宗鏡錄 46.3

Answer: For those who do not fathom the true nature of consciousness-only, erroneous attachments are exceedingly numerous. What the Mirror of the Source clarifies is precisely for this reason. As the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra states: "Furthermore, there are those who are confused and erroneous about the principle of consciousness-only: some cling to external objects as being non-existent just like consciousness; some cling to internal consciousness as being non-existent just like objects; some cling to the various consciousnesses as having distinct functions but the same substance; some cling to there being no separate mental factors apart from the mind." An ancient worthy says: "Some cling to external objects as being non-existent just like consciousness"—this refers to the Sarvāstivāda school, which, relying on the teaching of the twelve āyatanas, clings to both mind and objects as existing, claiming this to be the primary truth. The śāstra says: "Some cling to internal consciousness as being non-existent just like objects"—Explanation: this refutes Bhāviveka, who, relying on the teaching of emptiness with hidden intent, negates consciousness as also being non-existent. The śāstra says: "Some cling to the consciousnesses as having distinct functions but the same substance"—Explanation: this refers to a certain class of Mahāyāna bodhisattvas who say that the substance of the eight consciousnesses is only one, like a single water mirror producing many waves and reflections. The śāstra says: "Some cling to there being no separate mental factors apart from the mind"—Explanation: this is what is asserted by Dharmatrāta of the Sautrāntika, who, because the sūtras state that the six dhātus of a person and defilement and purity depend on the mind, holds there to be no mental factors; although there are mental factors within the skandhas, they are merely nominally posited in states upon consciousness and have no separate real existence. Great Master Ci'en, explaining Dharmapāla Bodhisattva's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiśāstra, broadly outlines four kinds: first, Bhāviveka and the Cārvākas, who hold there are objects but no mind; second, Middle Way Mahāyāna, which holds there is mind but no objects; third, many schools of the Hīnayāna, which hold there are both objects and mind; fourth, the single school of wrong view, which holds there are neither mind nor objects. Furthermore, distinguishing by four propositions: first, having the darśanabhāga but no nimittabhāga, meaning the Sammatīya masters, who do not form a nimittabhāga when cognizing objects; second, having the nimittabhāga but no darśanabhāga, meaning the master Bhāviveka; third, having both nimittabhāga and darśanabhāga, meaning the other schools, the Mahāyāna, etc.; fourth, having neither nimittabhāga nor darśanabhāga, meaning Sthiramati and others. The Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna states: Remedying erroneous attachments—all erroneous attachments depend on the view of self; if one is free from self, then there are no erroneous attachments. This view of self is of two kinds: what are the two? The first is the view of a personal self; the second is the view of a self in dharmas. The view of a personal self is explained as five kinds with respect to ordinary persons. What are the five? First, hearing sūtras say that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is ultimately tranquil like empty space, and because of not knowing this was said to destroy attachments, they then say that empty space is the nature of the Tathāgata. How is this remedied? By clarifying that the characteristic of empty space is a delusive phenomenon, its substance unreal; because it is juxtaposed with matter, there is this visible characteristic causing the mind to arise and cease. Since all material dharmas are fundamentally the mind and there is truly no external matter, if there is no matter, there is no characteristic of empty space. That is to say, all objects exist only because of the delusive arising of the mind; if the mind is free from delusive movement, then all objects cease, and there is only the one true mind, all-pervading. This is called the Tathāgata's vast nature-wisdom, the ultimate meaning, and is not like the characteristic of empty space. Second, hearing sūtras say that the dharmas of the world are ultimately empty of substance, up to the Dharma of nirvāṇa and tathatā being also ultimately empty, fundamentally empty of themselves from the beginning and free from all characteristics, and because of not knowing this was said to destroy attachments, they then say that the nature of tathatā and nirvāṇa is merely emptiness. How is this remedied? By clarifying that the intrinsic substance of the dharmakāya of tathatā is not empty, because it is replete with immeasurable virtues of nature. Third, hearing sūtras say that the Tathāgatagarbha has neither increase nor decrease and its substance is equipped with all dharmas of virtue, and because of not understanding, they then say that the Tathāgatagarbha has distinct characteristics of material and mental dharmas. How is this remedied? Because it is spoken of only in reliance on the meaning of tathatā; because of arising and ceasing, with defiled meaning, distinctions are spoken of through manifestation. Fourth, hearing sūtras say that all defiled dharmas of worldly saṃsāra exist in dependence on the Tathāgatagarbha and all dharmas are not separate from tathatā, and because of not understanding, they say that the intrinsic substance of the Tathāgatagarbha itself possesses all dharmas of worldly saṃsāra, etc. How is this remedied? Because from the beginning, the Tathāgatagarbha has only pure virtues exceeding the sands of the Ganges, which are not separate, not cut off, and not different from the meaning of