華嚴經明法品內立三寶章 2
English (machine translation) 2
- Language
- English
2.1
Authored by the Śramaṇa Fazang of the West Temple in the State of Wei
2.2
Chapter on the Dependent Origination of the Dharmadhātu; Chapter on the Round Voice; Chapter on the Dharmakāya; Chapter on the Ten Periods; Chapter on the Profound Meaning (The above seven sections have not yet been incorporated into the commentary).
2.3
Chapter on the Dependent Origination of the Dharmadhātu
2.4
Now, the dependent origination of the dharmadhātu is unobstructed in containing and sustaining; like Indra's net covering all, like celestial pearls mutually reflecting, perfectly interpenetrating and sovereign, boundless and difficult to name. In brief, its essentials are indicated through four gates: (1) the gate of the mutual conditionality of dependent origination; (2) the gate of the interpenetration of dharma-nature; (3) the gate of the dual manifestation of conditions and nature; (4) the gate of the non-separation of principle and phenomena.
2.5
First, regarding the gate of the mutual conditionality of dependent origination, within it there are in detail three gates: (1) the gate of the mutual difference of the various conditions, which is different essence; (2) the gate of the mutual correspondence of the various conditions, which is identical essence; (3) the gate of unobstructed correspondence and difference, which dual-clarifies identity and difference. Within each of these three gates there are three meanings: (1) the meaning of mutual reliance and sustaining, with force and without force, through which mutual interpenetration is attained; (2) the meaning of mutual shaping and depriving, with essence and without essence, through which mutual identification is attained; (3) the meaning of the dual interpenetration of essence and function, existence and non-existence, through which identification and interpenetration are simultaneous and sovereign.
2.6
First, regarding the gate of the mutual difference of dependent origination: within the boundless, great dependent origination, when the various conditions are viewed in relation to one another, their essences and functions are distinct and do not intermingle; hence they are said to be different. As for the meaning of reliance and sustaining: the one can sustain the many; the one has force, and therefore can gather the many. Because the many rely on the one, the many are without force, and therefore implicitly enter the one. Thus there is no one that does not contain the many, because none cannot sustain; there is no many that does not enter the one, because none cannot rely on the one. Just as it is when the many rely on the one's sustaining, so it is when the one relies on the many's sustaining. Therefore there is also no many that does not gather the one, and there is also no one that does not enter the many. Thus, when looking from the one to the many, there are sustaining and relying, complete force and no force, and therefore there are the capacity to gather and the capacity to enter without obstruction. When looking from the many to the one, there are relying and sustaining, no force and complete force, and therefore there are the capacity to enter and the capacity to gather, also without obstruction. That the two propositions of both preserved and both eliminated are unobstructed should also be contemplated accordingly. The meaning of mutual interpenetration is concluded. Second, regarding the various conditions mutually depriving, with essence and without essence: the many conditions lack self-nature and are established by the one; therefore, the many are identical to the one. Because the one has essence, it can gather the many; because the many lack self-nature, they implicitly identify with the one. Thus there is no one that is not the many, and there is no many that is not the one. That the one lacks self-nature and is established by the many, and that the many have one emptiness which is identical to the many, is also like this. Therefore, looking from the one to the many, because there are having essence and lacking essence, it can gather the other into identity with oneself, and abolish oneself into identity with the other, without obstruction. Looking from the many to the one, having no essence and having essence can also abolish oneself into identity with the other, and gather the other into identity with oneself, also without obstruction. Also identifying with other and self, also identifying with self and other; neither identifying with other and self, nor identifying with self and other: that these two propositions are unobstructed, perfectly interpenetrating and sovereign, can be seen upon contemplating it. The meaning of mutual identification is concluded. Third, regarding the gate of the dual interpenetration of essence and function, existence and non-existence, there are six propositions: (1) Because essence is never without function, when essence is completely brought forth it is fully function; that is, there is only function and no essence, having only mutual interpenetration and no mutual identification. (2) Because function is never without essence, when function is completely brought forth it reverts to essence; that is, there is only essence and no function, having only mutual identification and no mutual interpenetration. (3) Function that reverts to essence does not obstruct its function; essence that is fully function does not lose its essence. Therefore, essence and function both remain without obstructing one another; that is, there are both interpenetration and identification without obstruction, melted and sovereign. (4) The essence of that which is fully function is eliminated as essence; the function of that which is fully essence vanishes as function. Then essence and function interpenetrate, and shaping and depriving render both negated; identification and interpenetration share the same source, perfectly interpenetrating into one flavor. (5) Combining the preceding four propositions, they are the same dependent origination, unobstructed and co-existing. (6) Eliminating the preceding five propositions, it is absolute and beyond speech; one should cast off emotional notions and contemplate and encompass in accordance with principle. The gate of different essences in dependent origination is concluded.
