華嚴五十要問答 2

English (machine translation) 2

Language: English

2.30 — 3 parts

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Compiled by the monk Zhiyan of Zhixiang Temple on Mount Zhongnan Taiyi in the Great Tang

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37. The Meaning of the Differences among the Three Times; explained at the beginning of the Chapter on Leaving the World

Question: How are the times of the world [conceived] in the various teachings? Answer: According to the Hīnayāna teaching, dharmas exist across the three times. According to the triyāna teaching, among the three times the present exists, while the past and future do not exist. According to the Ekayāna teaching, there is the meaning of the nine times: the past, future, and present, as well as the present of the present—these three time periods exist; the past, future, and present each exist, while the past and future six times are non-existent. The nine times each interpenetrate and are mutually identical, and therefore can form a single comprehensive phrase; the comprehensive and the distinct combine to form the ten times. These times and so forth have cittaviprayukta-saṃskāras as their substance.

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38. The Meaning of Obstacles; explained at the beginning of the Chapter on Samantabhadra

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Question: How is the meaning of obstacles distinguished in the various teachings? Answer: If according to the Hīnayāna, the various propensities, entwinements, defilements, and so forth are the names and numbers of obstacles. These names of obstacles apply broadly to the initial teaching of the triyāna, and indirectly to the other teachings. Why is this? Because while the names of the afflictions are the same, their meanings have depth and shallowness. Therefore, the two obstacles of affliction and wisdom, the obstacles of affliction and knowable objects, the eight delusions, the twenty-two [forms of] ignorance, and so forth pertain directly to the initial teaching of the triyāna, and indirectly to the final teaching of the triyāna. The afflictions of the five levels of resting-ground, the three obstacles of skin, flesh, and mind, the four obstacles of the icchantika, the eleven obstacles of worldly ignorance, and so forth pertain to the direct advancement stages of the triyāna, and indirectly to the final teaching and so forth. As for the afflictions above: one affliction is all obstacles, and one severance is all severances—this belongs to the Ekayāna teaching, as explained below.

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39. The Meaning of the Distinct Obstacles of the Ekayāna; also explained at the beginning of the Chapter on Samantabhadra

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Question: In the Chapter on Samantabhadra, based on Samantabhadra's teaching being extremely profound, vast, and great, why does the text at first explain that a single [moment of] anger constitutes a hundred obstacles and so forth? Answer: According to the Hīnayāna teaching, one affliction is one obstacle in one lifetime; by one patience and one knowledge, through one severance one obtains one cessation. According to the triyāna teaching, the initial teaching is identical in terminology to the preceding, but differs in depth of meaning. If based on the final teaching of the triyāna, one affliction is one obstacle across the three times; by one patience and one knowledge that are neither beginning, middle, nor end, through severance one obtains cessation across the three times. Based on the Ekayāna teaching, one affliction is many obstacles across many times; one number [of severances] is many numbers of patiences, and many numbers [of severances] are one number of patiences; one number [of severances] is many numbers of knowledges, and many numbers [of severances] are one number of knowledges; one severance is neither beginning, middle, nor end, obtaining cessation in the nine times and cessation that is non-temporal. Now, that the Chapter on Samantabhadra first explains the obstacle of anger and so forth is stated based on the head [of the sequence], intending by analogy to reveal Samantabhadra's vast and great teachings of understanding and practice.

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40. The Dhāraṇī Gate; explained in the eleventh section under the Spiritual Benefactors

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Question: In the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, the dhāraṇī gate reveals all dharma gates; what are its characteristics? Answer: The treatise itself cites the Siddhaṃ syllabary: the twelve vowel sounds such as a (wu luo fan), and the thirty-six consonant half-graphs such as ka (jiu wo fan). By adding sounds to half-graphs, multiplying them successively, all full graphs are formed. Yet their graph forms still do not depart from their fundamental graph sounds: the one is within the many, for within the many there is one initial half-graph and initial sound, hence the many are within the one. Within the one there is the capacity for many graph sounds, hence the one is the many; because the half-graphs and sounds form the function of many graphs, the many are the one. Because full graphs and so forth are destroyed and formed through half-graphs and initial sounds, and because this dharma of graphs and dhāraṇī is understood by gods and humans alike, this is cited to establish the method of dhāraṇī; one should apply it accordingly. The ultimate application of this method is in the Ekayāna; its partial application is in the triyāna; in other vehicles it is not definitive.

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41. The Meaning of the Differences in the Number and Names of the Vehicle Gates; also explained after the forty eloquence abilities

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Furthermore, concerning the vehicles in the various sūtras and treatises, there are four kinds: First, two vehicles, namely the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna, because within expedient means they are divided into two according to progressing from teaching toward fruition. Second, three vehicles, namely the Great Vehicle, the Middle Vehicle, and the Small Vehicle, because within expedient means they are divided into three according to fulfilling practice from principle. Third, based on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the Ekayāna, the triyāna, and the Hīnayāna, which within the gates of teaching fulfill the nature of capacities and desires, revealing that the distinctions between the root and branches of the teachings are not the same. Fourth, based on the Lotus Sūtra, the triyāna and the Ekayāna, distinguishing substance, characteristics, expedient means, and definitiveness across realms as not the same. Moreover, speaking of numbers, namely two and three, each extends to the intention of three and two meanings, and is spoken of accordingly. That 'two extends to three' refers to Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha, and Ekayāna and triyāna. That 'three extends to two' has two intentional meanings: namely Great Vehicle, Middle Vehicle, and Small Vehicle, and Ekayāna, triyāna, and Hīnayāna; their intents are each distinct, and can be understood by considering them accordingly. Furthermore, according to the sūtra text below, there are either one, two, or three; or four, namely Ekayāna and triyāna; or five, namely the triyāna, humans, and devas; or immeasurable, namely all dharma gates; this is spoken according to the beginning and the end.