tathatā; and defiled dharmas of kleśa exceeding the sands of the Ganges exist only delusively, fundamentally lacking nature of their own, and from beginningless time have never been associated with the Tathāgatagarbha. If the substance of the Tathāgatagarbha possessed delusive dharmas, and one could cause its realization to eternally end delusion, that would be impossible. Fifth, hearing sūtras say that in dependence on the Tathāgatagarbha there is saṃsāra, and in dependence on the Tathāgatagarbha one attains nirvāṇa, and because of not understanding, they say that sentient beings have a beginning; seeing a beginning, they furthermore hold that the nirvāṇa attained by the Tathāgata has an end, and one turns back into a sentient being. How is this remedied? Because the Tathāgatagarbha has neither a prior nor a posterior limit; the characteristic of avidyā is also without beginning. If one says that outside the three realms there is a first arising of sentient beings, that is the teaching of externalist scriptures. Furthermore, the Tathāgatagarbha has no posterior limit; the nirvāṇa attained by all Buddhas is associated with it, and therefore has no posterior limit. The view of a self in dharmas: in dependence on the dull faculties of the two vehicles, the Tathāgata only taught selflessness of persons for them; because the exposition was not ultimate, they see the arising and ceasing of the five skandhas, dread saṃsāra, and falsely grasp nirvāṇa. How is this remedied? Because the intrinsic nature of the five skandhas is unarisen, there is no cessation; they are fundamentally nirvāṇa. Furthermore, as for ultimately leaving erroneous attachments, one should know that defiled dharmas and pure dharmas are all mutually dependent, having no intrinsic characteristic that can be spoken of. Therefore, from the beginning, all dharmas are neither matter nor mind, neither wisdom nor consciousness, neither existent nor non-existent, ultimately inexpressible in their characteristics. That there is verbal explanation: one should know that the Tathāgata's skillful expedients provisionally employ verbal explanations to guide sentient beings; for those who grasp their purport, it is entirely to abandon conceptual thought and return to tathatā. Because thinking upon all dharmas causes the mind to arise and cease, one does not enter real wisdom. It is simply that failing to understand correct causes and conditions, they all become externalists. What is clung to has four types: first, not knowing the karma and conditions of sentient beings, they cling to this as the Way or cling to spontaneity; second, not knowing the kalpa of emptiness induced by shared karma, they cling to it as chaotic primordial energy.

Third, not knowing the kalpa of formation after the voidness, they grasp it as the two separations of the clear and the turbid. Fourth, not knowing that sentient beings of higher realms are born below, they grasp it as the transformations of heaven and earth. Thus one knows that the net of views is difficult to escape, and heterodox interpretations easily arise. As minutely investigated in the *Zhiguan*: Regarding observing the objects of various views, 'not one' is called 'various'; heterodox interpretation is called 'view'. Furthermore, to understand and know is the meaning of 'view'. Reason is improperly investigated, yet a biased view is distinct; forming a definitive understanding is termed a 'view'. Now, students of listening and learning memorize names and characteristics, forming interpretations aligned with the letter of the text. Their mind's eye does not open, completely lacking contemplation of principle. Those who rely on the letter survive, yet without realization they die. Now, practitioners of dhyāna only value contemplation of principle; encountering anything, their minds blend, yet they are dark regarding names and characteristics, not recognizing a single sentence. Those who recite the texts guard the stump; those who comprehend through sensibility attain wondrous awakening. Both sides are mutually deficient; upon critical examination, both are mistaken. Broadly speaking, there are three types of heterodox views: First, non-Buddhists outside the Buddha Dharma. Originally there were three: First, the Kapila non-Buddhists, translated here as 'Yellow-head', who assert that the effect exists within the cause. Second, the Ulūka [non-Buddhists], translated here as 'Xiuhou', who assert that the effect does not exist within the cause. Third, the Ṛṣabha [non-Buddhists], translated here as 'Asceticism', who assert that the effect both exists and does not exist within the cause. Furthermore, according to the *Introduction to the Mahāyāna*, what Kāla taught had the fault of asserting oneness: the agent and the action are one; the characteristic and that which possesses the characteristic are one; the part and that which possesses parts are one. Such views are called asserting oneness. Ulūka asserted difference; Kakuda asserted oneness and difference; Jñātiputra asserted neither oneness nor difference. All non-Buddhists, as well as Makkhali and others who assert difference, never depart from these four. Branching streams derived from these three or four non-Buddhist teachings. By the time the Buddha appeared in the world, there were six great masters: namely, Pūraṇa, of the Kāśyapa clan, who asserted neither arising nor cessation; Makkhali Gosāla, who asserted that the suffering and pleasure of sentient beings have no cause or condition, being spontaneously so; Sañjaya Vairāṭīputra, who asserted that sentient beings attain the Way when their time ripens, and that when the suffering of eighty thousand kalpas is exhausted, they spontaneously attain liberation—like a ball of thread that comes to rest on its own when the string is spent; Ajita Keśakambala—'kambala' meaning coarse garment—who asserted that the