2.7
Second, regarding the gate of the mutual correspondence of the various conditions: among the multitude of conditions, because one condition corresponds to many conditions, each condition completely becomes that one for those many; therefore, this one possesses multiple ones. However, although these multiple ones arise from the original one corresponding to many conditions, their essence is not different from the original one; therefore, this is called the gate of identical essence. As for the meaning of reliance, sustaining, containing, and entering: this original one has force and can sustain those multiple ones, and therefore the original one contains those multiple ones. The multiple ones are without force and rely on the original one, and therefore the multiple ones enter into the original one. Thus there is no original one that does not contain the multiple ones, and there is no multiple ones that do not enter the original one. Just as it is with the original one having force to sustain and the multiple ones lacking force and relying, so containing and entering are thus; so it is with the multiple ones having force to sustain and the original one lacking force and relying, containing and entering are also thus. Thus there are no multiple ones that do not contain the original one, and there is no original one that does not enter the multiple ones. Thus, looking from the original one to the multiple ones, there are sustaining and relying, having force and lacking force, and therefore it can contain and can enter without obstruction. Looking from the multiple ones to the original one, there are relying and sustaining, lacking force and having force, and therefore they can enter and can contain, also without obstruction. That the two propositions of both preserved and both eliminated are unobstructed should also be contemplated accordingly. The meaning of containing and entering in the gate of identical essence is concluded. Second, regarding mutual shaping and depriving, with essence and without essence: the multiple ones lack self-nature, and being established as multiple ones by the original one, their entire essence is just the original one. Thus the original one has essence and can gather the multiple ones; the multiple ones lack essence and merge into identity with the original one. Therefore, there is no original one that does not gather the multiple ones, and there is no multiple ones that are not identical to the original one. Just as it is with the original one having essence and the multiple ones lacking essence, gathering and identification being thus; so it is with the multiple ones having essence and the original one lacking essence, gathering and identification being also thus. Therefore, there are also no multiple ones that do not gather the original one, and there is no original one that is not identical to the multiple ones. Thus, looking from the original one to the multiple ones, because there are having essence and lacking essence, it can gather the other into identity with oneself and abolish oneself into identity with the other, without obstruction. Looking from the multiple ones to the original one, having essence and lacking essence, gathering and identification can also be known. That the two propositions of both gathering and not gathering, both identifying and not identifying; neither gathering nor not gathering, neither identifying nor not identifying are unobstructed can be seen upon contemplating it. The meaning of mutual identification in the gate of identical essence is concluded. Third, regarding essence and function both interpenetrating, with identification and interpenetration unobstructed: this also has six unobstructed propositions; following the previous [explanation], it can be seen upon contemplating it. The gate of identical essence is concluded.
2.8
Third, regarding unobstructed correspondence and difference, the gate that dual-clarifies identical essence and different essence: because these two gates are the same dependent origination and are not separate from each other. If there were no different essence, then the various conditions would be chaotic and mixed, and it would not be dependent origination; if there were no identical essence, the conditions would not support one another, and it would also not be dependent origination. Only by not being mixed do they support one another. Therefore, if it were not identical essence, there would be no different essence; if it were not different essence, there would be no identical essence. Therefore, comprehensively clarifying it also has four propositions: (1) Either the entire essence is completely different, possessing both interpenetration and identification. (2) Or the entire essence is identical, also possessing both interpenetration and identification, because phenomena interpenetrate and each completely gathers [the others]. (3) Or both, because identity and difference are unobstructed and dual-manifest before one. (4) Or neither, because through mutual depriving both are exhausted, and thus both are negated. The remaining [aspects] such as interpenetration and identification should be known by contemplating accordingly. The first gate above, the mutual conditionality of dependent origination, is concluded (the rest has not yet been composed).
2.9
Chapter on the Round Voice
2.10
The meaning of the round voice is differentiated briefly into four gates: (1) adducing the meaning; (2) determining and selecting; (3) harmonizing contradictions; (4) analyzing and explaining.
2.11
In the first [gate] there are two: (1) It means that the Tathāgata can expound all distinct phenomena with a single voice: namely, those with much lust hear the Tathāgata expound the contemplation of impurity, and so on up to all things; therefore it is called the round voice. Hence the Avataṃsaka says: "The Tathāgata within a single speech expounds a boundless ocean of sūtras." (2) It means that the single voice of the Tathāgata can identify with all distinct sounds of speech; that is, the various sentient beings each hear the Tathāgata speaking only their own language. Hence the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: "The linguistic conventions of all sentient beings / Are expounded in a single word without remainder."