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42. The Meaning of the Four Thorough Inquiries; explained at the four dhyānas at the beginning of the Third Ground

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Question: How is the method of contemplation of the four thorough inquiries [taught] in the various teachings? Answer: As for the contemplation of thorough inquiry explained in sūtras and treatises, there are briefly three kinds: first, four thorough inquiries; second, six thorough inquiries; third, three thorough inquiries, also called seeking to know. There are five major sections: first, listing the names and the intent behind the arising of the teachings; second, explaining their meaning and revealing the differences in scope between host and guest; third, clarifying their nominal and real [status] in relation to the three natures; fourth, clarifying their depth and shallowness and revealing the scope of contemplation in relation to as-it-isness; fifth, distinguishing the stages and grounds and resolving doubts through questions and answers.

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First, listing the names and the intent behind the arising of the teachings: As for the initial four thorough inquiries: first, name, which refers to the teaching that expresses; second, referent, which refers to the meaning that is expressed; third, intrinsic nature, which refers to the substantial capacity of name and referent; fourth, distinction, which refers to the mutual comparison of name and referent, and their differing distinctions in relation to the characteristics of dharmas, hence called distinction. The six thorough inquiries divide name and referent into each having intrinsic nature and distinction, and therefore there are six. The three thorough inquiries combine name, referent, intrinsic nature, and distinction, thus making three. As for the intent behind the arising of the teachings: Question: Why are four thorough inquiries established? Answer: Because people of intermediate faculties have two kinds of views: first, the view of integration; second, the view of distinction. The view of integration means that referent and name integrate into one. The view of distinction means that referent and name each have intrinsic nature, possessing the capacity to correspond while their substances are distinct. The sages established teachings to counter those afflictions, giving rise to the four thorough inquiries to open up the initial name and referent. To counter the former view of distinction, they combined those meanings of intrinsic nature and distinction to counter the view of corresponding and becoming one. Question: In general, when speaking of antidotes, the obstacle and the antidote must be distinct. When non-Buddhists establish a single antidotal dharma, through the distinction of realms it forms multiple dharmas, revealing that the one is nominal, and demonstrating non-existence, and so forth. Why is it now said that opening up the two of name and referent remedies distinction? What is the reasoning? Answer: If confronted with the views of non-Buddhists and the triyāna, not relying on the methods of treatises would incur the Tathāgata's reproach. Now, these thorough inquiries are the bodhisattva's own contemplation, universally countering all non-Buddhists, two vehicles, and bodhisattvas, or conforming to the methods of treatises; hence this remedy arises. How is this known? If, like distinguishing realms, one analyzes and destroys integrated nominality and the view of intrinsic nature, this contradicts the method of the treatises. Why is this? Integrated nominality and intrinsic nature are dharmas assembled through conditions, and are constituent dharmas; the distinction of realms and so forth, rather, are destructive dharmas. Completion and destruction are not the same, and they rely on conditions distinctly; therefore they do not remedy each other. For this reason, the contemplation gates arising in the text have slightly different scopes, as explained fully below, and should be considered accordingly. The six thorough inquiries remedy the view of distinction, namely for persons of sharp faculties. The three thorough inquiries remedy integration and the view of oneness and so forth, for persons of dull faculties. Why? Because the view of distinction is an action of view, while the view of integration and oneness is an action of attachment.

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Second, explaining their meaning and revealing the differences in scope between host and guest: As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, 'What is called thorough inquiry? It refers to name, referent, intrinsic nature, and distinction. When the bodhisattva, regarding name, sees only name; regarding referent, sees only referent; regarding the designation of the intrinsic nature of name and referent, sees only the designation of the intrinsic nature of name and referent; and regarding the designation of the distinction of name and referent, sees only the designation of the distinction of name and referent; having overcome doubt and attained decisive comprehension with respect to these four points, this is called the gate of thorough inquiry.' As for why 'designation' is applied to intrinsic nature and distinction: it is because the contemplation characteristics of the latter two dharmas are deep. If based on contemplation of reality, all four dharmas are designations. Question: Based on what contemplation characteristics is it known that the latter two are deep and not shallow? Answer: The two dharmas of name and referent are straightforwardly grasped at first glance, so the view is not deep and heavy. Intrinsic nature and distinction establish grasping through verifying their reasoning, and are therefore especially heavy. Turning around and remedying them so that the contemplation is accomplished requires applied effort and operation before the contemplation appears, and is therefore deep. When the text says 'regarding name, seeing only name' and so forth: the bodhisattva, with respect to real names, sees them all as nominal names and non-names, not seeing real names. The referent and so forth are also like this. As for the differences in scope between host and guest: taking emptiness as the host and reality as the guest; taking nominality as the host and reality as the guest. Why is this? Because the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, 'having non-existence as intrinsic nature.' Moreover, this is known because contemplating name and referent is merely establishing thorough inquiry nominally. Some take cause as the host and fruition as the guest. Why is this? Because the guest is established relying on the host, floating and unrooted. The host serves as the support for the guest, enabling its tasks to be accomplished. This is how it is known. Mutually serving as cause and fruition accomplishes the meaning of host and guest. Therefore the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, 'Name and referent are mutually guests; the bodhisattva should thoroughly inquire into them.' Hence this is known. Question: If the meaning is like this, why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say, 'Name has no existence, and is a guest with respect to referent; referent has no existence, and is a guest with respect to name'? If based on this text, then 'having no existence' is the meaning of guest; why then do you say that emptiness and non-existence are the meaning of host? Answer: These words appear hidden at first, and should be considered carefully. Saying 'having no existence' is precisely real existence. In parikalpita-svabhāva, existence and non-existence share the same meaning; without principle, there can be no difference, and this characteristic is difficult to manifest. If one only wishes to speak of reality, it involves not yet contemplating; if one only wishes to speak of emptiness, one will not know its scope. Therefore now, adducing name to speak of having no existence, one knows it is real. Next, exclusively adducing having no existence as the fundamental nature of name and referent, one knows that the preceding text's 'name having no existence' and 'referent having no existence' precisely speaks of reality. This is stated with respect to the cognitive sphere of contemplating wisdom, and should be carefully considered.