suffering of karmic retribution is substituted by throwing oneself from cliffs and pulling out one's hair; Kakuda Kātyāyana, who asserted both existence and non-existence; and Nirgrantha Jñātiputra, who asserted that what is produced by karma is definitively unalterable. Second, non-Buddhists附-attached to the Buddha Dharma: These originated with the Vātsīputrīyas and the Fangguang. Relying on their own cleverness, they read the Buddhist scriptures and treatises, yet generated a single view that arose by attaching itself to the Buddha Dharma; hence they received this name. The Vātsīputrīyas read Śāriputra's *Abhidharma* and personally formulated a distinct doctrine, saying that the self exists outside the four propositions, within a fifth, ineffable repository. What are the four propositions? Non-Buddhists assert: form is the self; there is a self apart from form; form is within the self; the self is within form. The other four aggregates are also like this, totaling twenty views of the self. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* states that destroying the twenty views of the self constitutes becoming a srotāpanna—this is precisely the meaning. Now the Vātsīputrīyas' assertion of a self is different from the six masters, yet is also not the Buddha Dharma. The treatises all examine and reject it; it is precisely the teaching of heterodox persons attached to the Buddha Dharma. Alternatively, it is said that the three times and unconditioned phenomena constitute the four propositions. Furthermore, the Daoists of the Fangguang, relying on their own cleverness, read the Buddha's ten metaphors and personally formulated the doctrine, saying that neither arising nor cessation is like an illusion, like a phantom, taking emptiness and illusion as their doctrine. Nāgārjuna rebuked this, saying it is not the principle of the Buddha Dharma; what the Fangguang produced is also the teaching of heterodox persons. Third, those who study the Buddha Dharma and turn into non-Buddhists: They grasp the teachings of the Buddha and generate kleśas, unable to enter the principle. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* states: 'If one does not attain the expedient means of prajñā, entering the *Abhidharma*, one immediately falls into existence; entering emptiness, one immediately falls into non-existence; entering the *Piṭaka* (*Bhelasaṃhitā* / *Peṭaka*), one falls into both existence and non-existence.' The *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* states: 'Grasping neither existence nor non-existence is called foolish discourse.' Inverting the grasp of the correct Dharma, it turns back into the teaching of heterodox persons. If one studies the four gates of the Mahāyāna, having lost the meaning of prajñā, one is burned by the fire of heterodox views, and all four become the teachings of heterodox persons. Even if, regarding the limbs of contemplation, one suddenly understands that avidyā is transformed into vidyā, and vidyā is endowed with all phenomena; or states that avidyā is unobtainable, transforming into vidyā—how could vidyā be obtained?—and this unobtainability is also endowed with all phenomena; or states that the vidyā of the dharmatā is both obtainable and unobtainable, neither obtainable nor unobtainable; one gate is precisely three gates, and three gates are precisely one gate—this understanding being sharp and piercing, where whatever is refuted is without exception destroyed, and whatever is posited is without exception established, with nothing able to surpass it, and one also personally calls this anutpattikadharmakṣānti—such an understanding is the arising of views concerning the four gates of the Perfect Teaching. Furthermore, when all four gates of the Mahāyāna turn into views, true speech becomes false because of giving rise to views on words; nirvāṇa becomes saṃsāra because of giving rise to greed and attachment. Taking too much amṛta harms life and causes premature death; losing the gate of expedient means, one falls into heterodox grasping, hence it is termed 'internal heterodox views'. Furthermore, in this land of Cīnasthāna, there are also such doctrines. Zhou Hongzheng, in explaining the three mysteries, said: The *Changes* determines the eight trigrams, yin and yang, good fortune and misfortune; this elucidates the mystery in terms of existence. Laozi's emptiness and harmonization elucidates the mystery in terms of non-existence. Zhuangzi's spontaneity elucidates the mystery in terms of both existence and non-existence. The branches and streams derived beyond these originally issued from here. For now, let us explain gain and loss based on this. As Zhuangzi says: 'Nobility and baseness, suffering and pleasure, right and wrong, gain and loss—all are spontaneous.' To speak of spontaneity does not refute the effect, but by not discerning prior karma, it refutes the cause. Ritual codes, humaneness, and righteousness protect the body and bring peace to the state; if not put into practice, one's clan is destroyed and one's family perishes. Simply establishing virtue in the present life without incurring retribution in future lives—this is refuting the effect without refuting the cause. If one says that blessing flows to future generations, combining this with the former, it is then that the effect both exists and does not exist. With respect to a single doctrine, there are three types of practice: first, asserting existence and practicing good; second, asserting existence and practicing evil; third, asserting existence and practicing the indeterminate. Dividing according to the mysterious principle, it should be thus: wealth and nobility cannot be aspired to or sought; poverty and lowliness cannot be resented or avoided. Life is not worth rejoicing over; why should death be feared? Taking this empty mind, let one who dwells in nobility not be arrogant.