2.12
Second, concerning the critical determination: Some say that within a single vocal action the Tathāgata emits the speech and sounds of all sentient beings, and therefore causes those sentient beings each to hear their own language. This does not mean that the Tathāgata only emits a single sound; rather, simply because the vocal action is identical, it is called 'a single sound,' and because what is emitted is manifold, it is called 'the round voice.' Others say that the Tathāgata emits only one pure Brahmā-sound, which is called 'a single sound'; this can act as a sovereign condition (adhipati-pratyaya) for sentient beings, causing the resonance and comprehension that they produce to differ, and is therefore called 'the round voice'—not that the Tathāgata has several sounds. Still others say that the Tathāgata has only one quiescent, liberated sound that is free of characteristics, which is called 'a single sound.' Yet through the power of sentient beings' capacity and receptivity, they naturally hear the Tathāgata's various speech sounds, which is therefore called 'the round voice'—not that the Tathāgata's voice is either one or many. Question: Between these three explanations above, what is sound and what is flawed? Answer: If one selectively grasps them in isolation, all three are flawed. Why? The first explanation only has multiplicity and lacks the single sound. The next only has a single speech and lacks multiple sounds. The last only has non-cognition and lacks the meaning of voice. As for the true meaning, the three explanations unite into the single meaning of the round voice. Why? If those multiple sounds were not identical with the single sound, this would merely be multiple sounds and not the meaning of 'round.' Because those multiple sounds are identical with the single sound, they are completely fused and unobstructed, and are called the round voice. If that single sound were not identical with all [sounds], it would merely be a single sound and not the Brahmā-sound. Because that single sound is identical with multiple sounds, it is completely interfused and unobstructed, and is called the single Brahmā-sound. If these sounds were not identical with the lack of intrinsic nature and congruent with the ultimate reality, they would be conceptual grasping and not the Tathāgata's voice. Because those sounds and the like are free of fabrication, lack intrinsic nature, and are like an echo, the Dharma-conch constantly resounds, while the wondrous voice is ever quiescent.
2.13
Third, concerning the resolution of contradictions: As it is stated in the seventy-ninth fascicle of the *Vibhāṣā*, the World-Honoured One at one time spoke the four truths for the four heavenly kings first using the noble tongue (āryabhāṣā); two kings understood, and two could not understand. Out of compassion and for their benefit, the World-Honoured One spoke the four truths in the vernacular of the borderlands of South India; of the two heavenly kings, one understood and one did not understand. The World-Honoured One, having compassion, spoke the four noble truths in each of the barbarian (mleccha) languages, whereupon all four heavenly kings came to understand. Question: If diverse types understand through a single sound, why did the latter two heavenly kings not understand together [at first]? Answer: That treatise explains: The inclinations of those four heavenly kings were different; to fulfill their wishes, the Buddha therefore spoke differently. Furthermore, the World-Honoured One wished to demonstrate that he could skillfully comprehend all languages, in order to sever their doubts. Furthermore, there are those to be transformed who receive transformation relying on the Buddha's unaltering form and speech; there are also those to be transformed who receive transformation relying on the Buddha's altering form and speech. For those who receive transformation relying on the Buddha's unaltering form and speech, if he were to alter form and speech to preach the Dharma for them, they would not be able to understand—as it is said that when the Buddha was in Magadha, in order to liberate Chijian, he walked twelve yojanas on foot, and seventy thousand sentient beings all saw the truth, and so forth. For those who receive transformation relying on the Buddha's altering form and speech, if he did not alter form and speech to preach the Dharma for them, they would not be able to understand. Therefore, the World-Honoured One used three kinds of speech to preach the Dharma for the four kings. Based on the above three explanations, the principle can be harmonized; they all stem from differences in what sentient beings are suited to hear, and so there is no contradiction.
2.14
Fourth, concerning the analytical exposition, there are two [parts]: first, clarifying the scope; second, revealing the benefits.
2.15
Under the first, the Buddha's single word and sound pervades all—meaning all places, all times, and all dharmas. For those whose faculties are ripe, none fails to hear it, no matter how distant; for those whose faculties are not yet ripe, they do not hear it though they are near. As for 'pervading all places,' as in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*, Maudgalyāyana sought the sound, and the extremely distant was as if near. Second, pervading all times means that this round voice extends to the end of the future limit and has never rested. Third, pervading all dharmas means that there is not a single dharma that is not proclaimed by the round voice. Fourth, pervading all sentient beings means that with this round voice, there is no faculty or vessel that is not awakened. If so, why was Śāriputra seated there as if deaf and hearing nothing? Explanation: It is not that the round voice only reaches where it is heard; it also reaches these places where it is not heard, and is therefore called all-pervading. Question: If it is all-pervading, how can it form the inflections and expressions of vocal speech? If it were so, what would be the fault? Both would have faults. Why? If it were equally pervasive, it would lose vocal inflection; if it preserved inflection, it would not be equally pervasive. Now we explain: If on account of equal pervasion it lost vocal inflection, it would be round but not voice; if on account of inflection it went against equal pervasion, it would be voice but not round. Now, without destroying inflection it equally pervades, and without moving from pervasion it varies its melodies; this is called the Tathāgata's round voice, which is not a realm accessible to mental consciousness and deliberation.