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Third, explaining their demarcations in relation to the three natures. Thus the verse in the treatise states: "Names and referents are mutual guests; the bodhisattva should thoroughly investigate them. One should contemplate the two as mere measure, and the two as conventional designations; from this arises true cognition, free from the three kinds of conceptual discrimination regarding dust [i.e., external objects]. If one sees that they do not exist, one can enter into the three non-natures." The first verse-and-a-half explains the contemplation of signlessness (ānimitta); the next single line, "If one sees that they do not exist," explains the contemplation of non-arising (anutpāda); the third [line], "one can enter into the three non-natures," this single line explains the contemplation of naturelessness (niḥsvabhāvatā), as is extensively expounded in the treatise. What are the aspects of this contemplation? Relying on the paratantra-svabhāva one dispels the parikalpita-svabhāva; relying on that tathatā one dispels the paratantra-svabhāva. How can they be dispelled? Because name and referent have nothing existent, the discriminating [cognition] also cannot be existent. Why is this? If the discriminated name and referent were existent, the discriminating [cognition] that takes this name and referent as cognitive object could be said to be existent. Because name and referent have nothing existent, the causal conditions for discrimination are definitely non-existent, and thus the substance of the discriminating [cognition] also has nothing existent. Here, since discrimination is non-existent, conventional designation is also unobtainable, and thus one enters the non-arising nature of the paratantra[-svabhāva]. When the bodhisattva sees that this existence and non-existence have nothing existent, they enter the three non-natures and the unestablished truth. Among these three natures, the parikalpita-svabhāva is real and yet empty; the paratantra-svabhāva is conventional, neither real nor empty; the single pariniṣpanna-svabhāva is real and not empty. If the contemplation of the four thorough investigations enters the parikalpita-svabhāva, the discriminated objective dust is both empty and real. Thus the commentary on the treatise states: "If a bodhisattva sees that names and referents are mutual guests, they enter a parikalpita-svabhāva that is different from name and referent. Why is this? Because the contemplation of signlessness is not yet fully perfected. It is only different from the time prior to contemplation, hence it is called 'different'." Although they know non-existence here, they have not yet eradicated the view of reality; therefore, the contemplation of thorough investigation also remains within reality. If they see that the self-nature of names and referents is a conventional designation whose substance is mere conceptual discrimination, they then accomplish the contemplation of the signlessness of conceptual discrimination and only then attain culmination; at that time, everything known by thorough investigation is emptiness. If the contemplation of thorough investigation and so forth remains in the paratantra-svabhāva, it is neither real nor empty, and can also be conventional; this is because, in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, its similitude is explained with reference to the eight metaphors. The contemplation of the four thorough investigations does not enter the non-natures. Why is this? Because it is the initial expedient means of the contemplator. If one attains the four true cognitions, one only then enters the non-natures; hence it is known.

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Fourth, explaining the shallow and the profound, and demonstrating the demarcations of contemplation in relation to [the knowledge of] reality as it is. A passage in the treatise states: "Having explained the meaning of self-nature, profound meaning serves as the cognitive sphere." Investigating in this sense, one comes to know that the two gates of name and referent are shallow and not profound, whereas self-nature and distinction are profound and not shallow. Regarding what is spoken of as contemplation of conceptual discrimination as it is, the commentary on the treatise explains: "What is called the true cognition induced by thorough investigation? If a bodhisattva, regarding a name, has already thoroughly investigated that there is only a name, and later knows in accordance with reality that there is only a name, this definitely knows that the name has nothing existent." Question: If a name definitely lacks an intrinsic substance, why establish names for all phenomena? Answer: In order to lead sentient beings gradually into the correct principle. Conceptualized seeing and verbal discourse rely on names to conceptualize referents, and [sages] having directly realized this, utter speech to teach others by conventionally establishing adventitious names; there are no real phenomena. Therefore the commentary on the treatise states: "If the world did not establish names such as form, among categories such as form not a single person could conceptualize that this category is form. If they could not conceptualize, they would not superimpose; if they did not superimpose, they would not give rise to attachment; if they did not give rise to attachment, they could not instruct one another." What is the true cognition induced by the thorough investigation of referents? If a bodhisattva, regarding a referent, has already thoroughly investigated that there is only a referent, and later knows in accordance with reality that the referent is separated from all verbal discourse and inexpressible—meaning that in categories such as form and sensation, form and non-form are inexpressible, dharma and non-dharma are inexpressible, existence and non-existence are inexpressible—this is called the true cognition induced by the thorough investigation of referents. What is the true cognition induced by the thorough investigation of self-nature? In verbal discourse on the self-nature of categories such as form, one has already thoroughly investigated that there is only verbal discourse. Due to verbal discourse on self-nature, this category is not its self-nature, yet it appears as its self-nature. The bodhisattva penetrates in accordance with reality that this category is like a phantom or an image; it is not the category, yet it appears as the category. This is called the true cognition induced by the thorough investigation of self-nature. What is the true cognition induced by the thorough investigation of distinction? If a bodhisattva, in verbal discourse on distinction, has already thoroughly investigated that there is only verbal discourse, and within categories such as form sees that verbal discourse on distinction lacks two referents: this category is not existent, because it can be spoken of and its substance is not established; it is not non-existent, because it is inexpressible and its substance is established. Thus it is not form, by virtue of ultimate truth; it is not non-form, by virtue of conventional truth, within which there is verbal discourse of form. Therefore, the bodhisattva knows in accordance with reality that verbal discourse on distinction lacks two referents. This is called the true cognition induced by the thorough investigation of distinction. In such contemplations, the bodhisattva thoroughly investigates this conventional establishment of self-nature and distinction regarding names and referents; thus overcoming doubt, resolving dilemmas, and so forth, this is called thorough investigation. Induced by this thorough investigation, one contemplates that names, referents, and so forth are definitely non-existent, which is called true cognition. This is the difference between the two meanings of thorough investigation and true cognition.