Dwelling in poverty without depression, stopping the mind of greed and anger, remaining peaceful in one's embrace, instructing beings by means of spontaneity (ziran), and serving as an entryway into principle—such is its virtue. There are many kinds of virtue. If it is said, 'Always be desireless in order to observe its subtleties,' what kind of desire is absent? Disdaining jade rings, casting aside dukes and ministers, washing one's ears and leading back the ox, preserving one's own lofty aspirations—this is casting aside the desires of the desire realm and aspiring to the subtlety of ascending and transcending above; that is, taking the first dhyāna and so forth as subtle. How is this known? Zhuangzi says: 'The Yellow Emperor inquired about the Way and observed the spirit-breath, seeing all things within his body, and took this to be the Way.' This resembles developing the subtlety of the first dhyāna within the contemplation of comprehensive clarity (tongming guan). If it is said: 'The cause of all sufferings is rooted in covetous desire; if one is free from covetous desire, one attains nirvāṇa'—this is freedom from the desires of the three realms, attaining the subtlety of cessation, stopping, subtlety, and renunciation. Furthermore, phenomena are called 'undefiled'; if one is defiled by phenomena, this is being defiled by nirvāṇa. Without this defiling desire, one attains the subtlety of the Single Way. Making subtle all these desires, both desire and subtlety are entirely absent—what have you attained? You do not even understand the desires of the desire realm and the subtlety of the first dhyāna, how much less the subsequent desires and subtleties! If discussing this from the standpoint of provisional teachings, it is catering to capacities and gradually leading them, discussing desire and subtlety through veiled marks, unable to speak overtly and definitively. It merely puts to rest the desire for boasting and aspiring, observing the subtlety of spontaneity; when deceitful and flattering conduct is eliminated, the ethos of benevolence and deference remains. These are all instances of adhering to spontaneity and practicing goodness. Furthermore, adhering to spontaneity and giving free rein to impulse, neither directing oneself toward goodness nor stirring oneself to commit evil: if one harms the harmony of the spirit, one does not accord with spontaneity; although there is no grasping and rejecting, it is the performance of indeterminate [actions] (avyākṛta). When active karma is not exhausted, how can one doubt receiving retribution? If adhering to spontaneity leads to evil actions, claiming that all things are spontaneous and willfully committing evil because in the end it all returns to spontaneity, this is turning one's back on desirelessness to indulge in desires, violating the subtle to pursue the coarse. Just as Zhuang Zhou denounced benevolence and righteousness: although they prevent petty theft, unexpectedly the great thief seizes benevolence and righteousness to plot against his state. Originally, one was to use spontaneity to end desires, but instead one seizes spontaneity to do evil. This meaning is understandable. The adhering views of the heterodox traditions above and the inner tradition are twofold; both determine the true and the false. First, determining both with regard to the dharmas produced; second, determining both with regard to the dharmas relied upon. First, currently ranging broadly from the four propositions of the outer heterodoxies up to the heterodox views of the four gates of the perfect [teaching], and encompassing the Vedas up to the three stations of mindfulness and three liberations of the perfect gate: the terminology and numerical categories are identical, but the view-faults produced and the bonds incurred are no different—just like gold and iron chains. Again, from the four propositions of the heterodoxies up to the four views of the perfect gate: although the names are pure and fine, the kleśas produced are fundamentally defiled—just like the two unworked stones of jade and rat-stone. Again, from the four propositions of the heterodoxies up to the four views of the perfect gate: although all undergo smelting, there is success and failure—just like the milk of cows and donkeys. Again, from the four propositions of the heterodoxies up to the four views of the perfect gate: there is harm and non-harm—just like the kāraskara and tinduka fruits. The ātman posited by them is in fact a dharma of bondage, not an autonomous self. Each clings to its own as correct and considers others to be false speech, mutually arguing right and wrong; how does this relate to reality? They consider themselves the true path, yet turn around and open up the road of existence; hoping to attain nirvāṇa, they are just sinking into saṃsāra. They declare themselves to be accurate, yet in the end turn into perverse deviation. They generate love where there is attachment, and give rise to anger where there is repulsion. Although they give rise to compassion, it is merely the compassion of love and views. Although they endure anointing and dismemberment, it is merely the strained forbearance of arising and ceasing. Although called omniscient, it is worldly estimation. Although attaining supernatural powers, they