2.16
Second, regarding benefits: If one relies on the Hīnayāna, the Tathāgata's vocal sounds do not necessarily all have benefit, as when the Buddha asked Ānanda about rain from the sky and the like, which are not subsumed under the sounds of the wheel of Dharma. If in the Mahāyāna and the like, none of the worldly vocal sounds emitted by the Tathāgata fails to accomplish great benefit; as when the Buddha entered the city chanting the call for almsfood, causing the whole city to hear it together and all obtain benefit. Thus the sūtra says: 'The sounds, speech, deportment, moving, and resting of all Buddhas are nothing other than Buddha-work.'
2.17
Chapter on the Dharmakāya
2.18
The meaning of the dharmakāya is differentiated into four gates:
2.19
First, explaining the name: *Dharma* means holding to a standard; *kāya* (body) means basis. Thus the Dharma is the body; it is also called the svabhāvakāya (own-nature body).
2.20
Second, its essential nature briefly has ten kinds: 1. Relying on the *Buddhabhūmyupadeśa*, it takes only the illuminated tathatā, the pure dharmadhātu, as its nature, while the remaining four wisdoms and the like belong to the saṃbhoga[-kāya] and nirmāṇa[-kāya]. 2. Or it is treated purely in terms of wisdom, as in Asvabhāva's *Mahāyānasaṃgraha[-upanibandhana]*, because it takes stainless, unobstructed wisdom as the dharmakāya, meaning freedom from the two hindrances. The various masters explain: this is termed dharmakāya in terms of subsuming the objective realm into the mind, not that the dharmakāya is wisdom and not principle. Now we explain: Since all dharmas are already identical with tathatā, how much more so this true wisdom—how could it not be tathatā? Since it is already tathatā, why wait to subsume the objective realm? 3. It is both wisdom and objective realm, as the Liang translation of the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* says: 'Only tathatā and the wisdom of tathatā existing alone are called the dharmakāya.' 4. Objective realm and wisdom are both obliterated, as a sūtra says: 'The Tathāgata's dharmakāya is neither mind nor objective realm.' 5. The above four propositions combine into a single unobstructed dharmakāya; whichever one speaks is acceptable. 6. The above five propositions of the general and the distinct interfuse and cancel each other out, obliterating these five explanations, thoroughly unattached, constituting the dharmakāya. The above is distinguished solely in terms of objective realm and wisdom. 7. It comprehensively subsumes the five aggregates [of the unconditioned] and the virtuous qualities of Dharma practice such as compassion and vows; none are not gathered into this dharmakāya, because qualities generated through cultivation must realize principle. They interfuse and subsume without obstruction, as explained above regarding wisdom. 8. It comprehensively gathers the physical marks and virtuous qualities of the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa [bodies]; none are not gathered into this dharmakāya, and therefore in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* the thirty-two marks and the like are all subsumed into the dharmakāya. There are three meanings: first, because the marks are identical with tathatā, they return to the dharmakāya of principle; second, because they are manifested by wisdom, they belong to the dharmakāya of wisdom; third, their actual characteristics are all qualities of Dharma, and so it is called the dharmakāya. 9. Because it comprehensively subsumes all three realms, sentient beings and the insentient vessel are nothing other than the Buddha; because the one great dharmakāya is endowed with the ten Buddhas, the three bodies and the like are all present within this, being subsumed under the wisdom-fully-enlightened. 10. Uniting the previous nine into one general proposition: this is called the meaning of the Tathāgata's unobstructed, sovereign dharmakāya.
2.21
Third, specifying the causes: There are four. The first is the illuminating cause (jñāpaka-hetu), because it illuminates and manifests the fundamentally existent dharma of tathatā. The second is the productive cause (kāraka-hetu), because it generates and brings forth through cultivation supreme qualities. The third is the unobstructed cause of generation and illumination, because generation and illumination are mutually identical, and the two fruits are not different. The fourth is taking all these supreme qualities as the basis-cause, with the manifestation of functions in imprint to capacities being the resulting fruit.
2.22
Fourth, its activities and functions also have four: 1. This dharmakāya of principle serves as what is awakened by the various contemplative wisdoms; as the sūtra says, 'The dharmakāya expounds the Dharma because it confers meaning.' 2. Relying on this, it gives rise to the saṃbhoga and nirmāṇa [bodies] to benefit sentient beings, because it is a supreme activity and function. 3. Or it manifests as trees and the like, secretly gathering and transforming [beings]. 4. It pervades all dust motes, hair tips, and other places, an activity and function of manifold sovereignty and non-obstruction.