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Fifth, distinguishing the stages and grounds, and removing doubts through questions and answers. The stage of thorough investigation lies in the two stages of heat and summit; or according to the Chapter on Cultivation Periods, it lies in the ten faiths and the ten understandings. The stage of true cognition lies in patience and supreme worldly dharmas; or according to the Chapter on Cultivation Periods, it lies in the stages of the ten practices and the ten dedications. Thus the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: "The bodhisattva cultivates the two expedient paths of heat and summit in the four thorough investigations." How does one cultivate the path within the four true cognitions? Up to where the commentary on the treatise says: "Taking consciousness as the cognitive object, one discerns that there is no dust [i.e., external object]," and so on. Since the cognitive object is non-existent, the cognition that takes it as object definitely cannot arise. Because of this discernment, one can subdue and eradicate the conceptual thought of mere-consciousness. Once mere-consciousness is eradicated, proceeding from the final instant to the second instant, one immediately enters the first ground. Moreover, the Chapter on Cultivation Periods states: "Just as prior to the path of the śrāvaka there are four expedient means—namely heat, summit, patience, and supreme worldly dharmas—the four stages prior to the grounds of the bodhisattva are also like this, namely the ten faiths, the ten understandings, the ten practices, and the ten dedications." Hence it is known. Question: The bodhisattva sees that the marks of name and referent are distinct, and sees that their concordance is concordance reliant on referents. Since the bodhisattva sees that verbal discourse on self-nature and verbal discourse on distinction both belong to referents, names and referents are concordant. How does one come to know that names and referents are mutual guests? This is the text of the treatise; what is the sense of its meaning? For instance, non-Buddhists conceptualize that names and referents each have their own self-nature and distinction, and each is concordant between the two dharmas of name and referent. Their self-nature and distinction are thus each level, equal, and without partiality. How does one come to know that names and referents are mutual guests? The treatise gives three answers: First, because cognition does not arise regarding the name beforehand, this proves that names and referents are not of identical substance and are not concordant; when they are not of identical substance, then there is no dharma. Names and referents in worldly enumeration are all like this. If name and referent were of identical substance and were concordant, before hearing the name, when knowing within that referent, cognition of the name should already be established. Yet one currently observes that cognition knowing the referent arises while cognition knowing the name does not arise; hence one knows that names and referents are fundamentally not concordant. The second meaning: citing the contradiction between one and many proves that names and referents are not identical and also not concordant. For instance, for the single referent of a vase, the names established in different countries are all distinct. If name and referent were concordant so as to be established as existent, then since names are many and not one, the referent should also be many. Why is this? Because a single referent concordant with multiple names would be established as existent. The third meaning: because of the difference between definite and indefinite, the two marks of name and referent cannot be concordant, since names are indefinite. If name and referent were concordant, since the name is indefinite, the referent should also be so. In the Western land [i.e., India] there is a linguistic usage where a single name 'go' designates nine referents. The nine are: cardinal direction, earth, ray of light, cow, vajra, eye, heaven, and water; the single name 'go' designates these nine referents. If name and referent were definitely concordant, when designating heaven, earth should follow the name and be concordant with heaven, and the others would be likewise. Since this is not the case, one knows that the two natures of name and referent are distinct. Unity is also not concordant. Why is this? Because it contradicts the above three meanings. If difference were concordant, this also would not be established. Why is this? Because it also contradicts the above three meanings. Question: Concordance through unity and concordance through difference are two distinct meanings; how can they both contradict the same three meanings? Answer: Although the names are the same, the faults of contradicting the three meanings are both distinct; this is how it is known. If name and referent were one and concordant, the cognition seeing the referent would necessarily be the cognition knowing the name. Furthermore, if they were one, since the referent is one, the names would not be many. Furthermore, if they were one, since the name is indefinite, the referent should also be so. If name and referent were different and concordant, when the cognition knowing the referent arises, the cognition knowing the name should also immediately arise. Why is this? Because name and referent are distinct and yet concordant. Furthermore, if they were different, since the names are many, the referents should also be many, because the two marks would be distinct and yet concordant. Furthermore, if they were different, since the nine referents are distinct, the single name 'go' should also become nine. Why is this? Because they would be established as existent through the concordance of the distinct marks of that name and referent. Principles such as these are all spoken specifically in terms of the four thorough investigations; the six thorough investigations and the three thorough investigations can be known by analogy with this. Why is this? Because they do not transcend being established as existent through concordance as one or different; the rest can be investigated by analogy. This teaching is in the triyāna, yet it can also be utilized in the Ekayāna. Why is this? Because this method of contemplation is utilized everywhere, corresponding to the dharmadhātu.

