eighth bhūmi refers to those who previously cultivated bodhisattva practice, fell into the śrāvakabhūmi, and, relying again on their original aspiration, cultivate bodhisattva practice and together enter the gate of bliss of quiescence of the eighth bhūmi; it does not refer to śrāvakas of excessive pride or quiescent śrāvakas." The eighth fascicle further says: "The Buddha told Mahāmati: 'For those śrāvakas who had previously practiced the bodhisattva path, I bestowed prophecy on them relying on nirvāṇa without remainder. Mahāmati! When I bestow prophecy on śrāvakas, it is to generate courage in fainthearted sentient beings. Mahāmati! In this world and in other Buddha lands, there are sentient beings who practice the bodhisattva path yet still take pleasure in the śrāvaka Dharma; the Buddha turns them so that they take up great bodhi.'" According to this sūtra passage, in this land and in other directions it nowhere says that quiescent śrāvakas proceed toward the Great [Vehicle]. The second fascicle of the Ru dasheng lun says: "There are two kinds of śrāvakas: first, those who diligently cultivate dhyāna-concentration, who are people of dull faculties; second, those who dedicate themselves toward bodhi and can sever the cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa), who are people of sharp faculties." Regarding those who delight in practicing dhyāna-concentration, as the Baoliang jing says: "Just like crystal, it can never become a mani jewel. The śrāvaka's cultivation of dhyāna is also like this: it can never accomplish the fruit of bodhi." The fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: "Mahāmati! What is the characteristic of the fruit of the sakṛdāgāmin? It refers to once observing the appearance of form manifest before oneself and generating a mind that is not an imagined perception of false discrimination, because of the practice-characteristics of well-discerning dhyāna. Coming and going once in the world, he then severs suffering completely and enters into nirvāṇa." This passage is different from dwelling in the gate of samādhi bliss and generating the thought of nirvāṇa; the latter has transformative change (pariṇāma) and, generating the thought of nirvāṇa, has not yet exhausted suffering; here it says that suffering is exhausted and he enters nirvāṇa, and does not say that he generates the thought of nirvāṇa, making it clear that it is the determinate gotra entering extinction without remainder. Directly below, it says: "Mahāmati Bodhisattva addressed the Buddha, saying: 'The World-Honoured One speaks of three kinds of arhats. Of which kinds of arhats is it said they are arhats?' ... up to the Buddha telling Mahāmati: 'It was spoken for śrāvaka-arhats who attain determinate quiescence, not other arhats.'" The Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "Because of permanent differentiation, in nirvāṇa without remainder they do not fall into the extremes of severance and extinction." Therefore the commentary explains: the two vehicles, in nirvāṇa without remainder, still do not have the two bodies of saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa; because they do not observe the benefit of others and have no saṃbhogakāya, they fall into severance; because they have no nirmāṇakāya, they fall into extinction. Bodhisattvas, in nirvāṇa without remainder, constantly manifest the two bodies without limit... up to saying: because they have the saṃbhogakāya they do not fall into severance; because they have the nirmāṇakāya they do not fall into extinction. The first fascicle of the Ru dasheng lun says: "The question asks: 'Bodhisattvas cross over emptiness and transcend saṃsāra; how can they surpass śrāvakas?' The answer states: 'Bodhisattvas attain worldly benefit and supramundane benefit; because they cross the stage of the knowable (jñeya-bhūmi), although they transcend the world, they can dwell in the world to teach and transform sentient beings. Śrāvakas are not so: dreading saṃsāra, they seek swift extinction; through the supramundane path they see the dharmadhātu, and having seen the dharmadhātu they arrive at the shore of nirvāṇa. Bodhisattvas are not so.'" In the thirty-second fascicle of the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra, in explaining the sābhisaṃskāra and anabhisaṃskāra anāgāmin, in both cases it says that at the end of life they enter nirvāṇa. Furthermore, concerning the anabhisaṃskāra [anāgāmin], it says: "Also by the power of conditioned samādhi, at the end of life they then can enter nirvāṇa." Based on what this passage says, entering samādhi, transformative fire burns the body, and exhausting their lifespan they enter nirvāṇa. If dwelling in the bliss of samādhi were regarded as nirvāṇa, how could it be said that "by the power of conditioned samādhi, at the end of life they then can enter nirvāṇa"? Because conditioned samādhi is nirvāṇa. By this it is known that only after dwelling in the cessation-attainment (nirodhasamāpatti) and transformative fire burns the body do they finally attain nirvāṇa. The sābhisaṃskāra is also the same; hence it says: "Also for this reason, the determinate gotra enters [nirvāṇa] without remainder and does not receive transformative [birth]." The fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra also says: "Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have not yet realized dharma-selflessness, and have not yet attained freedom from inconceivable transformative birth (pariṇāmikī cyutiḥ)." By this it is known that the determinate gotra of the dviyāna proceed to [nirvāṇa] without remainder and do not undergo transformative saṃsāra. When the Śrīmālādevī and other texts say that arhats, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas of great power undergo transformative [birth], this refers to the indeterminate gotra. The second fascicle of the Buddhabhūmiśāstra and the eightieth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi both state that the indeterminate who turn back can undergo transformative [birth]. The first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "Fourth, due to the inexhaustibility of good roots. Why? Because the good roots of śrāvakas and the like are not luminous and pure like this; because the good roots of all people do not encompass the powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth; because the good roots of other people lack the benefit of others; because the good roots of other people are exhausted at the time of nirvāṇa. The good roots of bodhisattvas are not so." By this it is known that those of indeterminate gotra who enter without remainder cannot turn back, because those of