能顯中邊慧日論 4.15

4.15

The merits of all buddhas are free from conceptual proliferation and cut off the four propositions; one cannot speak of the distinctions of the three bodies as either permanent or impermanent. Yet, relying on conventional expression, they are revealed. In the merits of the three bodies, subject and object in wisdom and realization, mind and form, principle and wisdom, nature and characteristics are not the same, and their distinction into permanent and impermanent is expounded extensively in the explanation of the excellence of wisdom and abandonment in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, as well as stated in texts such as the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, Yogācāra[bhūmi], Buddhabhūmi[sūtraśāstra], and Saṃdhinirmocana[sūtra], which are too cumbersome to cite here. Now I shall merely cite briefly a few passages as evidence from other sources. As the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra states: 'Mahāmati addressed the Buddha, saying: "World-Honoured One, is the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly Awakened One permanent, or is he impermanent?" The Buddha told the noble Mahāmati: "The Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully and Perfectly Awakened One is neither permanent nor impermanent. Why is this? Because both extremes contain errors."' This refutes conceptual proliferation because it transcends the four propositions. Hence it says below: 'Mahāmati, it is like space, which is neither permanent nor impermanent. Why is this? Because it is free from permanence and impermanence. Because it does not fall into identity or difference; both or neither; existence, non-existence, or neither existence nor non-existence; permanence, impermanence, or neither permanence nor impermanence, therefore it is free from all faults, and cannot be realized or described.' And it continues up to: 'Therefore I prevent all ordinary persons from conceptually differentiating permanence and impermanence. Because one who has attained the real and peaceful Dharma puts an end to conceptual discrimination and does not produce conceptual differentiation.' The general drift of the sixth fascicle, the 'Dharmakāya Chapter', is also the same. If relying on conventional expression to reveal them, the saṃbhogabuddha can be said to be impermanent, because it is accomplished through the cultivation of causes. The intrinsic-nature dharmakāya is in its substance permanently abiding, because it is not brought about through the production of causes by cultivation, but is revealed through cultivation. The seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'Mahāmati, the Tathāgata is not permanent. Why is this? Because the nature of space also lacks the cultivation of all merits.' The intent of this is conversely to reveal that the saṃbhoga[kāya] and nirmāṇa[kāya] possess the cultivation of all merits; thus we know they are impermanent. Hence the sixth fascicle says: 'Mahāmati, if the Tathāgata's dharmakāya were not a conditioned phenomenon, then it would be devoid of a body. To say that there are all practices of cultivating immeasurable merits would then be false. Mahāmati, if it were not produced, it would be identical to a hare's horn or the child of a barren woman, for without a producing cause there is also no body.' This refers to the saṃbhogakāya, which is also called the dharmakāya because it is an aggregation of dharmas of merit. It also says: 'The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is not identical with the five aggregates. If one says it is identical, it would be impermanent, because the dharmakāya would be produced by the five aggregates.' This refers to the intrinsic nature; the dharmakāya is not like that. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Relinquishing impermanent form, one attains permanent form. Sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this.' These are precisely the five aggregates; how could one say they are not identical and are not conditioned phenomena? If the saṃbhogakāya Buddha is not intrinsically permanent, it is spoken of as permanent on the basis of [its accord with] Suchness (tathatā). Therefore the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'If one says it is permanent, it would be identical to the horns of hares, horses, camels, donkeys, turtles, snakes, flies, fish, and the like; therefore one cannot say the Tathāgata is permanent.' If it is from the permanence of what is realized and what it relies upon that it can be called permanent, it also says: 'Furthermore, Mahāmati, there are other dharmas, relying upon which one can say that the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, is permanent. Why is this? Relying on the wisdom of inner realization that realizes the permanent Dharma, therefore one can say the Tathāgata is permanent. Mahāmati, the Dharma of the wisdom of inner realization of all buddhas, the Tathāgatas, is constantly and eternally cool and changeless. Mahāmati, whether buddhas, Tathāgatas, Arhats, Fully and Perfectly Awakened Ones appear in the world or do not appear in the world, the nature of dharmas is constantly thus, the substance of dharmas is constantly thus.' Following this, it is properly named permanent by virtue of the principle that is realized; the wisdom that realizes it is called permanent because it relies on what is realized that is permanent, not because it is intrinsically permanent. This is also like the Nirvāṇa Sūtra's statement that ignorance and the like are permanent, and it precisely accords with the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra, and so forth. The first fascicle of the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra says: 'These three bodies are spoken of as permanent because of a certain meaning, and are spoken of as impermanent because of a certain meaning. The nirmāṇakāya constantly turns the wheel of the Dharma everywhere as suchness, and because its skillful means are continuous and uninterrupted, it is therefore spoken of as permanent; because it is not fundamental and its full, great functions are not manifest, it is spoken of as impermanent. The saṃbhogakāya has been continuous and uninterrupted since beginningless time, and because it is able to uphold the uncommon dharmas of all buddhas, and as long as sentient beings are not exhausted its function is also not exhausted or terminated, it is therefore spoken of as permanent; because it is not fundamental and its complete functions are not manifest, it is spoken of as impermanent. The dharmakāya is not an action, the Dharma is devoid of difference, and because difference is absent and it is fundamental, like space, it is therefore spoken of as permanent.' The Anuttarāśraya