2.23
Chapter on the Ten Periods
2.24
The meaning of the ten periods comprises two gates:
2.25
First, the establishment: For example, among dharmas in the past period, the time before they have ceased is called the past-present; looking further back into the past, that past is called the past-past; looking toward the present now, this has not yet occurred, and therefore the now is called the past-future. This set of three periods is entirely within the past. Again, after those have ceased and the present dharmas arise, the time before they have ceased is called the present-present; looking toward that past, because it has already ceased and is non-existent, that is called the present-past; looking toward the future, because it has not yet occurred, it is called the present-future. This set of three is entirely within the present. Again, after those dharmas have ceased and the future dharmas arise, the time before they have ceased is called the future-present; looking toward that present, because it has already ceased and is non-existent, it is called the future-past; looking further toward the future, because it has also not yet occurred, it is called the future-future. This set of three is entirely within the future. Among these nine, the three presents are each existent, while the six pasts and futures are all non-existent. Question: If three periods are established in each of the past and future, and since the past and future are each boundless, these three periods would also be boundless—why speak of only nine in three tiers? Answer: Even if one wished to establish further [periods] in the past and future, they would not differ from the previous gateway, and so there are only nine. Moreover, these nine periods are completely subsumed in a single thought-moment, yet the nine periods remain distinctly arrayed. Thus, discussing the general and the distinct together constitutes the ten periods.
2.26
Second, mutual subsumption comprises two gates: first, mutual identification; second, mutual interpenetration. The establishment of these two is due to two principles: first, the principle of the mutual interdependence of dependent origination; second, the principle of the complete interfusion of the dharma-nature.
2.27
First, as for mutual reliance in dependent origination: take, for instance, a phenomenon of the past present. Before it has ceased, it is of itself present. But when viewed from the perspective of the present present, it is the past of the present. Therefore, that phenomenon is both present and past; because the perspectives differ, they do not contradict one another. Again, a phenomenon of the present present is of itself present, because it has not yet ceased; yet when viewed from the perspective of the past present, it is the future of the past; and when viewed from the perspective of the future present, it is further the past of the future. Therefore, that phenomenon is both present and past-and-future. Again, a phenomenon of the future present is both present and future, which can be understood by analogy. Moreover, among these nine [times], the three present times certainly do not arise simultaneously, nor do the six times of past and future [arise simultaneously]; [yet] one present and two past-and-futures—these three definitely can be simultaneous. Therefore, among the nine, according to what is appropriate, there is concealment and manifestation, on account of their being simultaneous or non-simultaneous. First, regarding the simultaneous: because the past past is non-existent, it allows the phenomenon of the past present to exist. Why is this? If that [past past] did not cease, this [past present] could not exist. Again, because the past present exists, it makes the past past non-existent, because if this did not exist, that would have no cessation. Again, because the past present exists, it makes the past future non-existent, because that [past present] having not yet ceased makes this [past future] not yet exist. Again, because this past future is non-existent, it establishes that past present as existent, because if this were to exist, that would have already ceased; therefore, because this does not yet exist, that is able not yet to have ceased. Again, because the past past is non-existent, it makes the past future non-existent: that is, if that were not non-existent, this present would not be established as existent; if the present were not established as existent, this future would not be established as non-existent; therefore, this non-existence depends, through reciprocal conditioning, upon that non-existence. Again, because the past future is non-existent, it makes the past past non-existent; consider this by reversing the above. Just as the three times of the past have these six senses of mutual reliance, it can be understood that the present and the future each also have six.
2.28
Second, regarding the non-simultaneous, there are two aspects. First, mutual reliance through manifestation also has six senses: that is, because the past present exists, only then does it allow the present present to become existent. Why? Because if that did not exist, there would be no phenomenon that could cease and arrive at this current existence. Again, because the present present exists, only then do we know that the past present is existent, because if this did not exist, that existence would not be established. Why? If this existence were absent, it would cause that existence not to cease into non-existence; and an existence that does not cease is not an existence of dependent origination, so it would not be established as an existence. The present present with respect to the future present also has two senses, which should be considered by analogy with the above. The past present with respect to the future present also has two senses: namely, if the past present did not exist, then the existence of the future present would not be established; the reverse should also be understood by analogy. Question: What is simultaneous can rely on each other, but how can what is not simultaneous rely on each other? Answer: What is simultaneous relies on each other overtly; what is not simultaneous relies on each other covertly. This is also reciprocal mutual reliance, because if there were no non-simultaneous, the simultaneous could not be established. Therefore, these nine times are summarized into five positions and possess these ten gates: 1. As for the past past, it is solely a single cessation, merely past, because it is the past belonging to the present. 2. As for the past present, it has two gates: namely, it is of itself present within the past position; and viewed from the present, it is past; therefore, this phenomenon is both present and past, and because the perspectives differ, they do not obstruct each other. 3. As for the past future, it has three gates: first, viewed from the past present, this does not yet exist, so it is the future belonging to the past; second, because it is currently arising from present conditions and has not yet ceased, it is the present present; third, viewed from the future present, this has already ceased, so it is the past of the future. Therefore, this present present is both present and past-and-future. 4. The future present also has two gates. 5. The future future has only one gate. All can be understood by analogy. The above successive mutual reliance has these nine gates. Tenth, non-adjacent mutual reliance: that is, if there were not the first, there would not be the subsequent one, etc. Therefore, because of successive and non-adjacent unobstructed mutual reliance, based on this principle, it causes the various gates to mutually interpenetrate and mutually identify, as the sūtra says: 'Placing all kalpas of the past into the future and present, and turning around all kalpas of the future to place them into the past age'—this is what it means. Generally speaking, discussing the meaning of mutual reliance has two gates: 1. In terms of power and function: that is, if this were absent, that would not be established, yet this is not that; thus, because they mutually subsume through power and function, one can speak of interpenetration; yet because their essences are not commingled, they are not mutually identical. 2. In terms of essential nature: that is, if this were absent, that would entirely fail to be established; hence this is identical to that; therefore, in terms of essence, they are spoken of as mutually identifying. The explanation of these two gates is as explained elsewhere. Therefore, without losing their original positions, there is no lack of identification and interpenetration; this can be seen upon reflection. When the sūtra says, 'Countless, measureless kalpas can be made into the duration of a single thought-moment,' and so on, it is this meaning.
