摩訶止觀 10.40

10.40

次約天竺諸見，空見最強，今寄之以論得失。夫空見為三：一、破因不破果，破果不破因；二、因果俱破，不破一切法；三、破因果及一切法。一切法即三無為也。第三外道與佛法何異？《大論》明大、小乘空，體、析為異。外道亦體、析，此云何異？外道從邪因緣、無因緣，若析、若體、若畢竟空。佛弟子知從愛因緣，若析、若體、若畢竟空。有人言：「破語非體。」今明《中論》首尾以破題品，破豈異體邪？故不約此分邪正、大小，但依《大論》析正因緣，異外道；體正因緣，異小乘。

Next, with regard to the various Indian views, the view of emptiness is the strongest; we now rely upon it to discuss strengths and shortcomings. The view of emptiness comprises three: first, refuting causes without refuting results, or refuting results without refuting causes; second, refuting both causes and results, but not refuting all phenomena; third, refuting causes, results, and all phenomena. 'All phenomena' refers to the three unconditioned states. How does this third [view of] tīrthikas differ from the Buddha-dharma? The Da zhidu lun explains that the emptinesses of the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna differ in terms of embodying [emptiness] and analyzing [to emptiness]. Tīrthikas also have embodying and analyzing; how does this differ? Tīrthikas proceed from perverse causes and conditions or uncaused conditions, whether analyzing, embodying, or through ultimate emptiness. Disciples of the Buddha know that [phenomena] arise from causes and conditions of craving, whether analyzing, embodying, or through ultimate emptiness. Some say: 'The language of refutation is not embodying [emptiness].' We now clarify that the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā from beginning to end uses refutation in the titles of its chapters; how could refutation be different from embodying [emptiness]? Therefore, one does not use this to distinguish correct from perverse, or great from small; one simply relies on the Da zhidu lun: analyzing correct causes and conditions differs from tīrthikas; embodying correct causes and conditions differs from the Hīnayāna.