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43. The Meaning of Dependent Origination as It Truly Is: Explanation at the Beginning of the Chapter on Clarifying Difficulties.

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Question: When a bodhisattva first begins practice, they first contemplate actual causes and effects, establishing the skillful means for entering the path. What is the meaning of this?

Answer: Generally speaking, the main outline of the Buddha's Dharma has two types, namely the ultimate and the conventional; because conforming to the contemplation of the worldly truth allows entry into the primary meaning. What are the characteristics of this contemplation? Phenomena have many gates; here we briefly rely on the meaning of simultaneous, actual mutual causation.

Entering the meaning of cause and effect has two tiers. Within the first tier there are three gates: first, explaining the prevention of the error of conceptual discrimination; second, explaining its meaning; third, explaining how contravening it constitutes an error.

First, regarding the meaning of prevention: it is briefly explained by relying on the lamp-light and the burning wick; all bodily and mental matters can be understood by analogy to this. A question asks: Does the burning wick produce the glowing flame? Answer: No, because the wick is produced from the flame. It is asked again: Does the flame produce the wick? Answer: No, because the flame is produced from the wick. It is asked again: Is the flame produced from the wick? Answer: No, because the flame can produce the wick. It is asked again: Is the wick produced from the flame? Answer: No, because the wick can produce the flame. It is asked again: Can it be non-production? Answer: No, because when the wick is removed, the flame ceases accordingly. It is asked again: Are production and non-production both present? Answer: No, because they are mutually contradictory. It is asked again: Is it neither production nor non-production? Answer: No, because that contravenes the principle of the actual arising of causes and effects. The explanation of the first gate is concluded.

Second, regarding its meaning: The wick-cause producing the flame-effect—that the cause has the meaning of "existence" is because it has efficacy. That the flame-effect is produced from the cause has the meaning of "non-existence" because it is produced in dependence on the wick-cause. That the flame produces the wick can be understood in reverse to the above. That the flame-effect is produced from the wick-cause has the meaning of "non-existence" because it lacks an independent essence. That the wick produces the glowing flame—the wick-cause has the meaning of "non-non-existence" because it has efficacy. The remaining propositions can be understood by analogy. The second gate is concluded.

Third, regarding how contravening it constitutes an error: If one says that the wick-cause produces, then the effect could also be constantly produced, because it would always be able to produce the flame-effect, which is [the error of] superimposition. If one says that the wick does not produce, then it could also constantly not produce the flame-effect, because without a cause it would not exist, which is [the error of] deprecation. That the flame produces the wick can be understood as above. If it both produces and does not produce, they are mutually contradictory. If one says it neither produces nor does not produce, that is frivolous fabrication. The remaining meanings can be understood by analogy. The third gate is concluded.

Regarding the second tier: its three gates are the same as before. In the first gate, it is first explained in terms of the cause and subsequently discussed in terms of the effect. Question: Is the cause existent? Answer: No, because it is a cause relative to the effect, and because it is formed by conditions. It is asked again: Is the cause non-existent? Answer: No, because it produces the effect. It is asked again: Does the cause possess both existence and non-existence? Answer: No, because they are mutually contradictory. It is asked again: Is it neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: No, because one presently sees the phenomenon of producing an effect. Second, discussing it in terms of the effect: Question: Is the effect existent? Answer: No, because being the effect of another, it has no independent essence. It is asked again: Is the effect non-existent? Answer: No, because it is an effect. It is asked again: Is it both existent and non-existent? Answer: No, because it is a single effect, and because they are not contradictory. It is asked again: Is it neither existent nor non-existent? Answer: No, because it is what is presently produced by an existing effect. The explanation of the first gate is concluded.

Second, regarding its meaning: The cause has the meaning of "existence" because it can produce. The cause has the meaning of "non-existence" because it is the cause of the effect, and because it is formed by conditions. The cause has the meaning of "both existence and non-existence" because the cause is established. The cause has the meaning of "neither existence nor non-existence" because determinately grasping any single meaning is impossible. The four gates of the effect's meaning are known by analogy to the preceding. The second gate is concluded.

Third, regarding attachment constituting an error: Question: What fault is there if a cause produces an effect? Answer: If it produces, it could either constantly produce or constantly not produce; this is how it is known: If it produces, it would constantly produce. Furthermore, if it produces, the currently existing flame-effect is [present], and the wick-cause that can produce would then have nothing to produce, hence it is [the fault of] annihilationism. It is asked again: What fault is there if the cause does not produce the effect? Answer: There are likewise two faults. If the wick-cause does not produce, then the glowing flame is causeless, hence it is [the fault of] eternalism. Furthermore, if the wick does not produce, since the flame does not produce itself, and the cause again does not produce, it could not exist, hence it is [the fault of] annihilationism. Both producing and not producing, and neither producing nor not producing, should be reflected upon by analogy; the remaining meanings can be known by analogy.

Furthermore, all causes have six meanings: 1. Empty, efficacious, and not dependent on conditions, because it perishes moment to moment. 2. Existent, efficacious, and not dependent on conditions, because it is determinate. 3. Existent, efficacious, and dependent on conditions, as it induces and manifests its own effect. 4. Non-existent, inefficacious, and dependent on conditions, through observing causes and conditions. 5. Existent, inefficacious, and dependent on conditions, because it follows along until the stage of the antidote. 6. Non-existent, efficacious, and dependent on conditions, because both are efficacious. Question: One does not know what conditions it depends on when it depends on conditions? Answer: This depends on external conditions such as the lampstand, oil, water, and earth; it does not take the causal entity or its own six meanings.