are fundamental transformations, defiled transformations. The Vedas they read are spoken by worldly wisdom, not by the power of dhāraṇī, nor an outflow of the dharmadhātu. Although they sever the blunt proclivities, it is like an inchworm; treated by a worldly physician, once healed it breaks out again. The vast sea of the eighty-eight proclivities billows, and the suffering wheel of birth and death in the three realms is boundless. Sunk in the defiled, there is never a time of emergence. All are the illusory falsehoods of various views; how could they be the path of reality? Second, concerning the differences in the dharmas relied upon: all views each rely on their respective dharmas. The three outer heterodoxies are people with defilements (āsrava) who manifest defiled dharmas, and with a defiled mind cling to clinging-dharmas. Clinging-dharmas and clinging-minds are fundamentally contentious; not only at the time of causes do they grasp heads and pluck hairs, but having developed their views, they consider them nirvāṇa, and clinging to them forms views whose fierce poison increases strife. The dharmas relied upon are not true, and the views generated are also false. Although these are heterodox dharmas, if one secretly grasps the intent, entering the correct characteristics by means of heterodox characteristics—just as by flowers drifting and leaves fluttering, relying on a small condition one can even realize [the fruit of] a pratyekabuddha, how much more so with the ancient teachings of the world! Yet, although a pratyekabuddha is correct, the flowers and leaves are ultimately not the correct teaching. The outer heterodoxies have secret awakenings, but their doctrinal gates only lead to views, not the correct Dharma. All this is due to clinging minds clinging to clinging-dharmas; cause and fruit both involve contention and determination—this is heterodox dharmas generating heterodox views. If it is the four gates of the Tripiṭaka, these are the supermundane dharmas attained by supermundane noble ones, fundamentally pure, the place where kleśas are extinguished. Not only are the Buddha's sūtras the correct Dharma; what the five hundred [arhats] set forth can also attain the Way. The Miaoshengding jing states: 'One hundred years after the Buddha's passing, one hundred thousand people went forth, and ninety thousand attained the Way. At two hundred years, one hundred thousand people went forth, and ten thousand attained the Way.' You should know that with an unattached mind, not clinging to unattached dharmas, the initial resolve is genuine and correct, awakening to impermanence—arising and ceasing moment by moment, not guaranteeing the evening from the morning—resolutely seeking the essentials of liberation, not confining oneself to a gate to generate defilement and give rise to conceptual proliferation (prapañca). For example, if someone wishes to see the king quickly to receive rewards and appointment to office, entering through the four gates, what leisure has he to linger, dispute, and reckon fine and ugly? Knowing the gate is a thoroughfare, there is no need to dispute or calculate. Just as medicine is for curing disease and should not be differentiated, one quickly escapes the burning house to exhaust all extremes of suffering. When true illumination arises, one realizes the ultimate Way. Ultimately without contention: without contention there is no karma; without karma there is no birth and death; there is only the path and cessation; the mind-ground is calm and clear; causes and fruits are both absent; disputes and strife are both extinguished; there is only right view, with no wrong view. Furthermore, although the four gates are the correct Dharma,

If with an attached mind one clings to these four gates, then wrong views arise. Seeing differences among the four gates, when cultivating the cause one largely gives rise to disputes. It is like a person who stays long at a city gate, discriminating among the tiles and timber, judging their quality and coarseness, asserting that the south is right and the north wrong, or that the east is skillful and the west clumsy, causing delay for himself and refusing to advance. This is not the fault of the gate. The attached person is also like this: discriminating names and characteristics, knowing kleśas extensively, taking much to be the factors of awakening, seeking fame and gathering followers, hawking himself to gain advancement, beating his own big drum, erecting the banner of conceit, boasting to others, and mutually giving rise to disputes. Grabbing heads and pulling hair, the eighty-eight proclivities of aversion and attachment surge immensely. All this is due to an attached mind giving rise to wrong views toward the gates of the true Dharma; the kleśas aroused are no different from those of external non-Buddhists. But regarding the doctrines held, they are as distant as heaven and earth. The Vaipulya sūtras say: "Constantly asking about the bridge is reproved by the wise." People are also like this: for the sake of studying the path they cultivate these four gates, yet spend more than thirty years distinguishing a single gate without clarifying it; just as effort is applied, one is already old. Lacking the three kinds of flavor, one lives in vain and dies in