2.29
Second, the gate of the interpenetration of the dharma-nature: however, time in these nine times has no separate essence; it is merely conventionally established upon the phenomena of dependent origination. These phenomena of dependent origination, again, lack intrinsic nature and are established based on the real. Therefore, the interpenetration and unobstructedness of principle and phenomena in dependent origination has four levels: 1. eliminating characteristics so that both are entirely exhausted; 2. co-existing together with characteristics; 3. mutually subsuming by following one another; 4. mutually identifying as being each other. In the first, taking the root to follow the branch, there are only phenomena and no principle; taking the branch to return to the root, the reverse can be understood from the above. When the sūtra says, 'Non-kalpas enter kalpas, and kalpas enter non-kalpas,' this is the meaning. In the second, the principle that is entirely phenomena is not phenomena, and the phenomena that are entirely principle are not principle; thus both exist without commingling. When the sūtra states, 'The various kalpas mutually identify without destroying the original kalpas,' this is the meaning. In the third, because principle conforms to phenomena, the whole of one phenomenon can contain all; because phenomena conform to principle, all phenomena follow principle to enter into the one. The reverse of the above is that the one enters into all, which can be understood. In the fourth, because phenomena are identical to principle, the entirety of the one is identical to all; because principle is identical to phenomena, the entirety of all is identical to the one. Therefore, principle alone cannot be identified with or entered into, and phenomena alone cannot be identified with or entered into; it requires principle and phenomena to conform to each other and be mutually identified; therefore there is identification and interpenetration. Because temporal kalpas rely on this unobstructed dharma, they likewise follow this dharma in freely identifying and interpenetrating; the remaining meanings can be understood upon reflection.
2.30
Chapter on the Profound Meaning
2.31
1. Unobstructedness of dependent origination; 2. Dependent origination of defilement and purity; 3. Distinguishing principle from deluded sentiments; 4. Remedies for illness; 5. Divisions and non-existence of principle and phenomena; 6. Causes of causes and effects of effects; 7. Unobstructedness of the two truths; 8. True and false mind and objects; 9. Transforming agents and those transformed; 10. Expedient means for entering the Path.
2.32
Gate One: Unobstructedness of Dependent Origination
2.33
Question: How can the harmonious integration and unobstructedness of the various phenomena of dependent origination be seen? Answer: Now, in explaining this meaning, two gates are made: 1. unfolding the meanings into harmonious integration; 2. determining the count of propositions.
2.34
First, within the unfolding, there are three sets of four propositions:
2.35
1. The gate of emptiness and non-emptiness: that is, all are empty, without the slightest characteristic, because dependent origination lacks intrinsic nature and false characteristics are exhausted. Or, all are not empty, because emptiness is the various phenomena, because it is not the non-existence spoken of by deluded sentiment, and because it is not different from form and so forth. Or, the two meanings are unobstructed; or, both gates are entirely eliminated. All can be understood by analogy.
2.36
2. The gate of presence and absence within each other: that is, either all enter into the one, because the one lacks intrinsic nature, taking dharma-nature as the one. Furthermore, since all phenomena are identical to dharma-nature, therefore all are together within the one without being identical to each other. Or, they are not present in the one: that is, because of lacking intrinsic nature, one and many are transcended; because their existence is not destroyed, they are mutually uncommingled; though constantly interpenetrating, they abide in their own positions. Or, both: that is, subtle mutual interpenetration is constantly outside; being ten thousand miles distant, they are constantly present within each other; mutual presence and absence are a single phenomenon, on account of unobstructedness. Or, neither: that is, because entering and emerging are integrated, transcending the two characteristics, there is neither presence nor absence, yet this phenomenon remains difficult to name. Just as all entering into one possesses these four propositions, one entering into all should also be considered by analogy.