Furthermore, as for the sūtra text saying, "The cause of a cause is also the cause of a cause; the effect of an effect is also the effect of an effect": this differentiates the boundaries of cause and effect, intimate and remote, existent and non-existent, efficacy and function. The first "cause" is the direct cause. The second "cause" is the conditioning cause. "Also the cause of a cause" means that the two causes are mutually dependent. "The effect of an effect" and so forth is established through the mutual dependence of the two effects by analogy to the cause. Apart from this, causes and effects in relation to one another have no function.

Furthermore, the sovereign condition in relation to its own sovereign fruit is also considered a direct cause; hence the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā* incorporates remote conditions into direct causes. Furthermore, the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra* states that the cause-condition refers to conditioned phenomena that directly bring about their own effects. This entity has two types: 1. Seeds, 2. Manifest activity. "Seeds" refers to the different functional capacities—wholesome, defiled, and indeterminate—of the various realms and grounds within the *mūlavijñāna*, which are able to induce the immediately following functional capacity of their own kind and give rise to the simultaneous manifest effect of their own kind. These are cause-conditions solely in relation to them. "Manifest activity" refers to the seven evolving consciousnesses and the nature, realms, and grounds of the subjective and objective aspects transformed by them and their mental associates; with the exception of the wholesome fruits of buddhahood and extremely weak indeterminates, the rest perfume the *mūlavijñāna* to produce seeds of their own kind. These are natures of cause-conditions solely in relation to them. Because the mental associates of the eighth consciousness are not perfumed, they are not excluded as a support; because it alone can perfume and is extremely subtle and perfect, it does not perfume to form seeds. Homogeneous manifest activities in relation to one another are none of them cause-conditions, because they are produced from their own seeds. All heterogeneous manifest activities in relation to one another are also not cause-conditions, because they do not directly produce. Some say: Heterogeneous and homogeneous manifest activities in relation to one another are cause-conditions. One should know this is a metaphorical explanation, or a teaching given in accordance with provisional progression. Some say solely that seeds are the nature of cause-conditions; that relies on highlighting what is preeminent and does not exhaustively explain the principle, for the Noble One stated that the evolving consciousnesses and the *ālayavijñāna* in relation to one another are cause-conditions. This reveals the boundaries of cause and effect, intimate and remote, with utmost clarity and goodness.

These six meanings and the mutual establishment of principle and phenomena in cause and effect preceding them are further revealed through the six characteristics: namely, 1. Universality: universally establishing cause and effect. 2. Particularity: because the particular meanings establish universality. 3. Sameness: because their intrinsic sameness establishes universality. 4. Difference: because the various meanings are intrinsically different and manifest sameness. 5. Integration: because cause, effect, principle, and phenomena are integrated. 6. Disintegration: because the various meanings each abide in their own phenomenon without shifting from their original nature. The dependent origination explained here pervades and applies universally, being established in accordance with existent phenomena; it can be understood through examination and reflection. This text is in the triyāna, and only reaches culmination in the Ekayāna. Why? Because it accords with the dharmadhātu.

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44. The Meaning of the Method of Repentance. Explained at the beginning of the Fifth Dedication.

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Question: What are the differences among the methods of repentance in the various teachings?

Answer: There are four gates here: first, repentance; second, entreaty; third, rejoicing in others' merits; fourth, dedication. This passage is in the Ekayāna, and is applied generally to the triyāna; it is explained at length as in the *Vibhāṣā-śāstra*. The Hīnayāna teachings and others do not fully possess this method. The methods for eradicating transgressions are fully set forth as in the sūtras and treatises. If considered under the gate of making vows, they all pervade principle and phenomena, cause and effect. There are both vows of accomplished deeds and vows of unaccomplished deeds, which may be understood by analogy.

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45. The Meaning of the Application of Dhāraṇī. Also explained in the section on the eleven spiritual friends.

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Question: What are the differences among the methods of reciting dhāraṇī incantations in the various teachings?

Answer: The benefits of reciting incantations include eradicating transgressions, generating merit, and even culminating in the functions of benefiting oneself and others, realizing fruits, and so forth. This text is in the final teaching of the triyāna, and is applied generally to the Ekayāna. Why? Because it responds to the dharmadhātu. The Hīnayāna does not have this teaching. Furthermore, there are four kinds of dhāraṇī: 1. Dharma; 2. Meaning; 3. Incantation; 4. Receptivity (kṣānti), also called "restraining receptivity"—knowing that the intrinsic nature and meaning of all speech and all dharmas cannot be obtained is called the dhāraṇī of receptivity. The latter two dhāraṇīs appear in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Furthermore, the ten dhāraṇīs are the text and meaning of the Ekayāna, as spoken in the chapter "Transcending the World." The deployment of mudrās, technical skill, letter-characteristics, and so forth may all be understood by analogy to this.

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46. The Meaning of the Brief Contemplation of Consciousness-Only. Explained in the Sixth Ground.

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Question: Among the various teachings, when the contemplation of consciousness-only is spoken of, what are the skillful means?

Answer: One who wishes to practice contemplation should first draw near to two kinds of spiritual friends: 1. A spiritual friend of practice; 2. A spiritual friend of understanding. Relying on a quiet place, appropriate to one's personal capacity, one maintains pure precepts, repents with utmost sincerity, and supplicates the buddhas of the ten directions, all worthy and noble ones, and the kings of benevolent deities for their protective empowerment. Having done so, one sits cross-legged, places the left hand upon the right hand, and straightens the body. Closing the eyes, one regulates the breath, touches the tongue to the upper palate, and brings the mind correctly to rest upon the object. Recognizing that the manifested objective appearances are distinctions made by one's own mind, as one calms the mind, it comes to rest. Even if it has not yet come to rest, because one's initial practice is unaccustomed, over months and days the mind will cease, and subsequently, continuously form samādhi; these are the skillful means. If demonic events or signs arise, one goes to the bodhimaṇḍa to repent transgressions and practice circumambulation; demonic events will gradually diminish, and whatever doubts arise will be dispelled in due course; one resolves those demonic events in consultation with the spiritual friend of understanding. The mind simply desires appearances to be severed; in all things, one must exert diligent effort and will surely attain success without doubt; with indolence, nothing will be accomplished. The reduction of afflictions is the sign of the contemplation's completion. This applies generally to the teachings of the Ekayāna and the triyāna: initially conforming to the triyāna, and ultimately conforming to the Ekayāna. This is because it later matures and is fully endowed with host and companion.