vain, wasting a lifetime. What benefit is there, like that person asking about the bridge? This is because an attached mind clings to non-attached dharmas and gives rise to wrong views. Next, the four gates of the shared teaching are in substance the true Dharma, closely leading to the conjured city; the former were crooked while these are straight. Although the skillful and clumsy differ, there is no difference in the place to which they lead. It is like the celestial gate being straight and magnificent while the other gates are crooked and mean: by not staying in either gate, one can enter through both. If one counts the tiles and timber, both become delayed and obstructed. If one does not linger in the Dharma gates, whether in cause or in fruit, there is neither dispute nor attachment. This is called the non-attached mind not clinging to non-attached dharmas, so that wrong views do not arise. Furthermore, if with an attached mind one clings to this straight gate, wrong views also arise; or for the sake of fame, followers, supremacy, or profit, one discriminates the characteristics of the gates, so that the fetters of aversion, craving, and conceit arise because of it. It is like putting poison into good medicine: how could one not die? Because the poison of viewing and attachment enters the true Dharma, suffering and its origin increase; this is not the Tathāgata's fault. External non-Buddhists of sharp faculties enter the true characteristics by means of false characteristics, transforming attachment into non-attachment and becoming disciples of the Buddha. Those within the Buddhist teaching of dull faculties enter false characteristics by means of true characteristics, turning non-attachment into attachment and becoming disciples of falsehood. How lamentable! The four gates of the distinct and perfect teachings, whether skillful or clumsy, sharp or dull, all lead to ultimate nirvāṇa: because the cause is not clung to, the fruit has no disputes. If one fixes upon a gate and raises views, kleśas will arise, just as with Ulūka and the others. When viewed from this perspective, it is like a clear-sighted person standing by the Jing and Wei rivers: how could he be confused by names and fail to distinguish the clear from the turbid? The Fuxing ji explains: As for the two fetters of gold and iron, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "It is like being in prison, bound by shackles; even though pardoned, one is bound again with gold fetters. A person bound by craving is like being in prison; even though renouncing household life, he becomes attached to the monastic precepts, which is like being bound by gold fetters." Here this metaphor is borrowed for attachments arising within and without: the iron fetters in prison are like external doctrines; the gold fetters received after pardon are like internal doctrines. Although gold and iron differ, the meaning of being bound is equal; although the Buddha-Dharma is superior, being bound by views is no different. As for the two uncarved stones of jade and rat: a "pu" is an uncarved jade stone. The state of Zheng valued uncarved jade stones; if anyone obtained one, they gave him a generous reward. A man of Zhou heard of this and plotted for this generous reward. According to the customs of the people of Zhou, a dead rat was called an "uncarved jade stone" (pu). Thereupon he brought it to Zheng, and the people of Zheng laughed at him. Having realized his mistake, the man answered the people of Zheng: "The phoenix of the people of Chu was in fact a mountain pheasant. Because the King of Chu valued phoenixes, there was someone who did not recognize a phoenix. On the road was a man carrying a mountain pheasant; the person asked him, 'What bird is this?' The carrier, knowing he did not recognize it, joked, 'A phoenix.' The person took it to be real and asked the carrier, 'Is it for sale?' The carrier replied, 'It is for sale.' He asked, 'How much money?' The carrier replied, 'Ten thousand cash.' He bought it at that price, intending to present it to the king. Having obtained it, it immediately died. The King of Chu heard of this, felt ashamed, and summoned him to inquire; the king also believed it was real and rewarded him with one hundred thousand cash." Thus we know that the substances of Zhou and Zheng are eternally distinct as pure and defiled: non-attachment is like Zheng, and generating views is like Zhou. The names are the same but the substances differ: this is what it means. Possessing the names of the four gates from the Tripiṭaka up to the perfect teaching, the meaning is like uncarved jade; yet giving rise to views and craving is like a dead rat. As for the two milks of cow and donkey, the treatise also says: "Elsewhere there may be good words, but they also derive from the Buddhist sūtras. If they are not the Buddha-Dharma, upon first hearing they are good, but after a long time they are not marvelous. For example, with donkey milk, though its color is the same, churning it produces only dung." Therefore, the words of the Buddha-Dharma and external non-Buddhists both contain statements of non-killing and compassion; yet when one investigates their reality thoroughly, they all turn out to be false. Now this is also the case here: although external doctrines have words