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3. The gate of mutual identity and non-identity: either all is identical to the one. This has two gates: (1) In terms of nature: as the sūtra says, 'If a person wishes to accomplish Buddhahood, let them not destroy craving; all phenomena are identical to craving; knowing this, one immediately accomplishes Buddhahood.' The intention of this sūtra is that craving is identical to having no nature, hence it cannot be destroyed. That all phenomena are identical to craving means they are identical to the principle of craving's lack of intrinsic nature. If it were not so, how could craving be the essence of all phenomena? Therefore, one should know that it mentions the name 'craving' while taking the reality of craving. (2) In terms of phenomena: within this there are two, beginning and culmination. 'Beginning' means that the dharmadhātu does not exist separately; rather, it takes all phenomena as identical to the dharmadhātu to be the dharmadhātu; a single phenomenon does not exist separately; rather, it takes the dharmadhātu as identical to a single phenomenon to be a single phenomenon. Therefore, all phenomena are identical to a single phenomenon. 'Culmination' means that since the dharmadhātu's being entirely identical to a single phenomenon is taken to be a single phenomenon, therefore this one is identical to all, and all phenomena are identical to the one. Question: If in terms of the nature of principle, since one and many are both transcended, then there is nothing to identify with; if in terms of phenomenal characteristics, persons and phenomena diverge from each other, how can there be identification? If in terms of phenomena there is identification, that destroys the phenomena, which contradicts the conventional; if in terms of principle there is identification, that contradicts the ultimate. If one mentions phenomena while taking principle, then it does not differ from the previous gate—how could it be further distinguished? Answer: It is precisely because of these two meanings that mutual identification is possible. Why? If it were phenomena without principle, it could not be identified; if it were principle without phenomena, there would be nothing to identify. Now, because principle and phenomena are non-dual yet dual—that is, principle that is identical to phenomena is only then true principle, so that phenomena wholly identify with one another while true principle remains serene; and phenomena that are identical to principle are only then illusory phenomena, so that they constantly identify with one another while the myriad images proliferate—truly because principle and phenomena identify with each other yet are not one, therefore the entirety of one and many mutually identify without commingling. Ponder this free of deluded sentiment. If you cling to words seeking understanding based on vague semblances, you will struggle all day without seeing it. Or, all is not identical to the one: that is, because their entire essences identify with each other without commingling, and without destroying the original phenomena—just as form is identical to emptiness without destroying form and so forth—understand this by analogy. Or, both: because the previous two meanings are completely and unobstructedly endowed. Or, neither: because the previous two meanings mutually delimit and displace each other, transcending the two characteristics, there is neither identity nor non-identity, yet this phenomenon remains. Just as all being identical to one has these four propositions, the four propositions of one being identical to all should be considered by analogy. The above three levels merge into a single domain, perfectly luminous and possessing all virtues, unobstructed and sovereign; this is called the gate of the dependent origination of the dharmadhātu. Reflect on it and you will know.
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Second, concerning the determination of the number of propositions, there are likewise three levels. First, regarding the mutual identity and non-mutual-identity of the one and the many, there are overall four sets of four propositions: 1. Because the one is identical to the many, it is called 'one'; 2. Because the one is identical to the many, it is 'not one'; 3. Because the one is identical to the many, it is 'both one and not one'; 4. Because the one is identical to the many, it is 'neither one nor not-one'. The many being identical to the one should be understood accordingly. The second set: 1. Because the one is not identical to the many, it is called 'one'; 2. Because the one is not identical to the many, it is 'not one'; 3. Because the one is not identical to the many, it is 'both one and not one'; 4. Because the one is identical to the many, it is 'neither one nor not-one'. The many not being identical to the one should be understood accordingly. The third set: 1. Because the one is not identical to the many, it is called 'one'; 2. Because the one is identical to the many, it is 'not one'; 3. Because it is both identical and not identical, it is 'both one and not one'; 4. Because it is neither identical nor not identical, it is 'neither one nor not-one'. The many being identical to the one should be understood accordingly. The fourth set: 1. Because the one is identical to the many, it is called 'one'; 2. Because the one is not many, it is 'not one'; 3. Because both [apply], 'both [one and not one]'; 4. Because neither applies, 'neither [one nor not one]'. The many and the one should also be understood accordingly. Therefore, in the above, there are sixteen propositions in direct order and sixteen in reverse order, making thirty-two propositions in all. Second, regarding presence and absence, there are likewise thirty-two propositions. Third, regarding emptiness and non-emptiness, there are likewise thirty-two propositions. Therefore, together there are ninety-six propositions. Furthermore, if the three levels interpenetrate, there are three sets of four propositions: 1. either solely emptiness and non-emptiness, or solely identity and non-identity, or both, or neither; 2. either solely presence and absence, or solely emptiness and non-emptiness, or solely neither, etc.; 3. either solely identity and non-identity, or solely presence and absence, etc. The four propositions should be understood accordingly. Therefore, three times four makes twelve propositions, which, combined with the preceding ninety-six, make a total of one hundred and eight doctrinal propositions.