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47. The Meaning of the Contemplation of Emptiness. Explained within the ten minds after the First Ground.

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Question: What is the contemplation of emptiness? Answer: According to the Avataṃsaka-sūtra, the bodhisattva initially contemplating relies on ten kinds of phenomena: namely, the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, the Buddha, the Dharma, the Saṅgha, and the precepts. The deportment employed relying on these ten phenomena is completely as stated previously in the contemplation of consciousness-only. One merely needs to know that when any one among these ten objects appears before one, to know that it is immediately empty, devoid of characteristics of origin or end; then the mind is able to abide. If cultivated for a long time, it becomes clear and accords with samādhi. Question again: Are other phenomena not empty? Answer: All are empty. But for a beginner entering contemplation, the others are not suitable. Because sentient beings' defiled habits are long-standing and powerful, the others are not suitable. Any doubts or impediments are exactly as stated in the contemplation of consciousness-only. A doubt says: Previously, the contemplation of consciousness-only later accomplished correct samādhi; how does it differ from the calming of the contemplation of emptiness? In terms of the accomplishment of calming and contemplation, they are of one similar kind. Speaking now in terms of the objective realm of expedient means, there is a difference. These contemplations are the essence of calming and contemplation. If, during the affairs of the four deportments—walking, standing, sitting, and lying down—as well as matters such as benefiting sentient beings, the mind accomplishes the preceding consciousness-only and contemplation of emptiness in the present mind, thereby attaining the diminishment of afflictions, these are all subsumed under the aids to the path. This contemplation extends to both the Ekayāna and triyāna teachings; it does not exist in the Hīnayāna teaching. Even if they engage in contemplation of emptiness, it is not the same as the above meaning, because they only attain the emptiness of persons. In brief, there are five discriminations serving as the correct and assisting expedient means: first, the discrimination of tathatā—because of knowing tathatā, mental characteristics are immediately stilled; second, the discrimination of identity with emptiness; third, the discrimination of consciousness-only; fourth, the discrimination of false conceptualization; fifth, the discrimination of pratītyasamutpāda. Employing these five discriminations, the two contemplations of primary and assisting are easily accomplished. Furthermore, the boundaries of these two realms—the contemplation of emptiness and the above consciousness-only—must not be known in the manner of conceptual understanding. If known in the manner of conceptual understanding, they still turn into false realms. Emptiness has four [aspects], which combine to form the objects of contemplation: first, empty space of the conditioned and unconditioned; second, emptiness of cessation through deliberation; third, emptiness of nature taught in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra; fourth, emptiness of nature taught in the Daśabhūmika-śāstra—these combine to form the objects of contemplation, differing only in depth. If one exhausts the expedients of emptiness, the Ekayāna is ultimate.

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Forty-eight: The doctrine of universal reverence and acknowledging wickedness. Explained at the beginning of the ninth dedication.