such as existence and nonexistence, when examined they have no reality and are entirely false. Although the sixteen gates of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna of the Buddha-Dharma speak of existence and nonexistence, they merely break the clinging mind and naturally return to the correct track; therefore it is said that there are accomplishment and non-accomplishment. Holding views toward the external is like donkey milk; holding views toward the Tripiṭaka and so forth is like cow milk. Although the name "milk" is the same, their substances are eternally distinct; although the names of the views are equal, what they grasp differs. Even if external teachings eliminate attachment, there is no principle to be accomplished; when the Tripiṭaka and so forth are freed from attachment, they naturally enter the correct track. Furthermore, the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "The Buddha's teaching is like cow milk: cultivating it to attain liberation is like churning it to obtain curds, fresh butter, clarified butter, and so on. The teaching of external non-Buddhists is like that donkey milk, which originally is not something that yields curd. The teaching of external non-Buddhists lacks the flavor of liberation; thus churning donkey milk produces only feces and urine. Relying on the practice of external teachings brings only bitter fruits and yields no accomplishment or benefit." As for the two fruits of kāla and tinduka, the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra says: "Good son, it is like a kāla forest where there are many trees, and only one tinduka tree. The two fruits resemble each other. When these fruits ripened, a woman gathered them all. The tinduka fruit was only one part, while the kālaka fruit was ten parts; the woman did not recognize them."

brought them to the market. Common fools, failing to recognize [the difference], bought the kālaka [fruits], and upon eating them, their lives ended. People of wisdom, having heard of this matter, asked this woman: 'From where did you get these fruits?' The woman pointed out the place. The people then said: 'That region has countless kālaka trees and only a single tinduka tree.' Having understood this, the people laughed and walked away. The sūtra uses this as an analogy for the pure and turbid assemblies of the saṅgha. Now it is borrowed as an analogy for internal views and external views: the two views share the same name, but have harm and lack of harm. If an external view arises, it preaches the absence of cause and effect, culminating in heretical non-existence. If an internal view arises, it still grasps what is explained in the Greater and Lesser [Vehicle] sūtras and treatises; the harm means damaging one's wholesome roots. Therefore one knows that sometimes names are identical while substances differ, so they must not be conflated; sometimes names differ while substances are identical, so they must be distinguished. Once the heretical and the correct are distinguished, jade and stone are instantly separated, preventing beginners from being confused and deeply benefiting later students. Furthermore, the Huayan yanyi states: 'The profound and wondrous [teachings] of Confucianism and Daoism in this land do not exceed the three profundities: the Book of Changes is the true profundity, Laozi is the vacuous profundity, and Zhuangzi is the discoursed profundity. Laozi's Daodejing says: "The Dao produces the One; the One produces the Two; the Two produces the Three; the Three produces the myriad things." The commentary says: "'The One' is the harmonious, tranquil qi. This means that the Dao stirs to produce the wondrous qi of harmony and tranquility; yet regarding the principle of generating things, it is not yet sufficient, so it further generates the yang qi. Yang qi cannot generate on its own, so it further generates the yin qi. By accumulating the One of harmonious qi, it is said that 'the One produces the Two.' By generating and accumulating the Two of yang qi, it is said that 'the Two produces the Three.' Yin and yang harbor conception, and the harmonious qi harmonizes them; only then are the myriad things abundantly brought to completion. Therefore it is said that 'the Three produces the myriad things.'" Just below it also says: "The myriad things shoulder the yin and embrace the yang, harmonizing them through the tranquil qi." All the above explains that the myriad things are naturally produced. The 'Great and Venerable Teacher' chapter of Zhuangzi says: "[The Dao] is prior to the Great Ultimate, yet is not high; it is beneath the six directions, yet is not deep. It was born before heaven and earth, yet does not count as long-lasting; it is elder to high antiquity, yet is not old." The commentary says: "This states that the Dao is nowhere absent. Therefore, in what is high, it is not high; in what is deep, it is not deep; in what is long-lasting, it is not long-lasting; in what is old, it is not old. It is nowhere absent, and wherever it is, it is nothing." It also says: "To know what Heaven does, and to know what humanity does..." The commentary says: "'Knowing what Heaven does' is nature (ziran)." The meaning is: wherever there is knowing and doing, all are doing by non-doing, hence they are nature. Now, concluding