Sūtra says: 'Ānanda, what is the permanently abiding Dharma of unsurpassed bodhi? Yet this permanent abiding has two kinds of dharmas that serve as its causes and conditions: first, being unproduced and unceasing; second, being boundless and inexhaustible. These are called the permanently abiding dharmas of bodhi.' Following these two causes, the first is the dharmakāya, and the second is the saṃbhoga[kāya] and nirmāṇa[kāya]. The fourth fascicle of the Buddhagotraśāstra says: 'These three bodies are able constantly to give rise to beneficial activities for the world, and are therefore spoken of as permanently abiding. Permanently abiding relies on ten kinds of causes and conditions: first, the boundlessness of causes and conditions; second, the boundlessness of the realm of sentient beings; third, the boundlessness of great compassion; fourth, the boundlessness of the bases of psychic power (ṛddhipāda); fifth, the boundlessness of non-conceptual wisdom; sixth, being constantly in meditative absorption without distraction... up to tenth, the original nature being naturally devoid of arising and ceasing. For immeasurable kalpas they have relinquished body, life, and wealth in order to embrace the true Dharma. Since the true Dharma is boundless, endless, and inexhaustible, producing an inexhaustible fruit through an inexhaustible cause is precisely the three bodies, and thus they can be permanent. Sentient beings are not exhausted and vast vows are inexhaustible; therefore the nirmāṇakāya constantly abides in the world to instruct sentient beings without exhaustion. If a bodhisattva with a partial degree of great compassion is still able constantly to save sentient beings without entering nirvāṇa, how much more so the Tathāgata, in whom all merits are perfected and who constantly abides in great compassion, constantly thinking of rescuing and delivering—how could there be any boundary? Therefore it is called permanent. If one in the world who has attained the four bases of psychic power is still able to remain alive for forty minor kalpas, how could the Tathāgata not remain alive with sovereignty for hundred thousands of koṭis of kalpas? Therefore it is called permanent.' Up to saying: 'It is permanent because its nature is devoid of arising and ceasing: the dharmakāya is not non-existent originally and existent now, nor existent originally and non-existent now; although it moves through the three periods of time, it is not a dharma of the three periods of time. Why is this? Because this exists originally and is not newly existent now, transcending the dharmas of the three periods of time; therefore it is called permanent.' Following this, what is explained as permanent because its nature is devoid of arising and ceasing refers solely to the dharmakāya not being non-existent originally and existent now, nor existent originally and non-existent now. Since the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are non-existent originally and existent now, and furthermore are not said to have a nature devoid of arising and ceasing, yet they are permanently abiding, this clarifies that their continuity having arising and ceasing is called permanent. The fourth fascicle of the Ratnagotravibhāga also speaks similarly of permanence through ten causes and conditions. Its verse says: 'The World-Honoured One's substance permanently abides, / Because he cultivated immeasurable causes, / The realm of sentient beings is inexhaustible, / His compassionate mind conforms to his wishes, / He has accomplished and is endowed with wisdom, / He has attained mastery among dharmas, / He subdues all the māras and adversaries, / And because his substance is peaceful, he is permanent.' The six verses below explain this, differing only in extent of detail, and are not cited because of their prolixity. Relying on all the sūtras and treatises, they all state that the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are not intrinsically permanent; they are not devoid of arising and ceasing as dharmas born of causes and conditions, and therefore they are impermanent. Hence the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra says: 'All conditioned dharmas are impermanent. Just as pots, garments, carts, houses, mats, rugs, and the like are all conditioned dharmas, they are therefore impermanent.' Following this, being accomplished only through cultivation, the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are conditioned dharmas, originally non-existent and now existent, and therefore [they are not unconditioned] permanent [in nature]. The intrinsic-nature dharmakāya is intrinsically permanent, devoid of arising and ceasing, not a dharma of causes and conditions, and not originally non-existent and now existent, because it exists originally. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'All that is born of causes is impermanent; that which is permanently abiding is not born of causes.' This is extensively as cited above. Question: If the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa bodies are conditioned dharmas of the five aggregates that have arising and ceasing, why does the seventh fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra say: 'If one says that all are impermanent, then all-knowledge, the all-knowing person, and all merits would also be impermanent, because they share the characteristics of all conditioned dharmas'? Following this passage of the sūtra, although attained through cultivating causes, they are permanently abiding. The sūtra text further says: 'Moreover, there is another fault. If one says that all are impermanent, all buddhas, Tathāgatas, would be conditioned dharmas. But the Buddha, the Tathāgata, is not a conditioned dharma.' Following this passage of the sūtra, the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are of permanent nature because they are not conditioned dharmas; how then can one say that the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa are impermanent? Answer: Relying on that sūtra text, because the cause is perfected and the fruit is fulfilled in the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa bodies and there is nothing further to cultivate, they are termed 'not conditioned dharmas'. Since there is no further superior cause, the fruit is without difference; because before and after are similar, they are called permanent, not because the fruit is brought about without causes. Hence the sūtra itself says: 'Because there is no further explanation of having a superior cause.' Following the intent of this text, it does not deny arising from causes; it merely means there is no further superior cause that can be cultivated or made, which would make the superior cause equivalent to other kinds.