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Question: In the teachings compiled by people, what are the distinctions among the eight kinds of Buddhadharma spoken of? Answer: In order to eradicate the disease of icchantikas and accomplish the teaching of universal reverence and acknowledging wickedness, there are two sections. The first section clarifies universal reverence, within which there are eight subsections: First, the tathāgatagarbha, which has two [aspects]: First, the doctrinal explanation of the tathāgatagarbha is that it is the essence of all buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, down to the sentient beings of the six destinies. Second, the explanation by metaphors has five subsections: First, by metaphor, it is like the great Anavatapta lake producing eight great rivers: although the rivers differ, the substance of the water is without difference. Although all ordinary persons and sages differ and are not the same, the substance of the garbha is without difference. Like an actor performing various acrobatic feats: although the feats differ, the body has no difference. Just as all tiles are made relying on clay: although the tiles differ, the substance of the earth is without difference. Birth-and-death relies on the tathāgatagarbha; the tathāgatagarbha produces birth-and-death: this is called a skillful explanation. Because of worldly conventional speech, there is birth-and-death; it is not that the essence of the tathāgatagarbha has birth or death. By metaphor, it is like waves relying on water; water then produces waves: because of the conditions of wind there are waves, yet the substance of water does not have waves. By metaphor, it is like gold ornaments: although the various ornaments differ, the substance of gold has no difference; they are all the identical gold. All ordinary persons and sages differ and are not the same, yet all are the one garbha. Second, buddhadhātu is also explained both doctrinally and metaphorically. Buddhadhātu is the cause for all ordinary persons and sages; all ordinary persons and sages grow and develop from buddhadhātu. The explanation by metaphor: by metaphor, it is like milk being the cause of curd; all curds grow and develop depending on milk, being of one similar kind. The 'Future Buddha': all evil members of the fourfold assembly and the like, though currently practicing wrong good actions, will all become buddhas. The 'Buddha of Conceiving as Buddha': one conceives of all sentient beings with the conception of them being buddhas. Second, the universal, true, and universal, correct Buddhadharma: regardless of whether a wrongful person studies it, they also attain truth and correctness; if a correct person studies it, they also attain truth and correctness. Why? The essence of the tathāgatagarbha and buddhadhātu is exclusively a universal teaching, exclusively a true teaching, in which no demonic evil can enter; therefore, regardless of whether one is a wrongful person or a correct person, both attain truth and correctness. Third, the Buddhadharma without name and without characteristics, which has two kinds: first, the essence of all sentient beings is the tathāgatagarbha, but because they do not yet have the name of a true Buddha, it is called 'without name'. Because they do not yet have the thirty-two marks of a true Buddha, it is called 'without characteristics'. Second, the essence of all sentient beings of the six destinies is solely the tathāgatagarbha, having no other distinct name or distinct characteristic; therefore it is called 'without name and without characteristics'. Fourth, the Buddhadharma that uproots the root of all views, which has two kinds: first, all tathāgatagarbhas entirely possess the noble nature; because one merely reveres their essence and does not see their evil, wrong, or right, it is therefore called the Buddhadharma that uproots the root of all views. Second, for all sentient beings of the six destinies, their essence is the tathāgatagarbha and there is no other distinct phenomenon; because one solely reveres them as the four kinds of buddhas, etc., and does not see the good or evil of the six destinies, it is therefore called the Buddhadharma that uproots the root of all views. Fifth, the Buddhadharma that completely cuts off all paths of language: for all sentient beings, one merely reveres their essence and does not speak of designations such as good or evil, or the six destinies; therefore it is called the Buddhadharma that completely cuts off all paths of language. Sixth, the Buddhadharma of one person and one practice: 'one person' means that oneself is exclusively an evil person; 'one practice' is as the Lotus Sūtra says, Bodhisattva Sadāparibhūta practiced only one practice: toward anyone other than oneself, one only reveres them as the Tathāgatagarbha Buddha, Buddhadhātu Buddha, Future Buddha, and Buddha of Conceiving as Buddha; therefore it is called 'one practice'. Seventh, the Buddhadharma of no person and no practice: oneself and other, all sentient beings, are equally one identical tathāgatagarbha, having no distinct essence; therefore it is called the Buddhadharma of no person and no practice. Eighth, the Buddhadharma of the five kinds of non-interference and exhaustion, which has two [aspects]: First, if one wishes to practice these five phenomena, one must only maintain equilibrium: 1. Non-interference between self and other: not for one's own sake, and not associating back and forth with wrongful or good monastics and laity. 2. Non-interference between the close and the distant: not associating back and forth with those who do not study the Buddhadharma appropriate to their capacity. 3. Non-interference between monastics and laity: not associating in friendship back and forth with any wrongful or good monastics or laity. 4. Non-interference between the noble and the base: not associating back and forth with any noble or base. 5. Non-interference between ordinary persons and sages: within all sages there are many demonic evils, and within all ordinary persons there are many buddhas and bodhisattvas; ordinary persons, being born blind, cannot distinguish them; therefore ordinary persons and sages do not interfere. Only excepting circumstances of difficulty in begging for food where one temporarily associates back and forth—this is not within the restriction. Second, both self and other are the tathāgatagarbha; one should only produce one single contemplation, and must not form notions in one's mind of self and other, close and distant, monastic and laity, noble and base, or ordinary and sage. Within these eight subsections there are further two meanings: first, the Buddhadharma of sentient beings born blind, born deaf, and born mute; second, the Buddhadharma of dead persons. What is the second meaning of acknowledging wickedness? Answer: The second section, acknowledging wickedness, contains twelve kinds: 1. One's mind is inverted and constantly mistaken, constantly engaging in words of slander: if the mind directs toward the third level of Buddhadharma and beyond, forming any other mind, that is being inverted and constantly mistaken. The mouth may only speak the Buddhadharma of the tathāgatagarbha; if it produces any other speech, that is constantly engaging in words of slander. 2. The two inversions of good and evil, which has two [aspects]: First, all demonic evils assume the forms of buddhas and bodhisattvas to invert sentient beings; according with their original greedy mind, within them they see only goodness and do not know they are demonic evils. Demonic evils are not buddhas or bodhisattvas; seeing goodness where there is no goodness is called an inversion. Second, all buddhas and bodhisattvas manifest as various kinds of sentient beings; if they go against the minds of inverted sentient beings, anger will certainly arise in their minds and they will see only evil. Buddhas and bodhisattvas are truly not evil; seeing evil where there is no evil is called an inversion. 3. The four kinds of internal and external inversions, which has two [aspects]: First, wrongful greed: in all circumstances pleasing to the feelings, one sees purely goodness—seeing goodness where there is no goodness, seeing much goodness in small goodness, subsuming evil with good and interpreting all as good—therefore it is called an inversion. Wrongful anger: in circumstances displeasing to the feelings, one sees purely evil—seeing evil where there is no evil, seeing much evil in small evil, subsuming good with evil and interpreting all as evil—therefore it is called an inversion. Wrongful delusion: being unaware of obtaining evil within good, and not knowing that one loses good within evil—therefore this is called the inversion of wrongful delusion. Second, spirits, ghosts, and demons assisting the mind: whenever all buddhas, bodhisattvas, and worldly monastics and laity accord with one's mind, that is spirits, ghosts, and demons assisting the mind. 4. All sūtras, vinayas, and treatises constantly speaking purely of inversion: whenever all scriptural texts speak solely of inverted sentient beings as evil and do not speak of them as good, this is called all sūtras, vinayas, and treatises constantly speaking purely of inversion. 5. The seven kinds of distinct evil inversions: First, the three levels, called the third level. Second, the three determinations: the determination of correctness, the indeterminate, and the determination of wrongfulness.

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