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Second: The Gate of the Dependent Origination of Defilement and Purity
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Question: Are the defilement of sentient beings and the purity of the Three Jewels both delusional, or are they also not delusional? Answer: Each of these two has four propositions. Sentient beings are delusional because they are falsely conceptualized to exist; sentient beings are not delusional because they constitute vessels of the Dharma. These two are in terms of function. Sentient beings are delusional by virtue of the preceding two propositions; sentient beings are not delusional because delusion is identical to emptiness and the nature of tathatā is fully complete. The Three Jewels are delusional because they are grasped as existent by delusional conceptualization, as a sūtra states: 'Sentient beings forcibly conceptualize, making a Buddha to deliver sentient beings,' and another sūtra states: 'If one understands the real, there is no Buddha and no bodhi,' and so on. Second, the Three Jewels are not delusional because they are able to remedy delusion, as a sūtra states: 'Because they can be severed by the wisdom of Buddha-bodhi.' Third, the Three Jewels are delusional because they are established by virtue of remedying delusion—for when there is no delusion, there is no truth—as a treatise states: 'It is merely according to what sentient beings see and hear to obtain benefit' that it is spoken of as function. Fourth, the Three Jewels are not delusional because their entire essence is truth and they are perpetually of a single characteristic, as a sūtra states: 'Because the Three Jewels are of a single taste.'
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Third: The Gate of Distinguishing Principle from Deluded Sentiment
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Question: What is the difference between true emptiness and nihilistic emptiness? Answer: Briefly, there are four distinctions: 1. In terms of the objective realm: true emptiness is not different from form and so forth, and is called the emptiness of the principle of phenomena; nihilistic emptiness lies outside form and so forth, or is an emptiness only upon the annihilation of form, and is called annihilatory emptiness. 2. In terms of the mind: true emptiness is attained by noble wisdom, differing in inference and realization; nihilistic emptiness is attained by deluded sentiment, known by worldly people. 3. In terms of virtue and function: contemplating and penetrating true emptiness inevitably subdues and eradicates afflictions, brings about supreme practice, and allows entry into spiritual stages and attainment of the fruit; if one conditions one's thought on nihilistic emptiness, it becomes the view of annihilation, augments evil destinies, causes entry into the stages of tīrthikas, and brings downfall into bad destinies. A sūtra says: 'Better to give rise to a view of existence as large as Mount Sumeru than to give rise to a view of emptiness as small as a mustard seed.' A treatise says: 'If one again perceives emptiness, the Buddhas cannot transform him,' and so forth. Moreover, because true emptiness is identical to form, it cannot be grasped through nihilistic emptiness; therefore, true emptiness is inconceivable. Nihilistic emptiness is not so, which should be understood by inverting the above. 4. In terms of distinguishing difference through pairing: Question: Since form and so forth are identical to true emptiness, why alone is nihilistic emptiness not true? Answer: If nihilistic emptiness were also identical to emptiness, there would actually be no difference; it is only because it arbitrarily borrows the name of emptiness that it is distinguished here. We briefly formulate four propositions: 1. Form and nihilistic emptiness are not mutually identical, because both are objects of attachment, like seeing humans, animals, and so forth. 2. The emptiness that is identical with nihilistic emptiness and the emptiness that is identical with form are not different, because they are devoid of dual characteristics. 3. The true emptiness of form and nihilistic emptiness are not mutually identical, because sentiment and principle are different. Furthermore, the emptiness of nihilistic emptiness and form are not mutually identical, also because sentiment and principle are distinct. 4. Form as identical to emptiness and annihilation as identical to truth can be mutually identical, because principle is explained in dependence on verbal designation, and because things are harmonized in terms of phenomena. Just as these two gates possess these four propositions, all other phenomena are likewise when viewed mutually, which should be understood accordingly. Therefore, when the sūtra states that 'all phenomena are identical to greed,' it is because all phenomena, being identical to emptiness, are also identical to that greed which is identical to emptiness. Question: Since the phenomenon of greed is identical to emptiness, and anger and the like are also identical to emptiness, is the emptiness of anger and the like identical to the emptiness of greed, or is it still outside greed? Answer: It is entirely internal while remaining distinctly external; it is entirely external while being likewise internal, because of perfect interpenetration, because of lack of limitation, and because of unobstructedness. Question: Is it like the space inside a hall and the space inside a room, where because these two spaces have no limits and share a single taste, one says that the hall's space is identical to the room's space, whereas in reality the space in the hall is not contained within the room—is it like this? Answer: No. That is a worldly phenomenon and cannot be equated with this. According to that analogy, the room's space, without moving, is entirely within the hall, and the hall's is likewise; it is not that each penetrates the other and is thus called non-dual. Rather, it is because that space was originally this space that it is called non-dual. Since it is not a worldly phenomenon, it is difficult to explain. Comprehend its meaning and reflect upon it, and perhaps it may be perceived.
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Linked texts (1)
- 華嚴經明法品內立三寶章 — Classical Chinese