indeterminate gotra turn back precisely while dwelling in [nirvāṇa] with remainder. The verse in the second fascicle of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: "Attaining escape from the afflictions of suffering in the three realms, dwelling in the final body of nirvāṇa with remainder." The eightieth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "Answer: Only while dwelling in the realm of nirvāṇa with remainder can such a thing occur. Why? Because in the realm of nirvāṇa without remainder, one is far removed from all initiated activities, and all effort has entirely ceased." The Buddhabhūmiśāstra is identical. The Śrīmālādevī also says: "World-Honoured One! When arhats and pratyekabuddhas observe, they attain non-reception of future existence, and observe the nirvāṇa-ground as the supreme resting place. World-Honoured One! That ground previously attained by them is not ignorant of phenomena, nor dependent on others; they themselves also know that having attained the ground with remainder, they will certainly attain anuttarabodhi. Why? Because the vehicles of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha both enter the Great Vehicle." According to these various passages, none says that the two vehicles are able to turn back only after entering the realm of nirvāṇa without remainder; therefore, it is known that turning back must be by those of indeterminate gotra dwelling in nirvāṇa with remainder. It only speaks of dwelling in nirvāṇa for eighty thousand kalpas and so on, not of [nirvāṇa] without remainder. The good roots cultivated by these indeterminate persons are great expedient means, and are likewise inexhaustible like the good roots of bodhisattvas. Therefore the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka says: "That which you practice is the bodhisattva path," and so on. Furthermore, the second fascicle of the Śūraṅgamasamādhisūtra says: "When the devas heard the Buddha speak such meaning, they all wept and spoke these words: 'World-Honoured One! If a person has entered the stage of the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha, he permanently loses the Śūraṅgamasamādhi. Furthermore, one would rather commit the grave transgressions of the five immediate deeds (ānantarya) and attain hearing this Śūraṅgamasamādhi, than enter the dharmic stage and become an arhat with outリーflows exhausted. Why? If a person of the five immediate sins hears this Śūraṅgamasamādhi, he generates the mind of anuttarabodhi and can still become a Buddha. World-Honoured One! An arhat whose outflows are exhausted is like a broken vessel, forever incapable of receiving this samādhi.'" Thereafter, it extensively uses analogies to say that they cannot receive it. Furthermore, the Bodhisaṃbhāraśāstra says: "Just as rice without husk will certainly not sprout, so too is the person of the śrāvaka: he definitely will not become a Buddha. When it is said in the Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra that śrāvakas like Śāriputra attain Buddhahood, they were magical apparitions of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas." The Liang translation of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha also says: "In the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka and the Mahāsaṃnipāta, there are bodhisattvas each identical to Śāriputra and the like. These bodhisattvas comprehended this intention, and the Buddha bestowed prophecies on them, hence speaking of the ekayāna. Furthermore, the Buddha magically manifested śrāvakas such as Śāriputra to bestow prophecy upon them, and so forth." The Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa says: "To two kinds of śrāvakas the Tathāgata bestows prophecy: namely, apparitional śrāvakas, and those who regressed but generate the bodhimind again. To the two kinds of śrāvakas of determinate [gotra] and excessive pride, because their faculties are not yet mature, the Tathāgata does not bestow prophecy. When bodhisattvas bestow prophecy on them, it is an expedient means to cause them to generate the bodhimind; it is not determinately said to cause them to generate the mind of proceeding [toward bodhi]. But if the determinate generate a mind of faith in the Great [Vehicle] and become non-ignorant of phenomena, it can also be called generating the mind." Earlier it was said that this is for the benefit of two kinds of persons; if they also become Buddhas, they would merely be indeterminate, so why call them determinate gotra? The pratyekabuddha like a rhinoceros horn must be of determinate gotra and cannot see a Buddha. Therefore the Avataṃsakasūtra says: when a bodhisattva is about to descend, he first emits light from his right hand called "adornment of pure worlds." Pratyekabuddhas who encounter this light immediately enter nirvāṇa; those who are unaware are displaced to other directions by his supernatural power. From this it is known that the rhinoceros-horn pratyekabuddha must be of determinate gotra, determinately not proceeding toward the Great [Vehicle]. Among those who practice in groups, there are determinate and indeterminate: the indeterminate turn back, the determinate do not turn back. Thus it accords well with what the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "If one says that srotāpannas and others all attain the Buddha path, or says that none attain it, one does not understand my meaning." Hence we know that the determinate gotra does not attain Buddhahood, while the indeterminate gotra attains Buddhahood. The Yogācārabhūmi and others all say that the indeterminate turn their minds toward the Great [Vehicle], and do not say that all attain it, because not all attain it. Therefore the eightieth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi says: "By what cause and condition do not all arhats turn toward unexcelled bodhi? Answer: Because they have various distinctions," and so forth. The Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "'Due to the distinction of realms': sentient beings have innumerable distinctions of various realms (dhātu). As the Bahudhātukasūtra says: due to the distinction of realms, one should know that the gotras of the triyāna have distinctions." ... up to saying: "If there were no distinction of gotra, there would also be no distinction of fruits," and so on. Furthermore, in explaining the ten causes, the Shan jie jing, Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra, and Yogācārabhūmi, when explaining the cause of determinate difference (dharmatā-viśeṣa-hetu), state that having gotra and the triyāna gotras are all determinately distinct.

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