能顯中邊慧日論 4.7

4.7

If we speak of the nature of principle, it is not twofold and not born. As [stated in] the twenty-sixth [fascicle of the] *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, even icchantikas who have severed roots of goodness are endowed with it. That sūtra states: "If the bodhicitta were the buddhadhātu, icchantikas would not be called icchantikas, and the bodhicitta could not be called impermanent." The meaning of this is that the bodhicitta is not the buddhadhātu of principle; if it were the nature of principle, icchantikas would not sever it. Since there are true statements everywhere, there is no need to cite extensively. If we speak of the nature of practice, there are again two kinds: sāsrava and anāsrava. The existence or non-existence of these two kinds of nature is variable. Regarding the sāsrava nature, the seeds exist definitively in all sentient beings, while their actual manifestations are either achieved or not achieved. Regarding the anāsrava [nature], according to actual manifestation, ordinary persons do not achieve it. According to seeds, some achieve it and some do not. As the fifty-seventh [fascicle of the] *Yogācārabhūmi* states: "For one born in naraka, the seeds and actual manifestations of eight faculties are definitely achieved. Excluding the remaining three, the actual manifestations of the eight faculties are either achieved or not achieved, while their seeds are definitely achieved. For three faculties, their actual manifestations are definitely not achieved. Their seeds are either achieved or not achieved: that is, those who have the phenomenon of attaining parinirvāṇa achieve them, while those who do not have the phenomenon of attaining parinirvāṇa do not achieve them." This is based on present existence. If we speak regarding the future, in the future they will also be actually manifested. Why say definite and indefinite? The *Anuttarāśraya-sūtra*, the *Buddhagotraśāstra*, and the *Ratnagotravibhāga* all state: Sentient beings are of three kinds. First are those attached to existence. Those attached to existence are again of two kinds: first, those who turn their backs on the path to nirvāṇa, have no nirvāṇa-nature, do not seek nirvāṇa, and desire and delight in saṃsāra. The fourteenth [fascicle of the] Liang *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* states: "If sentient beings lack the nirvāṇa-nature, this is called being deficient in causes. In this stage, the Buddhas cannot cause them to attain parinirvāṇa, and their spiritual penetrations also have no mastery." Lacking the nirvāṇa-nature means being greedily attached to saṃsāra and not having faith in and delighting in the Mahāyāna; it is not like the determination of performing karma and receiving its retribution, for it is not the case that they can be transformed at these two times. Saying that one lacks the nirvāṇa-nature and that in this stage [the Buddhas] do not obtain mastery means that they perpetually lack the nirvāṇa-nature. Furthermore, the *Buddhagotraśāstra* states: "Because the pure portion serves as the condition and the pure nature serves as the cause, this contemplation is accomplished; it is not without causes and conditions. If it were not accomplished by means of these two things, and contemplation were without causes and conditions, then just as icchantika persons lack the nirvāṇa-nature, they should attain this contemplation. Yet since icchantikas do not have this contemplation, we know that causes and conditions are definitely required for the contemplation to appear." The *Ratnagotravibhāga* is the same. Furthermore, the third [fascicle of the] *Ratnagotravibhāga* states: "The pradhāna-hetu of buddhadhātu can perform two kinds of activities for sentient beings of the indefinite group: first, seeing the world and revulsing against suffering; second, seeing nirvāṇa and hoping for the bliss of quiescent cessation." It does not state that the definitely wrong group can perform the two activities; the *Buddhagotraśāstra* is also the same. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* also states: "One cannot establish the bodhicitta in icchantika persons, just as a diamond cannot break a white ram's horn," and so on, as cited extensively before. The ninth [fascicle] states: "The Buddha further said: 'Good son! Except for icchantikas, when all other sentient beings have heard this sūtra, they are all able to make it the cause and condition for roots of goodness. Those into whose pores the light of the voice of the Dharma enters will definitely attain anuttarā samyaksaṃbodhi.'" Since it is not said that icchantika persons will attain it in the future, it is clear that they lack buddhadhātu. Furthermore, the thirty-third [fascicle of the] *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra*, in explaining that there are seven kinds of persons in the river of saṃsāra, states: "Good son! Among these seven kinds of persons, either one person possesses all seven, or there are seven persons who each have one." Since it says each has one, the ever-drowned one is precisely one lacking the nature. Were it not so, what distinction would there be from one person possessing all seven? The *Bodhicaryā-sūtra*, the *Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra*, and the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s *Bodhisattvabhūmi* all state: persons lacking the nature are without gotra, and so forth. The *Śrāvakabhūmi*, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, the *Prakaraṇāryavācā*, the *Buddhabhūmiśāstra*, and so forth, all establish the existence and non-existence of the nature, as discriminated extensively in those texts and not cited here in full. The twenty-sixth [fascicle of the] *Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* states: "Good son! Although I have stated that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu, sentient beings do not understand such words spoken according to [the Buddha's] own intent. Good son, even bodhisattvas in their final rebirth cannot understand such words, much less the dviyāna and other bodhisattvas." It also states: "If one says that all sentient beings have buddhadhātu, this is called the Tathāgata's speech according to his own intent. How could sentient beings interpret such speech according to the Tathāgata's own intent in only one unilateral way?" The thirty-second [fascicle] states: "Just as there is grass of forbearance in the Gandhamādana Mountain, which not all cattle are able to eat; buddhadhātu is also like this; this is called a differentiated answer." Since the question was about buddhadhātu, he did not give a definitive answer, but gave a differentiated answer, just as with the grass of forbearance there are those who obtain it and those who do not; thus we clearly know that the existence and non-existence of the nature of practice are different. What of the nature of principle? All sentient beings enter it. Based on this principle, Maitreya, Asaṅga, and other bodhisattvas all cited sūtra evidence to clarify that sentient beings either have the nature or do not have the nature. The *Buddhagotraśāstra* and the *Ratnagotravibhāga* both state that icchantikas lack the nirvāṇa-nature. This means lacking the nature of practice, not lacking the nature of principle. In resolving objections, they say there is a pure nature, which is precisely the nature of principle. Were it not so, the preceding and following parts of the treatise text would contradict each other, and it would also contravene many teachings.