in judgment: if one takes nature to be the cause, this is the doctrine of annihilationism. This is Laozi's meaning: because the Dao produces the One, and the Dao is nature, he therefore takes it to be the cause; this is a false cause. Furthermore, if one maintains that the myriad things are produced naturally, this is Zhuangzi's meaning: the myriad things are natural, with nothing causing them to be so, hence called 'nature'—this is the absence of a cause. Like the blackness of a crow: this is a passage from Zhuangzi and the meaning in the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. The Book of Changes says: "One yin and one yang is called the Dao. The unfathomability of yin and yang is called the divine." The explanation says: "'One' means nothingness. Neither yin nor yang is what is called the Dao. That 'one' can be nothingness is because nothingness is vacuity and non-existence; empty space cannot be differentiated, it is solely one and nothing more; therefore 'one' is taken as nothingness. If there were an object, then there would be mutual comparison of this and that, having two and three, and it could not be one. When in yin, one does not see the efficacy of being yin; when in yang, one does not see the power of being yang. Naturally there are yin and yang, and naturally there is no contrivance; this is what is meant by the Dao." Now, concluding in judgment: if one considers that the transformations of yin and yang are able to produce, this is a false cause. Furthermore, 'one' being nothingness is the absence of a cause. If one posits that the One is vacuous nothingness and nature, then all are without a cause. Then, humans being born naturally, they should constantly give birth to humans without waiting for the manifold conditions such as father and mother; bodhi being produced naturally, then all karmic retributions would not be obtained through cultivation. Furthermore, the Book of Changes says: "Tranquil and unmoving, when stimulated it then penetrates throughout all causes under Heaven." The Record of Rites says: "Human beings are born tranquil; this is the nature of Heaven. Stirred by things to move, this is the desire of the nature." Later Confucians, all because the wordings are slightly similar and without examining what was originally established beforehand and afterward, ended up wishing to blend the three teachings together. Merely seeing that their words have slight similarities, how could they know that their meanings have great differences? From this one knows: if one does not enter the correct source, how can one know that words may be identical while meanings differ? If one has not clarified one's own eye, how can one perceive that names differ while substances are identical? Therefore, those who conform to words are deluded, and those who rely on the letter are confused. Fearing that they might confuse the great purport, this is recorded and shown. For example, when non-Buddhists speak of nature as the ultimate Dao, it does not constitute an expedient means and moreover destroys the correct cause. Buddhism also speaks of nature, and though it constitutes the correct teaching, it is still an antidote of the siddhāntas and is not yet the ultimate. Taking this as one example, the rest can be known. Furthermore, even if one's view transcends the four propositions, having just emerged from the simple four propositions, there are still the compound four propositions and the plenary four propositions. First, as for the simple four propositions: (1) existence, (2) non-existence, (3) both existence and non-existence, and (4) neither existence nor non-existence. As for the compound four propositions: (1) existence-existence and existence-non-existence, (2) non-existence-existence and non-existence-non-existence, (3) both-existence-and-non-existence-existence and both-existence-and-non-existence-non-existence, and (4) neither-existence-nor-non-existence-existence and neither-existence-nor-non-existence-non-existence. They are called 'compound' because within the four propositions, they all speak of existence and non-existence. As for the plenary four propositions, it is because each within the four propositions completely possesses all four. The first proposition of existence completely possessing four means: (1) existence-existence, (2) existence-non-existence, (3) existence-both-existence-and-non-existence, and (4) existence-neither-existence-nor-non-existence. Within the second proposition of non-existence completely possessing four: (1) non-existence-existence, (2) non-existence-non-existence, (3) non-existence-both-existence-and-non-existence, and (4) non-existence-neither-existence-nor-non-existence. The third proposition of both existence and non-existence completely possessing four: (1) both-existence-and-non-existence-existence, (2) both-existence-and-non-existence-non-existence, (3) both-existence-and-non-existence-both-existence-and-non-existence, and (4) both-existence-and-non-existence-neither-existence-nor-non-existence. The fourth proposition of neither existence nor non-existence completely possessing four: (1) neither-existence-nor-non-existence-existence, (2) neither-existence-nor-non-existence-non-existence, and (3) neither-existence-nor-non-existence-both-existence-and-non-existence.